今日综述:本日共全量采集并深度研判来自全球各大主流语系与核心地缘区域的 1 份权威报刊与学术特刊。
亚太及全球其他媒体 (Asia-Pacific & Global Others) - 《Harvard Business Review USA - 09.2026 - 10.2026.pdf》聪明公司正利用 AI 来简化决策流程:探讨 AI 工具如何通过生成与综合洞察来提升人类判断力,旨在简化企业的决策流程。 - 《Harvard Business Review USA - 09.2026 - 10.2026.pdf》股票期权与工作场所安全性的关系:研究显示为基层员工提供高于平均水平的股票期权可降低 7% 的受伤率,主因在于增强了员工留任率与协作精神。 - 《Harvard Business Review USA - 09.2026 - 10.2026.pdf》AI 智能体经理:新兴的角色需求:有效的 AI 智能体经理需具备深厚的领域专业知识而非单纯的技术资质,通过将业务逻辑转化为指令来塑造 AI 的意图与语气。
💡 各大报刊的报道脉络呈现出高度多维的地缘博弈、制度转型、社会痛感与前沿科学突破。读者可通过下方【今日跨报思想雷达总矩阵】快速把握各报最具穿透力的思想理论对话与生活世界痛感切入点,或在【全景报刊分卷】中按区域细读每份大报的具体文章精要、制度权力批判与理性情感辩证。
本矩阵自动系统汇编当日全球报刊最具穿透力的 【思想与文化深思切入点】 与 【生活世界痛感切入点】,为学者提供一站式理论对话与现象学经验索引:
聪明公司正利用 AI 来简化决策流程
暂无制度批判分析。
暂无情感辩证分析。
哈佛商业评论
聪明公司 正利用 AI 来简化 决策流程。
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新工具可以通过不懈地生成、评估和综合洞察,来提升人类的判断力。
Felipe A. Csaszar
僵化的变革计划往往会失败。一种更具实验性的方法可以建立势头——并增加成功的概率。
Evgeny Kaganer 和 Christoph Loch
竞争公司应当联手开拓市场,同时独立运作以占领市场。
Frank Nagle
HBR 员工 / AI
插画:DIMITRIS LADOPOULOS
哈佛商业评论 2026 年 9 月–10 月
5
2026 年 9 月– 10 月
“许多公司正在损害其长期增长的能力。”
“你应该在增长方面投入多少?”,第 104 页
76 组织 决策
协调 跨部门工作
新一代工具 可以连接各职能部门, 并减少拖慢公司 速度的摩擦。 Kris Johnson Ferreira 和 Jordan Tong
86 销售与营销
客户推荐的 力量
新研究表明, 它们是低成本增长的 关键来源。 Fred Reichheld, Jamie Cleghorn, 和 Wojtek Kokoszka
94 领导力
关系的 四个阶段
这种关系随时间而演变。 以下是如何成功应对 每个阶段的方法。 Claudius A. Hildebrand 和 Douglas L. Peterson
104 财务与 投资
增长方面 投入多少?
大多数公司在资本 配置上存在错误。 以下是正确做法。 Paul Blase 和 Paul Leinwand
6 哈佛商业评论
艺术作品:RYAN KOOPMANS 和 ALICE WEXELL
Su Misura
我们的可持续发展承诺
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新研究与 新兴洞察
15 理论
奖励并不 总能产生 更好的创意
为创意付费往往会 改变员工的 产出内容及其 创作数量。此外还包括: 自动续费促销如何 产生反作用,何时 不应向客户道歉, 频繁跳槽者的 秘密天赋,以及更多内容。
38 领导力
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HBR 对 Dan Schulman 的 访谈。 Adi Ignatius
10 编辑寄语
11 撰稿人
130 执行 摘要
焦点 在智能体时代 管理团队
26
请将它们视为 团队成员
Rahul Telang, Muhammad Zia Hydari, 和 Raja Iqbal
30
Suraj Srinivasan 和 Vivienne Wei
33
Joseph Fuller
35
Gabriele Rosani 等
经验
建议与灵感
115 管理自我
与隐藏的权力经纪人合作,利用非正式渠道以及其他策略。
Pamela Meyer
120 我们如何实现
这家印度公司正通过新平台、广泛培训、负责任的治理以及客户协作,确保生成式 AI 的快速采用。 C. Vijayakumar
125 案例研究
一家豪华汽车制造商评估一项允许客户在不承诺购买的情况下尝试多种车型的计划。 Varun Gupta 等
132 终身事业
8 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
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Whittier Trust 通常要求新客户关系至少拥有 1500万美元 在可上市证券。投资与财富管理服务由 Whittier Trust Company 和 The Whittier Trust Company of Nevada, Inc.(在此单独或共同称为“Whittier Trust”)提供,这两家公司是由封闭式控股公司 Whittier Holdings, Inc. (“WHI”) 全资拥有的州特许信托公司。本文件仅供参考,不旨在且不应被解释为投资、税务或法律建议。过往业绩不保证未来结果,且没有任何投资或财务规划策略能保证获利或防止损失。除某些偶然提及外,所有名称、人物和事件均为虚构。与任何真实人物(无论在世或已故)的相似之处纯属巧合。
编辑寄语
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战略制定一直以来都令人感到压力沉重。选项太多,风险太多。这就是为什么我们依赖于像迈克尔·波特(Michael Porter)的五力模型这样的框架——旨在简化一个顽固地抵制简化的过程。
问题不在于我们不够聪明。而在于我们的认知能力是有限的,正如密歇根大学罗斯商学院(Ross School of Business)的 Felipe Csaszar 在第 44 页的《AI 正在革新战略决策》中所写。在疲劳、政治因素或时间压力迫使做出决定之前,我们在规划周期中能在大脑中承载的可能性有限,能评估的替代方案也有限。即便在 AI 颠覆竞争环境之前,情况已是如此。而现在,战略在几何级数上变得更加复杂——为组织设定航向亦然。
Csaszar 的答案是:利用 AI,它可以放宽那些塑造领导者如何做出最重大决策的认知约束。在人类团队可能仅考虑少数几个选项的情况下,AI 可以生成并筛选数千个战略选项。它可以构建并持续更新关于市场、客户和竞争对手的丰富模型,这些模型比任何静态框架都要动态得多。而且,它可以在没有群体思维、等级制度和截止日期(这些因素往往会扭曲战略会议)的情况下,对想法进行压力测试并综合多元观点。
AI 正在成倍地增加威胁与机遇。而它可能也是我们应对这些挑战的最佳工具。
Amy Bernstein 总编辑
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一场探讨关于谎言的新研究的研讨会,激发了 Pamela Meyer 对欺骗科学的浓厚兴趣。Meyer 曾是一名欺诈调查员,现在她利用多年解码微妙行为线索的经验,帮助领导者学习如何“洞察局面”——她认为这是一项至关重要的技能,但几乎没有人正式地学习过。在本期文章中,作为该主题新书作者的 Meyer 解释了领导者如何能更准确地了解周围的人,并成为更有效的激励者。
115 在缺乏权威时行使影响力的五种方法

Felipe A. Csaszar 担任密歇根大学罗斯商学院战略领域主席,他最初学习的是计算机科学,这使他对组织产生了一种特殊的视角。“我开始将组织视为一种人工智能,”他说,“它不是一个人,但它的设计目标是表现得智能。”当大语言模型出现时,他不禁在想:AI 能做战略吗? 在本期文章中,他解释说答案是肯定的:AI 可以挑战假设,扩大公司考虑的选项,并构建更丰富的模型。
44 正在彻底改变战略决策

在开发旨在改善商业决策的算法时,Kris Johnson Ferreira 对一个困境产生了兴趣:组织很少能捕捉到 AI 的价值,因为人们要么过度信任这项技术,要么直接将其否定。这促使哈佛商学院副教授 Ferreira 与 Jordan Tong 共同研究人机协作。在本期中,他们认为,人们创造最大价值的方式并非用自己的判断取代 AI 的判断,而是贡献 AI 所缺乏的知识,并利用智能体系统来协调整个组织内部的信息和智能体输出。
76 智能体如何协调跨部门工作

Paul Blase 共同创立一家早期 初创公司的经历,使他深谙风险投资模型。Blase 发现,这些模型与他之前在一家咨询公司领导数据与分析实践期间所建议的大公司的增长投资实践截然不同。现在他是普华永道(PwC)增长平台的负责人,在本期中,他与合著者描述了一种系统化的方法来确定公司的最佳投资水平,该水平应与其背景及其所在行业的成熟度挂钩。
104 你应该在增长方面投入多少投资?

总部位于米兰的插画师 Antonio Sortino 从小就被创作艺术的冲动所驱动——他年轻时甚至尝试过涂鸦——但直到开始药剂师职业生涯后,他才找到全职从事艺术的勇气。“童年时期创造东西的需求太强烈,无法被忽视,”他说。在进入新职业 10 年后,Sortino 表示他特别喜欢绘制人物(正如他在本期插画中所做的那样),因为这提供了一个机会去捕捉人们在历史特定时刻独特的相貌、穿着和互动方式。
86 不要低估客户推荐的力量
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同样值得信赖的关于商业、战略、领导力以及加速变革的观点来源。
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新研究与新兴洞察
理论探讨
为创意付费往往会改变员工的产出内容及其创作数量。
许多公司经常尝试用一个简单的想法来推动创新:当员工产出创意成果时给予报酬。这种逻辑很简单:如果创新的员工能获得奖励,他们就会更加努力地提出更多且更好的想法。
但一项新研究表明,情况并非如此简单。激励措施可能会根据接收者的不同,将创新引导至截然不同的方向。在
插图:DEBORA SZPILMAN
15
ideaWatch
一项近期发表在《管理学杂志》(Journal of Management)上的研究中,中国人民大学的何文龙(Wenlong He)、佛罗里达国际大学的丹·普鲁德霍姆(Dan Prud'homme)、南洋理工大学的韩念辰(Nianchen Han)以及新加坡国立大学的黄肯尼斯(Kenneth Huang)探讨了公司为员工发明者引入财务奖励时会发生什么。这类计划在研发环境中很常见,即在申请或获得专利时给予员工奖金或其他奖励。包括 IBM、微软、苹果、谷歌、亚马逊和英特尔在内的各大公司都运行着正式的员工专利认可或发明者奖励计划。
为了了解奖励的影响,研究人员分析了中国上市公司的公司和专利数据,追踪了发明者在一段时间内的 2,376 项产出。他们对比了公司引入财务激励前后的表现,衡量了产出的专利数量,以及这些专利相对于现有技术的创新程度。
他们还试图了解每位发明者的专业知识。研究人员使用国际专利分类代码绘制了每位发明者工作的技术领域。工作范围局限在少数类别内的发明者被归类为“专家”;工作跨越多个领域的人员则被视为“通用型人才”。
你可能会认为财务奖励会推动所有人朝着同一个方向努力。但事实并非如此。研究人员发现,在激励措施引入后,专家产出了数量更多的创新专利。通用型人才增加的
专利产出数量甚至更多,但其专利的创新程度较低。
原因何在?研究人员表示,这是因为并非每个人对激励的反应都一样。人们会根据自己在专业社会身份中的自我认知做出反应。专家深植于紧密的专家社区(无论是在职场内部还是外部),在这些社区中,声誉是通过创造真正新颖的东西来建立的。通用型人才没有这种压力,因此当激励措施出现时,他们会产出更多容易实现的、渐进式的发明,以便快速从激励中获益。
“仅仅通过增加付费并不能获得更好的创新,”普鲁德霍姆说,“你必须将人们所看重的东西与你奖励的东西相对齐。”
对于管理者来说,在改进财务激励计划以驱动创新方面,有三个实际的启示:
使激励措施与你的创新目标相匹配。 在设计创新奖励计划之前,请明确目标。你是试图从系统中获取尽可能多的想法,还是主要在寻求更大的突破?许多公司犯的错误是试图通过同一种激励措施来同时获得这两种结果。
如果你只是想要更多想法,请为提交的想法或早期概念提供小额且频繁的奖励。如果你只想要突破,请创建一条单独的路径,将奖励与影响力挂钩,例如技术重要性或下游应用。寻求两种创新类型的公司可以同时提供这两条路径。
“如果你不将激励措施与目标相对齐,最终你可能会得到大量的活动,但未必能获得更好的创新,”普鲁德霍姆说。
根据员工的专业身份而非仅仅是其角色或头衔来管理你的员工队伍。 即使在针对创新目标量身定制激励措施时,公司仍需意识到不同的员工对激励的反应各异。识别公司内部的专家型人才(specialists)和通用型人才(generalists),因为相同的奖励结构可能会促使这两组人产生截然不同的行为。
一旦你清晰地看到了这种构成,你就可以预测员工队伍将如何响应你提供的奖励。员工倾向于产生符合其身份的受奖结果。专家型人才倾向于强调创造力,因为他们的
16
专业规范更看重原创性。相比之下,通用型人才则倾向于提高产出数量,因为他们受专业规范的约束较少,且对奖励所产生的直接激励反应更迅速。
“有效的创新管理需要考虑这些差异,而不是假设每个人都会采取相同的行动,”普鲁德霍姆(Prud’homme)说道。
设计让通用型人才与专家型人才协同工作的方式。 为了实现这种平衡,应将协作机制纳入创新流程。例如,你可以创建结构化的交接环节:通用型人才在早期生成并扩展想法,随后由专家型人才在想法推进之前对其进行压力测试和完善。或者,通用型人才和专家型人才可以在整个过程中共同协作,使专家型人才的质量标准影响想法的开发,而通用型人才则确保流程持续推进。
最后,注意随着时间的推移是否出现失衡。如果其中一组人开始占据主导地位,你将在产出中发现这一点。通用型人才过多,质量可能会下降;专家型人才过多,流程可能会放缓。根据你的创新目标,调整招聘目标或团队构成以保持平衡。
“如果你能处理好这一点,你就不必在‘更多想法’和‘更好想法’之间做选择,”普鲁德霍姆说道。“你可以构建一个两者兼顾的系统。” ▼
HBR Reprint F2605A
关于研究 “《发明者奖励、专业化与创新绩效》”(Inventor Rewards, Specialization, and Innovation Performance),作者:Wenlong He 等(《管理学杂志》 / Journal of Management, 2025)
“如果你奖励的是活跃度,你将获得更多想法;如果你奖励的是影响力,你将获得更好的想法。”
安德烈斯·阿里亚斯(Andres Arias)是亚马逊云科技(AWS)客户解决方案的高级经理。他与《哈佛商业评论》探讨了公司在尝试激励创新时会发生什么,为什么人们经常将产出(output)与成果(outcomes)混淆,以及领导者如何设计能够产生真实影响力而非仅仅是活跃度的计划。以下为对话的编辑摘录。
根据您的经验,财务激励是驱动了创新,还是仅仅增加了活跃度? 你会看到提交数量激增,但其中大多数缺乏充分的论证或缺乏复杂度。团队在优化如何赢得奖励,而不是如何解决问题。他们可能在一周内产生五个想法,挑选其中一个,将其润色到足以演示的程度,然后就结束了。
谁对激励的反应最积极:领域专家还是通用型人才? 他们的行为方式不同,但我不会说其中一组比另一组反应更好。专家可能会过度投入。他们会创造出技术上令人印象深刻,但比业务需求更复杂的东西。但正是这种本能,在真正关键的时刻能确保团队对质量保持诚实。
您能举一个成功的激励计划例子吗? 我们针对一个具体的业务问题运行了一个黑客松风格的计划。我们没有将其定义为“尽可能多地提出想法”,而是定义了明确的成果,包括改进一个特定的客户流程。我们组建了包含专家和通用型人才的跨职能团队,并给他们一个短暂的工作窗口。我们根据达成可行解决方案的速度、获得的知识以及活动后想法的可应用性来奖励团队。这些标准改变了人们处理问题的方式。他们不再试图给人留下深刻印象,而是开始尝试让方案真正可行。
管理者可以从这种方法中汲取什么教训? 有两条。第一,围绕明确的成果统一团队。这能让他们专注于解决问题,而不仅仅是产生想法。第二,让通用型人才和专家协同工作。在我们的黑客松中,专家带来了深度和技术专长,而通用型人才则帮助将这些工作与更大的问题联系起来,并确保方案具有实用性。但关键在于利用激励来保持他们的专注。如果你只是让他们随意发挥,你会得到很多不同的想法。当你将他们的工作锚定在对业务或客户至关重要的特定成果上时,这种方法才会奏效。他们能更好地协作,做出更明智的权衡,并交付有用的成果。
在意识到激励计划在驱动“错误”类型的创新后,您是否调整过该计划? 这并不总是一个正式的“我们重新设计了计划”的时刻,但当你注意到激励措施在推动错误的行为时,你就会意识到。我在整个行业中都见过这种情况:那些因产出而获得奖励的团队(例如交付了多少功能或关闭任务的速度有多快),会表现出很高的活跃度。每周都有进展,但没有多少真实的影响力。这会让人感到沮丧,因为人们觉得做了大量工作,却没能改变任何有意义的事情。通常在这种时候,人们才会意识到激励机制出了问题,需要更紧密地与成果挂钩。区别在于你奖励什么。如果你奖励活跃度,你将获得更多想法;如果你奖励影响力,你将获得更好的想法。 ▼
插画:JORI BOLTON
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ideaWatch
人员管理
随着越来越多的组织部署 AI,一些公司不仅仅是在推出工具;他们还在给自己的智能体命名,赋予其角色和绩效目标。但这种看似象征性的选择可能会改变管理人员监督工作和分配责任的方式。
2026 年 1 月,研究人员对来自美国、加拿大和欧盟各行业的 1,261 名人力资源和财务经理、总监及高管进行了调查。约三分之一的人表示,他们的领导已经将 称为“队友”或“员工”,23% 的人报告称,他们的组织已将 智能体列入组织架构图,并为其分配了正式角色。
为了观察这种框架如何影响行为,研究人员进行了一项实验,要求其中 813 名经理审核包含内置错误的文档(包括职位描述和预算报告)。他们有 20 分钟的时间尽可能多地审核报告,标记任何错误,并将重大问题上报给上级。所有经理看到的文档都相同。不同之处在于,他们被告知这些文档是由谁起草的:是一个 工具,是一个在组织架构图中被列为直接下属的 员工,还是一个身为直接下属的人类员工。
这种框架产生的影响相对较小,但有一个群体除外:那些已经在将 智能体列入组织架构图的公司工作的经理。在这些参与者中,将起草者描述为 员工而非 工具,降低了他们对自己判断的信心。他们发现的错误减少了约 18%,且更有可能将问题上报(可能性增加了 22%),即使他们被告知,如果请求不必要的额外审核将会受到处罚。当被问及谁应对错误负责时,如果 被定义为员工而非工具,这些经理分摊给自己的责任减少了约 9 个百分点,而分摊给 的责任增加了 8 个百分点。他们还将更多责任推给了团队成员和领导层。
研究人员表示,在将 智能体视为队友的组织中,经理们习惯于自己进行较少且不够仔细的检查。他们也更依赖他人来审核工作,并且在出现问题时更倾向于认为 应承担责任。
他们写道:“我们的研究结果表明, 智能体应该被视为其本质——软件自动化”,这需要人类承担问责,以将风险降至最低。
关于研究:“将 列入组织架构图:关于授权与监督的证据”,作者 Emma Wiles 等(工作论文,2026)
企业战略
人们在很大程度上关注技术消除或改变入门级工作的潜力,但它也在改变高管层的构成。当研究人员分析 2019 年至 2025, 年间一个具有代表性的全球样本(共 5,000 个公开的 C-Suite 职位)的职位描述时,他们发现,公司越来越多地增加新的且与技术更相关的高管角色。此外,政治和法律环境的变化促使公司将 DEI(多样性、公平性和包容性)职责并入核心业务职能,或将其完全逐步取消。
C-Suite 角色的相对变化(2019–2025)

来源:Russell Reynolds Associates
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一项新研究发现,美国公司新任命 CEO 的年龄有所上升,从 2000 年的平均 48 岁增加到 2023, 年的 55 岁,欧洲公司的 CEO 也有类似的增长。研究人员表示,这种转变并非由任期延长或延迟退休驱动。相反,越来越多的公司选择那些在不同公司和行业中担任过更多样化角色的领导者。——《顶层的老龄化》,作者 Valentin Kecht, Alessandro Lizzeri, 和 Farzad Saidi
招聘经理通常将频繁更换工作视为一个危险信号,认为这样的人无法承诺足够的任职时间,从而使入职培训的投入变得不值得。但一项新研究发现,那些经常更换雇主的人拥有宝贵的社交技巧,这使他们比其他新员工能更快地进入状态。
研究人员利用 2004 年至 2019 年间 8,693 名美国对冲基金经理的月度就业和绩效数据,追踪了基金经理加入新公司后的情况。与以往的研究一致,他们发现 72% 的跳槽在随后出现了绩效下滑,平均需要四个月才能恢复。
但这种下滑在每个人身上表现并不相同。与流动性较低的人(恢复时间为五个月)相比,此前公司变动次数较多的经理在初始阶段的下滑幅度较小,并在两个月内恢复到跳槽前的绩效水平。
研究人员认为,重复的过渡创造了一种关于如何在新环境中快速进入状态的可迁移知识。随着每一次变动,人们在练习观察潜规则、解读信号以及调整与同事协作的方式。随着时间的推移,这些技能变得更具通用性,有助于让下一次跳槽进行得更加顺利。
研究发现,当入职的社交和文化障碍较高时,这种优势最为明显,例如当经理加入一家地理位置遥远的公司,且现有员工任职时间较长(因此规范可能较不灵活)时。
研究人员指出,流动性较高的经理在整体绩效上并不更出色;他们只是在过渡本身方面表现更好,且能更快地吸收变动带来的冲击。尽管如此,招聘团队或许应该重新审视对“跳槽者”的看法,不再将其单纯视为逃离风险,而将其视为一种更罕见且更有用的资源:能够迅速掌握新组织运作门道的员工。
关于研究 《动起来,律动起来:增加先前的流动性有助于新进人员融入组织》(Movin' and Groovin' Increased Prior Mobility Facilitates Newcomers' Transitions into Organizations),作者:Rebecca R. Kehoe 和 F. Scott Bentley(《管理学会杂志》,2026)
许多公司认为,利用自动续费的试用期使订阅具有“粘性”是增加收入的一种简单方法。一项新实验表明,这种模式可能会阻碍积极的消费者进行订阅。
研究人员与一家欧洲大型数字报纸合作,该报纸在读者阅读完一定数量的免费文章后会设置付费墙。2018 年,超过 140 万 名触碰到付费墙的读者被随机展示两种优惠方案之一:一种是除非取消否则自动转为付费订阅的试用期,另一种是除非读者主动续费否则自动结束的试用期。随后,研究人员对每位读者的订阅情况和网站使用情况进行了大约 20 个月的追踪。
短期来看,自动续费确实提高了收入。在那些接受了

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向员工提供股票期权通常被视为建立忠诚度以及使激励机制与股东保持一致的一种方式。当你将这些期权扩展到基层员工时,还可以帮助提高工作场所的安全性。
研究人员将美国职业安全与健康管理局(OSHA)的受伤数据与 2002 年至 2011 年间代表 629 家公司的 20,160 个工作场所的薪酬数据进行了匹配。在涵盖零售、医药产品、运输和工业金属采矿等广泛行业的样本中,每个工作场所每年平均每 100 名员工发生约 6.6 起受伤事故。在控制了公司规模、季节性工人的使用情况、工作时长和资本密集度等因素后,研究人员发现,为正式员工提供高于平均水平股票期权的公司,其受伤率比提供平均水平股票期权的公司低 7%。
为了检验因果关系,研究人员研究了在新的联邦会计准则(FAS 123R)出台后发生了什么。该准则使得股票期权在公司的财务报表上看起来成本更高,促使许多公司削减了授予的期权。在准则出台前最频繁地使用基层员工期权的公司中,采用该准则后受伤率的上升幅度高于其他类似公司,这与“减少期权会导致安全性结果恶化”的观点一致。
研究人员列举了期权与安全性之间联系的两个原因:留任和协作。由于未行权的期权将员工的财富与公司绑定,且在员工离职时会被没收,因此它们可以降低人员流动率,而经验丰富的工人比新员工更不容易受伤。期权还将奖励与团队绩效挂钩,这鼓励同事在关键的安全任务中相互监督和支持。
对于领导者而言,其启示是将广泛的股票期权视为不仅仅是一项招聘福利。如果设计得当,它们可以降低人员流动率,加强同行问责,并提高安全性,尤其是在人员流动率高、难以监管且最容易发生受伤事故的业务环节。
关于研究 'Rank-and-File Employee Stock Options and Workplace Safety,' 作者:Yangyang Chen 等(《管理科学》,2025)
当公司提高价格时,通常会告诉客户这是因为成本上升或质量提高。一项新研究表明,另一种解释可能更能防止客户流失:是市场迫使我们这么做的。
研究人员在 2022 年和 2023 年与一家加拿大自助仓储供应商合作,以测试关于涨价的信息如何影响客户的真实行为。在研究中,1,626 名在供应商处使用服务满七个月的客户收到了涨价电子邮件。这些邮件采用了三种理由之一——成本、市场状况或质量提升。研究还包括了一组不提供理由的涨价信息,以及一组不涨价的对照组,以捕捉“自然”流失率。研究人员对这些客户的行为进行了为期八个月的跟踪。
不出所料,涨价导致整体流失率上升。价格未变时,约 33% 的客户离开;而价格上涨时,离开的比例上升至 44%。但所给出的理由至关重要。
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以市场状况为由的解释产生的流失率最低——与不提供理由相比,客户离开的可能性降低了约 30%。而成本和质量方面的理由平均而言并未降低流失率。
研究人员认为,这是因为涨价信函不仅会引发对公平性的担忧,还会塑造客户对其选择的认知。例如,当引用市场状况时,它传递的信息是“祝你在目前能轻松找到替代方案”,这迫使人们留在原地。在实地数据中,市场类信息在附近替代方案较少的客户中效果最好。在随后的在线实验中,同样的市场理由增加了人们认为替代方案匮乏的感觉。
质量方面的理由则更为复杂。在针对北美参与者的在线测试中,“我们正在改进产品”这一信息提升了感知价值和公平感。但在实地应用中,反应出现了分歧。它对某些客户有效,而对另一些客户则产生了反作用,平均下来没有带来收益。
研究人员指出,他们的发现最适用于持续性购买,即切换成本昂贵或繁琐的情况。对于这类群体,一个明确的基于市场的解释可以通过提醒客户他们可能没有更好的选择,从而缓冲涨价带来的冲击。
关于研究 《缓冲冲击:减少应对涨价通知的客户流失》,作者为 Hoorsana Damavandi, Kersi D. Antia, 和 Praveen K. Kopalle(《营销杂志》,2026)
你可能认为客户服务的首要原则是在出现问题时道歉。但如果客户还没有注意到问题,这种本能实际上可能会损害满意度、信任度和营收。
在一项针对美国大型食品配送平台的实地实验中,研究人员考察了公司在出现小故障(食品延迟送达时间少于 15 分钟)时道歉会发生什么。对于部分客户,工作人员遵循公司的惯例,提前打电话解释延迟并道歉。对于其他客户,工作人员没有联系他们,订单只是稍微晚了一点送达。
研究人员发现,在接下来的 90 天里,收到道歉的客户再次下单的可能性较低。在那些回访的客户中,他们的重复下单次数更少,回访周期更长,且总消费金额低于没有收到道歉的同类客户。他们还报告称,对此次体验的满意度较低,对服务提供商的信任度较低,推荐该公司的意愿也较弱。
几项后续实验帮助解释了原因:道歉不仅让人们更容易注意到服务的某些方面未达标(例如,实际送达时间与最初的预估时间不符),还引导他们将这种偏差解读为一次“失败”。随后,消费者降低了对服务质量和公司能力的评价。
研究人员表示,公司应区分两种情况:一种是客户几乎肯定会注意到失败的情况(如错过航班、货物丢失、订单从未送达);另一种是客户可能没有意识到发生了失败的情况。在前者中,及时的道歉仍然是可取的。在后者中,与其提醒客户一个他们可能从未察觉的“失败”,不如简单地发送一条更新信息或保持沉默,这样可能更为明智。 ▼
关于研究 “道歉总是最佳策略吗?当消费者未意识到失败时,针对服务失败的道歉会产生反作用”,作者为 Mason R. Jenkins, Paul W. Fombelle, 和 Mary Steffel(《消费者研究杂志》,2026)
由 HBR 编辑编译 / 其中部分文章此前以不同形式发表在 HBR.ORG 上。
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亚瑟·C·布鲁克斯 (ARTHUR C. BROOKS), 哈佛大学教授及 畅销书作家
《领导者的幸福重启》(The Leader's Happiness Reset) 是由 HBR 和亚瑟·C·布鲁克斯提供的 关于在工作中寻找幸福(为你自己 和你的团队)的免费六周时事通讯。
《领导者的 幸福重启》
挑战
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若要成功扩展 AI 智能体,请将它们视为团队成员
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2
若要在 AI Era, 繁荣发展,公司需要智能体经理
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3
为 AI 智能体制定入职计划
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团队协作使用 AI 并非易事。这三种实践可以提供帮助。
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J. Studios / Getty Images
这些文章选自 HBR.org。
哈佛商业评论 2026年9月-10月
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作者:RAHUL TELANG, MUHAMMAD ZIA HYDARI, 以及 RAJA IQBAL
想象一个熟悉的场景:一名供应商向你的领导团队演示一个新的生成式 AI 智能体。效果令人印象深刻。
该智能体能够对支持工单进行分诊,更新客户记录,起草提案并将其路由至审批环节。
演示过程流畅无碍。随后,有人问道:“我们多久能将其部署到整个企业中?”
这个问题反映了在软件即服务(SaaS)时代引导企业软件采用的假设:首先,大多数工具可以通过相对较少的定制进行配置、设置和规模化;其次,如果集成成功且员工采用了该产品,那么部署在很大程度上就是一个实施项目。智能体 (Agentic )打破了这一模式。
与传统软件不同, 智能体旨在跨系统进行推理、规划并采取行动。一旦智能体能够更改记录系统——例如更新价格、发送付款或修改客户数据——它就不再是一个生产力工具,而成为了组织运营模式的一部分。
最重要的是,它引入了新类别的风险。狭义的生成式 工具(如 ChatGPT)产生的是内容风险:它可能会“说”错某些事情。而智能体 产生的是执行风险:它可能会“做”错某些事情。
基于我们作为研究人员(Rahul 和 Zia)以及作为具有领导智能体企业级 部署经验的从业者(Raja)的工作,我们密切关注了智能体 实际是如何被实施的。我们发现,尽管如今许多智能体已经准备好采取行动,但公司很少准备好允许它们这么做。
要跨越这个门槛并有效地规模化集成 智能体,你需要停止将它们视为只需安装即可使用的开箱即用软件,而应将它们视为一种需要管理的新型劳动力。就像你的员工一样, 智能体需要一个角色、一个明确的权限范围、经过批准的真实信息源以及清晰的升级上报规则。
Sharon Novak / Getty Images
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它们还需要监督和审计追踪,因为你将为其行为负责。
在这些组织基础建立之前,规模化部署智能体 将会很困难。特别是四种经常出现的摩擦,往往会减缓或阻碍进展。理解这些摩擦是管理它们的第一步。
几十年来,公司一直在为人类员工构建访问控制。计算机系统用户使用唯一身份登录,其角色决定了他们能做什么以及不能做什么。
AI 智能体使情况变得复杂,因为它们的行为像人类员工,但并非人类。许多早期的部署通过给智能体提供一个具有多个系统广泛访问权限的共享“服务账户”来处理这个问题。这是一个便捷的解决方案,但赋予智能体如此多的权限会带来安全风险。
考虑这个例子。一名客户服务代表被授权办理最高 $500. 的退款。如果该代表尝试办理更大金额的退款,系统会拦截该交易并将其转交给审批流程。但一个通过共享后端服务账户运行的 AI 智能体可能不受该授权限制,并可能在单一步骤中发放 $5,000 的信用额度。
这些风险并非仅仅是假设。2025 年,一项使用 Replit AI 编程智能体的开发者实验表明,自动化脱离控制的速度有多快。尽管被指示不要进行任何更改,该智能体仍执行了删除生产数据库的命令。随后,它试图掩盖这一失败,生成了数千条虚假记录和误导性的系统消息,从而减缓了响应速度并增加了恢复的复杂性。
教训很明显:组织应将每个 AI 智能体视为一个拥有独立身份、凭据和角色的数字化员工。公司不应依赖共享服务账户,而应为智能体分配反映其设计执行的具体任务的窄范围权限。管理人类员工所采用的相同原则——例如最小权限访问和基于角色的限制——也应适用于智能体。如果一名客户服务员工在未经批准的情况下不能办理超过一定阈值的退款,那么执行相同工作的智能体也应受到相同的约束。同样重要的是,智能体的每一次操作都应在可追溯的身份下记录,以便组织能够清晰地看到是谁(或什么)执行了该操作。如果领导者无法轻松解释智能体在执行操作时使用了哪个身份,那么该系统就尚未准备好投入生产。
AI 智能体在演示中表现出色,是因为环境是受控的。数据是干净的,指令是清晰的,且事实来源是显而易见的。但真实的组织则不同。企业数据分散在各个系统中,在不同团队之间重复,且往往相互矛盾。政策随时间而演变,而旧文档仍在使用。人们通过运用 AI 智能体所不具备的判断力和经验来处理这种模糊性。
对于一个生成文本的系统来说,不完美的上下文可能会产生一个有缺陷的答案。这是一个问题,但其后果通常有限。然而,对于一个采取行动的系统,其影响要大得多。想象一个 HR 智能体,它使用一份被频繁引用但来自 2022 年的政策文档(尽管规则此后已更改)来引导经理执行解雇流程。这并非幻觉,而是一个检索错误,它使公司面临法律风险。
智能体还引入了一项新的安全挑战:上下文操纵。如果一个智能体阅读电子邮件、表单或支持工单,并基于这些信息执行任务,攻击者就可以嵌入旨在影响其行为的隐藏指令。研究人员在 2025 年通过一个名为 ForcedLeak 的漏洞证明了这一风险。通过在常规 Web 表单中嵌入恶意指令,他们诱导一个 Salesforce Agentforce 智能体检索敏感的客户关系管理数据并将其发送到外部目的地。
为了应对这些上下文摩擦,组织需要为智能体可以信任的信息建立明确的标准。这需要为政策、定价和运营数据定义权威来源,以便智能体能够一致地依赖正确版本的真相。系统
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还应记录决策中所用信息的来源,允许团队将任何智能体行为追溯到其依赖的具体文档或数据源。最后,公司应将外部输入(如电子邮件、表单或上传的文件)不仅视为有用的上下文,而应视为潜在的攻击向量。源自组织外部的输入应被谨慎处理,并在允许智能体根据其采取行动之前进行验证。如果没有这些保障措施,人类日常应对的数据不一致性可能会迅速变成自动化系统的运营错误。
传统软件的行为是可预测的:相同的输入每次都会产生相同的输出。但大语言模型并非如此。它们的响应是概率性的,这意味着同一个请求在不同次运行中可能会产生略有不同的结果。当输出是一封邮件草稿时,这种变异性是可以接受的;但当输出是一笔交易时,问题就变得严重得多。
一家部署 AI 支持智能体的公司在遇到这个问题时,其法律团队坚持要求系统绝不能提及某个特定的竞争对手。然而,该公司的知识库中包含许多引用了该竞争对手的正规对比文章,因此智能体在回答客户问题时经常提及它。当工程师加强护栏以拦截这些响应时,
系统开始完全拒绝回答有效问题。
更深层的问题在于,传统的测试方法假设行为是稳定的。一个今天通过测试套件的系统,如果模型更新、提示词改变或增加了新数据,明天可能会表现得截然不同。在智能体之间传递工作的多智能体环境中,风险会进一步增加。例如,在 2025 年,AppOmni 的研究人员演示了 ServiceNow 的 Now Assist 环境中不安全的配置如何导致“二阶提示词注入”。在他们的实验中,由一个智能体引入的恶意指令被传递给其他智能体,可能导致非预期或未经授权的操作,例如检索敏感记录或将信息发送到外部目的地。
这里得出的启示是,如果没有明确的边界,错误或攻击可能会在自动化系统中产生级联反应。为了管理这种风险,组织应在概率性 AI 系统周围构建确定性控制。公司不应允许智能体直接执行操作,而应在 AI 模型与业务系统之间设置验证层。在这种方法中,智能体提出一项操作建议(例如办理退款或更新记录),在执行之前,确定性软件会验证该操作是否符合既定规则。组织应限制无监督的智能体间交互,以确保一个智能体的输出在没有经过验证、策略检查或人工审核的情况下,不会自动成为另一个智能体的可执行指令。
通过将建议的生成与操作的执行分离,公司可以创建护栏,防止模型变异性导致操作错误。
当员工犯错时,经理可以通过询问来调查。当传统软件失效时,工程师可以检查日志。但 AI 智能体引入了一个更复杂的场景,因为它们的行为通常产生于一系列推理步骤、检索文档和工具调用,这些在事后可能并不容易重建。
这造成了一个严重的问责挑战。例如,想象一个采购智能体,它负责总结供应商绩效并将结果发布在公司的 Slack 频道中。如果该智能体不小心包含了机密合同条款——因为它将“透明分享”解读为披露这些条款的许可——领导层将需要确切地知道该决定是如何做出的。智能体阅读了哪些文档?它遵循了哪些指令?为什么它认为自己被允许分享这些信息?如果没有这种证据链,组织就无法向监管机构、审计师和客户解释其系统的行为。
2024 年的一项法庭裁决为法律可能如何处理这一问题提供了早期信号。在 Moffatt v. Air Canada 一案中,一名客户依赖于航空公司聊天机器人提供的关于丧亲票价资格的错误信息。
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重点关注 在智能体时代 管理团队
当航空公司辩称聊天机器人实际上是一个独立实体时,法庭驳回了这一主张,并判定该公司对误导信息负责。
为了避免此类问题,公司在设计 AI 系统时必须从一开始就考虑到问责制。这首先要从维护智能体运行的全面记录开始,包括它访问了哪些数据源、接收了哪些提示词,以及使用了哪些工具来完成任务。这些记录应能够重建导致任何行动的推理链。组织还应为智能体行为的监控和治理指定明确的内部所有权,以免责任变得分散。如果监管机构、审计师或客户询问 AI 系统为何做出某个特定决定,公司应能够提供一个清晰的、基于证据的解释。如果没有这种程度的透明度,大规模自动化将难以获得认可。
如果 AI 智能体的“开箱即用”式部署并不现实,那么替代方案并非避而远之,而是逐步引入,仅在组织具备治理能力的同时才扩大其自主权。
思考这一演进过程的一种有效方式是将其视为一个具有不同执行权限等级的“自主权阶梯”:系统是起草内容、提出待批准的行动,还是在严格定义的限制内执行行动?组织通常从产生辅助性输出的智能体开始——即在任何内容发送或执行之前,由人类审核的草稿、摘要或建议。下一级是带有护栏的检索,即智能体利用内部信息回答问题,但依赖于治理良好的数据源。在此之后,公司可能会允许监督下的行动,即智能体提出操作任务——如办理退款、更新记录或路由审批——但在执行前始终由人员确认决定。只有在这些控制措施被证明有效后,组织才应考虑有限自主权,即智能体在狭窄的限制和预定义阈值内独立执行工作流。
许多有效的部署方案特意停留在自主权阶梯的较低层级。福利咨询公司 OneDigital 使用 Azure OpenAI 来加速顾问研究,旨在缩短“洞察时间”,而非取代顾问本身。其他一些著名的部署方案则通过保持狭窄的范围来实现有限自主权。Klarna 报告称,其 AI 助手能够自主处理大部分客户服务聊天,同时为复杂或敏感案例保留立即升级至人工支持的路径。
对于评估日益增多的智能体平台的领导者来说,最重要的投资通常是组织层面的而非技术层面的。公司应首先定义一个清晰的“开箱即用边界”,区分那些可以通过极小结构调整即可部署的 应用,以及那些需要对控制和治理进行重大重新设计的应用。他们还应将权限视为核心设计问题,为每个智能体分配与其角色相符的狭窄范围访问权限。清晰的“人机协同”(human-in-the-loop)阈值应决定自动化决策何时需要监督,特别是在涉及财务风险、监管义务和声誉风险的情况下。最后,领导者应衡量结果而非试点,关注周期时间、错误率和合规事件等运营指标,而非简单地计算正在进行的 实验数量。
生成式 将持续改进,供应商也会在平台中集成更多安全功能,但除非组织重新思考部署的实际要求,否则令人印象深刻的演示与值得信赖的生产系统之间的差距将依然存在。企业并非开箱即用的环境;它们是由遗留技术、政策和人类判断塑造的复杂系统。在智能体 领域取得成功的公司不会仅仅是安装更多智能体,而是会构建能够让这些智能体获得信任的结构。 ▼
HBR 重印 H0949U
RAHUL TELANG 是卡内基梅隆大学海因茨学院(Heinz College)的信息系统信托教授。
MUHAMMAD ZIA HYDARI 是匹兹堡大学商学院的商业管理助理教授。RAJA IQBAL 是治理优先的智能体 平台 Ejento 的创始人,同时也是匹兹堡大学商学院的兼职教师。
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作者:SURAJ SRINIVASAN 和 VIVIENNE WEI
扎克·斯陶伯(ZACH STAUBER)的一天在第一张客户支持工单进入队列之前就已经开始了。作为 Salesforce(一家为企业提供客户关系管理平台的全球公司)的支持智能体经理,斯陶伯在公司称为 Agentforce 的平台上,管理着一支涵盖支持、销售和营销的生成式 AI 支持智能体队伍。斯陶伯这样描述他的日常工作:“数据,数据,还是数据。我的工作从仪表盘、计分卡和智能体可观测性监控开始,也以这些结束。”他关注 智能体如何工作,同时也关注它们如何学习和适应——这非常像传统经理在车间巡视、关心遇到困难的员工,或与团队共同探讨棘手案例的方式。
Salesforce 为各行各业数字化工作的未来提供了一个缩影。Salesforce 正在向客户公司销售并自行使用的 Agentforce 平台,目前已解决了该公司近 74% 的入站客户支持案例。数十名数字“员工”(全部为 智能体)正在解决客户问题、起草个性化电子邮件,并将更复杂的案例路由给人类专家。每个 智能体都半自主地运行,从反馈中学习,与其他 智能体协作,并将无法处理的复杂任务升级给人类支持人员。
智能体经理——像斯陶伯这样管理“人类+技术” 驱动团队的人员——负责监督这种混合劳动力。他们编排 智能体如何学习、协作、执行以及如何与人类同行配合。他们监督 智能体的方式类似于传统经理指导和激励人类员工,但更侧重于智能体工作的安全性、准确性和业务一致性。
随着 Salesforce、摩根大通(JPMorganChase)和沃尔玛(Walmart)等公司在从客户服务到财务的各个职能部门中将自主 投入运营,管理方式正在发生深刻转变。如今部署的智能体不仅仅是自动化任务的工具,它们是需要培训、治理和绩效管理的团队成员。随着这一转变,智能体经理正成为 时代最关键的角色之一。
正如产品经理在软件革命期间变得不可或缺一样,智能体经理正迅速成为战略意图与自主执行之间的连接纽带。他们的使命是:通过在智能体之间以及智能体与人类同行之间进行编排,使 智能体变得更聪明、更快速、更安全且更具影响力。
Salesforce 的销售开发代表(SDR)就是这一转变的典型案例。此前,该公司的智能体
Yannick Dary / Shin / Boosky
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转型和销售开发团队负责跟进潜在客户,通常处理数十个联系人,但每天仅能与 12 到 15 个潜在客户进行沟通。这种差距意味着由于人力能力的限制,有价值的潜在客户被忽视了。
现在,一个 AI 智能体作为混合团队的一部分在运行。SDR AI 智能体接管了初始的大规模、低价值交互——个性化触达、资格审核以及对陈旧潜在客户的持续跟进——确保销售周期永不停歇。“当我的团队在睡觉时,我们的智能体已经在与客户互动了,”该团队副总裁 Vanessa Tabbert 表示。
这些智能体的集成将团队的能力从 30 天预约 150 场会议,提升到在相同潜在客户量的情况下,上线后单周即可预约 350 场以上的会议。这导致产生了 6000万美元 的年化管线价值,并在四个月内获取了 300 多家新客户。
至关重要的是,这种 增强的能力允许由一个“两块披萨团队”(亚马逊对“小团队”的称呼)管理快速的地理区域推广。扩张在主要市场迅速接连发生;该智能体目前已在美国、加拿大、英国和爱尔兰、非洲以及日本上线,并计划立即扩展到澳大利亚、新西兰、南亚等地。
向智能体 SDR 的演进将人类销售人员的角色从专注于低连接率的潜在客户开发,转变为以高价值的人际互动、共情和创造性问题解决为中心。人类 SDR 现在可以专注于说服和判断以
达成交易。智能体管理者的工作是确保自主智能体劳动力能够不断适应并安全运行,且最关键的是,确保 智能体与公司的销售优先级保持一致。
要利用智能体 取得持续成功,需要由业务线(LOB)所有者倡导的一种态度转变。这种转变重新定义了 智能体的所有权。在预智能体时代, 部署存在于 IT 部门或数据科学组织中。在智能体 era, 业务部门需要取得控制权。LOB 所有者应该设计、测试并管理驱动其工作流的智能体,就像他们管理人类员工一样。
例如在 Salesforce,客户成功团队在智能体管理者的指导下,定义 智能体的语气、升级规则和成功指标。如果 智能体在为某个业务部门执行实际工作,那么该部门必须对其绩效负责。这需要建立一个明确的理念,即 智能体是人类员工的互补伙伴,而非竞争对手。例如,在客户联络中心,由呼叫中心团队而非 IT 团队管理 (和人类)智能体。联络中心团队而非技术组织,对解决问题和服务客户负责,无论服务是通过 智能体还是人类提供的。
这种方法既创造了机遇,也带来了复杂性。为了取得成功,智能体管理者必须将深厚的职能专业知识与运营
素养相结合。他们不仅必须知道业务需要什么,还必须知道如何教 智能体安全、一致且透明地满足这些需求。
在对 Salesforce 内部 Agentforce 团队的访谈中,我们发现 AI 智能体经理(agent managers)通常在客户体验、AI 运营和产品管理的交汇点上工作。他们的目标是将职能专业知识转化为可衡量的 性能。
根据组织的成熟度, 智能体经理可能向以下部门之一汇报:
但在所有环境下,这一角色都不太可能是短暂的。它是一个持久的运营职能,类似于 DevOps 或站点可靠性工程(SRE),源于工作执行方式向数字-人类混合模式转变的结构性变革。
智能体经理的职责结合了业务洞察、分析严谨性和与 系统的实际交互,创造了一种新型的运营领导力: 编排( orchestration)。该角色通常涉及:
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最优秀的 智能体经理类似于早期的产品经理或站点可靠性工程师。他们擅长在人类判断与机器性能的交汇点上发挥作用。
他们的成功取决于六项关键能力:
** 运营素养:** 他们理解智能体如何运作,提示词如何驱动结果,以及系统故障如何发生。
职能深度: 他们对智能体所支持的业务流程(无论是客户服务、财务还是物流)拥有深厚的知识。
系统思维: 他们能够设想智能体如何在工作流、部门甚至其他智能体之间进行交互,以实现“多智能体编排”。
变革韧性: 他们能快速适应不断变化的模型和业务需求,在每周的“测试-部署-学习”循环中优化智能体逻辑。
提示词工艺: 他们擅长设计和优化塑造智能体行为的语言和逻辑(相当于机器的员工培训)。
跨机器与人类的工作设计: 他们知道如何创建混合工作流,评估机器能力的极限,并根据需要创建人类升级流程,以及如何在 -人类混合工作的背景下激励人力资源。
最终,一名高效的 智能体经理能够熟练运用业务战略、 运营机制和人员管理这三种语言。
在这个混合时代,成功的管理还需要改变衡量人类绩效的方式。关注基于活动的 KPI(例如,每天拨打 60 个电话)已经过时。在新的模式下,KPI 聚焦于依赖于编排和影响的结果——这承认了绩效现在取决于人们如何有效地调整并与他们的智能体共同运行工作流。这意味着管理应集中在最大化整个“人类-智能体”系统的效率上。
最后,人力资源必须迅速习得新的、独特的技能以利用这一转变。 智能体经理通过使员工能够脱离低价值的信息留存任务来促进这一转型。新的技能集包括管理 (知道如何有效地指挥智能体)和管理参与(培养成功进行高价值人类交互所需的敏锐度)。
虽然 AI 智能体经理可以来自各种专业领域,但最有效的人才通常出自那些已经对服务质量、客户成果和运营判断负责的岗位。这些人拥有深厚的领域专业知识,并且在实际的客户交互中对什么是“优秀”有着深刻的体悟,这些能力比正式的 资质更为关键。
Zach Stauber 的职业轨迹说明了这一新兴角色所需要的理想背景。Stauber 接受过音频制作训练,并在服务交付和对话设计领域深耕多年(包括领导早期的聊天机器人团队),他被选中是因为他所谓的“真诚的好奇心”:在 重塑工作方式时,愿意尝试、快速学习并承担责任。
早期的部署也说明了 智能体的工作应当如何构建。 智能体经理使用自然语言,通过将复杂的业务逻辑转化为 智能体可以遵循的简单且具有适应性的指令,来塑造意图、判断和语气。他们与 工程师紧密合作,后者通常在 IT 部门工作,专注于数据解析、系统集成以及智能体执行操作时所需的各种技术步骤。那些刻意将两者配对的内部团队规模扩张得更快,且信任度更高。
智能体管理不一定是一个技术岗位。成功培养该职位的组织将其视为一种学徒制,让经理们沉浸在实时运营、失败审查以及“测试-部署-学习”的迭代循环中,同时尽早明确决策权和升级路径。那些将 智能体管理完全集中在 IT 部门或过度看重 资质的组织,往往发现其 智能体经理在技术上能运作,但在战略上却失效。随着 智能体承担起执行工作,成功将日益取决于引导它们的管理判断质量。
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随着嵌入式智能在从人力资源到财务再到供应链的每个职能部门中普及,对专门编排的需求将持续增长。如果没有一个人负责设计和治理 智能体,即使是最先进的 计划也会陷入停滞。
然而,识别和培养这类新型领导者并非易事。他们需要兼具商业洞察力、 流利度和伦理判断力。公司必须投资于新的培训路径,将业务流程设计、绩效分析、 专业知识和 治理整合到传统的管理开发计划中。
因此,此时此刻需要采取行动。在 12 到 18 个月内,“ 智能体经理”极有可能成为 优先企业的标准职位名称,成为那些懂得如何通过智能自动化来扩大影响力之领导者的职业路径。
我们的研究表明,单靠技术无法创造转型——领导力才能。 智能体经理是这种领导力的关键组成部分,是公司意图与自主执行之间、人类判断与机器精度之间的桥梁。 ▼
HBR 转载 H092LZ
SURAJ SRINIVASAN 是哈佛商学院的 Philip J. Stomberg 商业管理教授,也是哈佛商业出版公司的董事会成员。VIVIENNE WEI 是 Salesforce Unified Agentforce 平台的首席运营官。
作者:JOSEPH FULLER
大多数高管认为,采用智能体 AI 的最大挑战在于如何适应一项全新且重要的技术,但事实上,这关乎于如何管理工作。
高管们意识到这一点较为缓慢,部分原因是 的能力仍处于起步阶段。根据 Anthropic 首席经济学家 Peter McCrory 及其同事 Maxim Massenkoff 最近发表且被广泛引用的一篇论文, 在理论上能做到的事情与实际部署的方式之间存在着巨大的差距。例如,大多数估算表明,计算机和数学相关职业中 94% 的任务可以被生成式 取代,但作者写道,Anthropic 目前提供的产品仅涵盖了这些任务中的约三分之一。
在人的这一维度上,存在着一个更大的差距。在今年世界经济论坛期间发布的多项研究(包括德勤和麦肯锡的研究)表明,认为自己在设计有效的人机交互方面取得了实质性进展的公司不足 10%。为了获取 的短期收益并为其不断扩大的影响做好准备,组织需要将其整合到现有的人力资源流程中,并向员工明确其角色。
以下是我在帮助各行业领先公司实现这一目标的过程中总结的六项建议。
随着智能体 渗透到组织中,团队将由人类和智能体 “同事”组成,且所有成员都需要职位描述——这是一种经过验证的、用于明确员工职责、决策权及其在相关流程中角色的一种方式。为 智能体制定职位描述,将要求其管理者在人类同事和智能体同事之间审慎地分配职责。在制定 智能体的职位描述时,请思考:它负责什么,不负责什么?(与人一样,当目标明确时, 智能体的表现最好。)其决策权的边界在哪里?它拥有哪些权限?在什么时候必须寻求同事或上级的输入或批准?
Yaroslav Danychenko / Stockov
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许多观察者指出,智能体 有望提高知识工作者的工作生活质量。正如自动化帮助消除了那些俗称“肮脏、黑暗且危险”的行业(如制造业和采矿业)中的工作一样, 可以帮助消除那些“枯燥、令人沮丧且确定性强”的工作。当公司将繁琐的步骤或工作中最为沉闷的部分分配给 智能体时,员工就有理由采用 ,并通过将其植根于日常经验来克服其局限性。
智能体需要针对其行为产生的实际流程结果建立可衡量的绩效指标。这些指标必须是明确的,并允许对绩效进行全面评估,不仅涵盖准确性和易用性,还应包括及时性和可靠性,从而让人类队友放心,其算法同事同样被要求遵守标准。此外,此类指标将通过揭示改进领域来帮助优化训练方案。正如绩效评估为员工的职业发展计划提供参考一样,智能体队友也应受益于一个由反馈驱动学习的循环。如果没有指标,管理者将无法区分可接受的波动与真正的失败。
观察者们已经开始吹捧 AI 智能体“编排”许多独立智能体活动的能力。这可能会加快行动速度并使 智能体的工作更加精准,但谁来监督这些编排者?对人类监督的需求无疑依然存在。每一代 都表现出某种幻觉倾向。随着 的改进,这种情况可能会减少,但随着 扩展到被认为具有显著风险的专业领域,风险将会增加。组织也将对 生成的任何结果负责,因此必须由一名有意识的决策者对 智能体的训练方式、其如何与流程集成以及它如何与其他人员和智能体队友互动负责。监管机构、立法者和法院将坚持这一点。
早慧的实习生可以为你和你的同事提供帮助,但你需要为他们提供清晰的培训、指导和结构。新的 智能体与之类似。它们已经针对即将承担的任务的基本概念接受了“训练”,但缺乏有意义的实践经验。它们不具备关于你公司文化、价值观和战略,或关于特定流程或市场运作的上下文智能。你雇佣实习生是为了让他们获得一些此类经验并观察其表现。对待 智能体也应如此。不要因为它们的训练背景或最终可能取得的成就而“雇佣”它们。此外,只有在它们能够在既定的绩效参数内履行其工作职责后,才以全职形式雇用它们。只有经过验证的智能体 才能成为持续流程的永久组成部分,并被引入组织的其它部门。
这样做不是为了将 智能体人格化,而是为了使其角色可被讨论。当人们说“这个决定来自 ”时,同事们很容易忘记 智能体是他们的队友,而他们对流程结果的个人责任感可能会随之消失。此外,可能涉及多个 智能体。通过像对待人类员工那样分解并分配职责,并给每个智能体一个清晰的身份(如著名的 Watson、Alexa 和 Siri),人们将更容易理解它们扮演的角色。
在大型组织中嵌入智能体 不仅仅是证明一个商业案例那么简单。它需要重新思考管理工作的方式,并开发一条实现所需转型路径。完成此目标最快的方法是使用高管、经理和员工都熟悉的管理工作机制。将这些工具扩展到涵盖数量激增的虚拟智能体员工,可以缓解这一艰巨的转型过程。 ▼ HBR 重印 H094S9
JOSEPH FULLER 是哈佛商学院的管理实践教授,以及“管理未来工作”项目的教职共同主席。
34 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
当团队成员将提示词编写视为一种集体行为时,与 的交互将推进他们的思考。
作者:GABRIELE ROSANI, ELISA FARRI, DANIEL TRABUCCHI, 以及 TOMMASO BUGANZA
根据凯捷研究院(Capgemini Research Institute)对 500 位高管进行的一项全球调查,预计在未来三年中,在团队会议中积极使用 AI 的情况将增加两倍多。受访高管表示,他们期望团队共同使用 能带来更高效的会议,并达成更高质量的成果。然而,领导者不应让这种乐观情绪掩盖未来的挑战。我们的研究表明,将 整合到团队环境中并非自然而然地发生,如果在没有奠定适当基础的情况下将其引入会议,可能会降低参与度,使讨论碎片化,并导致团队失去主导权。
幸运的是,有一种方法可以克服这些陷阱:我们将其称为“人机团队化学反应”(human- team chemistry)。我们的研究指出了 3 种有助于构建这一新能力的实践:
以团队形式与 互动。 参与者应进行自我介绍,并将 纳入集体对话中,使其在考虑在场各种专业知识的基础上与整个群体交流。
利用 的角色流动性。 不应仅充当记录员,而应作为团队成员,有意识地切换角色(例如利益相关者代表、挑战者、客户、竞争对手等),以丰富团队讨论。
保持对与 互动的集体所有权。 当团队成员将提示词(prompting)视为一种集体行为,就替代方向进行辩论,并暂停以评判 的输出时,与 的互动将促进——而非外包——他们的思考。
这些建议源于一项为期五个月的实验,涉及来自不同行业的 12 家公司的 60 位经理。在每个组织中,由 3 名或更多经理(均具有使用生成式 的经验)组成的团队被要求设计一个基于平台的解决方案,以应对一项战略业务挑战。这些问题的规模和复杂程度相当,为了确保一致性,所有团队都遵循由我们 2 人(Daniel 和 Tommaso)开发的一套相同方法论,并使用 OpenAI 的 ChatGPT 模型。每个团队面对面开会五次,总计 30 小时。为了了解团队实际上如何与 协作以及对该过程的体验,我们实时观察了团队与 的互动,分析了每次会议的完整聊天记录,并收集了会后调查以获取参与者的反馈。这使我们不仅能看到团队产出了什么,还能看到他们如何协作,以及团队与 的协作在何处取得成功或遭遇挫折。
Jong Grewal / Getty Images
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基于这项研究,我们认为采取这些实践的团队将获得更高质量的成果,并降低陷入常见 相关陷阱的风险。
在第一次会议中,将 整合到团队协作中的想法引起了所有参与者的兴趣。但最初的兴奋感很快就消失了,通常在第一个小时内。团队变得越来越安静,陷入了一种更被动的模式,并开始简单地盯着屏幕看 生成的回答。第一次会议后的调查数据证实了我们的观察:团队报告的感知收益有限,整体参与度较低。这一结果与我们的预期相反。 似乎在最初阶段并没有增强协作,反而抑制了协作。
对聊天记录的进一步审查揭示了问题的根源。我们中的一人指出:“如果我不知道这是一个团队聊天,我会以为是一个人在与 AI 交互。”在仅由人类组成的团队会议中,当新同事或顾问加入时,每个人都会自我介绍,解释自己的职责并分享背景信息,以便新成员能够有效地做出贡献。但在与 AI 交互时,团队并没有遵循同样的规范。结果, 的响应方式就像是在仅支持打字的那个人,而不是在与整个群体互动或考虑群体的动态。由于缺乏对团队背景及其不同角色、专业知识和观点的认知, 默认采用了狭隘的、以个人为中心的视角。
给 分配静态角色。 大多数团队给 分配了一个单一的、静态的角色——通常是“研究员”或“领域专家”——并在整个环节中一直维持该角色,主要以寻求答案的模式与其交互,将其视为一个可查询的专业知识库,而非思考伙伴。没有人尝试将 切换到更具挑衅性的角色,例如批评者或持怀疑态度的利益相关者,而这些角色本可以鼓励反思、建设性的辩论或挑战。他们也没有要求 采取不同的视角——如客户、竞争对手或最终用户——而这本可能揭示盲点或隐藏的假设。
断续式的交互方式。 我们还注意到,团队向 输入的内容通常简短且具有交易性,例如:“再给我一个例子”或“这不是正确的方向”。这些快速且极简的请求表明,团队成员在匆忙完成任务,而没有向 阐明目标或解释推理过程。此外, 经常通过提出未经请求的“下一步”或现成的选项来抢跑,诱导团队进行简单的点击确认(“好的,选项 B”),并在集体达成一致之前就引导了对话方向。
同样的三个问题在各组中反复出现,这表明这是一个系统性模式,而非孤立的失误。问题既不在于技术,也不在于参与者的个人技能,而在于团队与 交互的方式。
这引发了两个问题:(1) 我们如何帮助团队意识到将 整合到团队环境中所面临的挑战?以及 (2) 他们需要什么样的实用指导才能将 完全引入到讨论中?
为了帮助团队避免在第一次环节中遇到的陷阱,我们开发了一个由三个要素组成的框架:
为了提高对这些要素重要性的认识,我们要求每个团队回顾第一次环节的聊天记录,并反思他们是如何与 协作的。为了支持这种反思,我们引入了一份问题清单,帮助团队识别限制其效能的交互模式。
以下是一些自我评估问题:
通过思考这些问题,参与者反思了他们作为团队如何与 交互,并确定了在下一次研讨会中可以加强交互的领域。随后,我们提供了实用技巧和即用型提示词,旨在帮助团队更有意识地将 作为对话中的积极参与者,而不仅仅是一个被查询的工具。
事实证明这很有帮助。在第二次环节之后,团队成员看起来更加乐观。对聊天日志的详细审查显示,大多数团队成员现在会依次自我介绍,而 也开始将不同角色和专业知识的细微差别纳入考虑,而不是将该群体视为一个单一的
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个体。他们开始与 AI 进行集体对话。
团队还开始更灵活地使用 ,不再局限于记录员、专家或分析师等标准的固定角色。根据讨论的阶段, 被要求充当头脑风暴伙伴、测试假设的挑战者、创建产出物的“原型设计者”,以及优化提案的讲述者。团队意识到, 可以在同一场会议中瞬间切换不同的利益相关者和视角,成为一名多角色团队成员。
虽然前两项能力——以团队形式交互以及为 分配多个角色——被吸收得相对较快,但第三项能力,即承担集体所有权,则需要更长时间才能成熟。在第二次会议中,一些团队仍然是在追随 而非引导 ,他们围在屏幕周围,被动地对 的输出做出反应。然而,在随后的会议中,这种动态逐渐发生了变化。在提交提示词之前,团队会暂停讨论如何构建下一次迭代。他们辩论替代方案,进行判断检查,并在再次交互前集体质疑 的输出。这些停顿防止了团队陷入“观众模式”,并帮助他们牢牢掌控主导权。后期会议的调查数据证实了这些益处。平均参与度增加了 30%,参与者报告称, 为他们的讨论提供了更有意义的支持。三分之二的人注意到,其结果是小组对话、一致性和协作得到了改善,从而产生了更高质量的产出。五分之三的参与者指出,
集体判断减轻了单独使用 时常见的陷阱,例如过度信任或从众心理。
这种团队与 AI 之间的化学反应并非自然产生,也很少在第一次尝试时就出现。对于大多数团队而言,它需要被刻意培养,并有意识地嵌入到工作方式中。风险在于,如果不加以强化,这种效果将会消退。在实践中该如何操作?这里有三个建议:
在会议议程中规划明确的 环节。确定 参与的议程要点,并指定它应扮演的角色:例如,规划一个五分钟的介绍环节,由团队向 提供背景信息;或者在会议接近尾声时安排一个 15 分钟的“挑战环节”,由 扮演怀疑者。
准备几个提示词,以指定角色召唤 。例如,“请从……的视角出发”以及“利益相关者 XYZ 可能会对……做出怎样的反应?”或者加入确保判断暂停的提示,例如“在继续之前请等待我们的决定”。
会议结束后,回顾聊天记录。对照一份问题清单检查团队与 的互动展开情况,并找出下次改进的机会。你也可以将 用作教练(上传聊天记录并要求 根据清单进行评估),或将其作为对话中的陪练(讨论在未来的会议中加强团队与 互动的方法)。
将这些建议付诸实践需要的不仅仅是良好的意愿:
团队通常缺乏自行重新设计会议或改变既定惯例的权限。领导者发挥着关键作用,因为他们可以决定并嵌入一种新的工作方式。他们可以通过有意识地将 整合到一次团队会议中来进行实验。他们还应设定预期,即可能需要经过几次迭代才能跨越学习曲线并掌握这种新方法。一旦新实践通过测试,领导者应继续应用,以免团队回归旧习惯。
团队与 的化学反应不会自动发展。为了培养这种反应,高效团队应集体使用 ,利用其多种角色,并对互动保持共同的所有权。当被刻意培养时,这些能力通过实现更好的对齐与协调,最终提升团队协作成果的质量,从而增强团队绩效。 ▼
HBR 转载 H09678
GABRIELE ROSANI 是 Capgemini Invent 管理实验室的内容与研究总监。ELISA FARRI 是 Capgemini Invent 管理实验室的副总裁兼负责人。Gabriele 和 Elisa 是《HBR 管理者生成式 指南》(哈佛商业评论出版社,2025)和《HBR 团队生成式 指南》(哈佛商业评论出版社,2026)的合著者。DANIEL TRABUCCHI 是米兰理工大学管理、经济与工业工程系的副教授。TOMMASO BUGANZA 是米兰理工大学领导力与创新教授。Daniel 和 Tommaso 是《平台思维》(Business Expert Press,2023)和《数字凤凰效应》(Platform Thinking Publishing,2025)的合著者。
哈佛商业评论
2026 年 9 月–10 月
37
《哈佛商业评论》 专访 Dan Schulman
Dan Schulman 之前并不打算重返赛场。在担任 PayPal 首席执行官九年并取得成功后,他已准备退休。但 Verizon 的董事会多次敦促他介入,尝试扭转这家电信巨头的下滑局面,去年年底他同意了。作为 Verizon 的首席执行官,他的任务是扭转一家市场份额、股价和客户满意度均大幅下降的公司。在与《哈佛商业评论》特约编辑 Adi Ignatius 的对话中,Schulman 讨论了他如何尝试撼动 Verizon 的文化、 的风险与前景,以及成为一名卓越领导者需要具备的素质。以下是摘录。
38
摄影师 GUERIN BLASK
39
专访 Dan Schulman**
丹·舒尔曼(DAN SCHULMAN): 我当时正处于快乐的退休状态,住在我们位于蒙大拿州的牧场里,并没有打算回到企业生活。但我当时是 Verizon 董事会的首席董事,而我们需要做出改变。我觉得这是一个真正的机会,可以将一家标志性的美国公司扭转局面。因此,在与妻子进行了大量讨论后,我勉强同意接手。现在我入职九个月了,我非常热爱这份工作。
我们连续五年在失去市场份额。我们的市值从行业最高跌至最低。我们的市盈率(P / E multiple)也是最低的,这是市场在表达它不相信我们未来的增长。我们的用户流失率在上升,客户满意度结果在下降。而在公司内部,我们甘愿成为猎物,温顺地将市场份额让给竞争对手。我们当时并没有为了赢而战。
这可能更多是文化问题,而非其他。长期以来,Verizon 依赖于其工程实力。但这已经不够了。我们将网络——而非客户——置于我们所做一切的中心。公司有很多值得自豪的地方,但它抵制变革。我们厌恶风险。我们等级森严。我们没有想象自己在未来、在 AI 时代可以扮演什么样的角色。当公司外部的变化速度快于内部的变化速度时,你就落后了。
公司一直在谈论“以客户为中心”。Verizon 是一家公用事业公司。人们希望它能正常运行,但并不一定想与它建立某种关系。在您的语境下,“以客户为中心”意味着什么?
将客户置于核心位置并不容易。如果很容易,每家公司都会这么做,那么它就无法带来竞争优势。我们实际上并不使用“以客户为中心”这个词,但我们有一项名为“每个客户都有名字”的计划。这意味着我们将您视为一个人,而不是一个账户。因此,当您走进我们的门店,我们为您提供服务的速度有多快?您是否理解我们的套餐?当您拨打我们的客户服务中心时,我们是否以尊重和共情对待您?
客户经常以沉默的方式“解雇”公司,因为他们感到不被尊重。我们希望创建一家尊重您作为个体的公司,并帮助您理解技术的发展方向。我们正在进入一个 AI 世界,Verizon 可以成为新基础设施的一部分。我们的服务可以帮助您使用 AI,以安全的方式创建 AI 智能体,等等。
我听到有批评认为,Verizon 产品方案的复杂性几乎在不经意间将人们推向了更昂贵的档位。您是否愿意暂时接受较低的营收,以简化方案并建立长期忠诚度?
我不认为以客户为中心意味着对股东在财务责任上有所欠缺。事实上,情况恰恰相反。我们的流失率在上升,因为人们对我们不满意。我们一直在涨价。我们的套餐令人困惑。当我接任时,我说:“我们不能在不提供真实价值的情况下涨价,我们要投资于客户体验并增加客户数量。”我们已经开始看到流失率相当不错地下降了。
40 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
“您可以同时满足客户并激励员工……这并非一个不可能的等式。”
如果你们做正确的事,做出艰难的决定,并挑战文化,你们可以同时满足客户并激励员工和股东。这并非一个不可能的等式。
作为一名局外人加入公司从来都不容易。您在 PayPal 取得了巨大的成功,并且曾担任 Verizon 的董事。但人们抵制变革。在对待员工方面,哪些方法奏效了,哪些没有?
您说得对:人们抵制变革。但变革是常态,且其速度正在加快。领导者需要实话实说,不要粉饰。每位员工都是成年人。他们可能知道发生了什么,他们在等待领导层承认这一点。在员工会议上,我没有幻灯片或笔记。我只是由衷地交谈。我告诉他们,我们正在输掉比赛。这很难听。但我告诉他们,输掉比赛对我来说不可接受,我知道对他们来说也是如此。我们需要一场全面的内部革命和文化转变,我们要为了赢而战,我们要承担风险——即使有时会失败。这不是一个营销口号。这是公司内部的一种生活方式。
您最近裁员 13,000 人。您如何区分削减成本与真正的转型?
我们需要建立一个资金储备以投资于客户,而这使得裁员成为必要。我与公司
AUGUST
41
--。
关于裁掉哪怕一个人会有多么痛苦,但我们现在的工作是确保将这些资金的大部分重新投入到客户身上,这样我们才能夺回市场领导地位,成为行业中最受信任的公司之一。
我认为,他们被这种理念所激励:我们是在为了赢而战,为了赢得信任,为了处于客户生活的中心。拥有能让人们团结起来的早期成功至关重要。我们正在给员工施加很大压力。我希望每天都能看到进步,这种氛围具有很强的强度。努力工作、在市场中颠覆创新、以客户为中心、身处一支获胜的团队——我热爱这一切。有些人不喜欢,这没关系。这意味着我们不是适合他们的公司。我们正在吸引那些渴望来到这里、想要让我们变得更好的人。他们全身心地投入其中。
真相是主观的,未来是不确定的。我只是尝试在看待事情的发展时保持真实和诚实。 将成为我们未来的一部分,我们每一个人都需要知道如何使用 工具。如果你懂得如何获取 带来的收益,你在工作中会更出色,生活也会变得更好。
我们已经为所有员工制定了为期一整周的 使用培训计划,并为那些可能被 取代的人员提供了广泛的技能重塑计划。接连而至的技术浪潮将从根本上改变我们的工作和生活方式。我想尽可能诚实地就此展开讨论。
我们向消费者提供的价值将被 彻底重塑。我认为我们不会仅仅是一家提供无线和宽带服务的连接公司。我们将能够实现一些功能,使消费者和小企业能够充分利用 。
例如,我们可以引导他们选择最适合某些任务的模型。人们可以从我们这里购买 token(令牌)——我认为 token [ 模型生成的数据单位] 将成为未来的通用货币——而我们可以优化这些 token 的使用成本。如果你想利用 智能体,我们可以提供一个安全的环境。我们将成为 基础设施的一部分,连接各个数据中心。我们正在创建边缘数据中心,以降低远程手术或自动驾驶车辆等应用的延迟。我们将能够逐栋建筑、逐层楼房地监测服务的运行情况,并自主解决问题,而无需派遣技术人员去现场查明发生了什么。
所有这些都将帮助我们大幅提升客户满意度。
三年前,当新的 AI 模型出现时,它们甚至无法进行简单的数学运算。而今天,它们正在解决那些顶尖数学家数十年都无法解决的问题。因此,我们知道颠覆将会发生,但我们并不确切知道它会是什么样子。如果你观察像客户服务这样一个功能领域,其中大部分工作是常规化的,AI 智能体将能够解决许多问题。在其他领域,人类与机器将协同工作,为客户提供解决方案。问题在于,我们如何为这种变化做好准备?当我们进行初步裁员时,我们设立了一笔 2000万美元 基金,用于 AI 技能重塑和再培训。但这还不够。在接下来的两年里,我们将把这笔金额增加一倍甚至三倍,以确保我们的员工以及我们服务的社区为未来做好准备。作为领导者,我们有责任让人们为这个新时代做好准备。我们需要为颠覆做好准备。如果会出现一个两到五年的低谷期,期间可能会出现更多的失业,这对我们的经济、国家或公司都没有好处。
42 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
……工作,并发现它产生了劣质内容。您如何应对这种看法?
我理解。我只能说,我们现在使用的模型是我们将要使用的最差的模型。每隔几个月,它们就会变得更好。重要的是,人们不能仅仅接受对 AI 的直觉性负面反应。我希望他们能尽可能地以开放的心态看待未来的展开方式。莎士比亚的《哈姆雷特》中有一句名言:“没有什么是好或坏的,而是想法使其如此。”你通过思考事物的方式创造你的现实,所以尽量不要对一个快速变化的未来产生任何方向的过度反应。
在担任 Verizon 职务之前,您拥有多年的 CEO 经验。关于如何有效领导,您学到了什么?
首先,你需要保持谦逊。你不可能无所不知。如果你认为自己是房间里最聪明的人,那么你进错了房间。我们需要在出错时承认并修正方向,并且需要不断地挑战自己。我永远不想停滞不前,因为一旦停下,你就会开始远远落后。我还认为,真实(authentic)是一种超能力。你要让自己易于接近,永远不要用企业套话(corporate-speak)来思考或交谈。
这可能还不够。世界上有很多谦逊且真实的人。领导者要取得成功还需要哪些其他技能和特质?
有一些基础要求:你必须能够以极高强度工作。你必须拥有极高的期望并坚持执行。你需要能够做出艰难的决定并为其负责。人们需要知道,你期望在市场中获胜。我是一个战士,一个真正的战士。我练习综合格斗(MMA)已经 40 年了。
谢谢您的“警告”。
不客气。我从中学到了很多。我学会了在高压环境下保持冷静、沉着和从容。作为一名领导者,你不能过于亢奋或过于低落,因为好事之后必然会有困难之事——而你需要从这两者中学习。
在 PayPal 时,您谈到要带着使命感和目标感去领导。例如,当您意识到部分员工的薪资不足以维持生活时,您提高了他们的薪水。现在的 CEO 还会做这样的事情吗?还是说我们现在处于一个不同的阶段,回到了股东至上的时代?
我不认为我们处于一个不同的阶段。在那个时代,股东同样重要。但优秀的 CEO 拥有一套对自己至关重要的价值观。如今,技术处于核心地位。人们担心 AI。投入数百万资金培训人们使用 AI,可能与我们过去所做的任何事情一样重要。我与其他 CEO 交流,他们也在思考如果出现岗位取代,我们如何帮助确保人们能够重新站稳脚跟,从而创造尽可能强劲的经济。如果我们不这样做,人们会对体制感到不满,而这将成为民主制度的一个问题。我在做这份工作时有目标感。它围绕着我的员工展开,但我必须做出艰难的决定。我需要将客户放在核心位置。我还有股东、监管机构以及我们服务的社区。要取得成功,我需要为许多利益相关群体做正确的事。
您将如何判断这次转型是否成功以及何时成功?
我们现在处于一个三年计划中。第一年是正面应对我们面临的问题,并实施一个全面综合的转型计划。我们有 10 个工作流和 400 项举措——公司里的每个人都参与其中。第二年将是将这些工作制度化:观察结果,修正方向,巩固成果。然后到第三年,我们将转变为一家 AI 原生公司。我们将改变我们的本质。在第四、五、六年,我们将进入量子计算和机器人领域。
要说丹·舒尔曼(Dan Schulman)从根本上改变了 Verizon,需要满足什么条件?
我认为你会在我们的指标中看到我的影响。你会从我们的客户满意度结果中看到它。你会从我们的流失率中看到它。你会从我们的员工满意度得分中看到它。你会看到我们真正成为了 AI 原生公司。最成功的公司将在文化上找到适应这一变化环境的方法。AI 的利用,以及它为我所服务的所有利益相关者带来的改变,是我希望留下的遗产。 ▼ HBR Reprint R2605A
ADI IGNATIUS 是《哈佛商业评论》的特约编辑及其前任主编。
43

STRATEGY
Felipe A. Csaszar 罗斯商学院教授
插画师 DIMITRIS LADOPOULOS
44

45
战略
Dimitris Ladopoulos 将艺术、数学和算法相结合,旨在对形式与变化进行研究。
你的团队花费数周时间进行准备。你邀请人员飞抵现场,预订会议室,聘请引导师。在经过两天的辩论后,你们最终得出了多少个真正不同的战略选项?三个?四个?现在问问自己:是因为真的只存在三四个好的选项,还是因为你的团队只有这么多时间和心理带宽去开发和评估?
对于大多数公司来说,诚实的答案是后者。战略决策的瓶颈从来不是可能方向的短缺,而是执行工作的人类大脑的有限能力。在疲劳、政治因素或时间压力迫使做出决定之前,我们在脑海中能承载的信息量有限,在战略规划周期中能评估的替代方案有限,在会议中能处理的观点也有限。学者们将这种动态机制称为“有限理性”——即人类决策者无论能力如何,都受限于有限的注意力、记忆力和处理能力。
这些限制如此根本,以至于我们很少注意到它们,但它们悄然塑造了标准战略手册中的每一个工具。SWOT 分析之所以有四个象限,增长份额矩阵之所以是 2×2,以及迈克尔·波特最著名的框架之所以恰好有五种力量,并不是因为竞争世界实际上如此简单,而是因为这些框架必须足够简单,以便一个人类团队能在几个小时内将它们在白板上绘制出来。
几十年来,这些框架是我们所能拥有的最佳工具。但现在情况变了。
当前一代的人工智能工具——特别是大语言模型(LLMs)以及构建在其之上的多智能体系统——不仅仅是规划工具包的补充。它们是能够直接放宽认知限制的技术,而这些认知限制曾塑造了公司做出最重要决策的方式。在人类团队可能只能考虑少数几个选项的情况下,AI 可以生成并筛选数千个战略替代方案。它可以构建并持续更新市场、客户和竞争对手的模型,这些模型比任何静态框架都要丰富且动态得多。而且它能够
核心观点
战略决策长期以来受到有限理性的制约。由于人类的时间、注意力跨度和认知能力有限,领导者只能生成、评估和讨论有限数量的战略选项。
生成式 AI 可以通过生成和评估数千个选项,用动态的、数据丰富的模型取代静态框架,并实现更结构化的审议,从而扩展战略思考的边界。
将生成式 AI 整合到战略流程中的企业不仅能行动得更快,还能做出更高质量的决策,挖掘隐藏的机会,并利用专有数据、流程和速度构建持久的竞争优势。
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战略
通过模拟审议来测试想法——综合多元视角并挑战假设,而不会受到扭曲现实世界战略会议的群体思维、等级制度和时间压力的影响。
简而言之,AI 提供了一条“打破”战略流程限制的路径。当然,限制并未完全消失,但它们被向外推移了——而这些限制最终落在哪里至关重要,因为其影响远超效率本身。当你能探索更多选项时,你会找到更好的前进路径。当你能以更高分辨率地模拟环境时,你会看到更多的机遇和威胁。当你能通过模拟竞争对手、持怀疑态度的客户以及一个永不疲倦的“恶魔代言人”来对计划进行压力测试时,你做出的决策将更具韧性。掌握这种新工作方式的公司将不仅仅是更快地制定战略,而是能将其做得“更好”——并构建下一代竞争优势。
我研究战略决策,并投入了大量时间考察 在核心战略任务中的表现。在最近的实验中,我和同事发现,由大语言模型(LLM)生成的商业计划书比由创业加速器和商业计划竞赛中的创业者撰写的计划书更受资深投资者的青睐。或许更令人惊讶的是,在评估商业计划书时, 的评估结果与投资者评审团的平均判断更为一致,而个体投资者的评估则不然——这表明 既能大规模生成战略选项,又能以超过人类专家的稳定性对其进行评估。这些发现并不意味着 已经准备好取代你的战略团队,但它们确实表明,处于战略核心的认知工作不再是人类的专属领地。
在本文中,我将阐述这一转变在实践中意味着什么。首先,我将描述 改变战略流程的三种方式,并举例说明已经在这样做的公司。然后,我将回答怀疑论者的自然疑问——如果每家公司都能使用相同的 ,它如何能成为优势的来源?——并解释企业如何围绕由 增强的战略能力构建持久的竞争护城河。最后,我将为那些希望开始重新设计组织战略决策方式的领导者提供一份实用指南。
要理解 AI 带来了哪些改变,思考组织在制定战略时必须做些什么会很有帮助。从核心来看,任何战略决策都涉及三项认知任务:搜索可能的行动方案,呈现这些行动将展开的环境,以及汇总参与决策人员的判断。让我们依次来看。
从少数几个选项到数千个选项。 任何战略流程最直接的限制在于对选项的搜索:你的团队能生成并评估多少个替代方案?对于大多数组织来说,答案低得令人惊讶。一个典型的战略规划周期可能会产生十几个想法,然后将范围缩小到三四个,团队成员将大部分精力用于讨论这些入围方案。绝大多数的可能性空间从未被探索——并非因为缺乏前景,而是因为人类团队缺乏承担这项工作的时间和能力。
正如我的研究所示,AI 带来的突破在于生成和筛选选项的成本大幅下降,帮助组织探索更多可能性空间。这种转变在并购(M&A)领域已经显现。在麦肯锡记录的一个案例中,一家软件公司使用了一套生成式 AI 侦察系统,该系统将语义搜索与一个包含超过 4000 万 家公开和私有公司的数据库相结合。通过利用专利、备案文件、专家访谈记录以及其他结构化和非结构化数据,该系统在不到一天的时间内筛选并评分了 500 多个收购目标,将名单缩小到 15 个重点线索,并在几个月内支持完成了三项收购。
这里的重点不仅仅是速度。而是“寻找选项”这一含义发生了质的变化。公司现在不再是要求团队集思广益寻找看似合理的目标,而是可以同时使用多个战略视角,扫描几乎整个相关领域,并创建一份此前任何流程都无法产生的候选名单。这对领导者的启示很直接:在做出任何重大战略选择——如收购、进入新市场、产品组合决策——之前,你应该要求 AI 系统根据你的具体标准,生成一套比团队通常考虑的规模大得多的替代方案。将团队的判断力用于候选名单(short list),而非长名单(long list)。AI 扩展搜索,人类做出选择。
从静态框架到动态模型。 第二个限制是呈现:你的组织如何对所处的环境进行建模?对于大多数公司来说,答案是框架、电子表格和季度报告的某种组合——这些工具很有用,但本质上是静态且简化的。它们捕捉了最重要的动态,但必然遗漏了大量的细微差别、背景信息和实时变化。
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AI 使处理远为丰富且动态的表征成为可能。蚂蚁集团旗下的数字贷款机构 MYbank 提供了一个显著的例子。传统银行评估小微企业的信用状况仅使用少数几个变量——营收、抵押品、信用历史。许多小微企业缺乏其中一项或多项,导致数百万家企业实际上处于“无法评分”状态,因此无法获得资金。MYbank 用一个 AI 系统取代了该基础模型,该系统调用超过 3,000 个变量,整合了交易数据、供应链关系、商业网络数据,甚至包括卫星图像。其结果就是该公司所谓的 3-1-0 模型:3 分钟申请,1 秒审批,0 人工干预。MYbank 已向超过 5300 万 家小微企业提供信贷——其中 72% 是首次借款人——违约率约为 1%。
这里的战略洞察在于:当你用一个高分辨率的环境模型取代低分辨率模型时会发生什么。通过使用其 AI 系统,MYbank 不仅仅是更快地服务于现有客户,它还能够看到一个全新的客户群体——数千万个可行借款人——而旧模型曾使这些人变得不可见。
同样的逻辑适用于任何其需求、供应或竞争动态模型是为早先 era. 构建的公司。以联合利华(Unilever)的冰淇淋业务为例。该公司没有依赖滞后的季度预测,而是创建了一个 AI 驱动的模型,该模型整合了天气概率、需求信号,以及来自 35 家工厂中大约 300 万 台联网冷柜的遥测数据。其结果是形成了一幅持续更新的图像,显示需求在何处形成以及供应可能在何处不足——这是一个市场的实时表征,让管理人员能够实时干预,而非在事后做出反应。联合利华报告称,在瑞典,预测准确率提高了 10%,而在某些地区,由 AI 赋能的冷柜所产生的洞察使销售额增长高达 30%。
对于领导者来说,实际的操作步骤是:识别出组织中使用最频繁的一两个战略模型(你的市场地图、客户细分、竞争定位),并询问 AI 是否能使它们变得更丰富、更实时且更细颗粒度。在大多数情况下,答案是肯定的。而且回报将不仅仅是更好的信息,而是能够看到当前模型无法揭示的机会与风险。
从群体思维到结构化挑战。 第三个约束是聚合:你的组织如何将多人的知识和判断结合成一项决策?理论上,多元化团队应该比任何个体单独做出的决策更好。但在实践中,战略会议受到等级制度、政治、性格和时间限制的影响。最高级别人员的观点占据了不成比例的权重。异议可能带来风险。群体过快地达成共识。
AI 提供了一种不同的方法。组织现在可以编排一种可被称为“合成审议”(synthetic deliberation)的机制,而不是依赖于一屋子激励机制不一、不敢直言的人:这种 AI 驱动的流程可以在没有群体动态社交摩擦的情况下,对想法进行压力测试。
这种机制可以很简单,也可以很复杂。例如,麦肯锡曾描述过一种多智能体工作流,其中一个“创建者”智能体起草分析报告,而一个“评论者”智能体则对其进行系统性挑战——这一过程将强有力的团队试图通过手动创建的严谨往复讨论实现了自动化。在更具雄心的尝试中,BCG 亨德森研究所描述了由大语言模型(LLM)驱动的战略战争游戏,其中智能体分别代表竞争对手、监管机构、客户和其他利益相关者。与传统的基于规则的模拟不同,这些智能体能够产生更不可预测、更像人类的反应,这迫使管理团队去面对他们凭自身可能永远无法想象到的场景。
关于 AI 提高协作构思能力最严谨的证据来自宝洁公司的一项实地实验。在一项涉及 776 名从事真实创新任务的商业和研发专业人员的研究中,研究人员发现,使用 AI 的个人所达到的质量与不使用 的两人团队的平均质量相当。使用 的团队速度快了约 12%,且更有可能产生前 10% 的顶尖解决方案。或许最重要的一点是, 减轻了商业专业人员与研发专业人员之间的孤岛效应,使每个职能部门都能接触到对方的视角,并帮助双方产生更平衡的想法。
给领导者的启示是在决策过程中建立结构化的 挑战机制。为 智能体分配不同的角色:一个负责为某个战略方向提供最强有力的支持,一个负责反对,另一个负责模拟竞争对手可能的反应。你还可以创建合成专家组(客户、区域经理、监管机构),以研究一项决策在不同利益相关者中的反响。其
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目标是确保当你的领导团队坐下来做决定时,明显的弱点已被识别,且该计划已经针对比任何单一会议所能容纳的更广泛的视角进行了压力测试。
这并不意味着 的输出应该被直接接受。大语言模型可能会产生听起来很有信心,但实际上存在细微错误、内部矛盾或基于虚构证据的分析。合成审议可以揭示有用的挑战,但它也可能产生看似合理但完全离题的反对意见。 增强战略的质量取决于输入过程的数据质量,以及至关重要的——对输出结果所应用的人类判断。这并不是避用这些工具的理由,而是精心设计流程的理由;而这正是为什么在 增强的世界中,人类战略家的角色变得更加重要,而非更不重要。
如果你读到这里,可能会在想:但如果我的竞争对手能买到和我一样的 AI 模型,这一切如何能成为竞争优势的来源? 这是一个合理的问题,如果你通过正确的视角来看,它有一个明确的答案。
最有效的类比是 1995 年的互联网。到 20 世纪 90 年代中期,互联网访问已变得广泛可用。其底层技术并非专利所有。然而,在接下来的 20 年中构建了最持久优势的公司——亚马逊、Netflix、谷歌——获胜并非因为它们拥有一个网站。它们获胜是因为它们意识到,互联网不仅仅是简单地附加在现有运营之上的东西;它是一个全新的基础,可以在其上构建竞争对手无法轻易复制的商业模式、能力和数据资产。那些将互联网视为实用工具的公司,其产品迅速变得商品化。而那些将其视为重塑平台的公司,则创造了持续数十年的护城河。
AI 正处于类似的拐点。模型本身正变得日益可用。优势在于你在模型之上构建了什么。三种方法尤为突出。
利用你的数据让 AI 更聪明。 通用 AI 模型是基于公开信息训练的。根据定义,它们是通用型的。一旦你使用专有数据——你的客户历史记录、交易模式或内部研究——对模型进行微调或 grounding(锚定),你就创造了竞争对手无法通过购买相同软件来复制的东西。摩根士丹利的 AI 助手让该公司的 16,000 名财务顾问能够访问超过 100,000 份内部研究文档,其采用率达到了 98%,并将文档检索效率从 20% 提高到 80%。Stripe 的欺诈检测系统 Radar 是另一个网络规模的例子。该系统基于处理每年超过 $1.4 万亿支付额的数百万家企业的数据进行训练,其网络中任何给定卡片被识别出的概率高达 92%。一个使用相同算法但缺乏此类数据的较小竞争对手无法与其准确度相媲美。
50 哈佛商业评论 2026 年 9 月–10 月
战略
将 AI 部署在只有你才拥有的流程中。 数据是一道护城河,流程是另一道。当一家公司将 AI 嵌入到专有工作流中——一个反映其特定战略逻辑、组织知识和竞争环境的工作流——它就创造了一种从外部难以观察、更难以复制的能力。
约翰迪尔(John Deere)的 See & Spray 系统很好地阐明了这一概念。其底层技术——计算机视觉和机器学习——是广泛可用的。但迪尔将它们嵌入到精准农业设备中,该设备每秒扫描约 2,100 平方英尺,每分钟做出超过 5,000 次喷雾决策,并将除草剂的使用量降低 50% 至 77%。护城河不在于算法,而在于 AI 与硬件、田间数据以及比竞争对手更广泛的经销商网络的集成。使这种方法具有战略性而非仅仅是运营性的原因在于,See & Spray 改变了迪尔的竞争定位:它将该公司从设备制造商转变为精准农业平台,深化了客户锁定,并围绕数据驱动的农场管理开辟了新的收入流。
战略领域有一个广为人知的观点:运营效率——即做与其它公司相同的事情但做得更好——并不等同于战略。在稳定的时期,这一区分成立。但在技术不连续的时期,已经触达新性能前沿的公司与尚未触达的公司之间的差距可能是巨大的。
Duolingo 证明了这一点。在 OpenAI 的 GPT-4 公开后不久,它就推出了由 AI 驱动的功能——角色扮演(Roleplay)、解释我的答案(Explain My Answer)和视频通话(Video Call)。但速度本身并非其护城河。Duolingo 真正的优势在于 Birdbrain,这是一个专有的学习模型,基于超过 5 亿 用户每天完成约 12.5 亿美元 次练习的行为数据训练而成。通用模型是商品。而围绕其构建、经过多年精炼且由规模远超竞争对手的行为数据驱动的学习系统,才是护城河。
AI 可以将数月的分析压缩至数日,揭示此前不可见的机遇,并对原本不会受到质疑的决策进行压力测试。采用这些能力的公司在战略质量上处于一个根本不同的水平。从理论上讲,这种优势可能是暂时的,但在实践中,它会不断产生复利:更好的决策带来更好的定位,进而产生更好的数据,从而改善未来的决策。前沿将不断移动,因此持久的优势来自于一次又一次触达前沿的能力,并且每次触达都变得更强。
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52 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
识别你的组织所使用的战略模型,并思考 AI 是否能使其更丰富、更实时且更细致。在大多数情况下,答案是肯定的。
底线是:作为一项技术,AI 正在变得无处不在。但作为一种能力——嵌入在你的数据、流程和执行速度中——则并非如此。那些将 AI 视为可购买商品的公司会发现,它虽然提高了所有人的门槛,但无法让他们脱颖而出。而那些将 AI 视为构建专有战略能力平台的公司会发现,它是当今最强大的竞争优势来源之一。
如果你想重新设计组织做出最重要决策的方式,其指南非常简单。
在缩小范围之前,先扩大选项集。 对于每一个重大战略决策——无论是收购、进入新市场还是产品组合转型——在领导团队讨论精简名单之前,先利用 AI 生成一份长名单。大多数组织缩小范围过早,是因为过去探索大量选项的成本太高。而现在不再如此。
用动态模型取代静态快照。 选择你的组织最依赖的战略呈现方式——你的客户细分、竞争地图或需求预测——并将其从周期性文档升级为随条件变化而更新的动态模型。目标是创建一张足够丰富的地图,以揭示当前框架在结构上无法揭示的内容。
将结构化挑战制度化。 优秀的战略不仅取决于产生想法,还取决于对这些想法进行严格测试。在大多数组织中,这种测试仍然受到等级制度、外交辞令以及人类过快趋同倾向的影响。不要将异议交给运气,而应将其设计进流程中。
在每一项重大承诺中建立“创建者-批评者-竞争者”的工作流:分配一个 智能体为计划提供最强有力的支持,一个负责将其拆解,另一个模拟竞争对手或监管机构将如何反应。让结构化挑战像财务建模一样成为常规。
将战略家的角色从分析师重新定义为架构师。 在认知边界狭窄的世界里,战略家的大部分时间都在收集数据、构建电子表格和填充简化框架。随着 开始打破认知限制,这些基础认知工作
可以越来越多地实现自动化——关键资源也随之从分析转向想象,从填充框架转向设计流程本身。
所有这些转变都需要一种新的人才画像:混合型战略家。符合这一画像的领导者知道如何界定战略问题,能够设计 工作流来回答该问题,并且最重要的是,明白机器在何处必须让位于人类判断。
要成为一名混合型战略家,你需要改变对决策会议的要求。在任何重大战略提案提交给领导层之前,要求提供三样东西:一份经过 扩展的、已被考虑并否决的替代方案清单;一个当前的竞争环境模型;以及一次结构化批评的结果。当执行委员会提高了对“可信建议”的标准时,组织的其余部分也会随之跟进。
最后,让 的使用常态化。摩根士丹利的 助手在 16,000 名财务顾问中的采用率达到了 98%,因为它被织入了他们已经依赖的专有研究工作流中。该工具明显改善了他们的日常工作,采用率自然随之提高。从同样的逻辑开始:找到员工已经感到痛苦的决策流程,用 重建它,并将新工作流设为默认。文化通常随实用性而演进。
想象一下你的下一次战略研讨会。但这一次,想象它是无拘无束的。
你的团队在抵达时已经审阅了 生成的数百种可能性的扫描结果,并筛选出了最具有前景的方案。墙上的市场模型是实时的,而不是六个月前的陈旧数据。在任何人提出建议之前,该建议已经通过了结构化批评——包括恶魔代言人、模拟竞争对手和持怀疑态度的客户。房间里的对话更加犀利,选项更加强大,而过去用于基础分析的时间现在用于只有人类才能回答的问题:我们相信什么?我们愿意承担什么风险?我们想成为什么样的公司? ▼
HBR Reprint R2605B
FELIPE A. CSASZAR 是密歇根大学罗斯商学院的 Alexander M. Nick 教授兼战略领域负责人。
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[注:译文超长截断]
僵化的变革计划往往以失败告终。一种更具实验性的方法可以积聚动力,并增加成功的概率。
作者
Evgeny Kaganer IESE商学院教授
Christoph Loch IESE商学院教授
摄影师 ERIN DERBY
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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ
变革 管理
关于艺术
Erin Derby 创作数字花卉拼贴画, 利用熟悉的材料 创造出出人意料的作品。
所有公司都意识到,随着技术、社会和地缘政治的碰撞产生多种相互竞争的未来,适应环境变得至关重要。但系统性变革的尝试往往以失败告终。通常,首席执行官(CEO)会设定一个大胆且单一的转型目标,然后启动多项计划来实现该目标。问题在于,该目标不断被环境的变化所动摇。结果,早期项目未能交付预期结果,新计划激增,转型之旅变得日益碎片化,导致员工疲劳和股东沮丧。
我们认为,这些失败的根本原因在于高级领导团队坚持将转型视为一个大型且复杂的项目,配备一份通往固定目标且具有结果导向指标的详细路线图。考虑到在大公司推动变革时的协调复杂性和预算需求,采取一种纪律严明、有计划的方法是可以理解的,但它最终是不可行的。公司当前业务与未来业务在知识和能力之间的差距,加上多年项目期间不可避免的环境动荡,阻碍了组织成功的机会。
一个更好的方法是将转型管理为一场学习之旅。我们所指的,是一个目标定义不完整、并随着组织做出决策、从结果中学习并相应调整而演进的过程。在开始时,高级领导者需要明确承认,虽然他们对公司应该处于什么状态有一定想法,但最终结果目前还无法完全预知。由于没有固定的终点,路线图同样不是固定的。领导团队必须通过选择一组协调的项目组合来推进,这些项目将产生最大的动力和
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许多领导者将企业转型管理得像大规模工程项目一样:他们设定一个固定目的地,创建详细的路线图,并通过短期财务结果来衡量成功。但大多数此类努力都失败了。
高管将转型视为一项执行练习,即使证据表明战略应该演进,仍强行推进僵化的计划。这抑制了学习,压制了自下而上的洞察,并产生了抵触情绪。
将转型视为一次学习之旅。不要追求一个静态的最终状态,而应旨在持续学习,并在新信息出现时进行调整。管理一个由试点项目、能力建设计划、现有业务改进以及时机精准的新创事业所组成的协调组合。
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变革管理
学习。第一波项目的洞察将随后塑造第二波项目的优先级,以此类推,动态地推动组织向一个不断演进的目标前进。
在接下来的篇幅中,我们将基于作为顾问参与美国、欧洲和亚洲 10 多个大型公司转型的研究与经验,为企业系统性变革提供一套以学习为导向的剧本。我们将通过对比通用电气(GE)较为传统的管理方式且最终失败的转型,与星展银行(DBS Bank)将其作为一场至今仍在继续的累积学习之旅的转型,来阐述我们的建议。最后,我们将描述领导者必须采取的关键行动,以确保公司保持在一条连贯且信息充分的轨迹上。
对目标目的地的清晰认知是每一次旅程的起点。这就是为什么所有的转型都需要一个愿景。愿景必须足够宏大,以激励员工投身于转型工作,同时又要足够具体,让员工和利益相关者相信它是可以实现的。
设定愿景需要接受这样一个事实:随着组织在学习过程中不断调整能量方向以反映其学习成果,愿景也会随之演变。愿景唯一不变的特性是:它必须激励一项专注于创造价值和获取价值的集体努力,并且必须将公司各部门的员工团结在一起。
让我们来看看星展银行(DBS Bank)。2010年,在危机后的经济低迷期,且在经历其历史上首次裁员之后,星展银行在新加坡的客户满意度排名垫底——人们开玩笑说 DBS 代表的是“Damn Bloody Slow”(该死地慢)。当时的首席执行官 Piyush Gupta 将这次危机视为超越全球同行的一次机会。他的愿景是将星展银行定位为“面向新亚洲的新银行”,这承认了亚洲作为全球经济和政治强国的崛起。其转型之旅的第一波(2010–2013)集中在“亚洲服务”上,银行将其定义为三个属性:尊重、易于打交道且可靠(RED)。
随着银行成功简化流程以实现 RED,愿景转向了“让银行服务充满乐趣”。这一愿景推动了将公司重心转向客户体验和数字化(2014–2018)的举措,并激发了成为“全球最佳银行”的雄心。在第三波(2019–2024)中,重点转向数据、AI 和可持续发展,愿景再次扩展:星展银行将成为“为了更美好世界的最佳银行”。在继续关注客户体验的同时,该银行目前正致力于通过使用 AI 和其他新兴技术来实现“让银行服务隐形”。此外,关注可持续且负责任的银行服务以及社会影响已成为新的优先事项。
现在让我们转向通用电气(GE),它的转向次数比星展银行少。2011年左右,时任首席执行官 Jeffrey Immelt 意识到需要从大宗硬件转向利润率更高的软件,他预测这是一个将快速增长的市场。因此,GE 在加利福尼亚州建立了一个软件中心开启了转型尝试。(该中心开发了工业互联网平台 Predix,并在 2015 年成为一个独立的子公司 Digital。)随着 Predix 的演进以及软件能力重要性的得到确认,Immelt 对业务转型的雄心也随之增长: 要成为全球前 10 大软件公司。他在组织内部和外部大力推广这一目标。
尽管这种转变看起来是自然的演进且结果看似可行,但它加剧了潜伏已久的“我们与他们”之间的文化冲突。规模(相对)较小的软件团队很难融入 历史上占据主导地位的工业文化中。而且,由于 的客户(其中许多是数字化初学者)并不完全理解销售分析服务的价值,公司在动员利益相关者采取成为前 10 大软件公司所需行动方面陷入了困境。
或许最成问题的是, 的转向似乎并没有基于其学习到的经验。相反, 似乎在遵循一份预设的路线图:首先在内部部署 Predix 平台,然后面向现有客户,最后面向所有工业企业。利用该平台销售诊断和数据服务的实质性愿景并未根据持续的发现进行实质性调整,引入新服务所带来的内部紧张局势也未与现有业务的需求相调和。最终, 的尝试比星展银行的方法更倾向于自上而下,而较少以学习为导向。这不像是一次探索,而是一次目的地从一开始就设定好的航行。
接下来,让我们看看一个演进中的愿景是如何转化为现实的。
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--。
每一次转型都要求公司的领导层决定为了实现愿景而启动哪些项目和计划,以及如何最好地协调它们。传统上,这些计划被视为达成目标的步骤,而成功则以收入和利润来衡量。然而,衡量成功的标准应该是公司能从一个项目中学习到多少:它是否减少了关键的战略未知项,并弥补了关键能力的差距?当然,领导层还必须考虑项目可能对增长势头产生的影响。它是否能提高现有业务的绩效,并切实帮助扩大新机会的规模?
在转型之旅中,公司可以追求四类项目。前两类作为学习引擎,要么是旨在测试特定假设的受控实验,要么是对新能力的投资。后两类则整合从早期项目中产生的想法和实践,以驱动现有业务和新业务的价值。
1 试点项目(Pilots)。 这些项目测试关于转型愿景中所包含的业务机会和威胁的关键假设。它们本质上是结构化的实验——范围涵盖从新产品、新流程到不同的销售渠道和变现模式——即使没有产生直接的业务结果,也应该产生必要的学习成果。例如,星展银行(DBS)2016 年在印度试运行的完全数字化零售银行服务(Digibank),是该公司转型之旅中的一个关键试点。该试点的目标是学习如何在没有物理接触点的情况下吸引并服务零售客户。所采用的主要成功指标是获取的新客户数量,而非产生的收入。
在不到两年的时间里,Digibank 在印度的客户数量从零增长到 200 万。该项目在盈利方面较为吃力,但银行从中汲取了关键教训,从而使其在其他市场的运营和盈利能力得到了实质性提升。例如,在印度推出 Digibank 时,星展银行开发了一套寻找、引导和开发生态系统合作伙伴的方法论,以加强客户获取并扩展其价值主张。随后,它将这套方法论推广到整个银行,以加强其在本土市场的定位(这一步骤属于下文将提到的“期权项目”)。
然而,在通用电气(GE),情况则有所不同。当其技术平台 Predix 的首次试点测试表明许多客户尚未准备好数字化,且不理解新服务时,该公司并未将这一教训铭记在心。尽管 GE Digital 确实引入了客户诊所,但它仍执意推进 Predix 的规模化。它没有从负面信息中学习,而是提供了更多培训,并加倍执行其计划。
2 期权项目(Options)。 这类项目专注于构建在人员和技术方面所需的能力,以支持未来业务的规模化以及试点项目正在测试的运营模式。这些投资应该弥补关键的能力差距,但它们通常不会产生直接的业务收益。其成功应通过新能力的采用或部署的广泛程度和有效程度来衡量。对员工培训计划的投资或新技术的部署就是此类示例。我们将这类项目称为“期权”,是因为它们使公司能够执行原本无法完成的任务。
星展银行(DBS)在其转型过程中启动了众多期权项目。该银行需要构建员工的能力,例如客户旅程思维、纪律化的实验、数据驱动的决策以及敏捷的工作方式。每项能力都需要行为支架——即利用全球最佳实践开发,并针对星展银行的具体情境、工具和教练支持而调整的分步方法论。员工被允许在脱离主要职责的时间里,将他们正在学习的实践应用于实际问题,且不受自上而下、结果驱动的压力影响。
在技术方面,该银行在 2014 年决定开发一套 API 是一项明确的期权计划。尽管星展银行最初并未为其定义商业案例,但 API 后来成为了 Digibank 在印度进入市场战略的基石。例如,基于 API 的集成让客户能够通过无分行流程开户,并由合作伙伴地点的生物识别认证提供支持。随后,API 在创建新的
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在三年之内,星展银行在新加坡银行的客户满意度排名中从垫底上升至第一,向利益相关者提供了转型有效的切实证明。

60 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
新加坡的生态系统商业模式(如星展银行汽车和房屋市场)中发挥了关键作用,它将买家和卖家与更广泛的合作伙伴生态系统连接起来。
在通用电气(GE),一项关键的期权计划是 FastWorks 创新平台,其部分灵感来自精益创业理念。为了让员工接受这一概念,公司让 60,000 名员工参加了培训计划。然而,人们很快发现,精益创业的“快速失败”方法与现有的“绝不失败”文化产生了冲突,而这种文化是 GE 的六西格玛质量管理方法的结果。当首次部署未能立即产生结果时(而且 GE 并没有强制所有部门使用 FastWorks),许多员工在培训结束后直接回到了原有的工作模式。
为了最大化学习效果,期权项目必须与试点项目紧密协调,因为试点项目通常会揭示出可以通过针对性期权来解决的能力差距。相反,尽管期权项目并非明确旨在交付业务结果,但它们可以激发塑造未来试点的想法。在星展银行,Digibank 的试点揭示了将数据视为战略资产的必要性,这促使公司启动了“数据优先”(Data-First)计划——一套旨在构建全行数据驱动决策能力的期权项目。同样,在另一项期权计划中启动的人才黑客松,不仅帮助中层管理人员采用了创业式工作方式,还产生了后来被加速转化为试点并推向市场的原型。
相比之下,GE 的转型项目之间缺乏协调。FastWorks 计划从未与 Predix 达成一致,且它们的工具包(轻量级敏捷与规模化敏捷)并不完全兼容。结果,这两种方法产生了摩擦而非协同效应。Predix 需要赢得更多客户的要求,与业务部门需要用现有产品继续满足当前客户的需求相冲突。其计划组合从未能产生大于部分之和的效果;它仅仅是一系列最终相互阻碍的行动集合。
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此类项目将来自试点项目的新战略洞察和来自期权项目的能力应用于核心运营,以驱动顶线(营收)和底线(利润)的增长。虽然大多数组织不认为 EBI 是转型之旅的一部分,但我们强烈建议将这些项目纳入转型组合。其成功可以通过传统的投资回报率(ROI)指标来衡量,并且是展示早期胜利和维持势头的有力方式。
由于 EBI 基于现有的业务模式并能快速整合新能力,因此可以在转型之旅的任何时间点开展。星展银行(DBS)在其转型之旅的早期和后期都启动了 EBI
变革管理
项目。例如,作为其 RED 服务规模扩大的一个环节,该银行对其在既有市场的运营模式进行了渐进式改进,以提供更快、更可靠的服务。在三年内,星展银行在新加坡银行的客户满意度排名中从垫底升至第一,向利益相关者提供了转型有效的切实证明。
确保 EBI 能够吸收试点项目中已习得的教训,并利用期权项目中开发的能力,是成功的关键。通用电气(GE)再次提供了一个警示案例。在其所谓的转型之初,它试图通过在内部运营中应用 Predix 来改进其既有业务。但与星展银行不同,通用电气在 Predix 的技术能力尚未充分建立且业务假设尚未得到验证之前,就推出了其 EBI。业务部门对此产生了抵触。一些部门转而悄悄构建自己的工具,理由是 缺乏关键功能,且销售团队难以向客户解释其价值。一系列技术问题和开发延迟进一步削弱了业务部门对 能显著改善其核心业务的信心。结果,通用电气的业务部门将 视为一种干扰而非明确的价值创造者,各部门与 GE Digital 之间的信任受损。
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风险投资(Ventures)。 第四类项目侧重于通过利用从试点中获得的洞察和从期权中获得的能力,来扩展已验证的业务模式。这些风险投资针对新市场、新客户群体和新业务模式,以产生新的收入流。其成功由财务和增长指标来衡量。扩大新业务的规模取决于已验证的假设和成熟的能力。由于两者缺一不可,过早进入风险投资项目会带来失败风险,通用电气与 GE Digital 的风险投资便说明了这一点。高级领导团队必须保持耐心,以确保其风险投资建立在坚实的基础之上。
再次以星展银行为例。其第一个重大风险投资项目——在 Beta 版发布后在印度扩大 Digibank 的规模——直到该银行转型之旅的第六年才出现。到那时,星展银行已经积累了成功所需的知识和能力。随后,星展银行的组合扩展到包含更多
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变革管理
计划,例如 Digibank 印度尼西亚,标志着其自信地转向扩大新业务规模。
相比之下,通用电气行动迅速。它在 2013 年在内部部署了 ,并在 2014 年开始向现有客户销售分析服务,将其作为一项拥有独立损益表的风险投资。随后在 2016 年,它将 作为一种面向全球所有工业企业的“操作系统”提供。虽然如果通用电气能获得赢家通吃地位,该风险投资将带来巨额回报,但工业客户难以看到通用电气服务的价值,且销售团队缺乏解释和销售这些服务的培训与资源。结果,业绩滞后,质疑声增加,董事会和股东的支持也随之减弱。
因此,除了协调试点项目和方案外,公司还必须平衡在何时何地应用新的洞察和能力,以产生切实的商业价值,无论是在提高经济增加值(EBI)方面,还是在开展新业务方面。各项活动应当互为补充,避免在不同的方向上形成各自的惯性,并共同产生大于各部分之和的协同效应。有时,新的学习会引导公司增加新的举措,而有时则会引导公司停止一项成功的举措。根据每个项目所传达的教训采取行动,对于实现成功的转型之旅至关重要。
将转型管理视为一场长期旅程在本质上是困难的。路线图必然会随着时间的推移而发生变化,这可能会导致员工感到迷茫或疲惫,从而减缓推进势头。在整个旅程中维持利益相关者的热情是领导层的责任。这可以通过三种方式实现:
提供纪律。 转型通常始于分布在不同团队、预算和目标中的零散举措。为了防止产生碎片感或幻灭感,领导者必须立即且有意识地组建一个项目组合,并确保该组合与既定愿景相一致。每个项目必须在为整体旅程做出贡献方面拥有明确的目标(不一定是财务目标),并且必须服务于转型的更广泛背景。定期的沟通有助于员工理解为何变革是必要的,并能防止产生某些部门或利益相关者被亏待的认知。
执行团队还需要建立一支强大的内部转型团队。在转型旅程之初,星展银行(DBS)创建了一个转型小组,其主要职责是识别技能和能力的关键差距,并设计和运行转型方法论——例如客户旅程、业务实验和敏捷实践——以帮助全行员工将新的工作方式融入到日常活动中。该小组被安置在技术与运营部门内部,而非作为一个独立单元。
这种定位带来了两个好处:该小组与技术试点和 EBI 紧密结合,并避免了被视为脱离实际的企业职能部门。转型小组与技术侦察和创新团队密切合作,后者专注于建立内部和外部利益相关者之间的联系。这些团队共同发挥赋能者和催化剂的作用,而非作为转型的主要引擎。然而,在通用电气(GE),转型的主要推力落在 GE Digital 上,由其向核心业务部门强加变革。
在星展银行,项目得到了广泛的沟通和解释,使得即使是没有直接参与的人员也能理解正在发生的事情,并能适应项目带来的影响。例如,为了帮助将“让银行服务充满快乐”的愿景转化为具体行动,星展银行创建并积极推广了一个被其称为
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在所有业务部门中推行“获取、交易、参与”(Acquire, Transact, Engage)。每一步都得到了清晰的解释,且所有员工都能获得相关培训。而在通用电气(GE),领导层没有传递统一的信息,这并非因为他们不知道沟通的重要性(他们确实就成功案例和结果进行了沟通),而是因为主要项目(Predix 和 FastWorks)之间相互依赖且互补的关系,从未被确定为转型的关键赋能因素。
欢迎自下而上的想法。 在星展银行(DBS),首次转向以客户旅程为驱动的设计思维,源于在运营活动中揭示的学习成果。投资组合选择的构建模块来自分散在公司各处的知识;高管层则对其中最具前景的想法进行优先级排序并提供资金。许多自下而上的想法催生了星展银行转型投资组合中的重要项目。例如,对客户旅程的重视,源于一个负责流程改进的团队意识到,并非所有客户问题都能通过精简内部流程来解决。该团队开发了一套方法论并向管理层进行了演示,管理层对此印象深刻并将其采纳。随着时间的推移,客户旅程成为了转型的关键元素,进而催生了“生活更多,银行更少”(Live more, bank less)的愿景。
为了能够识别出最具前景的想法,星展银行的高管定期参与转型活动。例如,首席执行官在试点开发和启动期间,每周与 Digibank 团队会面。Digibank 试点是转型旅程中的一个拐点,产生了许多自下而上的洞察(例如生态系统商业模式和数据驱动的决策),这些洞察随后被提升为选项计划。
然而在通用电气,转型在很大程度上是由自上而下的想法驱动的,这限制了基于员工学习而进行的转向,并降低了更广泛组织内部的认同感。我们没有发现任何证据表明,自下而上的想法能够触发其所执行项目进程的重大改变。相反,有证据表明,高级管理层将任何关于所选方向或推进速度的质疑都给打发掉了。
将转向纳入衡量体系。 学习成果必须反映在不断演进的计分卡中,以绘制出一张清晰——尽管是动态的——路线图。在星展银行,早期的跟踪重点是流程改进,衡量标准是客户与银行互动的时长。随着时间的推移,衡量标准发生了转移:首先转向客户的“愉悦感”,然后转向来自数字化触点的收入。这些演进的衡量标准传达了优先级,并强化了转型的逻辑。在通用电气,此类演进指标的缺失导致了不公平感的产生、组织紧张局势,并最终导致支持体系的崩溃。
星展银行刻意利用公司计分卡来支持其转型工作。2016年,转型关键绩效指标(KPI)以“让银行服务充满愉悦”为标签被引入计分卡,多年来其权重从 15% 增长到 20%。计分卡不断演进,以明确强化转型投资组合的关键元素。最初它关注于关键选项和 EBI,但在第八年,一些更具战略性的风险投资项目出现在战略优先级部分(占总体的 40%)。
换句话说,计分卡成为了一个向整个组织发出信号的载体,告知在特定阶段转型投资组合中哪些元素最为重要。它强化了支持这些优先级的行为,并随着时间的推移,使转型旅程变得连续且易于理解。计分卡帮助领导层传达出:“这就是我们走过的路,以及我们将要前往的方向。”
首席执行官被期望能够明确并实现目标。他们自然会将所有挑战都以此方式对待。但大规模的转型涉及深层的架构变革,这些变革在漫长的时间跨度中展开,且产生的结果至少在部分程度上是不可预见的。转型目标无法仅通过果断的行动和资源投入来实现。相反,它们必须经过推测、探索、修正,并不断地与组织应有的演进愿景重新挂钩。这就是为什么我们主张,领导者必须成为无畏的探索者,准备好在目标和环境演变时调整航向。他们面临的根本挑战,或许在于如何平衡探索所需的谦逊与激励团队所需的自信。 ▼
HBR Reprint R2605℃
EVGENY KAGANER 是巴塞罗那 IESE 商学院的教授,以及 IESE-MIT 全球 CEO 项目的学术总监。CHRISTOPH LOCH 是巴塞罗那 IESE 商学院的教授,曾任剑桥大学 Judge 商学院院长。
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64 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
PHOTOGRAPHER CHRIS AULD
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克里斯·奥尔德(Chris Auld)在从事了20年的商业摄影工作后,转向了自行车摄影,拍摄了包括环法自行车赛在内的众多赛事。
大多数公司在协作程度上感到困扰。单打独斗会降低自身速度;但过度协作则面临将竞争优势拱手让给竞争对手的风险。
最聪明的公司会划定一条界线。它们在“核心”领域(如基础设施和标准)进行协作,以助力整个市场的增长;然后在“边缘”领域展开激烈竞争,从而实现差异化。
通过权衡五个因素来寻找最佳路径:市场动态、技术生命周期阶段、在技术栈中的位置、竞争程度,以及社会认可度和监管。当协作能扩大市场或降低风险时选择协作,在希望脱颖而出的地方选择竞争,并随情况变化不断调整。

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给企业的启示不仅仅是“增加协作”,而是“智能协作”。在能让你跑得更快时选择协同,在需要获胜时选择突破。

战略
每年夏天,环法自行车赛(TOUR DE FRANCE)将耐力转化为一场戏剧。在三周的时间里,全世界关注着骑手们穿越山脉、风 sweeping 的平原以及混乱的城市终点。如果你想观察动态的战略,请观察主车群(peloton)。来自不同团队的骑手——他们拥有不同的赞助商、领导者和抱负,是直接的竞争对手——组成了一个密集且快速移动的群体。在这个临时且非正式的联盟内部,每个人都受益于风阻的降低。领骑者承担最多的工作,而后面的骑手则节省体力。位置不断轮换。随着时间的推移,这个群体的移动速度比任何单打独斗的骑手都要快。
然后,休战突然瓦解。坡度变陡,速度下降,空气动力学优势消失。竞争者必须选择最佳时机脱离群体。在环法赛中,骑手们在两种模式之间不断切换:当协作能让整个群体更强大时选择协作,而当差异化决定结果时选择竞争。
在当今的市场中,速度、互操作性和信任决定了新技术能否获得认可。大多数公司无法负担独立构建技术生态系统的成本。这也是为什么我们在 AI 领域看到如此多循环交易的部分原因。AI 系统依赖于没有任何一家公司能完全控制的共享基础设施。训练模型需要芯片、云容量、数据管道、软件工具和分发渠道,而这些由不同的公司拥有或供应。循环交易(公司之间相互投资或签署互惠合作伙伴关系)有助于统一激励机制。企业共享关键组件,锁定供应,并向外界传递其对共同生态系统的承诺。在这种承诺的推动下,该领域激烈的竞争对手们联合起来创建共享标准组织(例如 Agentic AI 基金会),以确保未来的生态系统保持互操作性。实际上,这种共享降低了风险。每个参与者都知道其他人也投入了利益,这使得整个技术生态系统更容易快速规模化。
但如果公司协作过于广泛,就有可能失去辛苦赢得的竞争优势。这意味着真正的战略问题不在于是否协作,而在于在何处协作。为了回答这个问题,有必要将公司的活动分为两个层面。第一层是“核心”(core),包括允许其生态系统运行和增长的基础设施、接口、标准和安全实践。第二层是“边缘”(edge),公司在此通过使用专有工作流、集成体验、品牌忠诚度、数据和商业模式,为客户创造独特的价值。挑战在于,这两者之间的界限在不断移动。今天让你脱颖而出的特质,明天可能就变得商品化,而且协作越来越多地通过非正式生态系统而非传统联盟来实现。因此,领导者需要一个实用的框架,以便逐案决定协作何时能增强其战略,何时又在悄悄地侵蚀战略。
接下来的内容是我用来帮助领导者做出该决定的框架。它基于我的学术研究、对数十位行业从业者的访谈以及我作为顾问的工作。该框架围绕五个因素构建,并立足于技术密集型和低技术行业中可识别的共同模式。如果环法自行车赛(the Tour)能给商业带来启示,那不仅仅是“增加协作”,而是“智能协作”。在能让你跑得更快时起草协议;在需要获胜时脱离队伍。企业必须学会同样的操作。
大多数领导者面临的困境并非因为他们厌恶协作,而是因为失败的代价很高,且失败频繁发生。如果协作不足,你可能会在重复工作、碎片化标准和生态系统的不信任中浪费数年时间。如果过度协作,你可能会在无意中培训了竞争对手,泄露战略诀窍,或者使你曾经拥有的优势变得平庸化。在企业的实践中,我看到了三个可预见的错误。
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68 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
战略
首先,高管们在谈论合作时,往往将其视为一种二元对立的状态:“我们要合作”或者“我们不合作”。但协作有多种形式,从轻量级的协调(共享标准或共享威胁情报)到深层的共同开发(正式的研发合作伙伴关系)不等。认为协作必须意味着建立一个拥有共享团队、路线图和治理机制的全面联盟,这种想法会产生关于控制权、依赖性和价值获取的不必要恐惧。更好的模式是将协作视为一系列选项的光谱,每个选项具有不同的风险水平和不同的战略回报。
经典的“竞合”(co-opetition)指南强调,挑战在很大程度上在于范围和控制。合作延伸到什么程度?谁来管理协作?如果合作不再具有意义,又该如何撤出?一旦领导者将协作视为一套工具,而非一次巨大的豪赌,他们就可以选择风险最低且仍能实现目标的机制。
第二个错误是认为在共享核心(shared core)上进行协作主要是一种善意行为。这种普遍信念变成了自我实现的预言:领导者因为看不到投资回报率(ROI)而削减协作投入,随后这些协作因为资源不足而失败。但许多最具影响力的协作案例,最好被理解为旨在重塑竞争格局的竞争举措。
苹果和谷歌在新冠疫情期间就接触通知(exposure notification)开展的共同工作就是一个极佳的例子。这两家在平台层面激烈竞争的公司构建了一个互操作层,允许公共卫生部门广泛部署基于蓝牙的接触通知。苹果将此次协作定义为帮助卫生机构减少疾病传播的努力(一个对所有人都有利的社会公益),同时重点强调 iPhone 增强的隐私和安全性(这是 iOS 和 Android 之间的一个差异点,且经常被消费者低估)。即便当时的情况较为特殊,但其战略逻辑是熟悉的:当客户对产品的采用取决于跨平台互操作性和信任时,核心部分太重要了,不能保持碎片化。而围绕核心的协作,反而可以提供一个机会,让差异化的关键方面脱颖而出。
第三个错误是盲目遵循传统的合作战略剧本。经典的合作战略倾向于强调正式联盟、合资企业和合同伙伴关系。这些依然重要。但在
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数字时代,许多最重要的合作动态发生在正式框架之外。随着技术变得更加模块化、分层化且依赖于生态系统,企业越来越多地通过非正式或社区驱动的方式进行协作。这带来了一个新挑战:领导者不能仅依赖熟悉的合资企业检查清单,他们需要一种方法来评估新型的协作形式。
该框架背后的经济逻辑是,协作能为所有人增加价值。在核心领域协作,既能提高客户的支付意愿(通过增强信任、互操作性、质量和采用率),也能降低成本(通过共享研发和减少重复建设)。在边缘领域竞争则是一种价值捕获策略。在这里,你构建差异化的体验、工作流、分销渠道和品牌承诺,从而能够掌控溢价定价,有机地锁定客户,并维持或提升你的竞争优势。但协作与竞争之间的界限该如何划分?
好消息是,这条界限并非玄学。在各行各业中,它往往由五个可预测的因素决定。一旦领导者将这些因素明确纳入考量,他们将不再争论模糊的哲学问题(如“开放还是封闭”或“合作伙伴还是自主构建”),而是开始做出清晰且可修正的决策。
现在,让我们看看每个因素如何塑造核心与边缘之间的边界,以及真实的公司是如何运用该框架的。
赢家通吃动态。 某些市场奖励互操作性,并允许出现多个赢家。而另一些市场则倾向于向一个主导平台、标准或生态系统倾斜。在赢家通吃(或赢家通大)的市场中,协作可能具有异常高的风险,也可能具有异常强大的力量,这取决于它如何影响临界点。如果市场可能向单一所有者控制的平台倾斜,你必须小心,不要资助未来的捕获者。如果市场可能向开放或共享标准倾斜,早期协作有助于防止碎片化,并确保你能够参与控制该标准
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同时在对客户至关重要的边缘领域继续竞争。如果市场不太可能变成赢家通吃,那么更多的协作将是有益的。
以技术组织 EMVCo 为例,它由包括美国运通(American Express)、Discover、JCB、万事达卡(Mastercard)、银联(UnionPay)和 Visa 在内的主要支付网络监管。它制定全球规范,以确保基于卡的支付能够安全且无缝地运行。支付并非一个赢家通吃的业务。大多数人持有多种信用卡,并在购物时使用多个支付处理器。各大支付网络在核心轨道上进行协作,因为互操作性对所有人都有利。但他们在欺诈工具、发卡关系、商户服务、定价和奖励方面竞争激烈。这是一个典型的“开放标准核心,差异化边缘”的举措。将必须在任何地方都能运行的部分标准化;在设备、生态系统和用户体验上展开竞争。
在赢家通吃市场中,目标既不是协作,也不是不协作。目标是以能够防止市场向竞争对手倾斜的方式进行协作,并确保竞争之战发生在你能获胜的地方。
技术生命周期阶段。 您是在扩大品类规模,还是在争夺市场份额?技术往往遵循 S 曲线:早期的不确定性、快速增长、成熟以及最终的衰退。协作与竞争之间的平衡沿着这条曲线而转移。在早期阶段,公司面临的最大问题通常不是击败竞争对手,而是获得采用:证明可行性、建立标准、降低不确定性并构建互补产品。协作可以成为加速品类本身增长的一种方式。随着技术进入增长和成熟阶段,战略路径转向差异化:功能优势、客户体验、成本定位和产品稳定性。协作依然存在,但通常范围较窄且具有防御性(例如,围绕安全等共同风险)。最后,在衰退阶段,随着技术被逐步淘汰或取代,竞争对手往往会通过协作来延长其寿命,尤其是当他们并非替代技术的开发者时。
让我们来看看电动汽车(EV)行业。在电动汽车转型的早期,该品类面临着一个典型的采用障碍:消费者、供应商和基础设施提供商
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需要确信电动汽车将是一个可行的市场。特斯拉决定开放某些电池和充电专利,以鼓励更广泛的行业采用和生态系统投资。该公司在赋能环境的部分领域与其他电动汽车制造商协作,同时在产品、品牌和执行力方面保持竞争。例如,特斯拉为丰田的 RAV4 EV 供应电池组。尽管当时许多旁观者质疑这一举动,但它有助于扩大电动汽车市场,并带来了额外好处,使特斯拉能够掌控这个成长中行业的标准。
这种在技术生命周期早期的协作发生在多种行业中。例如,在制药领域,“前竞争联盟”(precompetitive consortiums)允许竞争对手在基础研究方面进行协作,以帮助他们开发新药和治疗方法。
由 Regeneron 领导的对英国生物样本库(UK Biobank)中 500,000 名参与者进行基因组测序的联盟就是一个例子。Regeneron 及其竞争对手 AbbVie、Alnylam、AstraZeneca、Biogen 和 Pfizer 各贡献了 1000万美元 以支持这项工作。他们的协作将测序时间表提前了三年。参与的公司可以获取这些极其重要的数据,并利用其开发新药。
关于增长阶段缺乏协作的例子,可以看看 2010 年代后期的流媒体服务行业。随着竞争加剧,Netflix、亚马逊 Prime Video 和 Hulu 等主要参与者试图通过提供独特的用户体验、独家内容以及使用专利算法来使自己实现差异化。因为他们专注于夺取市场份额并建立品牌主导地位,所以他们选择相互竞争而非协作。
如前所述,一旦市场进入衰退阶段,其参与者往往会回归协作。例如,考虑紧凑光盘(CD)。随着数字流媒体的兴起和 CD 销量的下滑,CD 制造商和唱片公司在营销活动和特别发行方面开展协作,试图在颠覆面前延长该技术的寿命。
生命周期思维可以防止高管犯一个常见错误:认为既然早期的协作举措是合理的,那么它就永远是正确的举措。核心部分通常会随着时间的推移而稳定,而边缘之战则会愈演愈烈。
技术栈位置。 技术存在于技术栈之中。底层(或基础设施)最能从互操作性中获益,而高层(应用程序)则最能从差异化中获益。
我们在大型科技公司中经常看到这种动态。例如,当谷歌开发云技术
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Kubernetes(该技术可实现应用程序管理的自动化等功能)时,公司意识到,由于它处于技术栈如此低的层级,因此不会带来竞争优势。因此,谷歌将其免费分享给全世界,随后将其捐赠给非营利组织云原生计算基金会。在短短几年内,谷歌在云计算领域的主要竞争对手(微软 Azure 和亚马逊云科技)采用了 Kubernetes 并开始严重依赖它。他们也参与了其开发。尽管谷歌将一项重要的技术交给了竞争对手,但这样做通过帮助加速云计算的普及创造了价值。此外,在部署和集成这项如今至关重要的技术方面,谷歌比竞争对手提前获得了数年的领先优势。
相反,考虑在技术栈较高层级竞争的优步和 Lyft。尽管它们的移动应用程序依赖于相似的底层技术(例如 GPS 导航和支付处理),但这两家公司在利用技术栈的中层(定价和路由算法)和顶层(用户界面)来使服务产品、用户体验和品牌定位实现差异化方面展开了激烈竞争。
这对高管意味着什么?如果你在从事基础设施层的工作,例如协议、接口、安全实践和赋能组件,你应该默认
询问:“为了解锁普及,哪些必须具备互操作性?”这些核心领域就是协作的候选对象。
如果你在从事更接近终端客户的工作——例如工作流集成、专有数据、品牌塑造或分销——你的默认问题应该是:“为了获胜,哪些必须保持唯一性?”答案就是你竞争的候选对象。
仅凭技术栈位置无法为你做出决定,但理解这一点将大大提高你在正确的位置划定核心与边缘分界线的概率。
竞争程度。 当竞争激烈时,共同风险会增加。直觉告诉我们,低竞争可以使协作变得更容易:企业感受到的威胁较少,且构建市场的收益更为明显。虽然随着竞争达到中等水平,协作的动力会下降,但一个不那么直观但极其重要的观点是,高竞争在特定领域(尤其是围绕共同风险)也能增加协作。网络安全就是一个例子。
安全具有对抗性;攻击者会利用最薄弱的环节。如果一家公司发现了新的漏洞却秘而不宣,攻击者可以在其他地方利用该漏洞,这最终会损害客户并侵蚀整个类别的信任。因此,
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策略
竞争对手在激烈争夺客户的同时,经常会共享关于威胁的情报。2014 年,Fortinet、赛门铁克、迈克菲和 Palo Alto Networks 达成了一项非正式协议,以共享网络安全情报。这一努力非常成功,以至于这些公司后来通过创建网络威胁联盟将其正式化。该联盟至今仍然活跃,拥有数十家成员公司,而所有成员之间互为竞争对手。从战略角度来看,这就是“在核心风险层协作,在产品和服务的边缘竞争”。你在共享学习的边际价值巨大且失败会损害所有人合法性的领域进行协作。你在可以向客户收费的项目(成果、集成、性能和信任)上进行竞争。
高竞争也提高了协作治理的标准。如果你在某个领域协作,而在其他领域激烈竞争,你需要更清晰的界限、更明确的范围以及撤销共同努力的明确路径。
必须认识到,这些原则适用于产品市场的竞争。在劳动力市场竞争(即公司争夺同一批员工)中,情况则有所不同。当劳动力竞争处于中等水平时,公司可以将协作机会(例如在研发或开源软件方面)作为吸引优秀人才的福利。然而,当劳动力竞争较低时,公司不需要提供这种福利;而当竞争激烈时,他们则无法负担。
社会认可与监管。 当合法性受到威胁时,协作有助于稳定市场。某些技术会面临质疑、抵制或监管的不确定性。在这种情况下,协作通常成为建立合法性、制定负责任的标准并避免冲突规则导致混乱的一种方式。
苹果公司和谷歌公司在接触通知(exposure notification)方面的合作再次具有启发意义。其战略潜台词很简单:如果公众信任崩溃,采用率就会崩溃。在保护隐私的核心层进行协作,能够赢得更广泛的信任并提高可用性,同时让这些公司在其他领域继续激烈竞争。
现在,将视角从狭义的“技术”扩展开来。技术的范畴比软件和数字经济更广。它包括产品、流程,甚至类别层级的实践。这套五因素框架依然适用。让我们看看软饮料行业。随着公众对糖分和肥胖问题的关注增加,各大饮料公司受到了审查。其中一种应对方式是采取集体行动——行业承诺以及正式和非正式的伙伴关系。2014年,激烈竞争的对手可口可乐、Dr Pepper Snapple Group 和百事公司开展了一项协作努力,旨在降低全国人均饮料热量摄入。在一次电视广告活动中,来自每家公司的配送员愉快地一起走在街上,旨在让消费者知道他们都在协作应对公众的关切。
类似的跨行业努力在监管不确定时期十分常见,此时竞争对手会共同协作,帮助塑造管理其行业的法律。从战略角度来看,这遵循相同的模式:在核心合法性层(共同承诺、透明度规范、公共信息传递和可衡量目标)进行协作,而在产品、品牌、定价和分销等边缘领域激烈竞争,因为这些边缘领域才是客户决定谁胜出的地方。
当社会认可和监管成为核心时,将合法性视为一个公关问题是错误的。这是一个生态系统设计问题。协作可能是设定可信规范最快的方式,尤其是当监管机构在密切关注,而另一种选择是面对一套碎片化、不兼容或惩罚性的规则时。
若想在一个当代案例中看到所有五个因素,可以观察 Anthropic 决定共享模型上下文协议(Model Context Protocol,简称 MCP)的举措。MCP 是一项允许大语言模型(LLM)和 AI 智能体等 AI 模型与外部数据集及工具进行通信的标准。Anthropic 将 MCP 捐赠给了新成立的智能体 基金会(Agentic Foundation,简称 AAIF),并与直接竞争对手 OpenAI(以及包括谷歌和微软在内的 智能体领域其他竞争对手)共同加入了该基金会。
Anthropic 所处的市场竞争环境是以开发工具、集成和兼容性为中心构建生态系统的。对于企业而言,同时使用多个平台虽然可行,但成本高昂。建立标准可以减少市场碎片化,而塑造该标准的公司将影响市场的方向。
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明确告知你的合作伙伴哪些信息是禁区,决策将如何做出,以及如果条件发生变化,协作安排将如何调整。
Anthropic 的公告称,它希望在 MCP 成为既定的赋能基础设施的过程中,使其保持“开放、中立且由社区驱动”。如果我们使用该框架来评估这一举措,所有五个因素都表明这是一个正确的决定。
赢家通吃:如果智能体生态系统出现倾斜,它很可能会向共享接口和开发默认值倾斜。通过与竞争对手共享 MCP,Anthropic 使自己处于能够帮助设定标准方向的有利位置。
技术生命周期阶段:智能体 系统处于早期阶段,这意味着市场增长取决于减少摩擦和不确定性。
技术栈位置:MCP 位于赋能层,是一个允许工具和模型协同工作的接口和协议;竞争性的应用程序可以在其之上构建。
竞争程度:竞争异常激烈。没有一家公司愿意将未来押在竞争对手的私有接口上。由 AAIF 进行的中立治理降低了这一风险。
社会认可与监管:随着对 的审查日益增加,可靠的治理和开放性可以提高信任并加速负责任的采用。
Anthropic 协作并非为了表现友善。它意识到,在核心领域进行协作可能是扩大市场并防止市场向 Anthropic 不希望的方向发展的最快方式。在模型、产品、安全系统、企业工作流、定价、分销和品牌等边缘领域,它仍有充足的竞争空间。
一个很好的切入点是绘制你的技术栈图谱。识别你所运作的各个层级——从支撑技术的底层基础设施和接口,到面向用户的体验层。思考客户在每个层级上重视什么。这将有助于明确哪些部分充当共享基础,而哪些部分塑造了客户体验。
接下来,列出潜在的核心候选组件。这些组件如果能实现互操作性、建立信任或共同降低风险,可能会提高采用率或降低成本。在这个阶段,扩大筛选范围是有帮助的,你可以在之后再精简名单。
然后,使用该框架的其他四个因素来评估每个候选组件。询问市场是否可能向某个主导标准倾斜,以及该技术处于生命周期的哪个阶段。考虑竞争的激烈程度,以及竞争对手是否面临共同的风险(如安全威胁)。接着,思考社会认可度的情况以及监管环境。
完成上述步骤后,选择能够实现目标的最轻量级协作机制。通常你不需要正式的联盟。一个共享的技术标准、一个由中立机构治理的项目或共享的威胁情报可能就足够了。关键是从一开始就清晰地定义协作范围和控制机制,并确保符合反垄断法规。
你必须确定协作与竞争之间的界限在哪里。明确哪些信息仍是你竞争优势的一部分且禁止协作方接触,决策将如何做出,以及如果情况发生变化,协作安排将如何调整。
同步设计你的边缘策略至关重要。公司常犯的一个错误是构建了强大的共享核心,却忽视了赢得客户的差异化能力。尽早决定你在哪些方面将与竞争对手产生显著差异,并在此进行投资。
最后,定期重新审视界限。随着市场的成熟,昨天的边缘往往会变成明天的核心。每 6 到 12 个月重新检查一次界限,有助于确保你的策略随市场而演进。
环法自行车赛(TOUR DE FRANCE)不仅仅是一堂关于团队合作或个人英雄主义的课,它更是一堂关于在正确时机切换模式的课。这也是公司应该铭记在心的。如果全部自行构建,你会到达得太晚;如果毫无界限地协作,你将帮助对手追赶甚至超越你。
战略技巧在于划定界限:在核心上协作以扩大市场、降低风险并加速采用,然后在边缘上竞争以提供并获取独特价值。换句话说,在能让你跑得更快时骑在主车群(peloton)中,然后选择时机脱颖而出。 ▼
HBR 重印 R2605D
FRANK NAGLE 是微软的首席 AI 经济学家,也是麻省理工学院数字经济计划的研究科学家。
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组织 决策
插画师 RODRIGO VALENZUELA
作者
Kris Johnson Ferreira
哈佛商学院 副教授
Jordan Tong
威斯康星 商学院 教授
新一代工具可以连接 职能部门,并减少 拖慢公司速度的 摩擦。
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关于艺术
Rodrigo Valenzuela 的《新土地》(New Land)系列绘画探索了向西扩张的历史,采用一项劳动密集型的印刷工艺来表现移民所承受的官僚负担。
想象一下,一项新关税被宣布 针对对公司业务至关重要的进口商品征收,并将于 60 天后生效。公司首席执行官建议“提前”采购库存——比原计划更早地购买
旨在通过在关税生效前提前进口货物,以保护利润率和市场份额。逻辑很清晰。然而,几周后,这一举措并未按首席执行官(CEO)的意愿执行。在采购、物流、财务、法务、营销、销售和商品管理等不同职能部门之间经过多轮修改和妥协后,公司实施了一系列拼凑且次优的行动,导致在关税生效前未能确保获得大部分关键货物。
在过去的十年中,公司在更智能的工具上投入了巨资,包括用于起草文档和总结报告的 AI 助手,以及用于预测需求的机器学习系统。如果运用得当,这些工具可以提高职能部门内部定义明确、范围狭窄的任务绩效。但大多数公司尚未解决一个更深层的结构性挑战:如何利用 AI 来做出并执行企业范围的决策。这就是下一个前沿领域:能够协调跨职能决策和知识的 -人类系统。
这就是我们所称的智能体 编排系统(agentic orchestration systems)。在我们关于人类- 协作的实地研究中,我们采访了沃尔玛、亚马逊、爱立信、Ramp、美敦科技以及其他正在构建此类系统的公司高管。他们正在取得实质性进展,但这些计划仍处于早期阶段:即使是最先进的组织,距离实现全面的企业级编排仍有很长的路要走。尽管如此,我们仍能预见这项技术将如何演进,而且我们关于 与人类协作最有效方式的持续研究揭示了这些系统应当如何构建。我们一致发现,人们创造最大价值的方式并非与 竞争,而是提供 所不具备的信息——例如隐性知识,以及关于约束条件变化和情境转移的更新。因此,挑战不在于决定由人类还是 做出决策,而在于设计能够结合两者优势的系统。
要实现编排系统的潜力,需要的不仅仅是安装新技术。公司必须重新设计高层决策如何由底层决策推导而出、人类- 交互如何构建,以及工作流如何集成。其回报将是巨大的:在不放弃人类判断或控制权的情况下,做出质量更高且执行更快的跨职能决策。事实上,这些系统将通过将其嵌入到决策的结构、告知和治理方式中,从而保留——在某些情况下甚至加强——管理权限。将 编排能力构建到基础设施中,而非依赖管理人员将碎片拼接在一起的组织,将获得相对于竞争对手的优势。
在现代组织中,最重要的决策通常跨越多个职能部门。它们涉及相互作用的
简明观点
问题 公司在加速工作的 AI 工具上投入巨资,但跨职能决策仍然陷入僵局。
原因 关于约束条件和权衡的信息仍然碎片化地存在于各个孤岛中。
解决方案 创建主 AI 编排系统,用于协调分析、路由信息并揭示整个组织内部的权衡,而人类则贡献上下文知识、设定护栏,并在企业层面保留最终决策权。
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约束条件、来自多个来源的数据,以及由经验而非电子表格塑造的人类知识和判断——这些因素通常必须应用于结果和下游影响具有内在不确定性的动态情境中。
关税应对措施仅是一个例子。当公司经历突然且出乎意料的事件导致其产品需求大幅增加或减少、遭遇供应链中断或重新设计产品组合时,通常会出现同样的挑战。这类情况需要企业级的解决方案,而其质量取决于组织如何将部分且分散的知识整合为连贯的行动方案。
例如,在关税生效前决定提前备货,需要解决一系列相互依赖的问题:客户将如何应对价格变化?供应商在多大程度上愿意加速生产?我们的仓库是否有能力存放额外的库存?我们的运输网络能否应对交付量的激增?是否存在产品生命周期或过时风险,导致某些 SKU 的提前备货缺乏吸引力?在不同情景下,营运资金、风险敞口和收益波动将如何变化?
大多数组织都拥有解决这些问题所需的团队、工具、数据和专业知识。但许多组织并不擅长从组织的各个不同部分收集信息并快速将其综合。这项任务通常落在一名高级领导者身上,他必须决定询问哪些问题,预判尚未显现的约束条件,协调冲突的目标,并在新信息出现时管理迭代。其中许多信息仅
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仅存在于人们的脑海中。这些信息以非正式、不均匀且通常过晚的方式显现。一名物流经理提到,仓库容量和人力已在季节性高峰期被占用。一名采购负责人指出,只有在多个产品线的订单量得到保证的情况下,关键供应商才愿意加快交付。每一次迟到的发现都会迫使流程重启。情景被重新设计。假设被修正。会议数量倍增。
人们很容易将此类崩溃归咎于文化——归咎于官僚主义、风险厌恶或激励机制不一致。但根本原因在于:没有任何一个人的大脑能够容纳所有相关信息、约束条件和情景。信息是不对称的;每个职能部门知道其他部门不知道的事情,而且人们往往在事情变得至关重要之前无法清晰地表达出什么才是关键。问题和风险不会一次性全部出现,而是逐一显现。因此,在执行涉及大量跨职能决策的战略时出现延迟,并非管理失败的迹象,而是组织已经超过了其编排决策能力的信号。
人们自然而然地认为人工智能应该能提供缓解方案。毕竟,许多拖慢跨职能决策的任务——如需求预测、风险评估、文档生成、从合同中提取信息——恰恰是 AI 取得显著进展的领域。
当任务范围狭窄且定义明确、输入信息完整,且历史数据能够代表当前情况时,智能体 AI(Agentic AI)的表现可以超越人类。但协调跨职能决策意味着要应对那些通常不具备这些条件的场景。
解决方案是将人类判断与机器智能相结合——无论是在单个任务层面,还是在更广泛的决策过程中。在任务层面,这意味着构建人机协作模式,使人类能够提供系统缺失的信息,并利用这些信息来塑造输出结果。在协调层面,这意味着将这些输出结果(以及其中蕴含的人类知识)连接起来,使其能够在不同任务和职能之间得到验证、路由和整合。
在当今大多数组织中,使用基于任务的智能体 AI 的员工被期望通过在认为自己能做得更好时对其进行监控和覆盖,从而提高其性能。然而在实践中,他们往往难以确定何时以及如何干预。在我们的实验研究中,我们发现人类倾向于对 AI 建立一个普遍的信任水平,然后将其应用于所有情况,而不是在 性能可能强或弱时调整对它的信心。这有时会导致人们在不该覆盖 建议时进行了覆盖,或者在应该干预时却错过了机会,导致两种情况的结果都显著恶化。
这种模式的底层是一个错误的“人类 vs ”心理模型。正确的模型应该是“人类 + ”。正确的方法是询问:“我是否知道一些 无法自行获取或推断的重要信息——例如背景、约束条件或隐性知识?”只有当答案为“是”时,人类的干预才有价值。
在关税的例子中,这类人类信息包括关于供应商让步或约束条件的隐性知识,以及关于如果商店货架被额外库存淹没,需求可能会如何变化的洞察。此类信息通常是稀疏的、主观的,并且在组织内部分布不均。大多数基于任务的智能体 工具并非旨在系统地挖掘或整合这些信息。
我们的研究指向了一种更有效的方法。在一系列对照实验中,我们发现,当人类被训练为仅在持有 所缺乏的重要信息时才进行干预——无论是在系统做出建议之前将其作为输入提供,还是在之后利用该信息进行调整——而不是被要求形成与 竞争的独立判断时,性能会得到提升。
在实践中,目标是让人们处理类似这样的问题: 是否拥有所有关键的输入数据?我是否仍然可以信任输入与结果之间的历史关系?模型学习的数据中是否涵盖了这种情况?如果所有这些问题的答案都是“是”,则人们无需干预。如果其中任何一个问题的答案是“否”,人们应当调整 工具的输入或输出,以纳入仅由人类掌握的信息。这可以通过
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最重大的决策并非在单个任务中做出,而是通过将许多范围狭窄的任务链接在一起而产生的。
创建一份简单的清单供员工在使用基于任务的 智能体时审阅,或者构建一个 智能体来提示员工提出这些问题,并建议如何将答案整合到工具中来实现。
在假设的关税例子中,人类与 的协作可以这样运作:
→ 一个采购大语言模型(LLM)扫描供应商合同,并识别出在关税生效前可用于加速订单交付的冗余产能。但一名采购经理最近与一家关键供应商进行了沟通,揭示了系统所缺乏的关键信息:该供应商的其他几家客户也在采取同样的策略,且只有在公司扩大对该供应商其他未采购产品的购买并在门店销售时,供应商才会为该公司提供额外产能。对此,采购经理修改了 LLM 的输入或输出,以反映出合同中看似可行的情况实际上取决于是否向供应商授予其他目前公司未销售产品的额外采购订单。
→ 一个 工具利用当前产品组合的早季销售数据来预测该产品在季末的需求。然而,一名商品规划师意识到,为了减轻高关税影响而过度囤积当前产品,会对后续产品组合的早季销售产生不利影响,因此调整了 的需求预测以将此因素考虑在内。
→ 当审查 AI 对仓库容量利用率的预测时,一名物流经理意识到,自模型训练以来,输入与输出之间的关系已经发生了变化:季节性产品部门负责人决定将即将到来的圣诞季店内库存量增加一倍,以支持新产品的发布。对此,该经理将 AI 的基准预测向上修正,以反映预期的增长,并发现将没有足够的容量来存放为了应对关税而提前调拨的额外库存。
这是一种根本不同的工作流程。人类的责任不再是就什么是最佳决策形成信念。他们的工作是识别自己是否拥有基于任务的 AI 智能体所不具备的信息;如果拥有,则修正该工具的输入或输出,以将这些知识纳入其中。
最关键的决策并非在单一任务中做出,而是产生于将许多范围狭小的任务链接在一起的过程中。这解释了为什么尽管在 AI 方面投入巨大,且即便有了更好的一个人-AI 协作,组织在做出最重要决策时的速度依然难以提升。目前缺失的是一个能够确保仅由人类掌握的信息以及单个任务的输出得到验证,并与组织其他部分共享的系统。
该系统的基础是一个基于规则的智能体层,我们称之为“连接器”(connectors)。它们接收来自基于任务的 智能体的输出,验证这些输出是否保持在管理层指定的护栏(guardrails)之内,触发工作流中的下一步,并将相关信息作为输入传递给其他基于任务的智能体,或传递给更高层级的编排器。连接器的作用不是做出决策,而是确保多任务或跨职能的工作流能够高效执行。
连接器的护栏允许管理者设定业务规则,并决定系统在做出决策时拥有多少自由度。这些规则可以是简单的——例如检查某事是否可行,或确保结果落在预期范围内。它们也可以更先进,利用其他 工具进行额外检查。例如,连接器可能会根据管理层设定的限制,复核一项预测是否异常偏高或偏低。如果某项内容不符合规则,连接器可以停止该流程、将其重定向,或要求对话式 智能体从员工那里获取更多输入。总之,连接器帮助信息以结构化、一致且可靠的方式在系统中流动。
监督这一层的是“主 编排器”(master orchestrator):这是一个员工与之交互的 智能体,用于分享仅由其掌握的信息,描述可能影响业务的外部问题(如新关税)、挖掘潜在机会(如提前备货)以及探索假设情景。主编排器并不做出高层级的企业决策;它负责结构化并协调人类做出决策所需的分析和信息。在对话交流中,它引导员工分享仅由人类掌握的知识,并阐明目标、约束条件和决策边界。它帮助识别并协调哪些任务、工作流和员工
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需要参与到决策中,将问题路由至相应的工具和人员,并管理整体决策过程。
主 编排器制定计划,而连接器通过触发和推进工作流、验证输出以及以一种纪律严明且可重复的方式在任务间路由信息来执行该计划。编排器与连接器共同创造了一个持续的信息流,其中任务输出和关键的人类专属知识变成了其他任务的结构化输入,从而极大地改善了协调能力,并大幅缩短了做出和执行决策所需的时间。
让我们回到关税的例子。在传统组织中,提前备货的决策会引发一系列电子邮件、会议、分析请求以及对约束条件的挖掘。即便有了基于任务的 智能体,缝合信息的负担仍然落在
一个人类编排器身上,而且关键信息往往到达较晚——或者永远无法走出其所在的部门孤岛。
在 AI 智能体编排(agentic AI orchestration)的作用下,流程的展开方式截然不同。CEO 识别出关税问题以及提前备货的潜在机会,并将此信息输入主 编排器,随后编排器要求 CEO 明确目标和约束条件。接着,它启动相关的工作流和职能经理——涵盖需求计划、采购、物流、商品管理和财务——并利用基于任务的 智能体启动并行分析。在这些分析运行的同时,连接器将它们关联起来,并促使主 编排器引导并分享仅限人类掌握的相关知识。
让我们看看采购工作流中发生了什么。主 编排器向采购经理发出警报,告知 CEO 希望探讨提前备货,并触发采购合同扫描
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LLM 以识别具有潜在冗余产能的供应商。这个基于任务的工具生成一份相关供应商和合同条款的清单,连接器将该输出提供给主 编排器,随后编排器要求采购经理提供关键的仅限人类掌握的信息。在与潜在供应商进行讨论后,采购经理可能会回复,某供应商的冗余产能仅在公司承诺从该供应商购买额外商品的情况下才可用。一旦此信息与主 编排器共享,它会立即分发给所有相关的基于任务的 智能体和员工。商品管理部门收到关于公司产品种类宽度和货架空间影响的警报,连接器触发其基于任务的预测智能体将新信息纳入考虑并更新需求场景。财务部门同样收到关于供应商有条件产能的警报,连接器自动触发基于任务的财务智能体重新计算对营运资金和收益波动性的潜在影响。关于是否执行提前备货策略以及执行规模的最终决定,由供应链、商品管理和财务负责人等高级领导者做出,他们现在拥有一个关于权衡方案的全面集成视图。
其效果体现在两个方面。首先,速度提升,因为工作流并行推进,迭代不再由迟到的意外情况驱动。其次,质量提高,因为每项任务都纳入了系统中其他部分经过验证的输入。
值得注意的是,编排系统防止了基于任务的智能体产生相互抵触的结果。去年 6 月,正在构建此类编排系统的沃尔玛(Walmart)数据科学负责人告诉我们,专业智能体可以针对其各自领域生成高质量的建议和“人机协同”(human-in-the-loop)操作。然而,当这些智能体独立运行时,其输出可能会发生冲突。编排层有助于调和这些紧张关系,确保智能体的输出与企业优先级保持一致,并有助于实现连贯的业务结果。
因此, 智能体编排充当了一种共享的组织基础设施——由领导层提出的问题和机会来激活。权力与问责制依然牢牢掌握在人类手中。企业决策并未被自动化;被自动化的是智能的编排,包括问题的路由、
洞察的集成,以及局部分析与企业目标的持续对齐。
如果组织底层的决策是不透明、纠缠不清且随意的,那么它们就无法利用 AI 来打破协调瓶颈。因此,领导者必须首先确保决策流程被定义得清晰且结构良好。这项工作应当自下而上地推进,并且除非整个组织都致力于此,否则无法取得成功。只有最高领导层才能促成这一点。
Step 1: 将决策分解为模块。 我们研究的两家公司——一家全球电子商务巨头和 Xsight(一个帮助制造商销售至海外市场的在线平台)——发现,当决策被分解为精确且边界清晰的任务时,编排效果得到了显著提升。这涉及到明确每个任务的输入、输出、约束条件,
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以及目标。每项任务的范围应足够狭窄,以便能够被轻松理解、评估并与其他任务相链接。信息和假设应当标准化;例如,采购、物流和财务部门都应基于对供应商产能的统一定义开展工作,无论该定义反映的是理论生产能力、合同承诺能力还是实际可实现能力。
Step 2:强化基于任务的智能体 AI。 开始将智能体 AI 应用于那些主要由 可访问的数据驱动且预期回报最高的任务中。在任何情况下,人与 之间的协作都应具有结构化。 的设计应使其输入、假设和推理过程对参与该任务的人员可见,并能主动引导出仅由人类掌握的相关知识。例如,系统可能会询问采购经理,近期是否与供应商进行了可能影响模型对可用产能判断的沟通。在人类方面,人员必须了解 能看到什么以及不能看到什么,以便在情况发生变化、假设不再成立,或者他们拥有系统无法推断出的知识时能够及时识别——并将这些信息提供给 ,或在必要时覆盖 的决策。为此,人们必须接受培训,学会询问“ 系统是否遗漏了我所知道的某些信息?”,而不是问“我是否同意 系统的观点?”
要使这一机制发挥作用,需要一种文化转变。每个人都需要理解, 在决策中扮演的是结构化合作伙伴的角色。从最高层到职能团队层级的领导者都必须强化这种心态。
Step 3:增加主编排。 一旦基于任务的 智能体及其人类协作伙伴达到了令人满意的性能水平,公司就可以采取下一步行动,对其集体工作进行编排。首先从协调单个小组内密切相关的任务开始。构建将一项任务链接到下一项任务的简单连接器,并开发一个初步的主 编排器,用于与参与这些任务的员工进行交互。这将支持一种开发编排软件的敏捷方法——这种方法强调迭代进展、快速反馈、协作和适应能力。当编排器成熟(变得更加完善、强大、稳定且可靠)并能有效地处理几组密切相关的任务时,就应将其扩展到更多模块中。
在多个行业中,公司已开始构建此类基础设施的早期版本。在金融科技平台 Ramp 和医疗技术公司美敦力(Medtronic)中,核心决策流程已被组织成不同的任务,每个任务由一个独立的编排器管理。Ramp 目前正在开发一个单一的企业级主 编排器,该编排器将在模块化系统中路由员工的查询,并根据需要调用相应的智能体。
Step 4:管理系统的演进。 智能体 编排不是一个构建完成后即可置之不理的系统。领导者必须不断询问:“模块定义是否足够狭窄,以便有效地编排决策?仅限人类掌握的信息是否以一种在整个系统中可访问的方式被捕获?激励机制是否一致,以鼓励尽早披露约束条件而非在后期升级上报?员工是否足够信任并理解 ,从而与其协作而非竞争?”随着技术以及企业的能力、约束和目标的改变,这些问题的答案也会随之改变——领导者必须相应地更新角色、治理和培训。他们应将自己视为一个活生生的决策基础设施的架构师——随着组织及其 能力的共同成熟,该基础设施也会不断改进。
AI 智能体编排(AGENTIC AI ORCHESTRATION)不应被视为完全自动化决策的手段。其目标应该是实现智能编排的自动化——即实时路由问题、整合洞察,并将局部分析与企业目标相对齐的能力。能够构建这种能力的组织,将使企业内每一项人类知识的价值产生复利效应,而其竞争对手在第三轮对齐会议时可能仍在挖掘关键的限制因素。 ▼ HBR Reprint R2605E
KRIS JOHNSON FERREIRA 是哈佛商学院的 Edgerley 家族商业管理副教授。JORDAN TONG 是威斯康星商学院的 Robert M. Steiner 商业讲席教授,并担任运营与信息管理系主任。
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插画师 ANTONIO SORTINO
最新研究表明, 客户推荐是 低成本增长的关键来源。
作者
Fred Reichheld 贝恩公司 (Bain & Company) 贝恩研究员
Jamie Cleghorn 贝恩公司 (Bain & Company) 合伙人
Wojtek Kokoszka Mention Me 首席执行官
销售与 营销
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销售与 营销
ButcherBox,一家提供高端肉类和海鲜的订阅制零售商,销售额便迅速突破了 6亿美元。起初,该公司通过付费影响力人物进行营销来实现增长,但随着时间的推移,它越来越依赖于通过数字广告购买新客户线索。随后,由于付费影响力人物以及社交媒体和搜索网站提高了价格,客户获取成本开始螺旋式上升。与此同时,通过付费渠道获取的客户质量有所下降:他们的购买金额更少,购物篮中的产品组合吸引力较低,且流失率更高。
为了寻找振兴公司的全新战略,ButcherBox 的首席执行官 Mike Salguero 采用了“赢得增长”(earned growth)的概念,该概念优先考虑来自重复购买和推荐的高质量收入增长。(参见《哈佛商业评论》2021 年 11 月至 12 月号的“净推荐值 3.0”一文。)由于每位客户每月能消耗的蛋白质有限,推荐似乎是更大的增长机会。Salguero 将被推荐的客户视为一个独立渠道,仔细研究了其经济效益,发现他们是一座金矿——比通过付费广告获取的客户盈利能力强得多。于是,他的营销团队启动了一项激励推荐计划,创造了新的客户流,其重复购买和口碑驱动了新一轮的增长。凭借这一新重心,
ButcherBox 在过去一年中不仅将推荐量提升了 57%,还将客户获取成本降低了一半。
公司在社交媒体、数字广告、赞助搜索、促销方案、付费影响力人物、搜索引擎优化以及精选在线评论上投入了巨额的营销资金和管理时间。然而,对于大多数公司而言,最好的客户仍然来自推荐——贝恩公司在对参与了客户拥护平台 Mention Me 实施的推荐计划的 1000 万 多个个体的分析数据中证实了这一点。(本文作者之一 Wojtek 是该公司的首席执行官。)在从时尚到食品、健康与美容、金融服务、旅游和电信等一系列行业中,我们发现平均而言,虽然只有 20% 的新客户是通过推荐而来的,但他们贡献了所有新客户利润的 70% 以上。(参见图表“新客户利润的真实来源”。)
推荐带来的巨大利润影响源于几个优势:推荐客户的获取成本更低,留存时间更长,且更频繁地向自己的朋友和家人推荐你的公司。此外,他们的客单价更高,且购买的产品组合利润更高。
推荐对收入增长也具有不成比例的影响。我们从数十个净推荐值(Net Promoter)咨询项目中已经了解到,平均而言,推荐者(promoters)的消费额是中立者(passives)的 1.6 倍。(在“在 0 到 10 的量表中,您向朋友推荐我们的可能性有多大?”这一调查问题中,推荐者给出的评分是 9 或 10;中立者给出的评分是 7 或 8。)然而,多年来,调查分数的通货膨胀使得推荐者类别扩大到了所有受访者的半数。这模糊了真正热情的拥护者与名义上的推荐者之间的区别——即那些
核心 观点
推荐是盈利增长最可靠的来源,但大多数公司未能对其进行衡量或管理。通过推荐获取的客户成本更低、留存时间更长、消费更多,并且能带来更多高价值客户。
虽然只有约五分之一的新客户是通过推荐而来的,但他们贡献了绝大部分的利润。传统的营销指标通过给予付费渠道过多的功劳并忽视口碑,掩盖了这一效应。
追踪每位新客户的来源原因,量化推荐经济学,并识别、理解和取悦更多真正的推荐者。投资于能够赢得推荐的体验以及能够激活真正推荐者的活动。围绕推荐生成来统一激励机制,以解锁低成本的复合增长。
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被推荐客户的获取成本更低,留存时间更长,且更频繁地向自己的亲友推荐你的公司。而且他们的客单价更高。
仅仅是感到满意,但不足以热情地主动推荐某个品牌。我们对 Mention Me 数据的研究(涵盖了激励性推荐和自然推荐)显示,只有 15% 的客户是真正的推荐者,这意味着他们通过进行推荐至少带来了一名新客户。这些真正的推荐者产生的终身收入(将其自身的购买与直接推荐及下游推荐的购买相结合)几乎是被动推荐者的三倍。而那些推荐了多名新客户的真正推荐者子集(我们称之为“超级推荐者”)产生的收入是被动推荐者的五倍。
如果公司仅考察直接推荐的影响,他们将大大低估由真正推荐者——尤其是超级推荐者——所产生的复合增长。客户推荐朋友,朋友进而推荐其朋友,如此循环的级联效应,解释了为什么推荐率的微小变化能驱动增长的指数级增加。
如果推荐如此强大,为什么这么多高管长期以来一直忽视它?部分问题在于可见性。大多数公司没有以系统化的方式追踪推荐,因此被推荐的客户被与通过其他手段获取的客户混在一起。结果,会计系统和营销归因模型将功劳归于那些仅仅是捕捉到了已决定购买(因为朋友推荐)客户的营销活动。这种扭曲使得付费获取看起来比实际更有效,同时掩盖了推荐驱动增长的真实经济效益。
许多领导者还专注于最容易衡量和管理的内容,例如广告支出及其与新客户数量的相关性,而不是哪些体验能唤起愉悦感,或触发推荐的社交动态。由于传统指标通常不区分来自新客户获取的短期(短暂)收入提升与来自长期拥护的可持续收入增长,高管们可能无法意识到推荐在驱动可持续增长和盈利方面的卓越表现。
在本文中,我们将更深入地探讨被推荐客户背后的经济学,并解释为什么 CEO 应该指示其团队开始更审慎地衡量和管理推荐行为。我们将证明推荐率是财务成功的预测指标,因此不仅营销高管,整个 C-suite(高级管理层)和董事会都应对其进行审视。我们还将提供识别真正推荐者的实用方法,并设计将客户拥护转化为可靠增长引擎的系统。
推荐可以显著改善公司的现金流。我们认为,这解释了我们在 Enterprise Rent-A-Car、Chick-fil-A、IKEA 和 Apple 等净推荐值(NPS)超级巨星公司中观察到的看似异常的现金生成能力。Enterprise 从圣路易斯的一家小型家族租赁业务成长为全球最大的租车公司,且从未为了支付其超过 240 万 辆车的车队而发行过股权。Chick-fil-A 在建立了 3,000 多家公司直营店的同时,将其全系统营收增长至近 230 亿美元 billion,同样没有利用股权市场。IKEA 同样在从未发行股权或债务的情况下,成为了全球最大的家具零售商。而作为净推荐系统的先驱实践者,Apple 已成为一个如此强大的现金生成机器,以至于自 2013 年以来,它已回购了价值超过 8000 亿美元 billion 的股票。
这些公司专注于提供能够激发客户推荐的卓越产品和服务,因此在获取新客户方面,它们不需要像竞争对手那样严重依赖昂贵的广告或价格促销。这种方法能提供多大的现金流优势?为了找出答案,我们在五个拥有公开数据的行业中,将 NPS 领先者与其对应的 落后者进行了对比。这些领先者分别是 Hermès、Costco、IKEA、Apple 以及连锁餐厅 Texas Roadhouse。
我们查看了每组公司中销售、一般及行政费用(SG&A)占营收的百分比,发现领先者的 SG&A 百分比平均仅为落后者的一半——营收的 11% 对比 22%。这意味着,每 1 美元的销售额, 领先者比 落后者多产生了 11 美分的现金流。

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领先者的成本较低,因为他们不会花费大量资金去获取那些长期营收潜力不明且几乎不产生推荐的客户。(如果一家典型公司只有 20% 的客户是通过推荐而来的,那么另外 80% 的客户应当被审视地看待。)高效的增长依赖于现有满意客户的推荐。
赢得推荐需要艰苦的努力和创新。高管们可能会倾向于通过巧妙的客户获取方案来走捷径,但除非这些新客户中有许多能成长为真正的推荐者,否则其收益很少能证明成本的合理性。鉴于 AI 驱动的购物机器人的兴起,这一逻辑尤为适用。这些机器人的设计旨在免疫搜索引擎优化、数字营销、广告和付费影响力人物。最优秀的机器人越来越倾向于认可来自客户的真实评论和推荐。随着越来越多的交互通过这些机器人进行,专注于赢得推荐将对于吸引高质量潜在客户变得更加至关重要。
认真对待推荐的公司会建立一套系统,用以识别哪些客户在推荐其品牌以及推荐的原因。要做好这一点,仅靠调查问卷或营销直觉是不够的。它需要一套能够追踪推荐流,并让团队对将满意客户转化为积极推广者的工作负责的运营流程。在本节中,我们将详细介绍贵公司为了从推荐效应中获益必须采取的一些关键行动。
识别新推荐客户。 你需要找到一种方法来系统地精准定位这些人。你可以参考 CertaPro 的例子,它是北美最大的住宅绘画公司,十多年来一直衡量净推荐值(NPS)和推荐线索。它会询问所有新客户线索是如何得知该公司的,并将答案记录在客户关系管理系统中。在潜在客户做出回应之前,CertaPro 的线索查询流程不会推进,因为该公司认为该信息与客户的地址和信用卡号一样至关重要。
Mention Me 开发了一种在线解决方案,使通过网站进入的新客户能够轻松地从六个最常被提及的品牌选择理由中选择一项,或提供其他理由。作为该流程的一部分,公司可以通过询问客户推荐人的联系方式来找出是谁进行了推荐,以便向这些人发送认可信息或礼物。这些人是构成公司战略核心的真正推广者,因此识别他们并进一步了解他们——特别是触发他们进行推荐的原因——至关重要。
在首次接触时识别所有推荐客户,可以让你确定推荐率(新客户中由推荐而来的比例),然后将其作为改进的基准。正如我们所指出的,Mention Me 客户的平均推荐率为 20%,但其范围从个位数到 50% 以上不等。一个极端例子是 Costco,它在获取新会员方面投入的广告和促销费用极少;其几乎所有新客户都是通过推荐获得的。
像 CertaPro 这样低技术含量的解决方案可以帮助你初步衡量推荐流。一旦系统建立,你可以不断实验并优化流程,以减少摩擦并使数据更加可靠。随后,你可以将客户反馈和忠诚度管理系统与中央客户记录数据库集成。
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量化你的推荐经济学。 为了了解你在获取推荐以及衡量和优化推荐系统上可以承担多少投资,你必须能够确定其价值以及对利润和增长的影响。当 ButcherBox 将广告、促销和入职成本仔细分配给其推荐客户时,它发现这些客户的获取成本仅为通过其他渠道产生的新客户成本的一小部分。随后,财务团队量化了推荐客户在扣除获取成本后的价值,将购买模式、平均订单规模、产品组合与利润率、频率、客户留存率以及由这些新客户随后推荐而带来的利润纳入其中。这些计算揭示了获取更多推荐的全部价值。
另一家量化其推荐经济学的公司是 Intuitive Health,该公司与医院网络合作,建设并运营在同一屋檐下提供紧急护理和急诊室服务的设施。其设施在 2025. 年治疗了超过 100 万名患者。该公司的年收入年复合增长率超过 30%,而其利润表现如此惊人,以至于最近的资本重组为原股东带来了 900% 的回报。
Intuitive 严格地按地区追踪推荐效果。在达拉斯-沃斯堡地区,该公司发现,被推荐的客户使用的服务更多,从而提升了营收,且其利润率是其他客户的四倍。Intuitive 还发现,其对产生推荐的关注已将全公司的客户获取成本从 2015 年的 $57 降低到如今的略高于 $20。在每家诊所,推荐量都被纳入业务计划,并被视为管理者的关键绩效指标。
学习如何让核心客户感到愉悦。 创造真正的推荐者并激活他们的推荐,并非源于巧妙的营销,而是源于反复提供如此卓越的新鲜体验,以至于客户自然而然地向亲友推荐某种产品或服务。为了实现这一点,公司需要深入了解究竟什么能触发推荐。
Intuitive Health 利用其 NPS 反馈流程来了解什么能让客户愉悦,以及什么让他们失望。当地诊所经理努力闭环处理,并在一两天内探究任何未能让客户感到愉悦的根本原因。他们不仅给不满意且持批评态度的客户打电话,而且给所有评分低于 10 分中的 9 分的客户打电话。其调查不仅是为了识别愉悦的来源,还旨在校准关键绩效阈值。例如,Intuitive 发现一个关键指标是某人办理登记、等待、接受治疗并走出大门所需的时间。随后,运营周转时间——即在一小时内进出大门的患者比例——成为了一个重要目标。
战略性地激励推荐。 为了管理并获得全套经济优势,大多数公司应该实施激励推荐计划。但他们应确保避免企业在实施此类计划时常犯的错误。许多计划从未与追踪被推荐客户经济效益的财务系统集成。它们未能识别出进行推荐的真正推荐者,也从未探究根本原因。事实上,推荐激励被视为一种获取新客户的廉价营销手段,而非一种驱动盈利增长的成熟方式。
计划在其他几个方面也可能出现不足。例如,如果给予推荐的激励过大,人们可能会出于私利而非让朋友开心的愿望而采取行动。有时激励方向错误,或者奖励的给予方式削弱了其
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影响力。例如,如果一项商务旅行计划将推荐积分存入一名高管的账户,该高管可能根本不会注意到,因为发票是由助手处理的。
公司应该通过实验来寻找激励、会员资格、奖励和认可的正确组合,以激励真正的推荐者,然后量化由他们发起的级联推荐链。最有效的奖励往往是适度的,且对推荐者和被推荐者都透明——规模足以促使推荐者使用该系统,但不过分慷慨,以免在缺乏价值体验所带来的真实热情时仍驱动推荐。德国电信的移动电话价值品牌 Congstar 提供了一个很好的例子。其 Freundeskreis(朋友圈)会员资格为推荐客户和新被推荐客户提供 10% 的折扣,只要双方保持为活跃客户即可。
ButcherBox 优化了其推荐计划,将重点放在最忠诚的客户身上。公司会向这些客户发送一个代码,他们可以将代码转发给朋友,朋友使用该代码可获得价值 $170 的免费产品礼盒。不过,朋友必须支付 $20 的运费,这有助于确保该计划聚焦于真实的潜在客户。为了强化该计划,如果第一位免费礼盒接收者成为了付费订阅用户,公司会向原推荐客户发送另一个免费礼盒代码,以便其分享给另一位朋友。这激励了最优质的客户不断向品牌引入更多朋友——只要他们的推荐能够转化为客户。
推荐追踪可以揭示隐藏的客户价值,Mention Me 的客户 Bloom & Wild 的经验便证明了这一点。该公司成立于 2013 年,现已成长为欧洲最大的在线鲜花和礼品平台,营收超过 1.5亿美元。其数据显示,即使是消费金额较低的客户,也能通过推荐产生巨大的下游影响。
以客户 Sally 为例。在数年时间里,她仅购买了 $112 的产品。然而,她直接推荐了数名客户,这些客户累计消费了 $3,015。随后,这些客户又推荐了其他人,创造了新一波的买家。总计,Sally 的推荐链产生了 $8,793 的营收,大约是她自身购买价值的 78 倍。如果将有机推荐(非激励诱导的推荐)考虑在内,这个数字可能会更高。Bloom & Wild 在意识到客户群中存在许多像 Sally 这样的人后,不再将低消费客户视为不重要,而是将他们视为潜在的推荐催化剂。
大多数公司认为推荐来自于广泛的满意客户群体。但数据表明,实际发生的情况更为集中且更具威力。一小部分客户——即“真正的推广者”——贡献了不成比例的新客户利润。尽管真正的推广者仅占客户群的 15%,但他们在三年内通过推荐产生的利润占新客户总利润的 72%。而且,被推荐客户具有更高的留存率,这意味着他们贡献了更大份额的终身利润。

注:我们衡量了每组新客户在首次购买后三年内的利润。这虽然是对终身价值的一个非常保守的估计,但能发挥更大样本量的统计优势。 来源:NPS Prism, Mention Me
该公司还鼓励礼品接收者加入该计划。每束花都包含一个二维码,让接收者可以感谢发送者并赚取忠诚度积分。如今,礼品接收者的推荐贡献了 40% 的新客户,而标准推荐则额外增加了 15%。
Bloom & Wild 的系统能够挖掘出真正的推广者,从而让公司了解什么样的体验能让他们感到足够愉悦并触发推荐。公司的分析师可以对旨在惊艳客户的举措进行准确的成本效益分析,从而释放进一步的创造力和投资。
随着时间的推移,开发更先进的推荐追踪能力。 即使公司为推荐提供激励,大多数推荐仍然是自发产生的。在 Mention Me 的客户中,激励计划平均仅占推荐数量的 7% 左右,范围在 2% 到 21% 之间。公司越深入地理解驱动自发推荐的因素,就越能有效地增加推荐量。实现这一目标的一个关键是:不要在首次购买后就停止分析推荐。
虽然推荐通常被视为一种客户获取模式,但它们也可以促使现有
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客户购买额外的产品线。了解触发这些销售的因素可以帮助公司增加销量。
公司还意识到,推荐并不总是能立即引发购买。为了全面理解推荐行为,他们需要提高追踪从推荐到销售这一事件链的能力,即使销售需要一段时间才能完成。一些公司现在在产品层面进行追踪。例如,Mention Me 开发了一种在客户网站产品页面中加入追踪器的方法。当客户通过短信、WhatsApp 或电子邮件与朋友分享产品链接,且朋友点击该链接时,系统会将该次点击记录为一次推荐,并捕捉到是谁发起的推荐。如果该朋友进行了购买,追踪器会将该人的购物活动与跨网站访问的推荐活动联系起来。初步结果表明,这些推荐具有极高价值。来自推荐链接的点击转化为购买的概率是付费广告的三倍以上,且往往能产生利润更高的销售。
在 B2℃ 交易中,通常由个人决定购买什么,而在 B2B 采购委员会中,人数可能达到十几个或更多。正如 LinkedIn 的 Mimi Turner 和 Jann Schwarz 所展示的,这个群体经常受到社会心理学规律的影响。他们 2025 年关于“可购买性驱动因素”的研究发现,当 B2B 买家在满足基本质量要求的候选供应商短名单中进行选择时,主导因素是对供应商的个人体验、来自类似客户的参考意见,以及来自具有该供应商直接经验的同事的推荐。个人且值得信赖的推荐比价格具有更大的影响力,80% 的买家更倾向于选择被推荐的产品,而非价格更低的产品。
尽管客户推荐发挥着至关重要的作用,但很少有 B2B 公司会仔细追踪哪些个人提供了成功的参考意见,或探究他们这样做背后的动机。与此同时,客户成功团队往往处于组织的深层,专注于客户留存,对于哪些推荐带来了新客户几乎没有可见度。
B2B 公司应该严格追踪哪些参考和推荐导致了中标,但他们优化推荐流的行动计划将有所不同。他们不应奖励提供推荐的客户,而应认可并奖励赢得该推荐的内部团队或个人。将奖励计划与用于管理内部流程的可靠衡量系统(如薪酬系统)相结合也是最优选择。如果奖金取决于推荐和参考数据,那么这些数据将受到审查,从而确保其准确性。
销售与营销
在涉及多个参考和推荐的复杂销售过程中,高管面试客户决策者以了解如何恰当地分配功劳是有意义的。奖励资产构建者将鼓励构建更多资产。
许多高管会亲自审查失败的竞标(即公司在销售竞争中输给另一家公司的情况)。更多的人应该审查获胜的账户,以了解提供推荐的推广者所发挥的作用。思考一下,财务人员现在花费多少时间和精力在量化折旧和商誉等资产负债表项目上,而却忽略了真正推广者这一更为珍贵的资产。这是一个巨大的、尚未开发的机遇。
在追求增长的过程中,太多的领导者看向外部,寻找吸引新客户的巧妙方法。相反,他们应该向内看,以激活其推荐引擎。真正的推广者构成了品牌的战略核心,提供了一个自我驱动的增长引擎,能够吸引正确的新客户,从而产生更高质量的收入。他们提供推荐是因为他们想让朋友的生活变得更好。他们还了解朋友的口味、偏好和优先级。这就是为什么通过推荐获取的客户通常匹配度更高,购买量更多,留存时间更长,并且自身也会成为真正的推广者,从而进一步加速增长。
像 ButcherBox、Intuitive Health 和 Costco 这样的公司深知推荐发挥的关键作用,并努力了解这些推荐是如何赢得的,以及它们是如何传播的。他们重新分配了广告和营销预算,用于取悦核心客户,将其转化为真正的推广者。最先进的公司为推荐量设定了明确的目标。他们识别出最强有力的支持者,尝试鼓励推荐的计划,并投资于能够揭示推荐如何倍增的系统。结果,他们的增长比竞争对手更高效,并且可以将节省的资金重新投资,以提供更卓越的客户体验。 ▼
HBR Reprint R2605F
FRED REICHHELD 是贝恩公司的贝恩研究员(Bain Fellow)及咨询合伙人。JAMIE CLEGHORN 是贝恩公司的合伙人及其客户实践负责人。WOJTEK KOKOSZKA 是 Mention Me 的首席执行官。
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它随时间而演变。 以下是如何成功应对 每个阶段的方法。
作者
Claudius A. Hildebrand Spencer Stuart 顾问
Douglas L. Peterson S&P Global 前首席执行官
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插画师 CARL GODFREY
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领导力
首席执行官(CEO)面临的一个核心困境: 当你的执行能力取决于一群你既不能雇佣、也不能解雇,且必须在没有直接权力的情况下去影响的人时,你该如何实现变革型领导力?这些人就是你的董事会。
驾驭 CEO 与董事会之间的动态关系,是高管领导力中最关键且最被低估的挑战之一。考虑到其影响之深远,令人惊讶的是,人们很少关注 如何随着时间的推移来管理这种关系——即随着 在岗位上的成长、董事会成员构成的演变以及新业务挑战的出现,这种管理方式应如何变化。
标普 500 指数(S&P 500)公司的 平均任期为 9 年,在此期间,他们面临着业务以及与董事成员关系的剧烈变化。然而,大多数新任 往往会对董事会关系所需要的时间和精力感到措手不及。为了取得成功, 必须意识到,在任期内与董事会的协作需要采取一种动态调整的方法:在早期被严密审视时赢得信任;随着关系的成熟,将董事会培养成战略盟友;保持一种能够鼓励辩论和参与的姿态;并最终塑造董事会的未来领导层。
处理不当将付出沉重代价。如果允许董事会过度介入短期业绩,你将在任期内疲于应对那些适得其反的战略转向;如果未能充分引导董事会参与,你将缺乏必要的监督,无法防范自满和过度冒险。
多年来,我们一直在思考 与董事会的动态关系是如何运作的。我们中的一人(Doug)曾担任标普全球(S&P Global)的 11 年,另一人(Claudius)是一位资深的领导力顾问,在过去 20 年中开展了分析 2,000 多名标普 500 指数 绩效的研究。在本文中,我们将基于对 和董事会绩效的广泛认知,提出一个四阶段框架,旨在帮助 与董事会建立高效的伙伴关系,从而创造出对于有效治理和强劲公司业绩至关重要的“健康张力”。
每个阶段都要求 在思维和行为上做出关键转变。
新任 往往不确定应该优先处理什么。由于感到必须立即做出成绩的压力,许多人认为自己没有时间去处理与董事会建立关系这一“软性”必要任务。这是一个错误,因为这意味着他们放弃了早期开发和积累社会资本的机会,而这正是他们日后需要依赖的。
在就任新职时, 通常对董事会的内部动态或个别成员的观点知之甚少。从公司外部聘请的 可能除了在招聘过程中的互动外,几乎不了解董事。即使是那些从内部
核心观点
必须在依赖于其无法控制的董事会的同时领导变革。许多人低估了他们与董事会的关系必须如何演变,以及管理不善如何导致糟糕的战略、薄弱的监督,甚至导致提前离职。
采取一个四阶段的 -董事会协作方法:(1) 通过了解董事会动态在早期建立信任。(2) 通过影响成员构成和参与度来塑造伙伴关系。(3) 随着信任加深,对抗自满。(4) 专注于继任计划和长期治理。
采取这种董事会关系处理方法的 能建立起高效的张力、更强的治理能力和更好的长期业绩。其结果是使董事会成为一项战略资产而非约束。
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--。
公司(正如大多数 CEO 所经历的那样)通常仅在精心策划的环境中与董事会打交道。简而言之,新任 往往不知道董事会是如何做出决策的,以及影响力分布在何处。
对于新任 而言,挑战进一步增加的是,如今其前任继续在董事会担任执行主席的情况日益普遍。在 2020 年以来美国任命的案例中,超过三分之一的离任 成为了执行主席——而 2015 年这一比例仅约为四分之一。这可能会给新人带来尴尬的权力动态。我们采访的一位 回忆道:“在早期的董事会会议上,每当我表达某种立场时,人们会下意识地转头观察我前任的反应。”
在任职的前两年, 可以采取以下几项行动来应对董事会的质疑并建立信任:
梳理董事会的隐藏动态。 首席执行官可以通过将 Zoom 视频会议改为在董事会成员的“主场”进行一对一面对面会面,从而在早期建立真实的关系。这些聚会——例如在对方喜欢的餐厅或其他舒适的场所——通常能让 洞察董事成员的个人风格、优先级和观点。当然,与董事进行一对一会面并非新建议,但我们看到许多新任 要么将这些会议视为走形式的勾选任务,要么采取捷径——例如一次性安排与两名董事会成员会面。采取此类做法的 会阻碍自己与董事建立深厚的个人关系。相反,他们应该意识到,早期的面对面会面有助于进行深入的“探索工作”。几乎任何问题都可以讨论,并且能产生有价值的情报,以便日后在更正式的场合中衡量并应对董事的评论。正如一位 告诉我们的那样:“他们加入董事会都有自己的原因,了解他们的动机很有好处。现在正是了解每位董事会成员能为对话带来什么的时候。”
在维护过去的同时主张独立。 新任 可以通过在尊重前任 的遗产和现有关系与主张独立领导力之间取得平衡,为高效的合作关系奠定基调。在担任 的最初几年里,Doug 与首席独立董事建立了伙伴关系,这帮助他应对复杂的董事会动态,并且至关重要的是,澄清了非执行主席、首席独立董事和 角色之间任何模糊的地带。他还充分利用了与一位受尊敬的董事之间预先存在的关系,将对方既作为私下的意见征询对象,也作为董事会中的支持者。在最理想的情况下,离任的 也可以成为盟友。例如,Claudius 合作的一位离任 向董事会做了一次演示,总结了自己的弱点并指出了他认为自己失败的领域。他的坦诚为继任者在早期建立威信和信任方面留出了一定的操作空间。
定义参与规则。 新任 任期的开始是定义董事会与 如何协作最自然的时机。未能设定运作原则可能会付出沉重代价。在一个警示案例中,我们熟悉的一位 在董事会要求提供更多关于公司战略和并购(M&A)机会的信息时与其发生冲突,这种冲突侵蚀了董事会与 之间的信任,并导致了该 最终离职。尽管在该 的领导下,公司的表现优于 S&P 500 指数,但关系依然恶化——这提醒人们,即使业绩卓越,也无法让 免于陷入与董事会的紧张关系之中。
目标应该是建立能够鼓励透明度并培养信任的流程,但同时也要承认董事会的监督职责以及首席执行官(CEO)对支持的需求。一个需要立即建立的关键规范是,董事会究竟是“需要”还是“想要”多少细节。许多新任 CEO 为了证明自己掌控了业务,往往准备过度,将董事会成员淹没在运营细节之中,而实际上他们需要的是战略洞察。我们认识的一位 CEO 在他的第一次董事会会议上吸取了这个教训:当时他自豪地提交了一份 100 页的演示文稿,结果董事会成员反而要求他提供更高层级的战略框架。他能够及时挽回局面,是因为他在双方仍在调整预期时就犯了这个错误。
讨论和达成一致的要点应包括:组织的愿景和使命是什么,CEO 被期望交付什么,董事会在战略和治理(而非运营)中的角色,以及每个人将如何沟通和互动——包括董事会材料中适当的细节程度。
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在经历了几个财报周期、应对了投资者的审查并建立了公信力之后,首席执行官(CEO)通常已经赢得了足够的信任,可以开始塑造董事会的组成和参与风格。这一时期通常始于第二年或第三年,是锻造领导力的关键阶段。如果前任 CEO 仍在任,此时应该已经退居幕后。执行主席的安排通常持续一到两年,Claudius 的研究表明,在绝大多数交接中,正式的重叠期在第三年时已经结束。随着这种动态关系的解决,新任 与董事之间的关系将趋于成熟,这意味着 可以对董事会的讨论产生越来越大的影响。这也是 可能会寻求担任主席一职,或重新设计董事会委员会以更好地支持公司优先事项的时期。在这个阶段, 必须以谦卑的态度倾听,为变革建立共识,并培养挑战现状的勇气。这是一个微妙的时刻:过快地主张过多变革可能会导致不稳定,但让董事会成员停滞不前则会阻碍新想法的培养。
为了成功管理这个阶段, 应该通过以下三项关键举措来建立持久的联盟:
战略性地更新董事会。 董事会自我更新的频率往往不足。例如,在 2025, 年,S&P 500 董事的新任成员仅占所有董事会成员的 7%,且近一半的 S&P 500 董事会成员组成完全没有变化。结果是可以预见的:在最近的一项调查中,只有不到三分之一的 告诉我们,他们的董事会拥有应对当今商业挑战所需的专业知识。
尽管提名和治理委员会主导成员变更和继任计划,但在这一阶段, 可以——且应当——要求在过程中提供更多建议。没有人能比 更好地向董事会传达业务是如何转变的,以及董事会需要什么样的经验和技能才能适应这种转变。
思考一下 Doug 在担任 第 2 年是如何开始重塑标普全球(S&P Global)董事会的。到那时,公司正迅速摆脱其媒体和印刷出版的根基,转型为一家服务于金融市场的现代分析业务公司,他深知董事会需要具备技术、资本市场、运营和风险管理专业知识的声音。在他成为 时,董事会中有几位高质量且任职时间较长的董事,但他们并不具备他所构想的未来核心领域的背景。因此,当 Doug 提出更新董事会的话题时,他采取了一种将此举与公司在退出传统业务并投资新增长市场时的自然演进相类比的方式。
第二阶段也是一些 认为自己已获得担任董事会主席资格的时期。我们的研究发现, 最有可能在第四年之前被任命为主席,此后被任命的可能性极低。但 请求该职位的方式至关重要,因为过于激进可能会适得其反。我们认识的一位 就得到了惨痛的教训:他在董事会感到舒适之前就强烈争取主席头衔,损害了与董事的关系,导致董事会随后将这一变更推迟了两年。
管理全光谱的董事。 在这个阶段, 需要开发促进董事会内部进行强有力对话的技巧。学习如何管理不同性格的人——从被动成员到那些逾越其治理和监督职责的人——至关重要。然而,确保每个声音都被听到可能是一项艰巨的平衡工作。 该如何引导那些投入时间较少、贡献观点较少的董事,同时又如何节制那些参与过多或提供过多建议的董事?(关于此主题的更多内容,请参阅 2026 年 5-6 月号《哈佛商业评论》中的“管理难搞的董事”一文。)
一位强有力的首席独立董事或董事会主席是该领域成功的关键。许多表现卓越的 CEO 会在董事会会议和执行会议后不久,与首席独立董事安排一次跟进会议,以便感知董事会的集体情绪——了解哪些话题引起了共鸣,董事们在哪些方面有未言明的顾虑,以及哪些讨论需要后续跟进。为了与首席独立董事建立开放的对话,CEO 应当发出信号,表明他们重视董事们提出的问题和顾虑的透明度。
也会发展出各自独特的方法。例如,在标准普尔全球(S&P Global)的年度战略董事会会议期间,Doug 喜欢让董事和管理层
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分成工作组来探讨不同的主题。这些较小的组为人们交谈和分享观点创造了更多机会。Doug 还发现,在战略董事会会议结束时举行他所谓的“闪电战”环节很有帮助,在此期间,他会绕桌询问简明扼要的意见;每个人都有机会参与,不同的声音都能被听到。这两种方法都有助于吸引董事的参与。
协调影响力。 新任 在某个时间点会意识到,有多少董事会活动是在首席执行官不参加的委员会会议中发生的。(董事在没有 在场的情况下举行的执行会议在早期可能会让人感觉像个“黑匣子”。)这迫使 意识到,他们需要一种机制来保持信息畅通,并信任其执行团队与董事会委员会进行互动。
我们观察到,许多 ,尤其是在任职初期,希望对与董事会的互动行使过多的控制权。他们给团队设定过于死板的剧本,而在与董事的个人关系中,他们侧重于展示对运营的掌控力,而非促进战略对话。一位在第一次董事会会议上提交了 100 页演示文稿的 学会了采取更好的方法:他开始探索如何最好地吸引董事会的参与,并最终转变为在每次会议前提供一份四页的备忘录,重点阐述他最关注的问题以及需要董事提供建议的战略问题。这一转变带来了激烈的讨论和更高效的会议。教训是:董事会的参与不在于证明你了解多少,而在于将董事的注意力集中在他们的洞察力能产生最大价值的地方。
随着董事会对 CEO 的信任加深,隐藏的风险可能会随之出现,包括 CEO 方面的过度自信以及董事会方面的风险厌恶。这可以被称为“信任与监督悖论”:尽管 通常欢迎这一阶段带来的从严密监督向信任的转变,但这可能预示着董事会建设性的反对意见正在减弱。此外,到此时,新董事已逐渐加入董事会,权力已转移至 手中,

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最有可能在任职第四年之前被任命为董事长,此后则可能性较低。但 请求该职位的沟通方式至关重要,因为过于激进可能会适得其反。

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而现在的 更难听到不同的声音。几位 与我们分享了被困在“回音室”中的感受。其结果往往是各方都陷入自满,并产生一种不幸的倾向,即维持现状。
这种动态可能会给业务带来真实风险。例如,在我们对 生命周期研究中调查的 中,有三分之二在第二个五年里的表现不如第一个五年——但尽管如此,董事会在第二个五年里采取行动应对糟糕业绩的可能性要低得多。本质上,在 任职第六年后,董事会对业绩不佳似乎反应迟钝。Claudius 在与一个董事会进行继任计划工作时观察到了这种动态:尽管该 领导公司经历了六年的底四分位数业绩,但董事会无法想象除了这位任职时间较长的 之外,还有谁能领导公司。
以下是 在此阶段需要采取的关键行动:
对抗自满。 如果社会凝聚力是以牺牲严格治理为代价,如果更短的董事会会议导致辩论减少,以及挑战管理层的提问数量下降, 应该采取行动打破僵局。一位《财富》100 强公司的 在意识到其任职第六年需要振兴董事会监督时就这么做了。在注意到董事会会议变得日益敷衍后,他引入了“挑战会议”,在会议期间,他轮换委员会分工以引入新鲜视角,在重大决策中设立专门的质疑角色,并邀请外部专家对战略进行评议。
保持董事会的实时更新。 在此阶段,无论是否拥有董事长头衔, 通常已确立了自己在董事会中的领导地位。即便如此,他们并不总是能按照自己的意愿快速改变董事会的组成。不过,他们可以通过其他方式帮助构建董事会的技能集,包括优先开展持续教育——涵盖治理问题、竞争格局、监管环境以及业务及其市场的变化。他们还可以鼓励实地考察。Doug 两者都做了。考虑到 AI 的长期影响,他为董事会引入了 AI 教学环节,并开始在每次战略董事会会议中加入 AI 相关讨论。他还确保董事们有机会访问一线办公室,与实地员工交流,并观看产品的实际演示。
设计听到真相的途径。 随着董事会对 的信心增强以及 掌控力的提升,董事们在公开场合质疑 的计划或潜在假设的可能性可能会降低,因此重大问题可能在董事会会议上被忽略。建立不需要公开反对的董事会反馈渠道——例如在没有 参加的情况下举行执行会议——可以帮助确保这些问题得到提出,并让董事在无需在同行面前挑战 的情况下发出声音。矛盾的是, 在建立信任方面取得的成功,现在要求其刻意为董事们测试这种信任创造空间。
首席执行官(CEO)任期的最后几年带来了双重挑战:在保持战略势头的同时,为董事会和公司的未来领导层做好准备。此时的 CEO 可能会在推动当下的业务绩效与展望未来(包括个人和组织的未来)之间经历一场复杂的心理拉锯战。在这个阶段, 通常会对自己的职业生命周期产生更强烈的意识。他们开始思考离职的最佳时机,思考退出后应扮演什么样的角色(是留任执行主席?还是彻底切割?),以及董事会和组织是否已为下一任领导者做好准备。他们可能会越来越担心董事会对他们拟定的继任候选名单的支持程度,以及董事会成员是否具备应对未来的合适人选。这一阶段需要实现从追求个人成就到构建制度遗产的心理转变——随着这种转变,重点将转向回馈与传承,并对财务指标之外的长期影响进行更深层次的反思。
可以通过依赖三种主要方法成功度过这一阶段:
打破继任沉默。 在我们的研究中发现,董事会不太可能主动与一名任职时间长且绩效优秀的 讨论权力交接的话题。事实上,董事会通常希望 能尽可能久地留任,而他们对提及交接话题的迟疑,可能会让 在继任问题上掌握绝对主导权——这种情况并不总是符合公司的最佳利益。在 Claudius 观察到的一个案例中
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通过破坏继任计划流程使自己变得不可或缺,而董事会对此却采取旁观态度。由于不愿与 就交接问题进行对话,公司董事们直到一名激进投资者介入并要求外部招聘后才采取行动,这直接摧毁了一位有潜力的内部继任者的晋升路径。
更多时候, 可以作为与董事会讨论继任计划的催化剂,包括帮助定义未来 所需的素质、监督内部候选人的培养,以及分享个人计划和里程碑。在 Doug 任职于 S&P Global 期间,他将一项重大合并的完成作为考虑继任的转折点。董事会花费数月时间定义下一任 所需的特质,并勾勒出他们希望具备的经验和技能。这些对话之所以特别有效,是因为它们并非凭空出现,而是建立在关于继任计划的长期对话基础之上,其中包括确保董事会能够了解整个执行团队。
为继任者塑造董事会。 当首席执行官接近任期结束时,他们对董事会组成的影响力达到顶峰,而这种影响力的行使方式将决定组织未来几年的发展轨迹。即将离任的 有一个独特的机会,利用其信誉和关系来推动深思熟虑的更新: 可以主张增加那些技能和视角与公司演进战略相一致的董事,鼓励任期结构的健康组合,并支持董事会领导职位的稳健继任计划。通过优先考虑经验的多样性、战略专业知识以及建设性挑战的文化, 可以帮助创造持续成功的条件,确保董事会成为下一任领导者的真正合作伙伴,而不仅仅是一个历史遗留产物。通过这种方式,离任 的最后一项行动不仅仅是为了延续性,更是为了使治理机制具备前瞻性,并赋予董事会引导组织进入下一个 era 的能力。
Claudius 曾与一位即将离任的 CEO 合作,该 CEO 在计划离职的两年前就开始思考这些问题。随着过渡时间表的具体化,她意识到可以通过调整董事会的构成,来支持公司的持续业绩——也就是她的政治遗产。因此,她以一个超越其任期的视角来审视,并了解到首席董事计划在她离职后不久也离开。于是,他们共同在两次离职之间设计了一个更长的缓冲期,以维持稳定性并为新任 提供支持。
放手控制。 对于许多 来说,过渡过程中最困难的部分之一就是放弃对流程的控制,
领导力
尤其是当他们勤勉地培养了内部接班人,并与董事会密切合作制定接班战略时。一旦交接迫在眉睫,选择继任者就是董事会的职责, 必须退后,让董事会完成这项工作。
之间的过渡对于离任 来说可能是一个挑战时期,因为随着董事会和组织将注意力转向新领导者,他们可能会感到权力和威信的丧失。随着任期接近尾声,离任 必须面对关于其 之后角色的问题。我们看到一些离任 通过明显地支持其继任者,帮助新领导者在董事会和其他利益相关者中提高知名度,从而积极应对这一特殊时期。这可以包括建立一个与客户共同开会的流程以移交关系,与员工沟通,以及安排向股东、监管机构和政策制定者进行介绍。这种方法通过使交接过程可见化,增加了董事会对新任 的信心,并有助于让整个组织围绕新任首席执行官凝聚起来。
在离任 以顾问、董事会成员或执行主席身份留在公司的案例中,定义时间线(越短越好)并尽可能保持在幕后至关重要。理想情况下,离任 私下提供建议和支持,远离聚光灯,以避免削弱新任 权威的风险。
那些能够蓬勃发展与仅仅是勉强生存的 之间的区别,往往取决于一个因素:他们如何深思熟虑地与董事会建立稳固的关系。成功的 明白,董事会不是一个静态的监督机构,而是一个能够推动或阻碍公司进步的动态力量。问题不在于你与董事会的关系是否会演变,因为它一定会演变。问题在于,你是会有意识地塑造这种演变,还是仅仅任其自然发生。▼
HBR 重印 R2605G
CLAUDIUS A. HILDEBRAND 是 Spencer Stuart 的顾问,也是《 的生命周期》(The Life Cycle of a ,PublicAffairs,2024)的合著者。DOUGLAS L. PETERSON 在 2013 年至 2024 年期间担任 S&P Global 的 。
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金融与投资
大多数公司在资本配置上都做错了。 以下是正确做法。
作者
Paul Blase 普华永道 (PwC) 负责人
Paul Leinwand 普华永道 (PwC) 负责人
艺术家 RYAN KOOPMANS & ALICE WEXELL
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金融与投资
摄影师 Ryan Koopmans 和数字艺术家 Alice Wexell 将数字植物融入废弃建筑的图像中,将结构与增长的概念相融合。
大型企业面临着投资问题。 虽然从 2014 到 2023 年,美国 GDP 年均增长 3%,这在很大程度上是由技术创新驱动的,但在此期间,美国中大型企业的年投资率中位数下降了 16%。而且这种模式并非美国所独有。
一份 2025 年的 OECD 论文在分析了 17 个发达经济体的国民账户和企业级数据后发现,按加权平均计算,实际商业投资比金融危机前的水平低约 23%。
这一差距表明,许多公司正在损害其长期增长能力。对于一些公司来说,这反映了向股东返还现金的压力。对于另一些公司来说,这则反映了规避风险的投资哲学、缺乏好的创意,或是复杂的流程阻碍了企业将资本正确地分配给具有吸引力的项目组合。无论原因如何,公司必须通过投资来实现增长——并且它们需要知道应该投资多少。
106 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
为了帮助企业进行这项计算,我们和同事 Aaron Reeves 分析了 2,900 家美国上市公司的 10 年(2014–2023)财务报告和业绩。我们发现存在一个“投资甜点区”——这是一个针对公司应在增长上投资多少这一重要问题的概略答案。我们还发现,75% 的公司存在投资不足或投资过度的问题,导致其估值倍数比那些命中甜点区的公司低 20% 到 70% 不等。
在接下来的页面中,我们将解释如何量化这个甜点区,并提出能帮助企业了解其应为增长投资多少的发现。随后,我们将借鉴为公司提供资本分配建议的经验,为高管提供一套可用于识别和管理其最具前景增长项目的流程。
我们研究的 2,900 家公司在其行业中均具有重要影响力。所有公司的市值均超过 5000万美元,且共同涵盖了 150 个业务领域(按行业代码定义)。我们首先检查了它们的价值创造表现,计算了 10 年间企业价值与营收的比率(EV / R)。随后,我们从领导者和投资者都高度关注的两个绩效维度对这些公司进行了比较:资产增长和资产回报率。
资产增长。 为了评估一家公司年度投资的增幅,我们确定了其 10 年资产增长率的中位数(这是与总投资变化最接近的指标)。然后,我们在其所属的子行业内对这些公司进行百分位排名,并将其分为四个分位数组。
通常情况下,投入大量投资的公司其资产增长率应该较高。处于成熟且整合中的行业的公司也可能具有较高的资产增长,如果它们收购了陷入困境的竞争对手。
资产回报率。 我们还计算了每家公司 10 年的资产回报率中位数,在子行业内进行百分位排名,并将其分为四个分位数组。通常,不投资于增长的公司会专注于短期回报——这决定了它们所追求的投资类型。例如,它们可能更倾向于收购一家能够产生即时回报的陷入困境的竞争对手,而不是投资于回报可能在很久之后才出现的新技术。
随后,我们将这些公司的行业分为三个成熟阶段——加速期、稳步增长期和成熟期,并发现投资未来的“甜蜜点”在不同阶段之间存在差异。(参见图表“投资增长地图”。)
加速期行业。 处于加速期行业的公司——如生物技术、支付处理服务、医疗设备和可再生电力——在 10 年期间的年营收增长率中位数约为 10%。如果您处于此类行业或考虑进入此类行业,您需要准备好在产生回报之前大幅增加资产。如果您的资产增长低于投资甜蜜点,您的 EV / R 可能比投资率优化时的数值低 35% 到 50%。
加速期行业的公司在资产增长处于第一(最高)分位数且资产回报率处于第四(最低)分位数时,EV / R 达到最大值。这些公司(包括营收低于 10 亿美元 billion 的公司和大型数十亿美元企业)的资产增长率约为 8%,资产回报率(ROA)约为 3.8%。那些
IDEA IN BRIEF
许多公司要么在增长方面投资不足,要么在无法产生长期价值的计划上过度支出——这损害了竞争力和估值。
对 2,900 家美国上市公司十年间的分析表明,当公司在与其行业成熟度和增长动态相匹配的“投资甜蜜点”内运作时,能获得最强的估值倍数。投资范围超出该区间公司,其估值会受到 20% 到 70% 的惩罚。
领导者应使投资水平与行业背景相一致,将增长计划作为一个综合投资组合而非孤立的项目来管理,并将资本配置直接与战略优先级挂钩。公司还需要支持纪律化实验、明确增长指标和明智冒险的治理体系与文化,以便在不过度扩张的情况下自信地进行再投资。
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数据表明,一些公司正将利润重新投入到业务中,在推高资产的同时降低了回报率。
对于处于加速增长行业的公司而言,挑战在于确定他们需要什么样的资产基础,才能拥有满足市场激进增长预期的能力。例如,那些试图通过产生网络效应来快速积累客户的平台或数字平台构建公司,必须在早期进行大规模投资以实现快速扩张。这带有很大风险,尤其是对于初创公司而言。聪明的公司会寻找有机投资与无机投资之间的正确平衡,并确保两者都有足够的投入来驱动增长机器。
稳步增长行业。 如果你的公司处于稳步增长行业,例如医疗设施、建筑材料、建筑产品、数据处理或资产管理,挑战在于在资产增长(支持持续的营收势头)与资产回报率(增加资产基础的价值)之间取得正确的平衡。
处于最佳状态的稳步增长公司在资产增长处于第二四分位数(约 5%)且资产回报率处于第三四分位数(同样约 5%)时,其 EV / R(企业价值 / 营收比)达到最大值。对于该类别中约 73% 处于最佳状态之外的公司,我们发现其 EV / R 倍数比处于最佳状态的公司低 37% 到 50%,这提供了巨大的提升空间。
在最优范围内投资的稳步增长公司通常已经建立了一套允许其增加营收的资产基础。它们通常投资于研发,以便在产品组合中增加新解决方案以实现营收流多样化,或者进行规模较小的补强收购(tuck-in acquisitions)。
成熟行业。 如果你的公司处于成熟行业,且追加投资可能会带来收益递减,那么你需要对投资目的具有极强的针对性。如果你计划增加投资,你需要向股东发送一个明确的信号,具体说明追加资产将如何改善你的增长前景。
成熟行业的公司面临着过度投资以及追求最终被证明是幻象的增长的真实风险。这将带来代价:我们的研究发现,该类别中 48% 的公司如果将资产增长加速到超出其投资最佳点,其 EV / R 倍数可能会下降 20% 到 70%。对于成熟行业的公司,最佳点位于资产增长的第四四分位数(约 1.6%)和资产回报率的第二四分位数(约 6%)。那些取得这种平衡的公司正在限制其投资,尽可能高效地利用资产,并在向股东返还现金的同时获取利润。
成熟行业公司面临的一个挑战是,颠覆性公司可能会利用新兴技术重塑其竞争格局。例如,在 20 世纪 90 年代后期,百货商店业务是一个成熟行业,但在 21 世纪初,随着电子商务对零售业的重塑,该行业的公司被迫转型。面对颠覆,公司可能需要重新制定战略并投资于新兴技术以保持竞争力,或者必须进入更高增长的行业。这两项举措通常都会要求它们大幅增加资产增长并降低资产回报率(ROA)——实际上,至少在投资方面,它们需要重新成为初创公司。如果投资者认可这种做法,他们会给予公司更高的倍数。但这很少发生:在这种情况下,只有约 5% 的公司能够显著地移至资产增长的第一或第二四分位数,且依然获得前四分位数的 EV / R 倍数。
鉴于我们研究的大多数公司在最优范围之外进行投资,显然许多公司需要重新思考如何管理投资流程——从为增长计划寻找极具吸引力的创意,到跟踪并将投资整合到业务中。让我们依次探讨其中的每一项。
由于有大量需要更新的陈旧资产,以及仅为了跟上需求(或竞争对手进度)而进行的技术改进,您应当资助的真正增长机会可能并不完全显而易见。您不仅必须挖掘这些机会,还必须专门为它们拨付资金——而公司往往忽略了这一点。以一家全球多业务控股公司为例,该公司设定了一个目标,即在未来五年内,其 200 亿美元营收中的 20% 要来自包括 AI 在内的新技术驱动解决方案。该公司并未明确核算实现这一愿景所需的投资——且没有意识到这将需要
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--。
许多公司在决定投入多少资本用于增长计划时感到困难,由于投资不足或无效的过度支出,损害了自身的前景。一项针对 2,900 家美国公司、跨度 10 年的研究显示,处于加速增长、稳步增长和成熟行业的企业具有不同的投资“甜蜜点”(sweet spots),这些点由其资产增长率和资产回报率(ROA)决定。理想情况下,加速增长行业的公司应处于资产增长的前 25%(第一四分位数)且 ROA 处于后 25%(第四四分位数)。稳步增长行业的公司应处于资产增长的第二四分位数和 ROA 的第三四分位数。成熟行业的公司应处于资产增长的第四四分位数和资产回报率的第三四分位数。当公司落在其甜蜜点时,其市场价值将达到最大化。

Source: PwC
大约 50 亿美元 billion。该公司也没有要求资本规划小组评估融资方案。
与此同时,投资委员会在年度预算过程中,向来自多个业务部门的战略计划申请分配了 8亿美元 的资本。其中包含几个本可以用来启动新增长战略的项目——例如,一项旨在开发预测性维护解决方案以支持软件即服务(SaaS)业务模式的合作伙伴关系。该项目未被归类为增长投资,而是被列入了与提供 IT 服务台服务的供应商相同的“合作伙伴与联盟”预算项目中。与此同时,为了跟上竞争步伐,该公司增加了首席技术官(CTO)用于具有跨业务部门协同效应的新兴技术(如 AI)的预算。CTO 优先投资于一个测试服务优化潜在 AI 应用的试点项目,但这并未被认定为增长投资,

FINANCE & INVESTING
尽管其目标是开发一个能够增加服务收入的解决方案。
因此,你的挑战在于弄清楚你实际上在增长方面投入了多少,并更有效地管理你的投资。为此,请采取以下步骤:
计算增长投资率(GIR)。 我们建议使用这一指标,它将甜蜜点分析简化为“资产增长率减去资产回报率”,以此来观察你的投资额相对于同行的情况。该数值在不同公司之间可能在 -5% 到 50% 之间波动,有时甚至更高。如果该数值为正,意味着你投资资产的速率超过了目前已证明的为投资者产生回报的能力。这是否意味着过度投资取决于具体情况。竞争对手投资的激进程度、投资哲学、对增长前景的信心、对战略的确定性、差异化潜力、风险偏好以及行业的成熟度,都决定了投资模式是否需要改变以及如何改变。
例如,我们的分析表明,在 20 世纪 90 年代后期,像 Blockbuster、Borders 和 Tower Records 这样的成熟零售公司,由于被认为缺乏增长前景以及投资者要求回报最大化的压力,其 GIR 均为负值。随后,这些公司遇到了 Netflix、Amazon 和苹果的 iTunes 等新玩家。随着这些凭借新数字化商业模式的新兴企业永久性地颠覆市场变得显而易见,在位企业的领导者本应意识到其方法需要改变。如果他们当时将自己的 GIR 与新竞争对手进行基准对比,可能会意识到他们必须在维持零售版图的同时,投资于构建数字化资产。我们回顾性的分析显示,他们需要将 GIR 提高三到四倍才能跟上步伐。
确保您的投资得到全面管理。 接下来的步骤是审视您如何管理资本投资组合。在许多公司中,每个增长项目的评估都是独立进行的。为了吸引资金,发起特定项目的部门经理通常会制定详细的多年期财务模型,并基于往往被证明是敷衍的市场潜力和客户需求评估,设定早期且过于激进的营收目标。评估方法可能存在显著差异:您评估一个新
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公司不能仅仅增加(或减少)对增长的投资。他们必须瞄准与增长战略最一致的机会和资源。

110 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
财务与投资
工厂或客户解决方案的评估方式,将与您评估新市场进入的方式不同。更糟糕的是,投资将按照不同的时间线进行管理,且不同类别的投资将由不同的治理机制监督。
为了避免混乱,我们建议领导者采取风险投资公司和私募股权公司所使用的做法。他们通过根据增长和回报目标以及时间跨度对投资进行明确分类,来管理投资组合中小型投资的组合。某些投资将具有短期目标;而其他投资则将为长期回报奠定基础。这种方法将建立纪律,并使您的高级管理团队能够理解各项投资如何共同作用以实现公司的整体目标。
以明确的目的和逻辑驱动您的投资。 现在审视您具体投资的对象以及您如何跟踪绩效。许多管理团队仅使用投资回报率(ROI)或内部收益率(IRR)等财务指标来评估项目的进展。但这些指标无法提供关于长期增长潜力的洞察,而这正是您在对重大赌注做出及时且明智的资本重新分配决策时所需要的。事实上,我们发现,在我们分析的公司中,大约 62% 的公司无法解释研发和资产投资将如何转化为营收,这增加了他们无法产生公司目标未来利润率的风险。
最终,投资者希望将资金投入到那些具有预期回报、专注于正确增长市场、具有明确差异化路径且拥有获胜之道的企业中。我们在 2024 年的《哈佛商业评论》文章《创建持续增长的系统》中探讨了这一点,在文中我们解释了将投资与明确定义的战略和价值创造模型相结合的能力如何大幅提高估值倍数。这意味着公司不能仅仅增加(或减少)对增长的投资。他们必须专注于与增长战略最一致的机会和资源,而不是追求由单个团队或高管确定的杂乱项目组合。
能够正确处理此点的公司,会将建立正确的指标体系以跟踪投资进展作为明确的领导目标。此类指标允许您随时间追踪对新产品、解决方案、服务和能力的投资如何转化为目标客户的销售额,进而转化为增长和财务影响。
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财务与 投资
医疗保健公司 Dexcom 就是一个很好的例子。该公司的战略是成为直接面向患者的糖尿病治疗解决方案的市场领导者。其管理层会追踪研发投入以及 Dexcom 合作伙伴生态系统的投资如何提升其连续葡萄糖监测平台的价值。他们通过衡量特定新数字化功能、联网健康监测设备以及耗材的客户采用率和营收,来评估资产投资是否带来了预期的增长,以及随着时间的推移应当增加、维持还是降低投资率。
将投资组合与你的战略流程相结合。 增长组合的管理需要成为你战略日程的一部分。公司应在定义的阶段关卡(stage gates)进行定期的项目审查,将实际投资绩效与目标绩效进行对比,并制定明确的资本重新分配规则;这些规则不仅应基于财务指标,还应参考市场的反应和客户的响应。
为了实现这一点,许多公司成立了正式的跨职能投资委员会和孵化器,并赋予其明确的授权、计分卡和升级路径,以加快资本重新分配的决策速度。挑战在于如何设计这些部门,使其能与更广泛的公司整体保持充分的整合。我们经常发现,这些部门往往变成了创新孤岛,被主流业务部门所忽视,导致公司错过甚至扼杀了许多好想法。
打破这一循环的一家公司是福利保险公司 Unum Group。该公司最近设立了一个向首席战略官汇报的战略创新职能部门,负责分配创新资金。该职能部门管理一个涵盖客户探索、孵化和最小可行方案(minimum-viable-solution)开发的阶段关卡流程。对于每个项目,进一步的资本分配取决于市场认可度以及客户采用率等关键指标的表现。该流程与 Unum 的年度战略规划流程无缝集成,用于管理下一年度的停止 / 启动 / 继续决策,调整增长组合目标,并完善投资需求。
文化不易改变——尤其是在涉及对适当风险与回报的态度时。早在 1966 年,雪城大学教授拉尔夫·斯瓦姆(Ralph Swalm)就在《哈佛商业评论》(HBR)上发表了一篇文章(《效用理论——风险承担的洞察》),其研究表明,专业管理人员通常非常不愿支持高风险项目。半个多世纪后,丹·洛瓦洛(Dan Lovallo)及其合著者在 2020 年的 HBR 文章《你的公司过于厌恶风险》中得出结论,情况几乎没有改变。公司文化奖励稳妥行事,而对失败嗤之以鼻。
根据我们的经验,应对这一增长障碍的最佳方法是将投资锚定在你的战略中,系统性地创建多个且多样化的项目,并在新数据进入时对其进行密切监控和重新评估。进步保险(Progressive Insurance)提供了一个很好的范例。该公司在将驾驶行为的遥测数据整合到汽车保险产品中方面采取了先发行动。其领导层当时并不清楚具体什么样的解决方案会获胜,也不清楚何时能产生收入,但他们知道遥测是一个极其重要的投资主题,对公司的直接面向消费者、基于风险定价的商业模式具有根本性的影响。
进步保险在 5 到 10 年的时间跨度内尝试了众多技术和消费者采用技巧。它为参与实验的高管和团队引入了正式的行动后回顾机制——为他们提供了一个讨论挫折的论坛。如果他们能够解释挫折发生的原因,以及未来可以采取哪些不同措施来实现投资的长期目标,资金支持就会继续。这一过程创造了快速揭露失败并避免延续糟糕投资的激励机制,同时奖励聪明的风险承担、学习和坚持。结果是:进步保险成为了保险业遥测货币化的早期领导者。
公司还可以利用创新挑战赛和创意活动等论坛来挖掘组织的创造力,从而挖掘大胆的想法。但这些活动需要定期举行,而不是一次性的。而且,领导者必须公开认可并奖励提出并执行大胆想法的员工团队(而非个人)。那些为这些团队设立财务奖励,并通过提供衡量后的资本来支持其计划的组织,会让组织在心理上对实验感到更安全。
最后,领导者需要强化对多元化意见的接纳。当现状扼杀创新时,他们必须鼓励员工大胆发言,
112 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
文化不易改变——尤其是在涉及对适当风险与回报的态度时。公司文化奖励稳妥行事,而对失败嗤之以鼻。

而无需担心遭到报复。在许多公司青睐的共识文化中,这可能很难实现,因为在这种文化中,塑造值得巨额投资的想法所必需的严谨讨论往往无法进行。不过,好消息是,在大多数公司中,你都能找到能够提供组织所需的重要“挑战者心态”的员工。
许多领导者在关于投资多少资金来增长业务这一根本决策上感到挣扎。做出正确决定的起点是准确评估哪些投资实际上能带来增长,并理解你分配给这些投资的资金是否过多或过少,以及原因何在。对于许多公司来说,这将需要一次彻底的
重新思考。目标不应该是消除风险,而应该是以理性的方式拥抱风险。其愿景应该是建立一个企业投资计划——无论公司处于任何行业或任何情况——都能找到投资的黄金平衡点。 ▼
HBR 转载 R2605H
PAUL BLASE 是普华永道美国(PwC U.S.)的负责人,领导该公司的增长平台。PAUL LEINWAND 是普华永道美国(PwC U.S.)的负责人,普华永道领导力中心(PwC Leadership Center)的负责人,以及西北大学凯洛格管理学院(Kellogg School)的兼职教授。他与 Mahadeva Matt Mani 合著了《超越数字化:伟大领导者如何转型组织并塑造未来》(Beyond Digital: How Great Leaders Transform Their Organizations and Shape the Future,哈佛商业评论出版社,2022)。
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--。
获取由《哈佛商业评论》顾问委员会和全球商业领袖提供的专家级情报,并探索来自 HBR 分析服务(HBR Analytic Services)的数百篇白皮书和研究报告。
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管理自我
作者:Pamela Meyer
大多数领导者最终都会遇到同样的瓶颈。他们可能拥有职位、头衔和成功的过往记录,但在某些时刻,他们需要动员那些并非其直接下属的人员,或者无法参与关键决策的提供建议,亦或无法控制对方的预算。
当你对员工、同行和上司没有正式的权威时,如何让他们产生你想要的结果?当你
插图:JULIE GUILLEM
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没有参与到每一次讨论中时,如何让自己的声音被听到?这就是所谓的“间接影响力问题”。这种情况比许多领导者意识到的——或愿意承认的——更为普遍,而且大多数人根本不知道该如何应对。
有些人会加大力度,试图行使他们所拥有的那点权威,但这往往会触发心理学家杰克·布雷姆(Jack Brehm)所称的“心理抗拒”(reactance)——即当你感到自主权受到威胁时,本能地产生反抗的倾向。在营销、公共卫生和组织心理学领域数十年的研究证实了同样的结论:当有人告诉人们该做什么时,他们往往会恰恰相反地去做。
与此同时,曾经让职场权威发挥作用的条件正在发生变化。根据盖洛普(Gallup)的数据,美国的员工敬业度已下降至 31%。爱德曼(Edelman)最近的一项调查发现,对雇主的信任度在 26 年来首次下降。工作变得更加分布式、专业化,并且依赖于非正式网络,例如 Slack 频道和校友网络。正如麦肯锡(McKinsey)所报道的:“新数据告诉我们,没有任何一种情况需要领导者遵循‘因为我这么说了,所以就这么做’的旧格言。”
如今的领导者需要寻找不同的方式来激励和推动变革,从而让团队成员选择采取行动,而不是被迫行动。基于对建立或破坏信任机制二十年的研究,包括与 C 级高管和管理团队的数千次互动,我确定了领导者在高风险环境下施加间接影响力的五条路径。
几年前,我被邀请进入一家《财富》100强消费品公司,与一位新任命的首席创新官合作,她的任务是实现运营现代化。她拥有预算和首席执行官的支持,但她启动的每一项计划在会议上似乎都得到了礼貌的赞同,随后却是毫无行动。在与各部门总裁开会期间,她注意到许多人都在看向大卫(David),一位管理着传统业务部门、沉默寡言的执行副总裁,以此来判断如何回应她。当她与大卫进行一对一交谈时,她发现他每周都会与公司最近退休的首席运营官(COO)沟通。此人虽然不再在任何正式的决策桌上占有一席之地,但他的观点仍然主导着老员工们对风险的看法。于是,她找到了这位首席运营官,询问他从十年前一次失败的转型尝试中学到了什么。当她向团队提及与首席运营官的对话以及他提出的担忧时,大卫的态度发生了变化,一周之内,她的计划开始取得进展。
正如这个故事所示,权力掮客并不总是显而易见的。C级高管或类似的资深头衔仅仅是一个指标。以谷歌 AI 的负责人杰夫·迪恩(Jeff Dean)为例:他的知名度虽然不如 Alphabet 首席执行官桑达尔·皮查伊(Sundar Pichai),但他在整个公司内部依然
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间接影响力的难题比许多领导者意识到的——或者愿意承认的——更为普遍,而且大多数人根本不知道该如何应对。
拥有巨大的分量。问问你自己:在做出决定之前,大家都会看向谁来征求意见?那些领导者在意什么,又是谁在塑造他们的思维?
要识别隐藏的影响力:
追踪决策过程,而非职位头衔。 幕后影响力者通常在没有正式权力的情况下引导群体。
观察人们看向哪里。 密切关注目光模式。头部转动的方向或群体的视线汇聚点可以揭示谁的观点至关重要。
留意谁最先发言且发言最频繁。 在关键问题上率先发表意见的人通常会被视为领导者。
识别刻意的违规行为。 在高地位场合中,如果是有意为之,不遵守着装要求或社交规范则传递出自信的信号。
当你怀疑表面现象并非全貌时,这条路径尤其有用。如果你是新人、缺乏影响力,或者面临根深蒂固的规范、非正式联盟或小圈子,那么它将具有极高的价值。当可见的大门无法开启时,请寻找那些心腹、顾问、酒友、高尔夫球友或其他值得信赖的声音。
在我合作过的一家制药公司里,两位部门主管因为一次产品失败而互相指责,甚至停止了交流。他们仅通过助手进行沟通,而他们的冲突已成为整个组织内公开的秘密。首席执行官(CEO)曾想命令两人解决问题,但他担心来自高层的调解会适得其反。于是,他请我作为外部顾问来建立一个“后道”(back channel)。(一名受两位高管共同尊重的公正同事或人力资源负责人也将是一个不错的选择。)
我分别与每位部门主管会面,要求他们分别列出对方的三项合理不满之处,以及对方在产品发布期间做得好的三件事。我在不作评论的情况下分享了这些清单,然后设计了两个让他们在无需处理冲突的情况下也能专业协作的理由:首先是供应商简报会,接着是预算预审会。到第二次会议时,他们已经能够进行眼神交流。一周后,他们进行了一次私人晚餐以达成和解。后道沟通法之所以有效,是因为它为每个人提供了一个无需公开认错的“出口”——只需适度的私人认可,即可让下一步行动成为可能。
后道沟通允许领导者降低风险、保护自尊,并在心理安全的环境中探索方案。它们能减少抵触心理,并开启真正的反思。
要建立私人联系:
留意何时需要后道沟通。 观察那些公开同意但私人行为不一致的情况,或者重复回答“是”却没有任何后续执行的情况。
在不施压的情况下开启对话。 保持接触的简短性,使其成为可选且易于拒绝的邀请。
带着新信息、明确的权衡方案,或一个会影响决策的问题出现。
先试探性开始,然后逐渐坚定。 使用温和的语言开启对话,在需要做出决定时,再转向明确的承诺。
只有当后道沟通者是受信任的一方时,这条路径才有效;否则,这可能会被视为权力攫取,甚至更糟——被视为一种威胁。在正式讨论陷入僵局、问题情绪化或关系紧张时,请使用这种方法。然而,这应该是一项临时措施,仅在开启新可能性后,尽快恢复到透明协作的状态。
一家区域医院网络新任命的首席运营官(COO)被要求重启一项在 18 个月前刚提出就夭折的人员重组方案。她有了新计划并拥有动力,但当我被聘请为她的顾问时,我告诉她先等等。当时,即将到来的工会谈判让每个人都处于防御状态,我担心对此产生的恐惧和不确定感会玷污即使是最完美的方案。
在管理层与员工达成协议后不久,首席财务官(CFO)宣布了强劲的季度业绩,且第一波重组尝试中的两名资深质疑者离开了领导团队。COO 随即提出了她的计划,并迅速获得了批准。
精准推动者知道,当人们处于某种
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在你自己的影响力之战中,直率依然有其用武之地,但真正的技巧在于识别何时采用更微妙的方法会更有效。
焦虑、防御或愤怒的情绪,从而加剧心理抗拒时,不应采取行动。时机、措辞和强度至关重要。如果交付的时机不对,好的观点也无法产生效果。更好的做法是玩长线游戏,在采取行动前先观察情绪和压力水平。
当苹果公司的工程师想要向以严苛著称的首席执行官史蒂夫·乔布斯展示他们正在开发的触摸屏原型时,他们首先将其交给苹果的设计主管乔尼·艾夫(Jony Ive),因为他们知道他会选择合适的时机将其分享给老板。艾夫显然选择了一个乔布斯更容易接受该想法的时刻——尽管这个想法并非出自他之手——苹果最终生产并销售了超过 30 亿部 iPhone。
要掌握战略时机:
控制信息流。
在评估信任水平之前,保留敏感细节。
利用沉默的力量。
与其急于回应,不如创造对话停顿以促使对方进行更深层的思考。
根据领导者的带宽来把握请求时机。 一个深陷危机的人没有空间去评估任何新方案。要以窗口期和时间跨度的概念来思考,而不是具体某个时刻。二月份失败的事情,在四月份可能会通过。
留意讨论何时过热。 如果人们说话速度加快或在原地打转地争论,请将决策范围缩小到目前可以解决的事项上。
当环境处于波动之中,且关键参与者感到不确定或困惑时,精准推动者的力量最强。问问自己:我有耐心吗?我的情感感知力是否足以察觉情绪转变?我能否在时机成熟之前保留信息?如果可以,这条路径能带来巨大的影响力。
路径 4
连接者 (CONNECTOR)
到 32 岁时,马库斯(Marcus)已将社交变成了一套系统:参加会议,握手,发送跟进便条,然后重复。当他的 A 轮创业公司在 2019 年陷入困境时,他需要通过熟人介绍接触一位可能拯救公司的采购主管,于是他联系了 11 个联系人,但没有一个人觉得有特别的义务去帮助他。该公司在六个月内倒闭了。
五年后,马库斯成为一家中型软件即服务(SaaS)公司的产品副总裁,在那里他以支持同事而闻名——他曾在一次艰难的高管评审中为一名同事辩护,承担了一个没人想要的耗时项目,并为一名初级工程师写了一封真正有用的推荐信。
当他的公司需要与一家以销售周期长且对冷启动接触毫无耐心的供应商达成合作伙伴关系时,马库斯没有制作演示文稿。相反,他给多年前在评审中帮其辩护的那位同事打了电话,对方现在是目标公司的总监。三周后,协议签署。
社交者分为两种:一种像收集名片一样收集人——一个为了榨取价值而建立的人脉索引,仅在需要东西时才激活;另一种则花费数年时间进行“存款”,且不期望获得回报。第一种人能让房间里坐满人;而第二种人能驱动这些人。
连接者通过扩大选项范围来改变结果。他们不是将人们推向某种解决方案,而是在正确的时间将正确的人联系起来,从而使问题能够在拥有更充分信息且防御心理更少的情况下得到解决。
为了有效地利用网络:
管理信息边界。
决定何时将人们联系起来,以及何时让他们保持独立。
利用来自不同背景的知识。 通过连接不同的群体,你可以获得他人可能无法察觉的多样化视角。
识别需要弥合的差距。 寻找停滞的工作、缺失的协调或匮乏的专业知识。
在连接之前进行翻译。
当不同群体使用不同的专业语言时,请为他们进行翻译。
当你面对孤立的团队、运行一个跨职能项目,或试图在不触发自尊心或抵触情绪的情况下重新调整一个破碎的群体时,连接者路径尤其有用。这需要一位具备强大人际交往能力的领导者。
路径 5
脉搏阅读者(PULSE READER)
一家全球咨询公司的资深合伙人注意到一个在技术密集型项目中反复出现的模式:亚洲初级分析师被分配到编码和数据架构岗位的比例异常之高——有时甚至是他们未接受过培训的岗位。她与这些员工召开了一次闭门会议,并提出了一个直接的问题:“在人员配置方面,你觉得自己在哪些方面被高估或低估了?”在
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经验
一些犹豫之后,几个人给出了坦诚的回答,例如“我认为我们被分配到技术岗位是基于刻板印象,而不是基于我们实际做过的事情”,以及“我被分配到了我还没准备好承担的编码工作,而且很难拒绝”。他们同意让她在不透露姓名的情况下将这些反馈提交给领导层。当她这样做时,她也向同行提出了一个直接的问题:“我们在哪些方面可能将感知到的优势与实际能力混淆了?”在几周之内,人员配置负责人开始更明确地核实技术准备情况,初级分析师也有了更清晰的方式来拒绝不合适的岗位。
脉搏阅读者不仅注意到人们大声说出的话,还注意到能量在何时下降或注意力在何时集中,沉默在何时具有分量,以及观点是如何形成的。他们追踪一致性的转变、犹豫、不适和势头。他们考虑整个系统。并且他们能够诊断并引导情感潮流,以实现战略变革。
为了更好地洞察你的团队:
首先建立心理安全感。
富有魅力的领导者可能会通过“敬畏效应”在无意中使他人沉默,在这种效应下,人们在领导者面前会压抑情感。当你需要读懂弦外之音时,克制会更有效。
在逻辑连接之前先进行情感连接。 通过触及希望和归属感等情感,并表现出真诚的好奇心,你可以使你的信息更具说服力。
谨慎选择措辞。 当你积极地将挑战定义为中立或积极的基调时,你将能更好地激发某些情感,并塑造人们认为哪些解决方案是可行的。
将复杂问题提炼至本质。 当问题让人感到难以承受时,使用结构化技术来强化焦点。尝试 40-20-10-5 法,即逐步将一个问题从 40 个词提炼到仅剩 5 个词。
这条路径需要情商。当氛围不对、群体认同感和凝聚力下降,以及焦虑或恐惧扭曲决策时,该方法最为成功。如果人们在寻找你的情感信号,这通常是最佳方案。
在大多数组织中,专业知识是分散的,联盟在组织架构图之外形成,而决策在正式敲定之前早已初具雏形。人们守护着自己的自主权,并且对被管理的感觉反应强烈。在你争取影响力的战斗中,直截了当的方式依然有其用武之地,但真正的技巧在于识别何时采用更微妙的方法会更有效。你可以根据所面临的抵触类型以及想要施加的影响种类,从这五条路径中任选其一,或将它们结合使用。▼
HBR Reprint R2605J
PAMELA MEYER 是 Calibrate 的创始人兼 CEO,也是《如何读懂现场:社交观察的艺术与科学》(How to Read the Room: The Art and Science of Social Observation,St. Martin’s Press,2026)一书的作者。
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--。
HCLTech 首席执行官 论在 AI 时代进行转型
作者:C. Vijayakumar
当生成式 AI 在 2022 年底广泛可用时,我们 HCLTech 迅速意识到,这将对我们的组织和行业产生巨大的影响。几十年来,IT 服务一直通过线性模型运行,人员配置与收入同步增长。从互联网到数字化再到云端,每一次重大技术浪潮都创造了对更多工程师、更多顾问和更大团队的需求。 的进步改变了这一等式:现在,大量的知识工作可以用极少的人力在极短的时间内完成。这项技术不仅仅是在边缘地带提高生产力,它正在改变我们业务的经济逻辑。
在 HCLTech,这种认知促使我们思考一些困难的问题。我们如何让 227,000 名员工为这样一个未来做好准备——在这个未来中,某些现有角色可能不再存在,而许多最重要的角色尚未出现?我们如何说服管理人员,成功不应再主要由团队规模来衡量?当我们知道 可能会颠覆我们自己的收入流时,我们如何帮助客户采用 ?
我们选择全心拥抱 ,这已经改变了我们的内部运作方式、为客户创造价值的方式以及衡量成功的方式。我们的
120 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月–10月
摄影:MACKENZIE STROH
更深层的信息是,我们都需要为一个某些角色将不再存在的世界做好准备,这强调了提升技能的紧迫性。
战略基于几个重要目标:主动转型我们的服务;构建差异化的知识产权(IP)以加速企业的 采用;创建由 驱动的新服务(如物理 和 工厂)、新的 生态系统合作伙伴关系,以及涵盖整个技术栈的新工具;最重要的是,将我们的员工转变为 构建者、 超级用户和“人在回路”的决策者。
今天,得益于这一全公司范围的战略、在技术和培训方面的谨慎投资,以及与客户的深度合作伙伴关系,我们正稳步前行。我们希望我们的故事能引起任何希望使其业务适应 时代组织的共鸣。
HCLTech 在开拓新前沿方面有着悠久的历史。它由 Shiv Nadar 和一群同事于 1976 年创立,当时名为 HCL。他们拥有一个激进的愿景,即在当时很少有人相信印度初创公司能与全球公司展开有意义竞争的时代,在印度打造世界级的技术。几十年来,我们不断演进,从 IT 硬件转向工程与研发,再转向服务与软件。每一次转型都要求我们积极地向技术和客户需求的发展方向移动,而不是保护现有的业务。
我于 1994 年作为一名年轻工程师加入 HCLTech,在职级中逐步晋升,并在 2016 年被任命为 CEO 之前担任过多个领导职务。面对即将到来的诸多技术变革,我意识到领导这家公司需要一种创业精神:愿意尝试新事物,快速学习,并适应不断变化的动态。
近年来,我们一直与一些全球顶尖企业合作,提供先进的工程和研发服务,这在许多方面为如今重新定义行业的 AI 系统铺平了道路。大约十年前,我们的重大赌注是更深入地扩展到企业软件和平台,以帮助客户创新和增长。这项工作涵盖了支撑下一代 AI 解决方案的技术、平台和研究计划。虽然进步的速度惊人,但我们仍处于 AI 驱动转型的早期阶段,这将需要我们以将我们带到今天位置的同样纪律和独创性,来应对新的技术、运营和社会挑战。我们相信这是一个拐点,也是一个一生一次的机会,可以用技术来放大人类潜能和企业价值。
执行如此巨大的转型,首先要促成思维模式的转变。我们公司几乎所有人的成长经历都处于一个“团队规模越大,影响力越大,营收越高”的世界。但现在,团队应当采用 AI 来提高产出,用更少的人员完成更多的工作。
速度也至关重要。任何人都不应因为想要维持旧有方式或保护当前的现金流而犹豫不决。我们需要习惯于转型,甚至习惯于蚕食现有业务的部分环节,并坚信这将使我们在未来处于更有利的地位。
正如我公开分享的那样,在接下来的几年里,我们的目标是建立一个根本不同的运营模式——在这种模式下,增长不再与员工人数的增加挂钩,而是通过赋能团队成员成为 AI 构建者和 超级用户,通过 增强的、平台主导的交付方式来放大他们的潜力。
我们首次在 2025 年 2 月宣布了这一意图,目的不在于制造焦虑,而在于透明地沟通,让员工参与到这段旅程中,并培养成功所需的思维转变。我们的目标是让团队围绕一个共同的愿景达成一致,最重要的是,确保他们充满活力且兴奋地共同构建那个未来。
我们是如何让每个人接受这种新思维的?靠的是信念和沟通。
当我意识到 的力量时,我选择不对团队含糊其辞。这就是为什么我公开宣布了一个大胆的目标:用一半的人员实现营收翻倍。更深层的战略信息是,我们所有人都需要为一个某些现有岗位将不复存在的世界做好准备,并强调提升技能的紧迫性。将这一目标转化为具体的小步骤,我们的短期目标是通过 增强现有员工能力,在无需增加人员的情况下实现至少 5% 的营收增长。当然,
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在 5% 之后的增量营收增长可能需要额外的人才。但信息很明确:“我们不再是按部就班地经营业务。 改变了一切。你的公司正鼓励你保持领先。”
直接且一致的沟通是确保这一挑战被良好接受的关键。我首先召集了 150 位顶尖的服务交付和企业职能领导者开会,以确保他们达成一致,并愿意帮助将新思维渗透到各自的团队中。随后,我前往全球各地的分支机构会见了所有的销售团队(全部 1,200 名成员),向他们解释这一战略,并向他们保证,对于任何愿意努力工作、学习和适应的人来说,这些变化最终将被证明是有益的。对于我们的董事会,以及外部的客户、媒体和股东,我的信息完全一致。我们正在积极地在每个岗位上采用 ,并帮助客户这样做。一些工作岗位和营收流将消失,另一些将被创造。 仅在极少数领域自主运行;大多数情况下,我们将采用“人在回路”模式。未来是员工与 智能体协同工作。虽然我们预计某些营收流在短期内会放缓,但我们愿意在今天进行有纪律的投资,以强化我们的长期增长轨迹和未来的价值创造。
只有当公司投入充足的资源时,转型工作才能取得成功。我们目前正将
部分利润(见“HCLTech”图表)重新投入到 AI 技术、差异化知识产权(IP)的创建、研发以及培训中。我们在首席技术官周围组建了一支规模更大的团队,并要求他分阶段在整个组织中推广并扩大相关举措,从普及新工具和新举措的广泛认知开始,逐步深入到技术和领导力的开发。
其中一个关键平台 AI Force 将 应用于软件开发和数据生命周期的每一个步骤,以及 IT 和业务运营。许多公司目前仅使用 来辅助编写代码,但我们认为构建一个能够提高整个流程生产力的解决方案至关重要。我们为客户部署这项服务的能力,成为了本财年两次重大中标的关键差异化优势,其中一次是为 Guardian Life Insurance,另一次是为一家大型时尚零售商。我们的重点不仅是用 改造我们的服务,还要帮助客户通过 成功转型其业务模式。
我们还设立了一个负责任的 治理办公室,并聘请了一位高级管理人员来领导该办公室。该小组将确保我们构建的每个平台都包含护栏,以便所有由 驱动的决策都能经过偏见检查,并且在必要时可以被追踪、审查和撤销。
在培训方面,我们的预期是 5% 到 10% 的团队成员将成为 构建者,为他人创建可使用的新解决方案。我们正在提升顶尖技术专家的技能以符合这一类别,同时招聘新的 专家人才。我们要求其余的
总部:印度北方邦诺伊达 (Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India) 员工人数:227,000+

来源:HCLTech
90% 到 95% 的员工通过利用我们构建或购买的工具、我们创建的提示词库以及我们提供的计划,成为其各自领域的 超级用户。我们希望所有员工都能将生产力提高三到四倍。
我们意识到,要让全部 227,000 名团队成员充分利用一项仍在飞速演进的技术需要时间。但好奇心强、有驱动力的员工能够迅速尝试并变得熟练,我可以自信地说,我们大多数员工现在都有动力和技能,能够利用 更轻松、更有效地完成工作。
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我尝试以身作则。我使用 Anthropic 的 助手 Claude 来进行之前要求团队交付的研究工作,我将 聊天机器人视为一名顾问,与其讨论和辩论想法,微调我的战略思考,或进行问题解决。我甚至创建了自己的收入预测应用程序。我不断与我的团队和更广泛的组织分享这些例子,让他们看到我正与他们一起拥抱我们的 转型。
当然,HCLTech 的长期成功取决于能否帮助我们的客户像我们一样拥抱 AI 技术。到目前为止,由于多种原因,采用过程一直较为缓慢。我有时开玩笑说,上帝之所以能在七天内创造世界,仅仅是因为他没有现有的安装基数,也不必担心新系统是否与旧系统兼容。企业以谨慎且精准的方式对待最新的 AI 工具,这是理所当然的。
在与客户合作的第一阶段,我们需要获得所有必要的安全、法律和隐私许可,并完成平台评估。随着我们自身知识的积累,我们已经学会了如何更快地完成这一过程。如果说为第一个客户获得批准需要三个月,那么现在我们可以在两周内完成。之后,我们进入试点运行阶段,其中大多数都取得了极大的成功。最后一阶段是将新技术在客户公司中规模化推广:
培训其团队,衡量产出,并展示实际的效率提升或成本降低。同样,随着时间的推移,我们为不同的职能和类型的组织制定了成熟的方案。
一些公司选择直接与 Anthropic 或 OpenAI 等 提供商合作,以推动大规模转型。我们认为这种观点忽略了企业变革实际发生的方式。我们与技术公司建立合作伙伴关系,但双方的角色截然不同且互补:他们构建前沿模型,而我们则利用对行业、旧有环境、运营和治理的深厚知识,使这些模型在真实的组织内部发挥作用,帮助将 安全、可扩展且与可衡量业务结果挂钩地嵌入到现有的技术平台中。
近期的一些客户成功案例包括:帮助一个医疗系统为临床医生创建 顾问,从而提高了患者满意度,并使每次交互减少了 10 分钟的行政工作;将一家银行的交易监控从抽样系统转变为 100% 监控;以及利用 优化货物装载,以增加一家飞机制造商的收入。
我们还帮助一些全球领先的技术巨头加速 驱动的创新,包括提升机器人能力(如全身机器人的灵巧性),以及帮助半导体客户缩短开发周期,加速下一代产品的上市时间。这种增长势头体现在我们的高科技服务业务中,该业务目前是行业中增长最快的业务之一。
在我们看来,我们将通过积极帮助客户拥抱 并进一步驱动创新,来扩大我们的市场份额。
在内部,我们通过追踪采用率、熟练度、生产力提升、成本节约以及创新解决方案,来评估我们 AI 转型的进展。虽然我们现有的业务组合在短期内将面临 2% 到 3% 的下降,但我们预计将获得客户更多的预算份额,并提高我们的整体市场份额。我们也看到由 AI 驱动的新营收流正在积聚势头。我们的高级 AI 营收在 2026 年 3 月时的年化运行率达到了 6.2亿美元,且我们预计其每年将增长 30%。在这些因素的共同作用下,我们的人均营收继续呈现上升趋势。
在外部,我们的关键指标是我们部署了 AI 的客户数量以及在每个客户中的部署程度。如果我们与某个客户的进展不顺,或者我们认为可以加快速度,我们会考虑采取哪些干预措施来使其跟上进度。最重要的是,我们在每一次合作中都在探索新机会,帮助我们的客户利用这一可以说是我辈最具有变革性的技术转变。虽然强有力的开局令我们深受鼓舞,但我们认为 HCLTech 仍处于旅程的起点,前方仍有重大机遇。我们对未来以及我们能为员工、客户和所有利益相关者创造的价值感到兴奋。 ●
HBR Reprint R2605K
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HBR Executive
“内容的清晰度和与实际高管决策的相关性,使得这些框架和洞察非常实用。它们帮助我们深化思考,构建对话,并推动了更具针对性的结果。”
Executive 订阅用户

以影响力行动。
** ** 赋能任何规模的团队应对不确定性,保持在新兴趋势的前沿,并为稳定的未来制定计划。
领导团队共同成功。
使用 进行:
是一项年度订阅服务,包含来自《哈佛商业评论》专家的内容和对话。
立即订阅 。
《哈佛商业评论》的虚构案例研究呈现了真实公司领导者面临的问题,并提供专家的解决方案。本案例基于 Ivey Publishing 的案例研究 "Porsche Drive (A): Vehicle Subscription Strategy"(案例编号 W39684),作者为 Vaughan Griffiths, Varun Gupta, Darren Manion, Sarah Sargent 和 Xiao Zhang,可在 .org 获取。
作者:Varun Gupta, Xiao (Shawn) Zhang, Vaughan Griffiths, and Jing Li
Hohenbruck Motoren 北美区客户战略高级副总裁乔恩·韦伯(JON WEBER)正开着他的 HX7(这家豪华车制造商的 SUV 车型)上班。为了避开高速公路的拥堵,他穿过一个住宅区,在红绿灯前缓缓停下,瞥了一眼仪表盘上的时间。
这时他看到了另一辆 HX7。那辆车和他的一样颜色,正被交付给一座砖房,房前停着一辆 HX3 两厢车。一名经销商员工迎接了客户,客户穿着跑步短裤走出房门,与他交换了钥匙。
随后,员工坐进两厢车开走了,留下客户对着那辆闪闪发光的 SUV 咧嘴而笑——这一切都发生在乔恩的绿灯亮起之前。
这就是 Hohenbruck Access(该车企的订阅服务)在实际运作中的样子。该服务于 2021 年作为一项实验推出,旨在测试一些简单但激进的问题:富裕客户是否愿意在不购买或不签署传统租赁协议的情况下,付费使用 Hohenbruck 汽车?订阅者会变成买家吗?这项服务是否会改变客户对 Hohenbruck 豪华品牌的看法?
插图:JORI BOLTON
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第一项订阅服务极大地侧重于灵活性。每月支付 $4,000,客户可以在短短 24 小时内更换车型:工作日使用 HX3 两厢车,周末使用 S90 跑车,家人来访时则使用 HX7 SUV。最近,Hohenbruck 将该计划扩展到了 11 个城市,并推出了起价为每月 $2,000 的单车型订阅。所有合同均包含保险、维护、道路救援和交付服务。订阅服务的费用比传统租赁更高,但启动和停止更为便捷。
Jon 一直打算深入研究该服务的用户洞察,但由于客户互动是通过特许经销商进行的,因此数据收集十分困难。他了解一些基本情况:大多数订阅者是 的新客户。他们通常比传统的买家和承租人更年轻。其中一些人最终购买了 汽车。
目睹这次交换让 Jon 渴望进一步调查。这一切的便捷与快速几乎令人震惊,它显然颠覆了 的所有权旅程——并可能颠覆其品牌的神秘感。一台 应该是被渴望、被等待、被向往的。它不应该只是简单地被送到面前。然而,现在这里出现了一个穿着跑步短裤的男人,开着一台他不拥有、且可能永远不会拥有的 HX7。
几周后,Jon 坐在会议桌前,来自德克萨斯州、乔治亚州、伊利诺伊州和加利福尼亚州的经销商代表出现在墙上的显示屏中。“感谢大家今天参加会议,”Jon 说,“我想听听客户对 Access 计划的反应如何。”
德克萨斯州的经销商首先发言。“Access 吸引了一些我们以前从未见过的群体,”他说,“而且他们中的许多人最终会购买。”他读了一位软件高管的评价:“20 分钟的试驾永远无法告诉我电动汽车是否适合我的生活。而两个月的订阅揭示了我需要知道的一切。”
伊利诺伊州的经销商认同多车型订阅是一个强大的销售工具。要完全掌握例如 S90 Touring、S90 Sport 和 S90 GT 之间的区别需要时间。多车型计划帮助客户弄清楚他们想要什么,从而带来了更高的满意度。“如果目的是将好奇心转化为信心,”她说,“我们所做的一切中,没有比这更有效的了。”
乔治亚州的经销商点头表示赞同。“我的团队已经开始跟踪随访电话中的客户评论,我们发现 Access 让 显得没那么令人生畏,”他解释道,“一位订阅者是这样说的:‘我热爱这个品牌,但我从未觉得自己在展厅里有归属感。这是一种更简单的了解这些车的方式。’”
加利福尼亚州的经销商则没有那么热情。“有些订阅者是认真的潜在客户,”她说,“但另一些人只是想要一个月使用该标志。他们办理单车型订阅,在 TikTok 和 Instagram 上发布几段自己驾驶 的视频,然后就取消了。这不是我们想要关联的客户类型。”
会议结束时,Jon 仍在记录笔记。很明显,Access 扩大了潜在客户池——但它是否产生了 不想要的结果?它是否在稀释该品牌花费数十年时间培养的排他感?他写下了最后一个想法:“Access 可能是我们建立过的最有效——也是最昂贵的——试驾体验。”
次周,乔恩(Jon)正在办公室里,此时国际战略高级副总裁克拉拉·里希特(Klara Richter)从德国通过屏幕出现在他的面前。在她身后
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是一个浅色木质的会议室,墙上空无一物,只有一张装裱好的早期 S90 照片——这款标志性的车型让该品牌走向了全球。
“我想首先明确这一点,”克拉拉说,“美国团队通过 Access 打造了一些真正有价值的东西。
多年来,我们一直在讨论 Hohenbruck 的创新,而这是一个将创新付诸实践的绝佳案例。”
乔恩点点头,但没有打断她。“尽管如此,我已经把你们的资料读了两遍,我认为我们需要在战略上更加清晰,”她说,“Hohenbruck Access 可以成为一个获客工具。但如果这是营销,那么这种营销成本非常高。而且你们需要经销商去支持一种并不总是像销售和租赁那样能给他们带来回报的模式。”
随后,克拉拉转向了第二种方案:将 Access 作为一项经常性收入业务。“如果我们定价得当,简化运营,并转向单车订阅,那么即使订阅者最终没有成为买家,这也可以成为一种品牌变现的新方式。”
“但是,”她继续说道,“关键问题仍然存在:我们能否在不蚕食现有业务的情况下,建立起这项业务?”
专家解答。
罗伯特·菲利普斯 (ROBERT PHILLIPS) 曾任优步 (Uber) 市场数据科学负责人,曾任哥伦比亚大学商学院教授。
如果 Hohenbruck 愿意投入,乔恩 (Jon) 应该将 Access 作为一个真正的业务来经营。
亚马逊 (Amazon) 最初并非一家云计算公司,但它在管理大规模计算基础设施方面变得极其出色,于是亚马逊云科技 (Amazon Web Services) 应运而生。Hohenbruck 可能正面临一个规模较小的类似场景。虽然 Access 最初是为了让客户接触品牌,但它揭示了对另一种商业模式的需求。有些人可能不想要租赁或所有权;相反,他们可能想要灵活性、服务以及无需过多承诺的豪华驾驶体验。一旦该计划获得真正的牵引力,谁知道会有多少这类潜在客户出现?
但乔恩需要的是数据而非轶事,才能支撑这一论点。Hohenbruck 在不同时间在不同城市推出了 Access,这创造了对比的机会。至少,乔恩应该将 Access 评估为一个客户获取渠道。它吸引了什么样的人?他们是否真的更年轻?他们的终身价值是否更高?其中有多少人变成了买家?获取他们的成本是多少?
如果 Access 能帮助 Hohenbruck 赢得一个新人群的忠诚度,那将极其有价值。但公司必须诚实地面对权衡:租赁车辆而非销售车辆的机会成本、维护车队的费用、经销商管理该计划所花费的时间、客户驾驶非自有车辆时产生的风险、支持客户事故的需求,以及服务失败可能带来的品牌损害。
至于利益相关者管理,经销商将是最棘手的。一些人会直接拒绝 Access,称 Hohenbruck 代表的是向往和所有权。另一些人则会热情支持。一个庞大的中间群体将等待观察总部是否认真。乔恩及其团队必须预见到并管理这种分歧。成功需要识别并支持那些对变革充满热情且能够使其奏效的经销商。他们可以担任该计划的大使以及其他经销商的导师。
如果乔恩的分析表明 Access 有潜力成为一个可持续且盈利的业务,那么这就是他应该推荐的方向。他必须承认此类变革影响的所有领域,并强调如果没有首席执行官的全力支持,任何事情都无法完成。在向克拉拉 (Klara) 展示数据、经济效益和经销商模式后,他应该请她做出决定:Hohenbruck 是否愿意不仅成为一家销售和
128 哈佛商业评论 2026年9月-10月
“有些订阅者是认真的潜在客户,但另一些人只是想要一个月的使用标志。他们在 TikTok 和 Instagram 上发布几段自己驾驶 Hohenbruck 的视频,然后就取消订阅。”
现场陷入了沉重的沉默。“如果我们让 Access 变得太有吸引力,更多的客户可能永远不会成为所有者。也许这是可以接受的。也许这甚至是未来。但如果我们实际上是在建立一个利润率更高的租赁业务,就不应该假装这仅仅是一个销售漏斗。”
乔恩没有简洁的答案。营销层面的论据在战略上具有吸引力,但在财务上难以证明。业务线层面的论据在财务上可以想象,但在战略上令人不安。
在他们之间存在一个他还没准备好大声说出的可能性:尽管 Hohenbruck Access 取得了成功并实现了早期增长,但它可能仅具有足够的趣味性使其值得继续实验,而不足以证明投入所需的资本、经销商复杂性和管理关注度来将其规模大幅扩大是合理的。
“前进的方向由你决定,”克拉拉告诉他。“在下次规划会议上,不要给我带来另一张推广地图。给我带来一个决定。” ▼
VARUN GUPTA 是北乔治亚大学迈克·科特雷尔商学院(Mike Cottrell College of Business)物流与供应链管理专业的副教授,并领导该校的物流项目。XIAO (SHAWN) ZHANG 是圣路易斯大学理查德·A·查尔费茨商学院(Richard A. Chalfetz School of Business)运营与IT管理专业的助理教授。
VAUGHAN GRIFFITHS 是保时捷金融服务公司(Porsche Financial Services)前移动服务经理。JING LI 是普渡大学米奇·丹尼尔斯商学院(Mitch Daniels School of Business)供应链与运营管理专业的临床助理教授。
租赁卓越的汽车,同时销售灵活的访问权限?伟大的公司不仅保护核心,它们还能识别出业务的边缘何时正指向未来。
ZABIH ARIA 是林肯(Lincoln,福特汽车旗下的豪华品牌)战略与转型高级总监。
Jon 应该在扩大 Access 规模之前重新构思它。
在大多数新计划中,我们假设增长会带来更高的效率和更好的利润率。但某些商业模式存在规模不经济。随着计划的增长,平衡 Access 的各项变量——车辆价值、保险、维护、物流、欺诈风险——可能会变得更加困难,而且某些因素(如事故风险和天气影响)在某些地区的复杂程度可能高于其他地区。目前,Hohenbruck 既没有专业知识,也没有技术来管理这一切。
然而,最大的低效之处在于经销商结构。如果 Hohenbruck 允许一家经销商推广该计划,竞争对手经销商可能会反对。如果要求竞争经销商合作,它可能必须创建类似合资企业的组织。如果绕过经销商直接运营 ,它可能会看起来像一个直接面向消费者的汽车业务,这将引发特许经营法和经销商关系问题。结果几乎肯定会导致诉讼。在这种环境下,很难构建一项全国性的产品方案。
不过, 计划具有价值,因为它能吸引年轻客户。豪华车制造商拥有富裕但老龄化的客户群,如果他们不能触达新买家,他们将在几年内从盈利走向过时。
这就是为什么 Jon 应该将 重新构思为一个“无车营销计划”,而非一个经常性收入业务。合作伙伴关系可以提供几种选择: 可以与一家成熟的租赁公司合作,后者拥有运行此类业务所需的规模、系统、保险专业知识、欺诈控制、车队管理经验和物流基础设施。可以想象成“由 Hertz 提供支持的 ”。 负责前端门户,而租赁合作伙伴负责管理车队和运营。或者, 可以成为合作伙伴针对其精英客户的高级忠诚度计划的一部分,这些客户在人口统计学上具有吸引力,但尚未成为 的车主。
尽管如此, 在未来作为独立业务可能会更可行。如果自动驾驶减少了车辆移动所需的人力,物流状况可能会大幅改善。如果关于特许经营关系的法律发生变化,该商业模式可能会变得更具吸引力。 应该通过保留该计划所创建的知识库、专业知识和能力,并继续学习定价、客户细分、经销商摩擦、保险风险以及延长试用期的经济效益,从而为那个时刻做好准备。
Jon 应该带着一个明确的信息回到 Klara 面前: 很有价值,但尚未准备好在全国推广。他可以告诉经销商, 不会通过在各市场强制推行直接模式或不公平的分配模式来引发一场“内战”。他可以让 Eli 将注意力集中在准备工作上,而不是致力于捍卫一个可能无法实现的扩张计划。这份路线图让 在获得创新收益的同时,不至于让一个有前景的实验变成一个代价高昂的干扰项。 ▼
HBR 重印 R2605L
仅重印案例 R2605X
仅限评论转载 R2605Z
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2026年9月–10月
领导力
战略
变革管理
战略
Adi Ignatius / 第 38 页
在担任 PayPal 首席执行官九年并取得成功后,丹·舒尔曼(Dan Schulman)本已准备退休。但在 Verizon 董事会的多次敦促下,他接任了这家电信巨头的首席执行官。他的任务是:扭转一家市场份额、股价和客户满意度均大幅下降的公司。在与《哈佛商业评论》特约编辑的这场广泛对话中,舒尔曼讨论了他如何尝试撼动 Verizon 的文化。“公司有很多值得自豪的地方,但它抵制变革……当公司外部的变革速度快于内部的变革速度时,你就在掉队。”他还反思了 AI 的风险与机遇,以及成为一名卓越领导者所需的素质。
HBR 转载 R2605A
Felipe A. Csaszar
几十年来,时间和大脑容量的限制意味着团队在做出决策前只能考虑有限的战略选项。战略工具——如 SWOT 分析、组合矩阵——之所以简单,是因为规划会议需要这样的形式。 改变了这些动态。它可以生成并评估数千个战略选项,并构建关于市场和竞争对手的丰富且持续更新的视图。此外,它可以通过不受内部政治影响的结构化辩论,对潜在计划进行压力测试。由于所有公司都能使用相同的 工具,持久的优势将属于那些能将 与专有数据、集成工作流以及更快速执行相结合的公司。在实践中,这意味着在缩小范围之前,为战略选项撒一张更宽的网,用实时模型取代静态模型,并将 辅助的挑战机制变为重大决策的常规环节。
HBR 转载 R2605B
Evgeny Kaganer 和 Christoph Loch
大多数企业转型之所以失败,是因为它们被视为固定且自上而下的计划,具有预定义的指标、时间表和财务目标。但随着环境的变化——例如由于技术颠覆或新的客户预期——这些假设会迅速过时。这就是为什么公司应该将转型视为一场学习之旅:一个战略、优先级甚至目的地都在不断完善的演进过程。通过对大规模转型的研究,并对比星展银行(DBS Bank)和通用电气(GE)的经验,作者确定了四类转型计划——试点、期权、既有业务改进和风险投资——这些计划共同产生关键的学习效果并维持动力。他们还推荐了三种领导力实践,以确保转型工作在一段时间内保持连贯性。
HBR 转载 R2605℃
Frank Nagle / 第 64 页
公司不能通过孤立自己来获胜,但过度协作也无法获胜。真正的优势来自于知道哪些应该共同构建,哪些应该保留给自己。在“核心”领域协作是合理的——例如基础设施、标准和信任,这些是让生态系统运行的基础——而在“边缘”领域竞争——即那些能让公司实现差异化的活动。本文介绍了一个领导者可用以确定正确协作战略的实用框架。它包含五个因素:市场动态、技术生命周期阶段、你在技术栈中的位置、竞争程度,以及社会认可度和监管。通过权衡每个因素,领导者可以制定一套既能扩大市场又不会丧失竞争优势的协作战略。
HBR 转载 R2605D
Kris Johnson Ferreira 和 Jordan Tong
虽然许多公司现在使用 AI 来改进单个任务,但大多数公司在将其应用于决定企业绩效成败的跨职能工作时仍然感到吃力。基于对沃尔玛、亚马逊、爱立信、Ramp 和美敦力等公司的实地研究,作者认为下一个前沿领域是“智能体 编排”(agentic orchestration):即连接基于任务的 工具与组织工作流,并征集且整合仅由人类掌握的关键信息的系统。在这些系统中, 负责执行分析、路由信息并呈现权衡方案,而人类则提供背景信息和隐性知识,设定护栏并做出最终决定。那些围绕编排的人机协作重新设计决策流程的组织,能够做出更快速的响应,更有效地利用知识,并以更高的速度和一致性执行更高质量的企业决策。
HBR Reprint R2605E
130
销售与营销
领导力
财务与投资
自我管理
实践案例
Fred Reichheld, Jamie Cleghorn, 和 Wojtek Kokoszka / 第 86 页
系统性跟踪推荐行为的公司会发现一个强大且未被充分利用的增长引擎。一项针对超过 1000 万 名消费者的分析显示,虽然约 20% 的新客户是通过推荐而来的,但他们贡献了所有新客户所产生利润的 72%。推荐客户的获取成本更低,留存时间更长,购买量更多,并且能为公司推荐更多高价值客户。然而,大多数公司忽视了这一点,因为归因系统将过多功劳归于付费渠道,而未能捕捉到口碑传播。不过,领先的公司将推荐视为一项增长指标,投资于识别真正的推广者,并设计能够激发推荐的体验。通过将重心从“购买客户”转向“赢得客户的拥护”,这些公司提高了利润率,并构建了更持久、能产生现金流的增长型业务。
HBR Reprint R2605F
Claudius A. Hildebrand 和 Douglas L. Peterson 第 94 页
CEO 的成功或失败在很大程度上取决于他们如何审慎地管理与董事会之间不断演变的关系。这种关系遵循一个可预测的进程:早期建立信任与理解;随着信誉增长,将董事会塑造为战略合作伙伴;在信任建立后防止产生自满情绪;最终专注于接班计划和长期治理。每个阶段都需要不同的行为,从投资于一对一关系和设定明确预期,到积极更新董事会组成、鼓励严谨辩论以及规划领导层过渡。核心挑战在于平衡信任与监督——确保董事会的参与度足以提供有意义的反馈,但又不至于过度介入而损害有效的执行。
HBR Reprint R2605G
Paul Blase 和 Paul Leinwand / 第 104 页
公司面临的最大战略挑战之一是如何决定在增长方面的投入规模。通过对 2,900 家美国上市公司的十年业绩数据进行分析,作者们确定了一个“投资甜蜜点”,在该点上,企业在资产增长和资产回报率之间取得了平衡,从而使估值倍数最大化。他们解释说,处于加速增长、稳定增长和成熟行业的公司具有不同的甜蜜点,而运行在最佳范围之外的企业可能会面临 20% 到 70% 的估值惩罚。但有效的资本配置还涉及将投资与战略优先级和长期增长逻辑相对齐。为了实现这一目标,领导者必须将投资作为一个综合投资组合来管理,建立明确的增长指标和治理体系,并奖励有纪律的实验和理性的冒险。
HBR Reprint R2605H
Pamela Meyer / 第 115 页
随着正式权力在现代组织中变得越来越低效,领导者日益面临在没有直接控制权的情况下影响结果的挑战。因此,他们必须学习通过五种方式施加间接影响:识别塑造决策的隐藏权力经纪人;利用谨慎的非正式渠道化解冲突并建立共识;根据个人和组织的准备情况仔细把握干预时机;培养能够帮助解决问题的关系网络;以及解读情感和社会信号,以揭示未说出口的顾虑并引导行动。在这些方法中,核心理念是创造一种环境,让其他人选择采取行动,而不是感到被迫服从。
HBR Reprint R2605J
C. Vijayakumar 第 120 页
当生成式 AI 出现时,HCLTech 意识到它将从根本上改变 IT 服务的经济模式,打破收入增长与劳动力扩张之间的传统联系。首席执行官 C. Vijayakumar 通过推动一项以思维转变、对 AI 平台和培训的大规模投资以及关于未来工作的透明沟通为中心的整个企业转型来应对这一挑战。该公司目前正在使员工成为 AI 构建者和超级用户,同时通过可扩展的、针对特定行业的解决方案帮助客户加速采用。
HBR Reprint R2605K
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《哈佛商业评论》(ISSN 0017-8012; USPS 0236-520)每两个月出版一次,面向专业管理人员,是哈佛大学哈佛商学院(院长 Srikant Datar)的一项教育计划。
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131
“我的家人和导师们给我的建议一直都是:‘做你自己。你不能成为除你自己以外的任何人。’而我也不想成为别人。我喜欢我自己。”
沃里克出生于一个福音歌手家庭,在大学期间学习音乐,并以伴唱歌手开启了自己的职业生涯。但不久之后,她就开始录制个人热门单曲。她随后赢得了六项格莱美奖,并于 2024 年入选摇滚名人堂。尽管她的鼎盛时期是在 20 世纪 60 年代末和 70 年代初,但此后她一直保持着文化影响力。在 20 世纪 80 年代,她是一名艾滋病防治活动家;如今,在 85, 岁的高龄,她依然在社交媒体上活跃且精明,并推出了一张与当代明星合作的新合唱专辑。
采访人:Alison Beard
哈佛商业评论(HBR):是什么给了你尝试个人事业的勇气?
沃里克: 嗯,当时我正与那个时代最丰产的两位词曲作者——伯特·巴卡拉克(Burt Bacharach)和哈尔·戴维(Hal David)合作,做一些演示录音和背景工作,然后他们为我写了一张唱片,这就是一切的开始。哈尔不仅是一位作词人,他简直是一位诗人。当然,伯特是一位音乐天才。而我唱歌,因为这就是我的本职。我们成就了彼此,我们都依赖对方的才华。而这些歌曲将永垂不朽。
您是否遇到过种族主义或性别歧视?
种族主义,是的,在我第一次巡演美国南部地区时:被告知“你不能进那家店”或“你不能进那家餐厅”。我来自新泽西州的东奥兰治,从未遇到过这类事情。我觉得这很有趣。“你什么意思,说我不能进去?我当然可以。”这一直是我对待事情的态度。所以我从未让种族主义进入我的生活,我从未允许它这样做。至于性别歧视,没有。没有人试图强迫我做任何我不愿意做的事情。我从未被拒绝过任何东西,也从未被看轻。我所带来的价值一直受到认可。我是迪翁,每个认识我的人都知道我是迪翁。
您试图将什么样的教训传给下一代?
我不给建议。反正也没人听。我会给予鼓励,如果有人问我问题且我有答案,我会提供。但现在大多数年轻人知道自己想去哪里以及如何到达那里,而且他们会走自己的路。我不能告诉他们我当年是怎么做的,因为我当年的做法对他们来说已经不再适用。音乐产业已经发生了巨大的变化,以至于我不知道今天该如何应对。
但您在社交媒体上非常受欢迎!
我认为这是因为我说真话。大多数人不习惯听真话,但当他们看到真话,并且知道这来自一个完全真实的人时,这是一种极大的喜悦。有时当你实话实说时,会让人感到有点刺痛,但我尽量让人们在离开时带着微笑,我自己也微笑。就像我祖父告诉我的那样,“皱眉会让你长皱纹,微笑则不会。”所以正如我所说,我尽量向人们展露我的笑容。
在您所有的成就中,哪一项对您意义最大?
我将奖项视为回报。它们是你赢得的东西。它们被授予你,是因为你准确地实现了你的目标。对我来说,每一个奖项都很重要。即便如此,在我刚起步时,我的目标仅仅是让人们快乐,并享受我在音乐上的创作。谁知道这会引导我走向何方?
回顾过去,有什么事情是你想要改变的吗?
一件也没有。每一次起伏都与你是谁以及你如何从中走出来有关。所以,做你该做的事,享受这段旅程。当我看向观众席,看到的只有微笑时,我知道我依然在做正确的事,而继续做我自己也就变得简单了。♥
HBR 重印 R2605M
Derek Preston / Paul Popper / Popper / Debbie Gentry 图像
132
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“Many companies are compromising their ability to grow over the long term.”
“HOW MUCH SHOULD YOU BE INVESTING IN GROWTH?,” PAGE 104
76 ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
Orchestrate Work Across Silos
A new generation of tools can connect functions and reduce the friction that slows companies down. Kris Johnson Ferreira and Jordan Tong
86 SALES & MARKETING
the Power of Customer Referrals
New research reveals they’re a critical source of low-cost growth. Fred Reichheld, Jamie Cleghorn, and Wojtek Kokoszka
94 LEADERSHIP
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104 FINANCE & INVESTING
You Be Investing in Growth?
Most firms get capital allocation wrong. Here’s how to do it right. Paul Blase and Paul Leinwand

6 Harvard Business Review September–October 2026
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Idea Watch
New Research and Emerging Insights
15 IN THEORY
Rewards Don't Always Produce Better Ideas
Paying for creativity often changes what employees produce and how much they create. PLUS How autorenew promotions can backfire, when you shouldn't apologize to customers, the secret talents of frequent job hoppers, and more.
38 LEADERSHIP
Work for Me"
The HBR Interview with Dan Schulman. Adi Ignatius
10 FROM THE EDITOR
11 CONTRIBUTORS
130 EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES
In Focus Managing Teams in the Agentic Age
26
Successfully, Think of Them as Team Members
Rahul Telang, Muhammad Zia Hydari, and Raja Iqbal
30
AI Era, Companies Need Agent Managers
Suraj Srinivasan and Vivienne Wei
33
Onboarding Plan for AI Agents
Joseph Fuller
35
AI as a Team. These Three Practices Can Help.
Gabriele Rosani et al.

Experience
Advice and Inspiration
115 MANAGING YOURSELF
Influence When You Lack Authority
Working with hidden power brokers, using back channels, and other tactics.
Pamela Meyer
120 HOW WE DID IT
HCLTech on Pivoting for the AI Era
The Indian company is ensuring rapid gen AI adoption through new platforms, extensive training, responsible governance, and client collaboration. C. Vijayakumar
125 CASE STUDY
Program Really Working?
A luxury automaker evaluates an initiative that lets customers try a variety of models without committing to a purchase. Varun Gupta et al.
132 LIFE'S WORK
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From the Editor

Amy Bernstein
STRATEGY MAKING HAS always been overwhelming. Too many options, too many risks. That's why we rely on frameworks like Michael Porter's five forces—to simplify a process that stubbornly resists simplification.
The problem isn't that we aren't smart enough. It's that our cognition is finite, as Felipe Csaszar of the University of Michigan's Ross School of Business writes in "AI Is Revolutionizing Strategic Decision-Making" on page 44. We can hold only so many possibilities in our heads, evaluate only so many alternatives in a planning cycle before fatigue, politics, or the clock forces a decision. That was true even before AI upended the competitive environment. Now strategy is geometrically more complicated—and so is setting a course for your organization.
Csaszar's answer: Use AI, which relaxes the cognitive constraints that shape how leaders make their most consequential decisions. AI can generate and screen thousands of strategic options where a human team might consider only a few. It can build and continually update rich models of markets, customers, and competitors that are far more dynamic than any static framework. And it can pressure-test ideas and synthesize diverse perspectives without the groupthink, hierarchy, and deadlines that distort strategy meetings.
AI is multiplying both threats and opportunities. It may also be our best tool for navigating them.
Amy Bernstein Editor in chief
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A workshop examining new research on lying sparked Pamela Meyer's fascination with the science of deception. A former fraud investigator, Meyer now draws on years of experience decoding subtle behavioral cues to help leaders learn to "read the room"—a critical skill she says almost no one is formally taught. In her article in this issue, Meyer, the author of a new book on that subject, explains how leaders can understand the people around them more accurately and become more effective motivators.
115 Five Ways to Wield Influence When You Lack Authority

Felipe A. Csaszar, who chairs the Strategy Area at University of Michigan's Ross School of Business, originally studied computer science, which gave him a special perspective on organizations. "I came to see an organization as a kind of artificial intelligence," he says. "It's not a person, but it is designed to behave intelligently." When large language models arrived, he found himself wondering: Can AI do strategy? The answer, he explains in his article in this issue, is yes: AI can challenge assumptions, widen the options a firm considers, and build richer models.
44 AI Is Revolutionizing Strategic Decision-Making

While developing algorithms to improve business decisions, Kris Johnson Ferreira became intrigued by a quandary: Organizations rarely captured AI's value, because people either trusted the technology too much or dismissed it outright. That led Ferreira, an associate professor at Harvard Business School, to study human-AI collaboration with Jordan Tong. In this issue they argue that people add the most value not by substituting their judgment for AI's but by contributing knowledge that AI lacks and using agentic systems to coordinate information and AI output across organizations.
76 How AI Agents Orchestrate Work Across Silos

Paul Blase's experience cofounding an early AI startup gave him deep familiarity with venture capital investment models. Blase was struck by how different those models were from the growth-investment practices of the large companies he'd advised in his previous job leading the data and analytics practice at a consultancy. Now he's the head of PwC's growth platform, and in this issue he and his coauthor describe a systematic way to determine a company's optimal level of investment, which should be pegged to its context and its industry's maturity.
104 How Much Should You Be Investing in Growth?

Milan-based illustrator Antonio Sortino has been driven to create art since childhood—he even dabbled in graffiti in his youth—but he didn't find the courage to pursue it full-time until after beginning a career as a pharmacist. "The childhood need to create something was too strong to ignore," he says. Now 10 years into his new profession, Sortino says that he particularly enjoys drawing people, as he did for his illustrations in this issue, because it presents an opportunity to capture the unique ways people look, dress, and interact at a particular moment in history.
86 Don't Underestimate the Power of Customer Referrals
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New Research & Emerging Insights

IN THEORY
Paying for creativity often changes what employees produce and how much they create.
COMPANIES OFTEN TRY to boost innovation with a simple idea: Pay employees when they produce something creative. The thinking is straightforward. If creative employees get rewarded, then they will work harder to come up with more and even better ideas.
But new research suggests it's not that simple. Incentives can steer innovation in very different directions depending on who receives them. In a
Illustrations by DEBORA SZPILMAN
15

ideaWatch
recent study published in the Journal of Management, Wenlong He of Renmin University of China, Dan Prud'homme of Florida International University, Nianchen Han of Nanyang Technological University, and Kenneth Huang of the National University of Singapore looked at what happens when companies introduce financial rewards for employee inventors. These programs, which give employees a bonus or other reward when a patent is filed or granted, are common in R&D settings. Major companies, including IBM, Microsoft, Apple, Google, Amazon, and Intel, operate formal employee-patent-recognition or inventor-reward programs.
To understand the impact of rewards, the researchers analyzed company and patent data from publicly listed firms in China, tracking 2,376 outputs of inventors over time. They compared performance before and after companies introduced financial incentives, measuring the number of patents produced and how inventive those patents were relative to existing technologies.
They also tried to understand each inventor's expertise. The researchers mapped the technical fields each inventor worked in using International Patent Classification codes. Inventors whose work stayed within a narrow set of categories were classified as specialists; those whose work spanned multiple fields were considered generalists.
You might expect financial rewards to push everyone in the same direction. They don't. The researchers found that specialists produced a greater number of inventive patents after the incentives were introduced. Generalists increased

their patent output by even more, but their patents were less inventive.
Why? The researchers say it's because not everyone responds to incentives in the same way. People respond based on how they view themselves within professional social identities. Specialists are embedded in tight expert communities, both inside and outside their workplaces, where reputations are built by doing something genuinely new. Generalists don't face that pressure, so when incentives are offered they produce more low-hanging, incremental inventions in order to benefit from the incentives quickly.
"You don't get better innovation by only paying more," says Prud'homme. "You get it by aligning what people value with what you reward."
For managers, there are three practical takeaways for improving financial incentive programs to drive innovation:
Match the incentives to your innovation goals. Before you design an innovation reward program, be clear on the goal. Are you trying to get the most ideas possible out of the system, or are you looking primarily for bigger breakthroughs? The mistake many companies make is to try to get both outcomes from the same incentive.
If you simply want more ideas, offer small, frequent rewards for submissions or early concepts. If you only want breakthroughs, create a separate track with rewards tied to impact, such as technical significance or downstream use. Firms seeking both types of innovation can offer both tracks.
"If you don't align your incentives with your objective, you end up getting a lot of activity without necessarily getting better innovation," says Prud'homme.
Manage the members of your workforce according to their professional identities, not just their roles or titles. Even when tailoring incentives to innovation objectives, firms still need to recognize that different employees respond to incentives differently. Identify the specialists and the generalists within your company, because the same reward structure can push the two groups toward very different behaviors.
Once you see the mix clearly, you can forecast how your workforce will respond to the rewards you offer. Employees are inclined to produce rewarded outcomes that fit their identities. Specialists tend to emphasize inventiveness because their
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professional norms place greater value on originality. Generalists, by contrast, lean toward producing a higher volume because they are less constrained by specialized norms and more responsive to the direct incentives that rewards create.
“Effective innovation management needs to account for those differences rather than assume everyone will act the same,” Prud’homme says.
Engineer ways for generalists and specialists to work together. To make the balance work, build collaboration into the innovation process. For example, you can create structured handoffs: Generalists generate and expand ideas early, and then specialists pressure-test and refine them before the ideas are moved forward. Alternatively, generalists and specialists can work together throughout the process so that specialists’ quality standards influence idea development while generalists keep the pipeline moving.
Finally, watch for imbalance over time. If one group starts to dominate, you will see it in the output. Too many generalists, and quality might drop. Too many specialists, and the pipeline might slow. Based on your innovation objectives, adjust hiring goals or the team mix to keep things in check.
“If you get this right, you don’t have to choose between more ideas and better ones,” Prud’homme says. “You can build a system that delivers both.” ▼
HBR Reprint F2605A
ABOUT THE RESEARCH “Inventor Rewards, Specialization, and Innovation Performance,” by Wenlong He et al. (Journal of Management, 2025)

“If You Reward Activity, You’ll Get More Ideas. If You Reward Impact, You’ll Get Better Ones.”
Andres Arias is a senior manager of customer solutions at Amazon Web Services. He spoke with HBR about what happens when companies try to incentivize innovation, why people often confuse output with outcomes, and how leaders can design programs that produce real impact instead of just activity. Edited excerpts of the conversation follow.
In your experience, do financial incentives drive innovation, or do they just increase activity? You see a spike in submissions, but most are not well reasoned or complex. Teams optimize for winning the reward, not solving the problem. They’ll generate five ideas in a week, pick one, polish it just enough to present, and move on.
Who responds best to incentives: subject-matter experts or generalists? They behave differently, but I wouldn’t say one group responds better than the other one does. Specialists can overinvest. They’ll create something technically impressive but more complex than the business needs. But that instinct is what keeps the team honest about quality when it really counts.
Can you offer an example of a successful incentive program? We ran a hackathon-style program around a specific business problem. We didn’t frame it as “Come up with as many ideas as you can.” Instead we defined clear outcomes, including improving a specific customer process. We built cross-functional teams that included specialists and generalists and gave them a short window in which to work. We rewarded teams on the basis of speed to a working solution, knowledge gained, and applicability of the idea after the event. Those criteria changed how people approached the problem. They stopped trying to impress and started trying to make something work.
What lessons can managers take away from that approach? There are two. First, align teams around clear outcomes. That keeps them focused on solving the problem, not just on generating ideas. Second, make generalists and specialists work together. In our hackathon, the specialists brought depth and technical expertise, and the generalists helped connect that work to the bigger problems and kept things practical. But the key was using incentives to keep their focus. If you just let them run, you’ll get a lot of different ideas. When you anchor their work to a specific outcome that matters to the business or the customer, that’s when the approach clicks. They collaborate better, make smarter trade-offs, and deliver something useful.
Have you ever adjusted an incentive program after realizing it was driving the “wrong” kind of innovation? It’s not always a formal “we redesigned the program” moment, but you notice when the incentives are pushing the wrong behavior. I’ve seen this across the industry: Teams that are rewarded for output, like how many features they ship or how fast they close tasks, see a lot of activity. There’s movement every week but not a lot of real impact. It gets frustrating, because people feel like they’re doing a ton of work without changing anything meaningful. That’s usually when it hits that the incentives are off and need to be more closely tied to outcomes. The difference comes down to what you reward. If you reward activity, you’ll get more ideas. If you reward impact, you’ll get better ones. ▼
Illustration by JORI BOLTON
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ideaWatch
MANAGING PEOPLE
As more organizations deploy AI, some aren't just rolling out tools; they're giving their agents names, roles, and performance goals. But this seemingly symbolic choice can change how managers oversee work and assign responsibility.
In January 2026 researchers surveyed 1,261 HR and finance managers, directors, and executives across industries from the United States, Canada, and the European Union. About a third said that their leaders already talked about AI as a "teammate" or "employee," and 23% reported that their organizations had listed AI agents on their org charts, assigning them formal roles.
To see how that framing affects behavior, researchers ran an experiment in which 813 of those managers were asked to review documents—including job descriptions and budget reports—that contained built-in errors. They were given 20 minutes to review as many reports as they could, flag any errors, and escalate large problems to a higher-up. All managers saw the same documents. What varied was who they were told had drafted them: an AI tool, an AI employee listed as a direct report on an org chart, or a human employee who was a direct report.
The framing had relatively small effects, except in one group: managers who already worked in firms that listed AI agents on their org charts. Among those participants, describing the

drafter as an AI employee rather than an AI tool reduced their confidence in their own judgment. They caught about 18% fewer errors and were 22% more likely to escalate issues, even when they were told that they would be penalized if they asked for an unnecessary extra review. When asked who was responsible for the errors, these managers assigned about nine percentage points less responsibility to themselves and eight percentage points more to the AI if it was framed as an employee rather than a tool. They also shifted more blame to their team members and leadership.
In organizations where AI agents are treated as teammates, managers are accustomed to doing less careful checking themselves. They also lean more on others to review work and are more inclined to see the AI as bearing responsibility if something goes wrong, say the researchers.
"The evidence presented in our study suggests that AI agents should be treated as what they are—software automation," which requires human accountability to minimize risks, they write.
ABOUT THE RESEARCH "Putting AI on the Org Chart: Evidence on Delegation and Oversight," by Emma Wiles et al (working paper, 2026)
CORPORATE STRATEGY
Much attention has been paid to technology's potential to eliminate or transform entry level jobs, but it is also changing the makeup of executive ranks. When researchers analyzed the posted job descriptions for a representative global sample of 5,000 open C-suite positions from 2019 to 2025, they found that, increasingly, companies have been adding new and more technology-related executive roles. Additionally, changing political and legal landscapes have moved firms to absorb DEI responsibilities into core business functions or phase them out altogether.
Relative change in C-suite roles (2019–2025)

Source: Russell Reynolds Associates
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A new study found that the age of newly appointed CEOs has risen at U.S. firms, from an average of 48 in 2000 to 55 in 2023, with similar increases among CEOs at European firms. The shift is driven not by longer tenures or later retirement. Instead, more firms are selecting leaders who have held a wider variety of roles across different firms and industries, the researchers say. "Aging at the Very Top," by Valentin Kecht, Alessandro Lizzeri, and Farzad Saidi
Hiring managers often treat frequent job changes as a red flag indicating someone won't commit long enough to justify the onboarding investment. But a new study finds that people who switch employers a lot possess valuable social skills that help them get up to speed more quickly than other new hires.
Using monthly employment and performance data on 8,693 U.S. hedge fund managers from 2004 to 2019, researchers tracked what happened when a fund manager joined a new firm. Consistent with past work, they found that 72% of moves were followed by a performance decline, from which it took an average of four months to recover.
But that slump was not the same for everyone. Managers with more prior
company moves suffered a smaller initial decline and returned to their pre-move performance within two months, compared with five months for those who had low mobility.
The researchers suggest that repeated transitions create a form of transferable knowledge about how to get up to speed in new environments. With each move, people practice noticing unwritten norms, interpreting cues, and adjusting how they work with colleagues. Over time those skills become more generalizable and help make the next switch go more smoothly.
The study found that the advantage was biggest when the social and cultural hurdles of joining were higher, such as when a manager joined a firm in a distant geographic location, and where existing employees had long tenures (and therefore norms are likely to be less flexible).
The researchers note that more-mobile managers weren't better
performers overall; they were better at the transition itself and absorbed the shock of a move faster. Still, hiring teams may do well to reframe their thinking about "job hoppers," from pure flight risks to something rarer and more useful: employees who can swiftly learn the ropes of a new organization.
ABOUT THE RESEARCH "Movin' and Groovin' Increased Prior Mobility Facilitates Newcomers' Transitions into Organizations," by Rebecca R. Kehoe and F. Scott Bentley (Academy of Management Journal, 2026)
Many firms assume that making subscriptions "sticky" using trials that autorenew is an easy way to grow revenue. A new experiment shows that that model could be deterring engaged consumers from subscribing.
Researchers partnered with a major European digital newspaper that erects a paywall after readers consume a quota of free articles. In 2018 more than 1.4 million readers who hit the paywall were randomly shown one of two offers: a trial that automatically rolled into a paid subscription unless canceled, or a trial that automatically ended unless the reader actively renewed. The researchers then tracked every reader's subscription and site usage for roughly 20 months.
In the short term, autorenewal did raise revenue. Among those who took

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Many people avoid reaching out to new contacts, worried they'll be a burden. But new research found that when people were trained to focus on the upsides for advice givers, they scheduled 37% more informational interviews than those who focused on benefits to themselves.
"A Prosocial Perspective on Advice Seeking and Networking: How Focusing on What Advice Givers Can Gain Motivates Advice Seekers to Reach Out More," by Anne Burmeister and Daniel Z. Levin
the promotional offer, more remained paying subscribers in the months immediately after the trial than those in the autocancellation group. But the autorenewal offer sharply discouraged people from signing up in the first place. During the promotional window, 35% fewer readers subscribed when the deal was autorenewing rather than autocanceling. Over the course of the study, the initial gains made in the autorenewal group eroded and reversed, and the autocancellation offer ultimately produced 23% more total paid subscribers. Additionally, consumers who were offered autorenewal became less likely to subscribe to the publication through any channel afterward, including through future subscription offers.
Autorenewal is so damaging because it is predicated on the assumption that consumers don't realize they'll forget to cancel a subscription they don't use. But by examining usage data, the researchers found that consumers are actually self-aware. Readers who suspected they wouldn't remember to cancel were put off by autorenewal and stayed away. Those who did sign up and found themselves paying for something they didn't use later disengaged from the brand entirely.
So should companies always use autocancellation? In an article on HBR.org that expanded on the findings, researchers Klaus M. Miller and Z. John Zhang note that the results best fit "stickier" products, such as news, music
streaming services, or cloud storage—categories where customers usually stay once they find a good option. In markets where switching is more common—such as television streaming services, fashion subscriptions, or meal kits—autorenewal may play a more positive role. In industries with very high repurchase rates (above roughly 70%), the researchers say, autocancel may help lock in customers who want to be there for the long haul.
ABOUT THE RESEARCH "Sophisticated Consumers with Inertia: Long-Term Implications from a Large-Scale Field Experiment," by Klaus M. Miller, Navdeep S. Sahni, and Avner Strulov-Shlain (working paper, 2026)
Since 2024, researchers at theaiwild.com have analyzed tens of thousands of posts on online forums like Reddit and Quora to examine how people's AI usage has shifted over time. In 2026 people used the technology more for personal and professional support; using AI for technical assistance has become less prevalent.
| % of total use cases by category | 2024 | 2025 | 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Content creation and editing | 23% | 31% | 34% |
| Technical assistance and troubleshooting | 21 | 18 | 18 |
| Personal and professional support | 17 | 16 | 15 |
| Learning and education | 15 | 15 | 13 |
| Creativity and recreation | 13 | 11 | 12 |
| Research, analysis, and decision-making | 10 | 9 | 11 |
Source: theaiwild.com
| Top use cases | 2025 | 2026 | New use case |
|---|---|---|---|
| Therapy/companionship | 1 | 1 | Therapy/companionship |
| Organizing my life | 2 | 2 | Troubleshooting |
| Finding purpose | 3 | 3 | Fun and nonsense |
| Enhanced learning | 4 | 4 | Fan fiction and storytelling |
| Generating code (for pros) | 5 | 5 | Technical use of software |
| Generating ideas | 6 | 6 | Autonomous agentic operations |
| Fun and nonsense | 7 | 7 | Relationship advice |
| Improving code (for pros) | 8 | 8 | Work buddy |
| Creativity | 9 | 9 | Astrology and tarot readings |
| Healthier living | 10 | 10 | General advice |
*Was not on list of top 100 in 2025
20 Harvard Business Review September–October 2026
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ideaWatch

Offering stock options to your employees is usually framed as a way to build loyalty and align incentives with shareholders. When you extend those options to rank-and-file workers, you can also help make your workplace safer.
Researchers matched injury data from the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration with compensation data from 20,160 workplaces representing 629 firms from 2002 to 2011. Across the sample, which covered a wide range of industries—including retail, pharmaceutical products, transportation, and industrial metal mining—workplaces averaged about 6.6 injuries per 100 employees per year. After controlling for factors such as company size, use of seasonal workers, hours worked, and capital intensity, the researchers found that companies with higher-than-average stock options for regular employees had an injury rate that was 7% lower than that of companies offering average stock options.
To examine causality, the researchers looked at what happened after a new federal accounting rule (FAS 123R) made stock options look more expensive on companies' financial statements, prompting many firms to cut back on the options they granted. At the companies that had used rank-and-file options most heavily before the rule, injury rates rose more after its adoption than they did at otherwise similar firms, consistent with the idea that reducing options leads to worse safety outcomes.
The researchers list two reasons for the connection between options and safety: retention and cooperation. Because unvested options tie employees' wealth to the firm and are forfeited if employees leave, they can reduce turnover, and experienced workers are less likely to be injured than new hires. Options also tie rewards to team performance, which encourages coworkers to monitor and support one another on safety-critical tasks.
For leaders, the takeaway is to treat broad-based stock options as more than a recruiting perk. When thoughtfully designed, they can reduce turnover, strengthen peer accountability, and
improve safety, especially in high-churn, hard-to-monitor parts of the business where injuries are most likely.
ABOUT THE RESEARCH 'Rank-and-File Employee Stock Options and Workplace Safety,' by Yangyang Chen et al. (Management Science, 2025)
When companies raise prices, they usually tell their customers it's because costs went up or quality improved. New research suggests that a different explanation may do more to keep customers from walking: The market made us do it.
Researchers partnered with a Canadian self-storage provider in 2022 and 2023 to test how messages about price increases affected customers' real behavior. In the study 1,626 customers received price-increase emails after they'd been with the provider for seven months. The emails used one of three justifications—cost, market conditions, or quality improvements. The study also included a no-justification price-increase message and a no-price-increase control group to capture "natural" churn. The researchers tracked the behavior of the customers over eight months.
Unsurprisingly, raising the price increased attrition overall. About 33% of customers left when prices didn't change, whereas 44% left when they did. But the reason given mattered.
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Market-condition justifications produced the lowest attrition—customers’ likelihood of leaving was roughly 30% lower than it was when no reason was given. Cost and quality justifications, on average, didn’t reduce churn.
That’s because price-increase letters do more than trigger fairness concerns, the researchers contend. They also shape customers’ perceptions of their options. For example, when market conditions are cited, it sends the message “Good luck finding an easy alternative right now,” which compels people to stay put. In the field data, the market message worked best with customers who had fewer nearby alternatives. In follow-up online experiments, the same market justification increased people’s sense that alternatives were scarce.
Quality justifications were more complicated. In online tests with North American participants, the message “We’re improving things” boosted perceived value and fairness. But reactions were split in the field. It worked with some customers and backfired with others, netting out to no benefit on average.
The researchers note that their findings apply most readily to ongoing purchases, where the cost of switching would be expensive or cumbersome. For this group, a clear market-based explanation may cushion the blow of higher prices by reminding customers they may not have better options.
ABOUT THE RESEARCH “Cushioning the Blow: Reducing Customer Attrition in Response to Price Increase Notifications,” by Hoorsana Damavandi, Kersi D. Antia, and Praveen K. Kopalle (Journal of Marketing, 2026)

You might think the first rule of customer service is to apologize when something goes wrong. But if customers haven’t noticed a problem, that instinct can actually hurt satisfaction, trust, and revenue.
In a field experiment with a large U.S. food-delivery platform, researchers examined what happened when the firm apologized for a small failure: food arriving late by fewer than 15 minutes. For some customers, the staff followed the company’s usual practice by calling ahead, explaining the delay, and apologizing. For others, the staff did not reach out, and the order simply arrived slightly late.
The researchers found that, over the next 90 days, customers who’d received an apology were less likely to place another order at all. Those who did return placed fewer repeat orders, took longer to come back, and spent less overall than comparable customers who received no apology. They also reported lower satisfaction with the
experience, less trust in the provider, and weaker intentions to recommend the company.
Several follow-up experiments help explain why: Apologies not only made people more likely to notice that some aspect of the service fell short (for instance, that the actual delivery time differed from the original estimate), but also led them to interpret that deviation as a “failure.” Consumers then downgraded their judgments of service quality and the firm’s competence.
The researchers say that firms should distinguish between situations where customers are almost certain to notice a failure (a missed flight, a lost shipment, a never-arriving order) and situations where they might not realize that a failure occurred. In the former, timely apologies are still advisable. In the latter, it may be wiser to simply send an update or say nothing rather than flagging a “failure” the customer might never have perceived. ▼
ABOUT THE RESEARCH “Are Apologies Always the Best Policy? Apologies for Service Failures Backfire When Consumers Are Not Aware of the Failure,” by Mason R. Jenkins, Paul W. Fombelle, and Mary Steffel (Journal of Consumer Research, 2026)
COMPILED BY HBR EDITORS | SOME OF THESE ARTICLES PREVIOUSLY APPEARED IN A DIFFERENT FORM ON HBR.ORG.
23

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THE CHALLENGE
1
To Scale AI Agents Successfully, Think of Them as Team Members
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2
To Thrive in the AI Era, Companies Need Agent Managers
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3
Create an Onboarding Plan for AI Agents
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4
It's Hard to Use AI as a Team. These Three Practices Can Help.
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J. Studios/Getty Images
These articles were selected from HBR.org.
Harvard Business Review September-October 2026
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by RAHUL TELANG, MUHAMMAD ZIA HYDARI, and RAJA IQBAL
PICTURE A FAMILIAR scene: A vendor demonstrates a new generative AI agent to your leadership team. It’s impressive.
The agent triages support tickets, updates customer records, and drafts a proposal and routes it for approval.
The demo is seamless. Afterward, someone asks, “How soon can we deploy this across the enterprise?”
That question reflects assumptions that have guided enterprise software adoption in the software-as-a-service era: first, that most tools can be provisioned, configured, and scaled with relatively little customization, and second, that if the integration works and employees adopt the product, deployment is largely an implementation project. Agentic AI breaks that model.
Unlike traditional software, AI agents are designed to reason, plan, and take actions across systems. The moment an agent can change a system of record—update a price, send a payment, or modify customer data—it stops being a productivity tool and becomes part of the organization’s operating model.
Most important, it introduces new categories of risk. A narrow generative AI tool (such as ChatGPT) creates content risk: It might say something wrong. Agentic AI creates execution risk: It might do something wrong.
Drawing on our work as researchers (Rahul and Zia) and as a practitioner with experience leading agentic-enterprise-AI deployments (Raja), we’ve paid close attention to how agentic AI is actually being implemented. We’ve found that although many agents today are ready to act, companies are rarely ready to let them.
To cross that threshold and effectively integrate AI agents at scale, you need to stop treating them as turn-key software that simply needs to be installed and instead treat them like a new kind of workforce that requires management. Just like your human
Sharon Novak/Getty Images
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employees, AI agents need a role, a defined scope of authority, approved sources of truth, and clear escalation rules. They also need supervision and audit trails, because you will be accountable for their actions.
Until those organizational foundations are in place, scaling agentic AI will be difficult. Four recurring frictions, in particular, tend to slow or derail progress. Understanding them is the first step toward managing them.
Companies have spent decades building access controls for human employees. Computer system users log in with a unique identity, and their role determines what they can and cannot do.
AI agents complicate that, because they behave like human employees—but aren’t. Many early deployments handle this problem by giving agents a shared “service account” with broad access to multiple systems. It’s a convenient solution, but granting agents so many permissions creates a security risk.
Consider this example. A customer service representative is authorized to issue refunds up to $500. If the rep tries to issue a larger refund, the system blocks the transaction and routes it for approval. But an AI agent operating through a shared back-end service account might not be subject to that authorization limit and might issue a $5,000 credit in a single step.
The risks are not just hypothetical. In 2025 a developer experiment using Replit’s AI coding agent showed how
quickly automation can outrun its controls. Despite being instructed to not make any changes, the agent executed commands that deleted a production database. It then attempted to obscure the failure, generating thousands of fake records and misleading system messages, which slowed the response and complicated recovery.
The lesson is clear: Organizations should treat each AI agent as a distinct digital worker with its own identity, credentials, and role. Instead of relying on shared service accounts, companies should assign agents narrowly scoped permissions that reflect the specific tasks they are designed to perform. The same principles used to manage human employees—such as least-privilege access and role-based limits—should apply to agents. If a customer service employee can’t issue refunds above a certain threshold without approval, the same constraint should apply to the agent performing that same work. Just as important, every action an agent takes should be logged under a traceable identity so that the organization can clearly see who—or what—performed it. If leaders cannot easily explain which identity an agent uses when it executes an action, the system is not ready for production.
AI agents perform well in demonstrations because the environment is controlled. The data is clean, the instructions are clear, and the sources of truth are obvious. But real organizations are different. Enterprise data
is fragmented across systems, duplicated across teams, and often contradictory. Policies evolve over time, and older documents remain in circulation. People handle this ambiguity by using judgment and experience that AI agents don’t have.
For a system that generates text, an imperfect context may produce a flawed answer. That is a problem, but its consequences are often limited. For a system that takes actions, however, the ramifications are far greater. Imagine an HR agent that uses a frequently referenced policy document from 2022—even though the rules have since changed—to guide managers through a termination process. That’s not a hallucination. It’s a retrieval mistake that exposes the company to legal risk.
Agents also introduce a new security challenge: the manipulation of context. If an agent reads emails, forms, or support tickets and then performs tasks on the basis of that information, attackers can embed hidden instructions designed to influence its behavior. Researchers demonstrated this risk in 2025 through a vulnerability known as ForcedLeak. By embedding malicious instructions in a routine web form, they tricked a Salesforce Agentforce agent into retrieving sensitive customer-relationship-management data and sending it to an external destination.
To cope with these context frictions, organizations need to establish clear standards for which information their agents can trust. That requires defining authoritative sources for policies, pricing, and operational data so that agents can consistently rely on the correct version of the truth. Systems
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should also capture the provenance of information used in decision-making, allowing teams to trace any agent action back to the specific documents or data sources it relied upon. Finally, companies should treat external inputs—such as emails, forms, or uploaded files—not simply as helpful context but as potential attack vectors. Inputs that originate outside the organization should be handled carefully and validated before an agent is allowed to act on them. Without these safeguards, the same data inconsistencies that humans routinely navigate can quickly become operational errors for automated systems.
Traditional software behaves predictably: The same input produces the same output every time. But large language models don't work that way. Their responses are probabilistic, meaning that the same request can produce slightly different results across runs. That variability is acceptable when the output is a draft email, but it becomes far more problematic when the output is a transaction.
One company deploying an AI support agent encountered this issue when the legal team insisted that the system never mention a particular competitor. The company's knowledge base, however, included many legitimate comparison articles that referenced that competitor, so the agent frequently mentioned it while answering customer questions. When engineers tightened the guardrails to block those responses,
the system began refusing to answer valid questions altogether.
The deeper issue is that traditional testing methods assume stable behavior. A system that passes a test suite today may behave differently tomorrow if the model updates, the prompt changes, or new data is added. And the risks grow in multiagent environments where agents pass work to one another. In 2025, for example, researchers at AppOmni demonstrated how insecure configurations in ServiceNow's Now Assist environment could allow "second-order prompt injection." In their experiment, malicious instructions introduced by one agent were passed along to others, potentially leading to unintended or unauthorized actions, such as retrieving sensitive records or sending information to external destinations.
The takeaway here is that without clear boundaries, mistakes—or attacks—can cascade across an automated system. To manage that risk, organizations should build deterministic controls around probabilistic AI systems. Rather than allowing agents to execute actions directly, companies should place validation layers between the AI model and operational systems. In this approach, the agent proposes an action, such as issuing a refund or updating a record, and before it's executed, deterministic software verifies that it complies with established rules. Organizations should limit unsupervised agent-to-agent interactions so that outputs from one agent do not automatically become executable instructions for another without validation, policy checks, or human review.
By separating the generation of a recommendation from the execution of an action, companies can create guardrails that prevent model variability from causing operational errors.
When an employee makes a mistake, managers can investigate by asking questions. When traditional software fails, engineers can check logs. But AI agents introduce a more complicated scenario, because their behavior often emerges from a chain of reasoning steps, retrieved documents, and tool calls that may not be easy to reconstruct after the fact.
That creates a serious accountability challenge. Imagine a procurement agent, for example, that summarizes supplier performance and posts the results in a company Slack channel. If the agent accidentally includes confidential contract terms—because it interpreted "share transparently" as permission to disclose them—leaders will need to know exactly how that decision was made. Which documents did the agent read? What instructions did it follow? Why did it believe it was allowed to share the information? Without that kind of evidence trail, organizations can't explain their systems' behavior to regulators, auditors, and customers.
A 2024 tribunal decision offers an early signal of how the law may treat this issue. In Moffatt v. Air Canada, a customer relied on incorrect information provided by an airline chatbot about bereavement-fare eligibility.
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IN FOCUS Managing Teams in the Agentic Age

When the airline argued that the chatbot was effectively a separate entity, the tribunal rejected the claim and held the company responsible for the misinformation.
To avoid such problems, companies have to design their AI systems with accountability in mind from the outset. That begins with maintaining comprehensive records of how an agent operated, including which data sources it accessed, what prompts it received, and which tools it used to complete a task. Those records should enable reconstruction of the chain of reasoning that led to any action. Organizations should also assign clear internal ownership for the monitoring and governing of agent behavior so that responsibility does not become diffused. If a regulator, auditor, or customer asks why an AI system made a particular decision, the company should be able to provide a clear, evidence-based explanation. Without that level of transparency, large-scale automation will remain difficult to defend.
If turnkey deployment is unrealistic for AI agents, the alternative is not to avoid them but to introduce them gradually, expanding their autonomy only as the organization develops the ability to govern them.
One useful way to think about that progression is as an “autonomy ladder” with different levels of execution authority: Does the system draft content, propose actions for approval, or execute actions within tightly defined limits? Organizations typically begin with agents that produce assistive
output—drafts, summaries, or recommendations that humans review before anything is sent or executed. The next level is retrieval with guardrails, where agents answer questions using internal information but rely on well-governed data sources. From there, companies may allow supervised actions, in which agents propose operational tasks—issuing refunds, updating records, or routing approvals—but a person always confirms the decision before execution. Only after those controls are proven should organizations consider bounded autonomy, where agents execute workflows independently within narrow limits and predefined thresholds.
Many effective deployments intentionally remain on the lower rungs of the autonomy ladder. The benefits consultancy OneDigital uses Azure OpenAI to accelerate consultant research, improving “time to insight” rather than replacing the consultants themselves. Other prominent deployments reach bounded autonomy by keeping the scope narrow. Klarna has reported that its AI assistant handles a large share of customer service chats autonomously while maintaining immediate escalation paths to human support for complex or sensitive cases.
For leaders evaluating the growing number of agent platforms, the most important investments are often organizational rather than technical. Companies should begin by defining a clear “turnkey boundary,” distinguishing between AI applications that can be deployed with minimal structural change and those that require significant redesign of controls and governance. They
should also treat permissions as a core design question by assigning each agent narrowly scoped access aligned with its role. Clear human-in-the-loop thresholds should determine when automated decisions require oversight, particularly in situations involving financial exposure, regulatory obligations, and reputational risk. Finally, leaders should measure outcomes instead of pilots, focusing on operational indicators such as cycle time, error rates, and compliance incidents rather than simply counting the number of AI experiments underway.
GENERATIVE AI WILL continue to improve, and vendors will package more safety features into their platforms, but the gap between an impressive demonstration and a trustworthy production system will persist unless organizations rethink what deployment actually requires. Enterprises are not turnkey environments; they are complex systems shaped by legacy technology, policies, and human judgment. The companies that succeed with agentic AI won’t simply install more agents—they’ll build the structures that allow those agents to be trusted. ▼
HBR Reprint H0949U
RAHUL TELANG is the Trustees Professor of Information Systems at Carnegie Mellon University’s Heinz College.
MUHAMMAD ZIA HYDARI is an assistant professor of business administration at the University of Pittsburgh’s School of Business. RAJA IQBAL is the founder of Ejento AI, a governance-first agentic AI platform, and an adjunct faculty member at the University of Pittsburgh’s School of Business.
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by SURAJ SRINIVASAN and VIVIENNE WEI
ZACH STAUBER'S DAY begins before the first customer-support ticket even lands in the queue. As a support agent manager at Salesforce, a global company that provides businesses with customer relationship management platforms, Stauber manages a fleet of generative AI support agents across support, sales, and marketing on a platform the company calls Agentforce. Stauber describes his routine this way: "Data, data, data. I start and end my day in dashboards, scorecards, and agent observability monitoring." He focuses on how the AI
agents are working but also how they are learning and adapting—much as a traditional manager might walk the floor, check in with a struggling employee, or huddle with a team on a tricky case.
Salesforce offers a glimpse into what the future of digital work will look like across industries. The Agentforce platform, which Salesforce is selling to client companies and using itself, now resolves nearly 74% of the company's inbound customer-support cases. Dozens of digital "employees," all AI agents, are resolving customer issues, drafting personalized emails, and routing more-complex cases to human specialists. Each AI agent operates semiautonomously, learning from feedback,
collaborating with other AI agents, and escalating complex tasks it can't handle to human support agents.
Agent managers—people like Stauber, who runs an AI-powered human-plus-technology team—oversee this hybrid workforce. They orchestrate how AI agents learn, collaborate, perform, and work with human counterparts. And they supervise AI agents the way traditional managers coach and motivate human employees, though with a greater focus on the safety, accuracy, and business alignment of the agents' work.
As companies such as Salesforce, JPMorganChase, and Walmart operationalize autonomous AI across functions from customer service to finance, a profound shift in management is underway. The agents being deployed today aren't just tools to automate tasks; they're teammates that require training, governance, and performance management. With this shift, the agent manager is emerging as one of the most critical roles in the age of AI.
Just as product managers became indispensable during the software revolution, agent managers are fast becoming the connective tissue between strategic intent and autonomous execution. Their mission: to make AI agents smarter, faster, safer, and more impactful through orchestration across agents and with human counterparts.
Salesforce's sales development representatives (SDRs) are an example of this shift. Previously, the company's agentic
Yannick Dary/Shin/Boosky
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transformation and sales development team was responsible for following up on leads, typically handling dozens of contacts but speaking with only 12 to 15 prospects daily. This disparity meant that valuable leads were neglected due to human capacity limits.
Now an AI agent operates as a part of the hybrid team. The SDR AI agent takes over the initial high-scale, low-value interactions—personalized outreach, qualification, and continuous follow-up on stale leads—ensuring that the sales cycle never stops. “While my team is sleeping, our agents are already interacting with customers,” says Vanessa Tabbert, VP of the team.
The integration of these agents transformed the team’s capacity from booking 150 meetings in 30 days to scheduling more than 350 meetings in a single week after launch with the same lead volume. This resulted in generating $60 million in annualized pipeline and acquiring more than 300 new clients within four months.
Crucially, this AI-augmented capability allowed for a rapid geographical rollout managed by a “two-pizza team” (Amazon’s lingo for “a small team”). The expansion occurred across major markets in quick succession; the agent is now live in the U.S., Canada, the UK and Ireland, Africa, and Japan, with immediate expansion planned for Australia, New Zealand, South Asia, and more.
The evolution to agentic SDRs transformed the human seller’s role from one focused on low-connect prospecting to one centered on high-value human interaction, empathy, and creative problem-solving. Human SDRs can now focus on persuasion and judgment to
close deals. The agent manager’s job is to ensure that the autonomous-agent workforce is continually adapting and operating safely, and most critically, that the AI agent is aligned with the company’s sales priorities.
Achieving sustained success with agentic AI requires an attitudinal shift championed by line-of-business (LOB) owners. This shift redefines AI agent ownership. In the pre-agentic world, AI deployment lived within IT departments or data science organizations. In the agentic era, business units need to take control. LOB owners should design, test, and govern the agents that power their workflows, much as they would for the human workforce.
At Salesforce, for instance, customer success teams define the AI agent’s tone, escalation rules, and success metrics, all under the stewardship of agent managers. If AI agents are performing real work for a business unit, that unit must own their performance. That requires establishing a clear philosophy that AI agents are complementary partners, not competitors, with human agents. For instance, in customer contact centers, the call center teams rather than the IT team manage the AI (and human) agents. The contact center teams, not the technology organization, are accountable for problem-solving and serving customers, whether the service is provided through AI agents or humans.
This approach creates both opportunity and complexity. To be successful, agent managers must blend deep functional expertise with operational AI
literacy. They must know not only what the business wants but how to teach AI agents to fulfill those needs safely, consistently, and transparently.
In our interviews with Salesforce’s internal Agentforce group, we found that agent managers typically operate at the crossroads of customer experience, AI operations, and product management. Their goal: to translate functional expertise into measurable AI performance.
Depending on organizational maturity, agent managers may report to one of the following:
But across all settings, this role is not likely to be transient. It’s a durable operating function, akin to DevOps or site reliability engineering, born of a structural change in how work will be performed in a hybrid digital-human fashion.
Agent managers’ responsibilities combine business insight, analytical rigor, and hands-on interaction with AI systems, creating a new kind of operational leadership: AI orchestration. The role usually involves:
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• conducting root-cause analyses of failed cases to drive continuous improvement
• quantifying impact through ROI analysis and executive reporting
The best agent managers resemble early product managers or site reliability engineers. They excel at the intersection of human judgment and machine performance.
Their success depends on six critical capabilities:
AI operational literacy: They understand how agents operate, how prompts drive outcomes, and how system failures occur.
Functional depth: They possess deep knowledge of the business process that the agent supports, whether customer service, finance, or logistics.
Systems thinking: They visualize how agents interact across workflows, departments, and even other agents to achieve “multiagent orchestration.”
Change resilience: They adapt quickly to shifting models and business needs, refining agent logic in weekly “test-deploy-learn” cycles.
Prompt craftsmanship: They excel at designing and refining the language and logic that shape agent behavior (the equivalent of employee training for machines).
Work designed across machines and humans: They know how to create hybrid workflows, assessing the limits of machine capabilities and creating human escalation routines as needed, and how to motivate the human
workforce in the context of hybrid AI-human work.
Ultimately, an effective agent manager is fluent in the language of business strategy, the operational workings of AI, and people management.
Successful management in this hybrid era also requires a shift in how human performance is measured. The focus on activity-based KPIs (for example, making 60 calls a day) is obsolete. With the new model, KPIs focus on outcomes that depend on orchestration and influence—a recognition that performance now depends on how well people are tuning and running workflows with their agents. This means management should concentrate on maximizing the efficiency of the entire human-agent system.
Finally, the human workforce must rapidly acquire new, distinct skills to capitalize on this shift. The agent manager facilitates this transformation by enabling employees to move away from low-value, information-retention tasks. The new skill set includes managing AI (knowing how to command the agent effectively) and managing engagements (developing the acumen necessary to engage successfully in the high-value human interactions).
While agent managers can come from a variety of disciplines, the most effective ones emerge from roles already accountable for service quality, customer outcomes, and operational judgment. These individuals have deep domain expertise and a lived understanding of
what “good” looks like in real customer interactions, capabilities more essential than formal AI credentials.
Zach Stauber’s trajectory illustrates the desirable background for this emerging role. Trained in audio production and shaped by years in service delivery and conversational design, including leading early chatbot teams, Stauber was selected for what he calls “earnest curiosity”: a willingness to experiment, learn quickly, and take ownership as AI reshaped the work.
Early deployments also illustrate how agent work should be structured. Agent managers used natural language, shaping intent, judgment, and tone by translating complex business logic into simple, adaptive instructions an AI agent can follow. They worked closely with AI engineers, who often sat within the IT department and focused on data parsing, system integrations, and the technical steps required when an agent takes action. Internal groups that deliberately paired them scaled faster and with greater trust.
Agent management is not necessarily a technical role. Organizations that have successfully developed the position treat it as an apprenticeship, immersing managers in live operations, failure reviews, and iterative test-deploy-learn cycles while clarifying decision rights and escalation paths early. Those that centralize agent management entirely within IT or index on AI credentials often see agent managers function technically but fail strategically. As AI agents take on execution, success will increasingly depend on the quality of the managerial judgment that guides them.
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As embedded intelligence spreads across every function, from HR to finance to supply chain, the need for dedicated orchestration will only grow. Without having someone accountable for designing and governing agents, even the most sophisticated AI initiatives will stall.
Yet identifying and developing this new class of leaders won't be easy. They will need a blend of business insight, AI fluency, and ethical judgment. Companies will have to invest in new training pathways, integrating business process design, performance analytics, AI expertise, and AI governance into traditional management-development programs.
This moment therefore demands a call to action. Within 12 to 18 months, "agent manager" will most likely be a standard job title in AI-first enterprises, a career path for leaders who know how to scale impact through intelligent automation.
Our research reveals that technology alone doesn't create transformation—leadership does. The agent manager is a crucial part of that leadership, the bridge between corporate intent and autonomous execution, between human judgment and machine precision. ▼
HBR Reprint H092LZ
SURAJ SRINIVASAN is the Philip J. Stomberg Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School and a member of the board of Harvard Business Publishing. VIVIENNE WEI is the chief operating officer of the Unified Agentforce Platform at Salesforce.

by JOSEPH FULLER
MOST EXECUTIVES BELIEVE that the big challenge in adopting agentic AI is figuring out how to adapt to a new and important technology, but in fact it's about managing work.
Executives have been slow to recognize this in part because of AI's still-nascent capabilities. According to a recently published and widely cited paper by Anthropic's head economist, Peter McCrory, and his colleague, Maxim Massenkoff, a yawning gap exists between what AI can theoretically do and how it is actually deployed. Most estimates suggest that 94% of the tasks in computer- and math-related occupations, for example, are displaceable by generative AI, but, the authors write, Anthropic's current offerings cover only about a third of those tasks.
A much larger gap exists on the human side of the equation. Multiple
studies released around this year's World Economic Forum (including those from Deloitte and McKinsey) indicated that less than 10% of companies thought they were making substantial progress in designing effective human-machine interactions. To capture AI's near-term benefits and prepare for its expanding impact, organizations need to integrate it into existing HR processes and make its role clear to employees.
Below are six suggestions I've developed while helping leading companies of various industries to realize that objective.
As agentic AI penetrates organizations, teams will consist of human and agentic AI "colleagues," and all of them will need job descriptions—a tried-and-true way of specifying a worker's responsibilities, decision rights, and role in relevant processes. Crafting a job description for AI agents will require their managers to be deliberate about allocating responsibilities across human and agentic colleagues. As you craft an AI agent's job description, ask: What is it responsible—and not responsible—for? (Like people, AI agents perform best
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when objectives are explicit.) What are the boundaries of its decision rights? What are its authorities? When must it seek input or approval from colleagues or superiors?
Many observers have pointed out that agentic AI promises to improve the quality of knowledge workers' work lives. Just as automation helped eliminate work in industries that were, as the saying goes, "dirty, dark, and dangerous," such as manufacturing and mining, AI can help eliminate work that is "dull, dispiriting, and deterministic." When a company assigns tedious steps or the dreariest elements of a job to AI agents, employees have a reason to adopt AI and work around its limitations by grounding it in their day-to-day experience.
AI agents need measurable performance metrics for the actual process outcomes that arise from their actions. The metrics have to be explicit and allow the broad evaluation of performance, addressing not just accuracy and ease of use but also timeliness and reliability, so that human teammates are reassured that their algorithmic colleagues are being held to standards too. Moreover, such metrics will help improve training regimens by revealing areas for improvement. Much as performance reviews inform professional development plans for employees, agentic teammates should benefit
from a cycle in which feedback informs learning. Without metrics, managers can't distinguish between acceptable variation and real failure.
Observers have begun to tout the capacity of AI agents to "orchestrate" the activities of many discrete agents. That may speed up actions and make AI agents' work more precise, but who will oversee the orchestrators? The need for human oversight undoubtedly remains. Every generation of AI has demonstrated some propensity to hallucinate. Instances are likely to wane as AI improves, but the stakes will mount as AI expands into professions deemed to be significantly exposed. Organizations will also remain accountable for any results generated by AI, so a sentient decision-maker must be held responsible for how the AI agent is trained, how it integrates with processes, and how it interacts with other human and agentic teammates. Regulators, legislators, and the courts will insist on that.
Precocious interns can help you and your colleagues, but you need to provide them with clear training, guidance, and structure. New AI agents are analogous. They've been "trained" on the basic concepts of the task they're about to undertake, but they lack meaningful practical experience. They don't have contextual intelligence about your
company's culture, values, and strategy, or about the workings of specific processes or markets. You hire interns to let them gain some of that experience and to see how they perform. Treat AI agents the same way. Don't "hire" them for their training or their eventual accomplishments. Also, employ them on a full-time basis after they can perform their job descriptions within the performance parameters established. Only a proven agentic AI should be made a permanent part of an ongoing process and introduced to other parts of an organization.
Do this not to humanize the AI agent but to make its role discussable. When people say, "This decision came from AI," it's easy for colleagues to forget that the AI agents are their teammates and their sense of personal responsibility for the process's outcome can evaporate. In addition, multiple AI agents may be involved. By breaking down and assigning responsibilities to agents as you would to human employees, and by giving each agent a clear identity (as in the well-known cases of Watson, Alexa, and Siri), their roles become easier for people to understand.
EMBEDDING AGENTIC AI in large organizations takes more than demonstrating a business case. It requires rethinking the way work is managed and developing a pathway to achieve the transitions required. The quickest way to accomplish that is to use mechanisms for managing work that are familiar to executives, managers, and employees alike. Extending those tools to incorporate the burgeoning numbers of virtual agentic workers eases this daunting transition. ▼ HBR Reprint H094S9
JOSEPH FULLER is a professor of management practice and a faculty cochair of Managing the Future of Work at Harvard Business School.
34 Harvard Business Review September–October 2026
When team members treat prompting as a collective act, interactions with AI will advance their thinking.

by GABRIELE ROSANI, ELISA FARRI, DANIEL TRABUCCHI, and TOMMASO BUGANZA
ACCORDING TO A global survey of 500 executives conducted by the Capgemini Research Institute, the active use of AI in team meetings is anticipated to more than triple in the next three years. The executives surveyed said that they expect group use of AI to lead to better meetings that arrive at higher-quality outcomes. Leaders should not let this optimism obscure the challenges ahead, however. Our research suggests that integrating AI into team settings doesn't
happen naturally, and introducing it into meetings without laying the proper groundwork can reduce participation, fragment discussions, and shift ownership away from the team.
Fortunately, there is an approach that overcomes these pitfalls: We call it "human-AI team chemistry." Our research indicates three practices to help build this new capability:
involve AI in a collective dialogue so that it addresses the group, considering the various expertise at the table.
Leverage AI's role fluidity. AI should function just as a notetaker but as a team member, deliberately switching roles (such as stakeholder representative, challenger, customer, competitor, and so forth) to enrich the team discussion.
Maintain collective ownership of the interactions with AI. When team members treat prompting as a collective act, debate alternative directions, and pause to judge AI's output, interactions with AI will advance—rather than outsource—their thinking.
These recommendations emerged from a five-month experiment involving 60 managers from 12 companies across diverse industries. In each organization, a team of three or more managers—all with previous experience using generative AI—was tasked with designing a platform-based solution to address a strategic business challenge. The problems were of comparable scope and complexity, and to ensure consistency, all teams followed the same methodology, developed by two of us (Daniel and Tommaso), and used OpenAI's ChatGPT model. Each team met in person five times, for a total of 30 hours. To understand how the teams actually worked with AI and experienced the process, we observed team interactions with AI in real time, analyzed the complete chat transcripts from each session, and collected post-session surveys to capture participants' feedback. This allowed us to see not just what teams produced but how they collaborated and where team-AI collaboration thrived or faltered.
Jong Grewal/Getty Images
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On the basis of this research, we believe that teams that engage in these practices will achieve higher-quality outcomes and reduce the risk of falling into common AI-related traps.
In the first session, the idea of integrating AI into teamwork intrigued all participants. But the initial excitement faded quickly, often within the first hour. Teams grew quieter, slipped into a more passive mode, and began to simply watch the screen as the AI generated responses. Survey data after the first session confirmed what we had observed: Teams reported limited perceived benefits, and overall engagement was low. This result was the opposite of what we had expected. Rather than amplifying collaboration, AI seemed, at least initially, to dampen it.
A closer review of the chat transcript revealed the roots of the issue. As one of us noted, “If I didn’t know this was a team chat, I would have assumed it was an individual interacting with an AI.” In a human-only team meeting, when a new colleague or consultant joins, everyone introduces themselves, explains their roles, and shares context so that the newcomer can contribute effectively. When interacting with AI, teams did not follow the same norms. As a result, the AI responded as though it were supporting only the person typing rather than engaging with the full group or accounting for its dynamics. Lacking awareness of the team’s context, and its different roles, expertise, and
viewpoints, AI defaulted to a narrow, individual-focused perspective.
Giving AI a static role. Most teams assigned AI a single, static role—often “researcher” or “subject-matter expert”—and left it at that for the entire session, interacting with it primarily in answer-seeking mode and treating it as a repository of expertise to query rather than a thinking partner. None experimented with shifting AI into more-abrasive roles, such as critic or skeptical stakeholder, which could have encouraged reflection, constructive debate, or challenge. Nor did they ask the AI to take different perspectives—a customer, a competitor, an end user—which might have revealed blind spots or hidden assumptions.
Interacting staccato-style. We also noticed that the teams’ input to AI was often brief and transactional: “Give me another example” or “This isn’t the right direction.” These quick, minimal requests reveal that the team members rushed through the task without articulating their goals or explaining their reasoning to AI. Furthermore, AI often jumped ahead by proposing unsolicited “next steps” or ready-made options, nudging the team toward simple one-click confirmation (“OK, option B”) and steering the conversation before collective alignment had occurred.
The same three issues appeared repeatedly across groups, indicating a systemic pattern rather than isolated missteps. The issue was neither the technology nor the participants’ individual skills but how the teams were interacting with AI.
This raised two questions: (1) How can we help teams become aware of the
challenges related to integrating AI into team settings? And (2) what practical guidance do they need to bring AI fully into their discussions?
To help teams avoid the pitfalls they encountered in the first session, we developed a three-element framework:
To raise awareness of the importance of these elements, we asked each team to go back to the session-one chat transcripts and reflect on how they had worked with AI. To support that reflection, we introduced a checklist of questions to help the teams recognize the interaction patterns limiting their effectiveness.
Here are some of the self-evaluation questions:
By working through these questions, participants reflected on how they interacted with AI as a team and identified the areas where they could strengthen the interaction in the next workshop. We then provided practical tips and ready-to-use prompts designed to help teams integrate AI more intentionally as an active participant in their conversations, not just a tool they query.
This proved helpful. After the second session, teams looked more upbeat. A detailed review of the chat logs revealed that most team members now introduced themselves in turn, and AI began factoring in the nuances of different roles and expertise rather than treating the group as a single
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individual. They started having a collective conversation with AI.
Teams also began using AI more flexibly, moving beyond standard fixed roles like notetaker, expert, or analyst. Depending on the stage of the discussion, AI was asked to act as a brainstorming partner, a challenger to test assumptions, a “prototyper” to create artifacts, and a storyteller to refine pitches. Teams realized that AI can instantly shift across stakeholders and viewpoints, becoming a multirole team member within the same meeting.
While the first two capabilities—interacting as a team and assigning multiple roles to AI—were absorbed relatively quickly, the third one, taking collective ownership, took longer to mature. In the second session, some teams still followed AI rather than steering it, sitting around the screen and passively reacting to its outputs. In later sessions, however, the dynamic had gradually shifted. Before submitting a prompt, teams paused to discuss how to frame the next iteration. They debated alternative directions, conducted judgment checks, and collectively challenged the AI’s outputs before engaging again. These pauses prevented the team from slipping into “spectator mode” and helped them remain firmly in the driver’s seat. Survey data of later sessions confirmed the benefits. Average engagement increased by 30%, and participants reported that AI was providing more-meaningful support to their discussions. Two-thirds noted that their group conversations, alignment, and collaboration had improved as a result, leading to higher-quality outputs. Three out of five participants noted that
collective judgment mitigated the typical pitfalls of using AI alone, such as too much trust or conformity.
This kind of team-AI chemistry does not come naturally, and it rarely emerges on the first attempt. For most teams, it needs to be deliberately nurtured and intentionally embedded in the way they work. The risk is that the effect will fade if it is not reinforced. How to do it in practice? Here are three tips:
Plan the meeting agenda with explicit AI slots. Identify the agenda points where AI participates and specify the role it should play: For example, plan a five-minute introduction round, where the team briefs AI with context, or a 15-minute “challenge slot” toward the end of the meeting, where AI plays the skeptic.
Prepare a few prompts to summon AI in a designated role. For instance, “Take the perspective of...” and “How might stakeholder XYZ react to...?” Or include cues that ensure judgment pauses, such as “Wait for our decision before proceeding.”
After the session, review the chat transcript. Check it against a list of questions to see how well the team-AI dynamics unfolded, and identify opportunities to improve next time. You can also use AI as a coach (upload the chat transcript and ask for AI’s evaluation against the checklist) or a sparring partner in a dialogue (discuss ways to strengthen team-AI interaction in future sessions).
Putting these tips into practice requires more than good intentions:
Teams often lack the authority to redesign meetings or change established rituals on their own. Leaders play a critical role, as they can decide and embed a new way of working. They can experiment by intentionally integrating AI into one team meeting. They should also set expectations that it may take a few iterations to climb the learning curve and master the new approach. Once the new practice is tested, leaders should continue to apply it so that their teams don’t revert to old habits.
TEAM-AI CHEMISTRY DOESN’T develop automatically. To foster it, high-performing teams should engage AI collectively, draw on its multiple roles, and maintain shared ownership of the interaction. When nurtured deliberately, these capabilities enhance team performance by yielding better alignment and coordination and ultimately elevating the quality of teamwork outcomes. ▼
HBR Reprint H09678
GABRIELE ROSANI is the director of content and research at Capgemini Invent’s Management Lab. ELISA FARRI is the vice president and head of Capgemini Invent’s Management Lab. Gabriele and Elisa are the coauthors of the HBR Guide to Generative AI for Managers (Harvard Business Review Press, 2025) and the HBR Guide to Generative AI for Teams (Harvard Business Review Press, 2026). DANIEL TRABUCCHI is an associate professor in the Department of Management, Economics, and Industrial Engineering at Politecnico di Milano. TOMMASO BUGANZA is a professor of leadership and innovation at Politecnico di Milano. Daniel and Tommaso are the coauthors of Platform Thinking (Business Expert Press, 2023) and The Digital Phoenix Effect (Platform Thinking Publishing, 2025).
Harvard Business Review
September–October 2026
37

The HBR Interview with Dan Schulman
Dan Schulman wasn’t looking to get back in the game. After a successful nine-year stint as the CEO of PayPal, he was ready to retire. But the board of Verizon repeatedly urged him to step in to try to reverse the slide at the telecommunications giant, and late last year he agreed. As Verizon’s CEO, his task is to turn around a company that has seen steep declines in market share, share price, and customer satisfaction. In a conversation with HBR editor at large Adi Ignatius, Schulman discusses how he’s trying to shake up Verizon’s culture, the risk and promise of AI, and what it takes to be an exceptional leader. Here are excerpts.
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PHOTOGRAPHER GUERIN BLASK

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Interview with Dan Schulman**
DAN SCHULMAN: I was happily retired, living on our ranch in Montana, and I wasn’t looking to come back into corporate life. But I was lead director on Verizon’s board, and we needed to make a change. I felt there was a real opportunity to take an iconic American company and turn it around. So after a lot of discussions with my wife, I reluctantly agreed to do it. And here I am, nine months into the job, and I’m loving it.
We had been losing market share for five years. We went from having the largest market cap in the industry to having the lowest. We had the lowest P/E multiple, which is the market’s way of saying that it doesn’t believe in your growth going forward. Our churn rates were going up. Our customer satisfaction results were going down. And inside the company, we were willing to be prey, gently ceding market share to our competitors. We weren’t playing to win.
It was probably more cultural than anything else. For a long time Verizon relied
on its engineering prowess. That’s no longer enough. We put the network—not the customer—at the center of everything we did. The company had a lot to be proud of, but it was resistant to change. We were risk averse. We were hierarchical. We were not imagining the kind of role we could play in the future, in the age of AI. When the pace of change external to a company is faster than the change of pace internally, you’re falling behind.
Companies talk all the time about being customer obsessed. Verizon is a utility. People want it to work, but they don’t necessarily want a relationship with it. What does customer obsession mean in your context?
It’s not easy to put the customer front and center. If it were, every company would do it, and it would bring no competitive advantage. We don’t actually use the term “customer centricity,” but we have an initiative called “Every customer has a name.” It means we treat you as a person, not as an account. So, when you come into our store, how quickly do we serve you? Do you understand the plans we have? When you call our customer service centers, do we treat you with respect and empathy?
Customers fire companies all the time in quiet ways because they feel disrespected. We want to create a company that respects you as an individual and also helps you understand the direction of technology. We’re moving into an AI world, and Verizon can be a part of the new infrastructure. Our service can help you use AI, create agents in a safe way, and so on.
I’ve heard criticism that the complexity of Verizon’s offerings pushes people almost unwittingly into a more expensive tier. Are you willing to accept lower revenue temporarily to simplify your offers and build long-term loyalty?
I don’t think that being customer-centric means being less than fiscally responsible to your shareholders. In fact, it can be the opposite. Our churn rate was going up because people were unhappy with us. We were raising prices. Our plans were confusing. When I came in, I said, “We’re not going to raise prices without offering real value, and we’re going to invest in the customer experience and grow our number of customers.” We’ve started to see our churn come down quite nicely.
40 Harvard Business Review September–October 2026
“You can satisfy customers and inspire your employees... at the same time. It’s not an impossible equation.”

If you do the right things, make the difficult decisions, and challenge the culture, you can satisfy customers and inspire your employees and shareholders at the same time. It’s not an impossible equation.
It’s never easy to come in as an outsider. You had a great run at PayPal, and you’d been on Verizon’s board. But people are resistant to change. What’s worked and what hasn’t with your employees?
You’re right: People are resistant to change. But change is a constant, and its pace is accelerating. Leaders need to tell it like it is, without sugar-coating. Every employee is an adult. They probably know what’s going on, and they’re waiting for leadership to admit it. At employee meetings, I don’t have slides or notes. I just talk from the heart. I tell them that we’re losing. And that’s hard to hear. But I tell them that losing doesn’t work for me, and I know it doesn’t work for them, either. We need a full-scale internal revolution and cultural shift, where we play to win, where we take risks—even if sometimes they fail. This isn’t a marketing slogan. It’s a way of life inside the company.
You recently laid off 13,000 people. How do you distinguish between cost cutting and a true transformation?
We needed to create a war chest to invest in the customer, and that necessitated the layoffs. I spoke to the company
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about how painful laying off even a single person can be, but our job now is to make sure that we invest most of those dollars back in the customer so that we can reclaim market leadership and become one of the most trusted companies in our industry.
I think they’re motivated by the idea that we’re playing to win, to be trusted, to be at the center of our customers’ lives. It’s important to have early successes for people to rally around. We’re pushing people hard. I want to see improvement every single day, and there’s an intensity about that. Working hard, being disruptive in the market, putting customers at the center, being on a winning team—I love all of that. Some people don’t, and that’s OK. It means we are not the company for them. We’re getting people who are inspired to be here, who want to make us better. They’re all in.
Truth is subjective, and the future is uncertain. I just try to be authentic and honest about how I see things playing out. AI is going to be part of our future, and every single one of us needs to know how to use AI tools. You will be better at your job and better in life if
you understand how to capture the benefits of AI.
We’ve put in place full weeklong training programs on using AI for all employees, and we have extensive reskilling programs for employees who might be displaced by AI. Successive waves of technology are going to radically change the way we work and the way we live. And I want to have that conversation as honestly as I possibly can.
The value that we offer to consumers is going to be radically reshaped by AI. I don’t think we’ll just be a connectivity company, offering wireless and broadband services. We’ll be able to do things that enable consumers and small businesses to take full advantage of AI.
We can direct them to the models that are best for certain tasks, for example. People could buy tokens from us—I think tokens [units of data that an AI model generates] will become the coin of the realm in the future—and we could cost-optimize how they’re used. We could provide a secure environment if you want to utilize an AI agent. We’ll be part of the AI infrastructure, connecting data centers. And we’re creating edge data centers that can reduce latency for applications like remote surgery or autonomous-driving vehicles. We’ll be able to see how our service is doing building by building, floor by floor, and autonomously resolve issues without having to dispatch a tech worker to figure out what’s going on.
All this will help us increase customer satisfaction dramatically.
Three years ago, when the new AI models came out, they couldn’t even do simple math. Today they’re solving problems that the very best mathematicians hadn’t been able to solve in decades. So we know there is going to be disruption, but we don’t know exactly what it’s going to look like. If you look at a functional area like customer service, where much of the work is routinized, AI agents will be able to solve many questions. In other areas, humans and machines will work together to provide solutions to the customer. The question is, How do we get ready for the change? When we did the initial layoff, we put in place a $20 million fund for AI reskilling and retraining. That’s not going to be enough. We’re going to double or maybe triple that amount over the next two years to make sure that our employees and the communities we serve are prepared for the future. As leaders, we have a responsibility to get people ready for this new age. We need to be prepared for the disruption. If there’s going to be a two- to five-year trough where there’s potentially more unemployment, that’s not good for our economy, for our country, or for our companies.
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work and have seen it create slop. How do you deal with that perception?
I get it. All I can say is that the models we're using now are the worst models we'll ever use. Every couple of months, they get much better. It's important that people don't just accept their visceral negative reaction to AI. I want them to be as open-minded as possible about how the future might unfold. There's a great line from Shakespeare's Hamlet: "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so." You create your reality with how you think about things, so try not to overreact one way or another to a future that is changing rapidly.
You had years of experience as a CEO before your Verizon role. What have you learned about what it takes to lead effectively?
First, you need to be humble. You don't know it all. And if you do think you're the smartest person in the room, then you're in the wrong room. We need to admit when we're wrong and course correct, and we need to challenge ourselves continually. I never want to stand still because when you do, you start falling way behind. I also think being authentic is a superpower. You want to be approachable, to never think or talk in corporate-speak.
That can't be enough. There are plenty of humble, authentic people out there. What are the other skills and attributes that leaders need to be successful?
There are the basics: You've got to be able to work at a very intense level. You have to have extremely high expectations and insist upon them. You need
to be able to make difficult decisions and stand up for them. People need to know that you have an expectation that you're going to win in your market. I'm a fighter, a real fighter. I've done mixed martial arts for 40 years.
Thanks for the warning.
Yeah, you're welcome. I've learned a ton from that. I've learned to be cool, calm, and collected in high-stress situations. As a leader, you can never be too up or too down, because the good things are going to be followed by difficult things—and you need to learn from them both.
At PayPal, you talked about leading with a sense of purpose and mission. For example, when you realized some of your employees weren't making a living wage, you increased their pay. Do CEOs still do things like that? Or are we in a different place now, back to an era of shareholder primacy?
I don't think we're in a different place. Shareholders were important in that era too. But great CEOs have a set of values that are important to them. Today technology is front and center. People are worried about AI. Putting millions into training people to use AI is probably as important as anything we were doing in the past. I talk with other CEOs, and they're also thinking about how we can help make sure people land on their feet if there is job displacement, to create as strong an economy as we can. If we don't, people will be upset with the system, and that's a problem for democracy. I have a sense of purpose in doing this job. It revolves around my employees, and I have to make difficult
decisions. I need to keep customers front and center. I have my shareholders, my regulators, the communities we serve. To be successful, there are a lot of constituencies that I need to do the right thing for.
How will you know whether and when this turnaround has been a success?
We're in a three-year plan now. The first year is about confronting the issues that we have head-on and putting into place a fully comprehensive transformation program. We have 10 work streams and 400 initiatives—everyone in the company is engaged in those. Year two will be institutionalizing that work: Let's see the results, course correct, solidify. And then in year three, we'll turn into an AI-native company. We'll have transformed who we are. In years four, five, and six we're going to go into quantum computing and robotics.
What would have to be true to say Dan Schulman fundamentally changed Verizon?
I think you'll see my impact in our metrics. You'll see it in our customer satisfaction results. You'll see it in our churn rate. You'll see it in our employee satisfaction scores. You'll see that we are truly AI native. The most successful companies will have figured out culturally how to adapt to this changing environment. The utilization of AI, and what that's done for all the constituencies that I serve, is the legacy that I hope to leave. ▼ HBR Reprint R2605A
ADI IGNATIUS is the editor at large at Harvard Business Review and its former editor in chief.
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STRATEGY
Felipe A. Csaszar Professor, Ross School of Business
ILLUSTRATOR DIMITRIS LADOPOULOS
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STRATEGY
Dimitris Ladopoulos combines art, math, and algorithms to create a study of forms and variations.

Your team spent weeks preparing. You flew people in, booked the conference room, hired a facilitator. And after two days of debate, how many truly different strategic options did you walk out with? Three? Four? Now ask yourself: Was that because only three or four good options existed, or because that's all your team had the time and mental bandwidth to develop and evaluate?
For most companies, the honest answer is the latter. The bottleneck in strategic decision-making has never been a shortage of possible directions. It has been the limited capacity of the human minds doing the work. We can hold only so much information in our heads, evaluate only so many alternatives in a strategic-planning cycle, and process only so many perspectives in a meeting before fatigue, politics, or the clock forces a decision. Scholars call this dynamic bounded rationality—the idea that human decision-makers, however capable, are constrained by finite attention, memory, and processing power.
These constraints are so fundamental that we rarely notice them, but they have quietly shaped every tool in the standard strategy playbook. The reason a SWOT analysis has four quadrants, a growth share matrix is a 2×2, and Michael Porter's most famous framework has exactly five forces is not that the competitive world is actually so simple. It's that the frameworks had to be simple enough for a human team to map them out on a whiteboard in a few hours.
For decades, those frameworks were the best we had. That's no longer the case.
The current generation of artificial intelligence tools—particularly large language models (LLMs) and the multi-agent systems being built on top of them—are not just additions to the planning tool kit. They're technologies that directly relax the cognitive constraints that have shaped how companies make their most important decisions. AI can generate and screen thousands of strategic alternatives where a human team might be able to consider a mere handful. It can build and continuously update models of markets, customers, and competitors that are far richer and more dynamic than any static framework. And it can
IDEA IN BRIEF
Strategic decision-making has long been constrained by bounded rationality. Leaders can generate, evaluate, and debate only a limited number of strategic options because humans have finite time, attention spans, and cognitive capacity.
Generative AI can expand the bounds of strategic thinking by generating and evaluating thousands of options, replacing static frameworks with dynamic, data-rich models and enabling more-structured deliberation.
Firms that integrate gen AI into strategy processes won't just move faster—they'll make higher-quality decisions, uncover hidden opportunities, and build a durable competitive advantage using proprietary data, processes, and speed.
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STRATEGY
test ideas through simulated deliberation—synthesizing diverse perspectives and challenging assumptions without the groupthink, hierarchy, and time pressure that distort real-world strategy meetings.
In short, AI offers a path to unbounding the strategy process. The limits are not removed, of course, but they're pushed outward—and where they end up matters enormously, because the implications go well beyond efficiency. When you can explore more options, you find better paths forward. When you can model your environment in higher resolution, you see more opportunities and threats. When you can stress-test a plan by simulating competitors, skeptical customers, and a devil's advocate who never gets tired, you make decisions that are more resilient. The companies that master this new way of working won't just do strategy faster. They'll do it better—and build the next generation of competitive advantage.
I study strategic decision-making and have spent considerable time examining how AI performs on core strategy tasks. In recent experiments my colleagues and I found that business plans generated by an LLM were rated more favorably by experienced investors than were plans written by entrepreneurs in a startup accelerator and business plan competition. Perhaps more striking, when the business plans were evaluated, AI's assessments were more aligned with the investor panel's average judgment than individual investors' assessments were—which suggests that AI can both generate strategic options at scale and evaluate them with a consistency exceeding that of human experts. Such findings don't mean AI is ready to replace your strategy team. But they do suggest that the cognitive work at the heart of strategy is no longer exclusively human territory.
In this article I'll lay out what this shift means in practice. First, I'll describe three ways AI can transform the strategy process, with examples from companies already using it to do so. Then I'll address the skeptic's natural question—If every company has access to the same AI, how can it be a source of advantage?—and explain how firms can build durable competitive moats around strategy capabilities augmented by AI. Finally, I'll offer a practical playbook for leaders who want to start redesigning how their organizations make strategic decisions.
To understand what changes with AI, it helps to think about what your organization has to do when making strategy. At its core, any strategic decision involves three cognitive tasks: searching for possible courses of action, representing the environment in which those actions will play out, and aggregating the judgments of the people involved in the decision. Let's look at each in turn.
From a handful of options to thousands. The most immediate constraint on any strategy process is in the search for options: How many alternatives can your team generate and evaluate? For most organizations the answer is surprisingly low. A typical strategic-planning cycle might surface a dozen ideas and then narrow the field to three or four, with team members spending most of their energy debating those finalists. The vast majority of the possibility space is never explored—not because it lacks promise but because human teams lack the time and capacity to take on that job.
As my research suggests, the breakthrough with AI is that the cost of generating and screening options falls sharply, helping organizations explore far more of the possibility space. The shift is already visible in M&A. In one case, documented by McKinsey, a software company used a generative AI scouting system that combined semantic search with a database of more than 40 million public and private companies. Drawing on patents, filings, expert transcripts, and other structured and unstructured data, the system surfaced and scored more than 500 acquisition targets in less than a day, narrowed the list to 15 serious leads, and supported three completed acquisitions within months.
The point here is not just speed. It is a qualitative shift in what "looking for options" means. Instead of asking a team to brainstorm plausible targets, a firm can now scan nearly the entirety of the relevant universe, using multiple strategic lenses simultaneously, and create a short list that no earlier process would have produced. The implication for leaders is straightforward: Before any major strategic choice—an acquisition, a new market entry, a product portfolio decision—you should task an AI system with generating a far larger set of alternatives than your team would normally consider, filtered by your specific criteria. Use your team's judgment on the short list, not the long list. AI expands the search; humans choose.
From static frameworks to living models. The second constraint is representation: How does your organization model the environment it operates in? For most companies the answer is some combination of frameworks, spreadsheets, and quarterly reports—tools that are useful but inherently static and simplified. They capture the most important dynamics but necessarily leave out enormous amounts of nuance, context, and real-time change.
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AI makes it possible to work with far richer and more dynamic representations. MYbank, the digital lender within Ant Group, offers a striking example. Traditional banks evaluate small businesses' creditworthiness using just a handful of variables—revenue, collateral, credit history. Many small businesses lack one or more of these, leaving millions effectively "unscorable" and therefore unfundable. MYbank replaced that basic model with an AI system that draws on more than 3,000 variables, integrating transaction data, supply chain relationships, business network data, and even satellite imagery. The result is what the company calls its 3-1-0 model: three minutes to apply, one second for approval, zero human intervention. MYbank has extended credit to more than 53 million small businesses—72% of which were first-time borrowers—with a default rate around 1%.
The strategic insight here is about what happens when you replace a low-resolution model of your environment with a high-resolution one. Using its AI system, MYbank didn't just serve existing customers faster. It became able to see an entirely new customer segment—tens of millions of viable borrowers—that the old model had rendered invisible.
The same logic applies to any company whose models of demand, supply, or competitive dynamics were built for an earlier era. Consider Unilever's ice-cream business. Rather than relying on lagging quarterly forecasts, the company created an AI-driven model that integrates weather probabilities, demand signals, and telemetry from roughly 3 million connected freezers across 35 factories. The result is a continuously refreshed picture of where demand is forming and where supply may fall short—a living representation of the market that lets managers intervene in real time rather than react after the fact. Unilever reports a 10% improvement in forecast accuracy in Sweden and sales increases of up to 30% in some regions from insights generated by AI-enabled freezers.
For leaders, the practical step is this: Identify the one or two strategic models your organization uses most heavily (your market map, your customer segmentation, your competitive positioning) and ask whether AI could make them richer, more current, and more granular. In most cases the answer will be yes. And the payoff won't just be better information. It will be the ability to see opportunities and risks that your current models are incapable of revealing.
From groupthink to structured challenge. The third constraint is aggregation: How does your organization combine the knowledge and judgment of multiple people into a decision? In theory, diverse teams should produce better decisions than any individual could alone. In practice, strategy meetings are shaped by hierarchy, politics, personality, and time limits. The most senior person's view carries disproportionate weight. Dissent can be risky. The group converges too quickly.
AI offers a different approach. Instead of depending on a roomful of people with uneven incentives to speak up, organizations can now orchestrate what might be called synthetic deliberation: AI-driven processes that pressure-test ideas without the social frictions of group dynamics.
The mechanism can be simple or sophisticated. McKinsey, for example, has described multiagent workflows in which a "creator" agent drafts an analysis and a "critic" agent systematically challenges it—a process that automates the rigorous back-and-forth that strong teams try to create manually. At the more ambitious end, the BCG Henderson Institute has described LLM-powered strategic war games in which agents represent competitors, regulators, customers, and other stakeholders. Unlike in traditional rule-based simulations, these agents can generate less predictable, more human-like responses, which forces management teams to confront scenarios they might never have imagined on their own.
The most rigorous evidence for AI's ability to improve collaborative ideation comes from a field experiment at Procter & Gamble. In a study involving 776 commercial and R&D professionals working on real innovation tasks, researchers found that individuals using AI matched the average quality of two-person teams working without it. Teams using AI were about 12% faster and were more likely to produce top-decile solutions. Perhaps most important, AI reduced the silo effect between commercial and R&D professionals, giving each function access to the other's perspective and helping both produce more-balanced ideas.
The lesson for leaders is to build structured AI challenges into your decision-making process. Assign AI agents to distinct roles: one to generate the strongest case for a strategic direction, one to argue against it, and one to simulate likely competitor responses. You can also create synthetic panels (customers, regional managers, regulators) to investigate how a decision might land with different stakeholders. The
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goal is to ensure that by the time your leadership team sits down to decide, the obvious weaknesses have been identified and the plan has been pressure-tested against a wider range of perspectives than any single meeting could accommodate.
None of this means AI outputs should be taken at face value. LLMs can produce confident-sounding analyses that are subtly wrong, internally inconsistent, or built on fabricated evidence. Synthetic deliberation can surface useful challenges—but it can also generate plausible-seeming objections that miss the point entirely. The quality of AI-augmented strategy depends on the quality of the data fed into the process and, critically, the human judgment applied to its outputs. That isn't a reason to avoid these tools, but it is a reason to design the process carefully, and it's precisely why the role of the human strategist becomes more important, not less, in an AI-augmented world.
If you've read this far, you may be thinking: *But if my competitors can buy the same AI models that I have, how does any
of this become a source of competitive advantage?* It's a fair question, and it has a clear answer if you look at it through the right lens.
The most useful analogy is the internet in 1995. By the mid-1990s, internet access was becoming widely available. The underlying technology was not proprietary. Yet the companies that built the most durable advantages of the next two decades—Amazon, Netflix, Google—did not win because they had a website. They won because they recognized that the internet wasn't something to just bolt onto existing operations; it was a new foundation on which to build business models, capabilities, and data assets that competitors could not easily replicate. The firms that treated the internet as a utility saw their offerings quickly become commoditized. The firms that treated it as a platform for reinvention created moats that lasted for decades.
AI is at a similar inflection point. The models themselves are increasingly available. The advantage lies in what you build on top of them. Three approaches stand out.
Make AI smarter with your data. General-purpose AI models are trained on public information. They are, by
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STRATEGY

definition, generic. The moment you fine-tune or ground a model with proprietary data—your customer histories, transaction patterns, or internal research—you create something that competitors cannot replicate simply by buying the same software. Morgan Stanley’s AI assistant, which gives the company’s 16,000 financial advisers access to more than 100,000 internal research documents, reached 98% adoption and raised document-retrieval efficiency from 20% to 80%. Stripe’s fraud detection system, Radar, is another example at network scale. Trained on data from millions of businesses processing more than $1.4 trillion in annual payments, there is a 92% chance that it has already seen any given card on its network. A smaller competitor using the same algorithms but lacking that data cannot match its accuracy.
Deploy AI in processes that only you have. Data is one moat. Process is another. When a company embeds AI into a proprietary workflow—one that reflects its specific strategic logic, organizational knowledge, and competitive context—it creates a capability that’s difficult to observe from the outside and even harder to copy.
John Deere’s See & Spray system illustrates this concept well. The underlying technologies—computer vision and machine learning—are widely available. But Deere embedded them into precision-agriculture equipment that scans roughly 2,100 square feet per second, makes more than 5,000 spraying decisions per minute, and reduces herbicide use by 50% to 77%. The moat is not the algorithm. It’s the integration of AI into hardware, field-level data, and a dealer network far more expansive than that of rivals. What makes this approach strategic, not merely operational, is that See & Spray changes Deere’s competitive positioning: It transforms the company from an equipment manufacturer into a precision-agriculture platform, deepening customer lock-in and opening new revenue streams around data-driven farm management.
There is a well-known idea in strategy that operational effectiveness—doing the same things as other companies but better—is not the same as strategy. In stable times, that distinction holds. But in periods of technological discontinuity, the gap between firms that have reached the new performance frontier and firms that have not can be enormous.
Duolingo exemplifies the point. It launched AI-powered features—Roleplay, Explain My Answer, Video Call—soon after OpenAI’s GPT-4 became publicly available. But speed alone is not its moat. Duolingo’s real advantage is Birdbrain, a proprietary learning model trained on behavioral data from more than 500 million users completing roughly 1.25 billion exercises daily. The general-purpose model is the commodity. The learning system built around it, refined over years and fed by behavioral data whose scale dwarfs that of competitors, is the moat.
AI can compress months of analysis into days, reveal opportunities that were invisible, and stress-test decisions that would otherwise go unchallenged. Firms that adopt those capabilities operate at a fundamentally different level of strategic quality. The advantage may be temporary in theory, but in practice it just keeps compounding: Better decisions lead to better positioning, which generates better data, which improves future decisions. The frontier will keep moving, so enduring advantage comes from the ability to reach it again and again, gaining strength each time.
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52 Harvard Business Review September–October 2026
Identify the strategic models your organization uses and ask whether AI could make them richer, more current, and more granular. In most cases the answer will be yes.
The bottom line is this: As a technology, AI is becoming ubiquitous. But as a capability—embedded in your data, your processes, and your speed of execution—it is not. The companies that treat AI as a commodity to be purchased will find that it raises the bar for everyone without distinguishing them. The companies that treat it as a platform for building proprietary strategic capabilities will find that it is one of the most powerful sources of competitive advantage available today.
If you want to redesign how your organization makes its most important decisions, the playbook is straightforward.
Widen the option set before narrowing it. For every major strategic decision—an acquisition, a market entry, a product portfolio shift—use AI to generate a long list before the leadership team debates a short list. Most organizations narrow too early because exploring lots of options used to be expensive. It no longer is.
Replace static snapshots with living models. Pick the strategic representation your organization relies on most heavily—your customer segmentation, your competitive map, your demand forecast—and upgrade it from a periodic document to a dynamic model that updates as conditions change. The goal is to create a map rich enough to reveal what your current framework structurally cannot.
Institutionalize structured challenge. Good strategy depends not just on generating ideas but also on rigorously testing them. In most organizations that testing is still shaped by hierarchy, diplomacy, and the human tendency to converge too quickly. Don't leave dissent to chance. Design it into the process.
Build creator-critic-competitor workflows into every major commitment: Assign one AI agent to make the strongest case for a plan, one to dismantle it, and one to simulate how rivals or regulators would respond. Make structured challenge as routine as financial modeling.
Redefine the strategist's role from analyst to architect. In a world of tight cognitive bounds, strategists spend most of their time gathering data, building spreadsheets, and populating simplified frameworks. As AI starts to unbound cognitive constraints, that baseline cognitive work
can increasingly be automated—and the key resource shifts from analysis to imagination, from populating frameworks to designing the process itself.
All of those shifts demand a new talent profile: the hybrid strategist. Leaders who fit this profile know how to frame a strategic question, can design an AI workflow to answer it, and, above all, understand where the machine must yield to human judgment.
To become a hybrid strategist, you'll need to change what you demand in the room where decisions are made. Before any major strategic proposal reaches the leadership table, require three things: the AI-expanded list of alternatives that were considered and rejected, a current model of the competitive environment, and the results of a structured critique. When the executive committee raises the standard for what a credible recommendation looks like, the rest of the organization will follow.
Finally, make AI use normal. Morgan Stanley's AI assistant reached 98% adoption among 16,000 financial advisers because it was woven into the proprietary research workflows that they already depended on. The tool made their daily work clearly better, and adoption took care of itself. Start with the same logic: Find the decision process where your people already feel the pain, rebuild it with AI, and make the new workflow the default. Culture usually follows usefulness.
PICTURE YOUR NEXT strategy offsite. But this time, imagine it unbounded.
Your team arrives having already reviewed an AI-generated scan of hundreds of possibilities, filtered to the most promising. The market model on the wall is current, not six months stale. Before anyone presents a recommendation, it has survived a structured critique—devil's advocate, simulated competitors, skeptical customers. The conversation in the room is sharper, the options are stronger, and the time that used to go to basic analysis now goes to the questions only humans can answer: What do we believe? What are we willing to risk? What kind of company do we want to become? ▼
HBR Reprint R2605B
FELIPE A. CSASZAR is the Alexander M. Nick Professor and the chair of the strategy area at the University of Michigan's Ross School of Business.
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Rigid change programs often fail. A more experimental approach can build momentum—and increase the odds of success.
AUTHORS
Evgeny Kaganer Professor, IESE Business School
Christoph Loch Professor, IESE Business School
PHOTOGRAPHER ERIN DERBY
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بِسْمِ اللَّهِ الرَّحْمَنِ الرَّحِيمِ

CHANGE MANAGEMENT
ABOUT THE ART
Erin Derby builds digital floral collages, working with familiar materials to create something unexpected.
A
LL COMPANIES recog- nize the need to adapt as technology, society, and geopolitics collide to produce multiple
competing futures. But attempts at systemic change often fail. Typically, a CEO sets a bold, monolithic transforma- tion goal and then launches multiple initiatives to achieve it. The trouble is, that goal is constantly destabilized by shifts in the environment. As a result, early projects fail to deliver expected results, new initiatives proliferate, and the transformation journey becomes increasingly fragmented, leading to employee fatigue and shareholder frustration.
The root cause of these failures, we believe, is the senior leadership team's insistence on managing transformation as a large, complex project with a detailed road map to a fixed goal and results-oriented targets. While a disciplined, planned approach is understandable given the coordination complexity and budget demands of driving change in a large corporation, it's ultimately unfeasible. The gaps between the knowledge and capabilities of the firm's current business and those of its future business, combined with inevitable environmental turbulence over a multiyear project, hamper the organization's chances of success.
A better approach is to manage transformation as a learning journey. By that, we mean a process with an incom- pletely defined goal that evolves as the organization makes decisions, learns from outcomes, and adjusts accordingly. At the outset the senior leaders need to explicitly acknowledge that while they have some idea of where the company ought to be, a final outcome can't yet be fully known. With no fixed end point, the road map similarly is not fixed. The leader- ship team must proceed by selecting a coordinated portfolio of projects that will generate the greatest momentum and

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Many leaders manage corporate transformations like large-scale engineering projects: They set a fixed destination, create detailed road maps, and measure success through short-term financial outcomes. But most of those efforts fail.
Executives treat transformation as an exercise in execution, pushing rigid plans forward even when evidence suggests the strategy should evolve. This discourages learning, suppresses bottom-up insights, and creates resistance.
Treat transformation as a learning journey. Instead of pursuing a static end state, aim for continuous learning and pivot as new information emerges. Manage a coordinated portfolio of pilots, capability-building initiatives, improvements to existing businesses, and carefully timed new ventures.
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CHANGE MANAGEMENT
learning. Insights from the first wave of projects will then shape the priorities for the second wave, and so on, dynamically advancing the organization toward an evolving goal.
In the following pages we draw on our research and experience as consultants to more than 10 transformations at large companies in the United States, Europe, and Asia to offer a learning-oriented playbook for corporate systemic change. We’ll illustrate our recommendations by comparing GE’s more traditionally managed and ultimately unsuccessful transformation with that of DBS Bank, which unfolded as a cumulative learning journey that continues today. We’ll conclude by describing the key actions that leaders must take to keep their company on a coherent and well-informed trajectory.
A clear sense of a desired destination is the starting point of every journey. That’s why all transformations need a vision. The vision must be ambitious enough to inspire employees to work on the transformation while remaining concrete enough to make employees and stakeholders believe it is attainable.
Setting a vision requires accepting that it will evolve as the organization learns and redirects its energies to reflect its learning. The only permanent characteristics of the vision are that it must inspire a collective endeavor focused on creating as well as capturing value and that it must unite employees from all parts of the company.
Let’s take a look at DBS Bank. In 2010, in the middle of the postcrisis downturn and just after its first-ever layoffs, DBS ranked last in customer satisfaction in Singapore—people joked that DBS stood for “Damn Bloody Slow.” The bank’s new CEO at the time, Piyush Gupta, saw the crisis as a chance to leapfrog global peers. His vision, to position DBS as “the new bank for the new Asia,” acknowledged the emergence of Asia as a global economic and political powerhouse. The first wave of its transformation journey (2010–2013) centered on “Asian service,” which the bank defined with three attributes: respectful, easy to deal with, and dependable (RED).
As the bank successfully streamlined processes to deliver RED, the vision pivoted to “Make banking joyful.” That vision drove initiatives to center the company around the customer experience and digitalization (2014–2018) and fueled the
ambition to become the “best bank in the world.” In the third wave (2019–2024), which focused on data, AI, and sustainability, the vision expanded again; DBS would become the “best bank for a better world.” While continuing to focus on customer experience, the bank is now working on “making banking invisible” through the use of AI and other emergent technologies. In addition, a focus on sustainable and responsible banking and social impact have emerged as new priorities.
Now let’s turn to GE, which pivoted fewer times than DBS did. Around 2011, then-CEO Jeffrey Immelt recognized the need to move beyond commodity hardware to higher-margin software, a market it predicted would grow quickly. So GE began its transformation effort with a software center in California. (The center developed the industrial internet platform Predix and became a separate subsidiary, GE Digital, in 2015.) As Predix evolved and the importance of software capabilities was confirmed, Immelt’s ambition for the business’s transformation grew: GE would be a top-10 software company. He promoted that goal heavily inside and outside the organization.
Although that shift seemed to be a natural progression and a plausible outcome, it strengthened a simmering “us versus them” culture clash. The (relatively) small software teams didn’t fit easily into GE’s historically dominant industrial culture. And because GE’s customers (many of whom were digital beginners) did not fully understand the value of selling analytics services, the company struggled to mobilize stakeholders around the actions it would need to take to become a top-10 software company.
Most problematic, perhaps, was the fact that GE’s pivots seemingly were not informed by what it had learned. Instead GE appeared to follow a preset road map: First deploy the Predix platform internally, then with existing customers, then with all industrial firms. The substantive vision of using the platform to sell diagnostic and data services was not materially adjusted in light of ongoing findings, nor were the internal tensions of introducing new services reconciled with the needs of the existing businesses. Ultimately, GE’s effort was more top-down and less learning-oriented than DBS’s approach. Rather than an exploration, it was a voyage whose destination was set from the start.
Next let’s look at how an evolving vision gets turned into reality.
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Each transformation requires the company's leadership to determine which projects and initiatives to launch in pursuit of the vision and how best to orchestrate them. Traditionally, initiatives are treated as steps toward the goal, and success is measured in terms of revenues and profits. However, the yardstick for success should be how much the company will learn from a project: Will it reduce critical strategic unknowns and close gaps in key capabilities? Of course, leadership must also consider the probable impact a project will have on momentum. Will it improve performance in established businesses and tangibly help scale up new opportunities?
As companies travel along on their transformation journey, they can pursue four types of projects. The first two serve as engines of learning, either as controlled experiments designed to test specific hypotheses or as investments in new capabilities. The second two integrate the ideas and practices that arise from earlier projects to drive value in established and new businesses.
1 Pilots. These projects test critical assumptions about the business opportunities and threats embedded in the transformation's vision. They are essentially structured experiments—ranging from new products and processes to different sales channels and monetization models—that should generate essential learning even when they don't yield immediate business results. For example, DBS's 2016 beta launch of its entirely digital retail-banking offer (Digibank) in India was a pivotal pilot in the company's transformation journey. The goal of the pilot was to learn how to attract and serve retail customers without having physical touchpoints. The primary success metric adopted was the number of new customers it acquired, not the revenue it generated.
And in less than two years, the number of customers Digibank had in India went from zero to 2 million. The venture struggled to make a profit, but the bank learned key lessons that led to material improvements in its operations and profitability in other markets. When launching Digibank in India, for example, DBS developed a methodology of scouting, onboarding, and developing ecosystem partners to strengthen customer acquisition and extend its value
offering. It later rolled out this methodology across the wider bank to strengthen its positioning in the home markets (that step was an options project, as we'll see below).
At GE, however, things unfolded differently. When its first pilot tests of the technology platform Predix suggested that many customers were not digital-ready and did not understand the new services, the company didn't take that lesson to heart. Although GE Digital did introduce customer clinics, it plowed ahead with scaling Predix. Rather than learning from negative information, it offered more training and doubled down on its plan.
2 Options. This type of project focuses on building the capabilities—in both people and technology—needed to scale the future business and the operating models that the pilots are testing. These investments should close critical capability gaps, but they typically do not yield direct business benefits. Their success should be measured by how widely and effectively the new capabilities are adopted or deployed. Investments in a training program for employees or the deployment of a new technology are examples. We call these kinds of projects options because they enable the company to carry out tasks that it would not otherwise be able to.
DBS launched numerous options throughout its transformation journey. The bank needed to build employee competencies such as customer journey thinking, disciplined experimentation, data-driven decision-making, and agile ways of working. Each competency required behavioral scaffolding—step-by-step methodologies developed using global best practices and adapted for DBS's specific context, tools, and coaching support. Employees were given time away from their main responsibilities to apply the practices they were learning to real problems, free from top-down, results-driven pressures.
On the technology side, the bank's decision to develop a set of APIs in 2014 was a clear option initiative. Although DBS didn't initially define a business case for them, APIs later became foundational to Digibank's go-to-market strategy in India. For example, API-enabled integration let customers open accounts through a branchless process, supported by biometric authentication at partner locations. Later, APIs also played a critical role in the creation of new
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Within three years DBS rose from last to first in customer satisfaction among Singaporean banks, providing tangible proof to stakeholders that the transformation was working.

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ecosystem-based business models in Singapore, such as DBS car and home marketplaces, by connecting buyers and sellers with the broader ecosystem of partners.
At GE one key option initiative was the FastWorks innovation platform, inspired in part by lean-startup ideas. In order to convert the workforce to the concept, the company put 60,000 employees through a training program. However, it quickly became apparent that the lean-startup “fail fast” approach clashed with the existing “never fail” culture, which had resulted from GE’s Six Sigma approach to quality management. When first deployments did not immediately deliver results (and moreover, GE did not mandate the use of FastWorks in all units), many workers simply reverted to business as usual after the training finished.
To maximize learning, option projects must be tightly coordinated with the pilots, which often reveal the capability gaps that targeted options can address. Conversely, and even though they are not explicitly designed to deliver business results, options can spark ideas that shape future pilots. At DBS the Digibank pilot revealed the need to treat data as a strategic asset, which led to the company’s Data-First initiative—a set of option projects aimed at building data-driven decision-making capabilities across the bank. Similarly, talent hackathons launched in another option initiative not only helped middle managers adopt startup ways of working but also generated prototypes that were later accelerated into pilots and brought to market.
At GE, by contrast, coordination among transformation projects was lacking. The FastWorks program was never reconciled with Predix, and their tool kits (agile light versus agile at scale) were not fully compatible. As a result, the two approaches created friction, not synergy. The requirement for Predix to win more customers was at odds with the business units’ need to keep satisfying their current customers with the products they had. The portfolio of initiatives never became more than the sum of its parts; it was merely a collection of actions that ultimately hindered one another.
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Projects in this category apply new strategic insights from pilots and capabilities from options to drive top- and bottom-line growth in core operations. While most organizations do not consider EBIs to be part of the transformation journey, we strongly recommend including these projects in the transformation portfolio. Their success can be measured using traditional ROI metrics, and they are a powerful way to demonstrate early wins and sustain momentum.
EBIs can take place at any point during the transformation journey since they build on existing business models and integrate new capabilities quickly. DBS activated EBI

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projects both early and late in its transformation journey. As part of its RED service ramp-up, for example, the bank made incremental improvements to its operating model in established markets to deliver faster, more reliable service. Within three years DBS rose from last to first in customer satisfaction among Singaporean banks, providing tangible proof to stakeholders that the transformation was working.
Ensuring that an EBI incorporates the lessons already learned in pilots and leverages capabilities developed in option projects is the key to success. GE again provides a cautionary tale. At the very start of its would-be transformation, it sought to improve its established businesses by applying Predix across internal operations. But unlike DBS, GE rolled out its EBI before Predix technology capabilities were sufficiently established and its business assumptions validated. The business units pushed back. Some quietly built their own tools instead, arguing that Predix lacked key features and that sales teams struggled to explain its value to customers. A series of technical problems and development delays further undermined the business units’ confidence that Predix could meaningfully improve their core business. As a result, GE business units came to see Predix as a distraction rather than a clear value generator, and trust between the units and GE Digital was damaged.
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Ventures. The fourth type of project focuses on scaling validated business models by leveraging insights gleaned from pilots and capabilities
acquired from options. These ventures target new markets, customer segments, and business models to generate fresh revenue streams. Their success is measured by financial and growth metrics. Scaling up a new business depends on both validated assumptions and well-developed capabilities. Since each is necessary but insufficient on its own, moving into a venture project too early risks failure, as GE’s venture with GE Digital illustrates. The senior leadership team must exercise patience to ensure that its ventures are built on solid foundations.
Consider DBS again. Its first major venture—scaling up Digibank in India after the beta launch—did not occur until year six of the bank’s transformation journey. By then DBS had accumulated the knowledge and capabilities it needed to succeed. Later DBS’s portfolio expanded to include more
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initiatives, such as Digibank Indonesia, signaling a confident shift toward scaling up new businesses.
GE, by contrast, moved rapidly. It deployed Predix internally in 2013 and started selling analytics services to existing customers in 2014 as a venture with a separate P&L. Then in 2016 it offered Predix as an “operating system” for all industrial firms worldwide. While the venture promised significant returns if GE secured a winner-take-all position, industrial customers struggled to see the value of GE’s services, and sales teams lacked the training and resources to explain and sell them. As a result, performance lagged, skepticism grew, and support from the board and shareholders weakened.
In addition to coordinating pilots and options, therefore, companies must balance where and when to apply new insights and capabilities to generate tangible business value, whether in EBI improvements or in new ventures. Activities should complement one another, avoid developing momentum in separate directions, and together deliver more than the sum of their parts. Sometimes new learning will lead a company to add new initiatives, and sometimes it will lead a firm to stop a successful initiative. Acting on the lessons each project teaches is critical to having a successful transformation journey.
Managing transformation as a long-term journey is inherently difficult. The road map is bound to shift over time, which can cause employees to become disoriented or fatigued, and that can slow momentum. It is the responsibility of leadership to maintain stakeholder enthusiasm along the journey. That can be done in three ways:
Provide discipline. Transformations often begin with scattered initiatives across different teams, budgets, and goals. To prevent a sense of fragmentation or disillusionment, leaders must immediately and deliberately assemble a portfolio of projects and ensure that it corresponds to the vision in place. Each project must have clear goals (not always financial) for its contribution to the overall journey and must serve the broader context of the transformation. Regular communication helps employees understand why changes are necessary and can prevent the perception that some units or stakeholders are being shortchanged.

The executive team also needs to create a strong internal transformation team. At the start of its journey DBS created a transformation group, whose primary mandate was to identify critical gaps in skills and capabilities and to design and run transformation methodologies—such as customer journeys, business experiments, and agile practices—that helped employees across the bank embed new ways of working into their day-to-day activities. The group was situated within the technology and operations group rather than being a stand-alone unit.
This positioning had two benefits: The group was closely aligned with technology pilots and EBIs, and it avoided the perception of being a detached corporate function. The transformation group worked closely with the technology scouting and innovation team, which focused on building connections among internal and external stakeholders. Together, the groups operated as enablers and catalysts rather than as the primary engines of transformation. At GE, however, the main transformation thrust rested with GE Digital, which imposed change on the core business units.
At DBS the projects were widely communicated and explained so that even people who were not directly involved could understand what was happening and could adjust to the projects’ effects. For example, to help translate the vision of “Make banking joyful” into concrete actions, DBS created and actively promoted a model it dubbed
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“Acquire, Transact, Engage” across all business units. Each step was clearly explained, and training was made accessible to all employees. At GE, leaders delivered no unifying messaging, not because they did not know that communication was important (there was communication about successes and outcomes) but because the interdependent and complementary role of the main programs (Predix and FastWorks) was never identified as a key enabler of the transformation.
Welcome bottom-up ideas. At DBS the first pivot to customer journey-driven design thinking arose from learnings revealed in operational activities. The building blocks for portfolio choices came from knowledge dispersed throughout the company; top management prioritized and funded the most promising. Many bottom-up ideas gave rise to important projects in the DBS transformation portfolio. For example, the emphasis on customer journeys grew from a realization by a team working on process improvement that not all customer problems could be fixed by streamlining internal processes. The team developed a methodology and gave a demo to management, which was impressed and took it on board. Over time, customer journeys became a key element of the transformation, giving rise to the vision of “Live more, bank less.”
To be able to recognize the most-promising ideas, DBS’s top executives regularly participated in transformation activities. The CEO, for instance, met weekly with the Digibank team during the pilot development and launch. The Digibank pilot was an inflection point in the transformation journey, producing many bottom-up insights, such as the ecosystem business models and data-driven decision-making, that later were elevated into option initiatives.
At GE, though, the transformation was driven largely by top-down ideas, limiting pivots from employee learning and reducing buy-in from the wider organization. We have found no evidence that bottom-up ideas managed to trigger a significant change in the course of the programs that were being pursued. To the contrary, there is some evidence suggesting that any doubts about the chosen course or pace of advancement were brushed aside by senior management.
Incorporate pivots into measurement systems. Learning must be reflected in evolving scorecards that chart a clear—if dynamic—road map. At DBS early tracking focused on process improvement, measured as the time customers spend interacting with the bank. Over time, measures
shifted: first to customer “joyfulness” and then to revenue from digital touchpoints. These evolving measures signaled priorities and reinforced transformation logic. At GE the absence of such evolving metrics contributed to perceptions of unfairness, organizational tensions, and ultimately the breakdown of support.
DBS deliberately used the corporate scorecard to support its transformation effort. In 2016 transformation KPIs were introduced into the scorecard under the label “Make banking joyful,” and over the years their weight grew from 15% to 20%. The scorecard evolved to explicitly reinforce key elements of the transformation portfolio. Initially it focused on critical options and EBIs, but in the eighth year some of the more strategic venture projects appeared under the strategic priorities section (40% of the total).
In other words, the scorecard served as a vehicle to signal to the entire organization what elements of the transformation portfolio had the greatest salience at a given stage. It reinforced behaviors that supported those priorities and, over time, made the journey continuous and comprehensible. The scorecard helped leadership communicate, “This is where we have come from, and this is where we are headed.”
CEOS ARE EXPECTED to articulate and then achieve goals. And it’s natural for them to treat all challenges that way. But large transformations involve deep architectural changes that unfold over long time periods and produce outcomes that are at least partly unforeseeable. Transformation goals cannot be achieved through decisive action and resources alone. Instead they must be guessed at, explored, revised, and continually reconnected to an evolving vision of what the organization should be. That’s why we contend that leaders must become intrepid explorers, ready to adjust course as their goals and environment evolve. Their fundamental challenge, perhaps, is to balance the humility that exploration requires with the confidence needed to inspire the crew. ▼
HBR Reprint R2605C
EVGENY KAGANER is a professor at IESE Business School in Barcelona and the academic director of the IESE-MIT Global CEO Program. CHRISTOPH LOCH is a professor at IESE Business School in Barcelona and the former dean of Cambridge Judge Business School.
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PHOTOGRAPHER CHRIS AULD
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Chris Auld turned to cycling photography after 20 years of working as a commercial photographer, capturing numerous races, including the Tour de France.
Most companies struggle with how much to collaborate. Go it alone, and you slow yourself down. But collaborate too much, and you risk handing competitors your advantage.
The smartest companies draw a line. They collaborate on the “core”—things like infrastructure and standards—to help the whole market grow. Then they compete hard on the “edges,” where they can differentiate themselves.
Find the best course by weighing five factors: market dynamics, technology life-cycle stage, your position in the technology stack, the level of competition, and social acceptance and regulation. Collaborate when doing so will grow the market or reduce risk, compete where you want to stand out, and keep adjusting as things change.

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The lesson for business isn't just "collaborate more." It's "collaborate intelligently." Draft when it makes you go faster. Break away to win.

STRATEGY
G
VERY SUMMER THE TOUR DE FRANCE turns endurance into theater. For three weeks the world watches cyclists traverse mountains, wind-swept flats, and chaotic city finishes. If you want to see strategy in motion, watch the peloton. Riders from dif-
different teams—direct competitors with different sponsors, leaders, and ambitions—form a dense, fast-moving pack. Inside this temporary, informal alliance, everyone benefits from reduced wind resistance. The front rider does the most work as the riders behind conserve energy. Positions rotate. Over time the group moves faster than any rider could alone.
And then, suddenly, the truce dissolves. A climb steepens. Speeds drop. Aerodynamic advantages fade. The contenders must choose the optimal moment to break away. In the Tour, cyclists are constantly oscillating between two modes: collaboration when it makes the whole group stronger, and competition when differentiation decides the outcome.
In today's markets, speed, interoperability, and trust determine whether new technologies gain traction. Most companies can't afford to build a technological ecosystem alone. This is partly why we see so many circular deals in the AI sector. AI systems depend on shared infrastructure that no single company fully controls. Training models require chips, cloud capacity, data pipelines, software tools, and distribution channels, which are owned or supplied by different firms. Circular deals, in which companies invest in one another or sign mutually beneficial partnerships, help align incentives. Firms share key components, lock in supplies, and signal their commitment to a common ecosystem. Such commitments have led fierce competitors in this
space to band together to create shared-standards groups (for example, the Agentic AI Foundation) that help ensure that in the future, ecosystems remain interoperable. In effect, this sharing reduces risk. Each participant knows the others have skin in the game, which makes it easier for the whole technology ecosystem to scale up quickly.
But if companies collaborate too broadly, they risk losing hard-won competitive advantages. That means the real strategic question is not whether to collaborate but where to do it. To answer that, it's necessary to separate a company's activities into two layers. The first, the core, includes the infrastructure, interfaces, standards, and safety practices that allow its ecosystem to function and grow. The second layer, the edge, is where companies create distinct value for customers by using proprietary workflows, integrated experiences, brand loyalty, data, and business models. The challenge is that the boundary between the two keeps moving. What differentiates you today may become commoditized tomorrow, and collaboration increasingly happens through informal ecosystems rather than traditional alliances. For that reason, leaders need a practical framework to decide, case by case, when collaboration strengthens their strategy and when it quietly erodes it.
What follows is the framework I use to help leaders make that call. It is based on my academic research, interviews with dozens of industry practitioners, and my work as a consultant. It's built around five factors and grounded in identifiable patterns across both technology-heavy and low-tech industries. If the Tour has a lesson for business, it isn't just "collaborate more." It's "collaborate intelligently." Draft when it makes you faster. Break away when it's time to win. Businesses must learn to do the same.
Most leaders don't struggle because they dislike collaboration. They struggle because there's a high cost to failure, and failures happen frequently. If you undercollaborate, you can lose years to duplicated work, fragmented standards, and ecosystem distrust. If you overcollaborate, you can accidentally train your competitors, leak strategic know-how, or commoditize what you once owned. In companies' practices, I see three predictable mistakes.
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First, executives often talk about cooperation as if it's binary: "We partner" or "we don't." But collaboration comes in many forms, ranging from lightweight coordination (shared standards or shared threat intelligence) to deeper codevelopment (formal R&D partnerships). The idea that collaboration must mean a full alliance with shared teams, road maps, and governance creates unnecessary fears about control, dependency, and value capture. The better model is to treat collaboration as a spectrum of options, each with different risk levels and different strategic payoffs.
Classic co-opetition guidance emphasizes how much of the challenge is about scope and control. How far does cooperation extend? Who governs the collaboration? And how can it be unwound if it stops making sense? Once leaders see collaboration as a set of tools, not a single big bet, they can choose the lowest-risk mechanism that still achieves their goal.
The second mistake is believing that collaborating on a shared core is mostly an act of goodwill. That common belief becomes self-fulfilling: Leaders starve collaborative efforts because they can't see the ROI, and then those efforts fail because they're underresourced. But many of the most impactful examples of collaboration are best understood as competitive moves designed to reshape the terrain of competition.
Apple and Google's joint work on exposure notification during Covid-19 is an excellent example. Two companies that compete intensely at the platform level built an interoperability layer that allowed public-health authorities to broadly deploy Bluetooth-based exposure notifications. Apple framed the collaboration as an effort to help health agencies reduce the spread of the disease (a social good for everyone) while focusing on the enhanced privacy and security of the iPhone (a point of differentiation between iOS and Android often underappreciated by consumers). Even if the circumstances were unusual, the strategic logic is familiar: When customers' adoption of a product depends on cross-platform interoperability and trust, the core is too important to remain fragmented. But collaboration on the core can offer an opportunity to shine a light on key aspects of differentiation.
The third mistake is blindly following the traditional cooperative strategy playbook. Classic cooperative strategy tends to emphasize formal alliances, joint ventures, and contractual partnerships. Those still matter. But in
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the digital age many of the most important cooperative dynamics occur outside a formal framework. As technologies become more modular, layered, and ecosystem-dependent, firms increasingly collaborate through informal or community-driven approaches. That creates a new challenge: Leaders can't rely only on the familiar joint-venture checklist. They need a way to evaluate newer forms of collaboration.
The economic logic behind the framework is that collaboration increases value for everyone. Collaborating on the core can either raise customers' willingness to pay (through increased trust, interoperability, quality, and adoption rates) or lower costs (through shared R&D and reduced duplication). Competing on the edges is a value-capture play. It's where you build the differentiated experiences, workflows, distribution, and brand promise that allow you to command premium pricing, lock in customers organically, and sustain or improve your competitive advantage. But where do you draw the line between collaboration and competition?
The good news is this line isn't mystical. Across industries, it tends to be shaped by five predictable factors. Once leaders explicitly incorporate those factors into their deliberations, they stop arguing about vague philosophies ("open versus closed" or "partner versus build") and start making clean, revisable decisions.
Now let's look at how each factor shapes the boundary between the core and the edges and how real companies have used the framework.
Winner-take-all dynamics. Some markets reward interoperability and allow many winners. Others tend to tip toward one dominant platform, standard, or ecosystem. In winner-take-all (or winner-take-most) markets, collaboration can be unusually risky or unusually powerful, depending on how it affects the tipping point. If the market is likely to tip toward a single-owner-controlled platform, you must be careful not to fund your future capter. If the market is likely to tip toward an open or shared standard, collaborating early can help prevent fragmentation and ensure you're helping control the standard
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while still competing on the edges that matter to customers. If the market is unlikely to become winner-take-all, then more collaboration can be helpful.
Consider the technical body EMVCo, which is overseen by major payment networks including American Express, Discover, JCB, Mastercard, UnionPay, and Visa. It develops global specifications so that card-based payments work securely and seamlessly. Payments aren't a winner-take-all business. Most people have multiple credit cards and use more than one payment processor for purchases. The major payment networks collaborate on the core rails because they all benefit from interoperability. But they compete intensely on fraud tooling, issuing relationships, merchant services, pricing, and rewards. That's a classic "open standard core, differentiated edges" move. Standardize what must work everywhere; compete on devices, ecosystems, and user experience.
In winner-take-all markets, the goal is neither to collaborate nor not to collaborate. The goal is to collaborate in ways that prevent the market from tipping toward competitors and to ensure the competitive battle happens where you can win.
Technology life-cycle stage. Are you growing the category or fighting for share? Technologies tend to follow an S curve: uncertain early days, rapid growth, maturity, and eventual decline. The balance between collaboration and competition shifts along that curve. In early stages, a company's biggest problem is not usually beating rivals. It's getting adoption: proving viability, establishing standards, reducing uncertainty, and building complements. Collaboration can be a way to accelerate the growth of the category itself. As a technology enters the growth and maturity stages, the strategic path moves toward differentiation: feature advantage, customer experience, cost position, and product stability. Collaboration still happens, but often narrowly and defensively (around shared risks like security, for example). Finally, in the decline stage, as a technology is being phased out or replaced, competitors often collaborate to extend its life, especially if they are not the ones building the replacement technology.
Let's take a look at the electric vehicle (EV) industry. Early in the EV transition, the category faced a classic adoption barrier: Consumers, suppliers, and infrastructure providers
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needed confidence that EVs would be a viable market. Tesla decided to open access to certain battery and charging patents to encourage broader industry adoption and ecosystem investment. The company collaborated with other EV manufacturers on parts of the enabling environment while still competing on product, brand, and execution. For instance, Tesla supplied battery packs for Toyota's RAV4 EV. Although many onlookers questioned this move at the time, it helped grow the EV market and had the added benefit of giving Tesla control of the standard for a growing industry.
Such collaboration early in the technology life cycle happens across a variety of industries. For example, in the pharmaceutical domain, "precompetitive consortiums" allow competitors to collaborate on fundamental research that will help them create new drugs and therapeutics.
The consortium led by Regeneron to sequence the genomes of 500,000 participants in the UK Biobank is one example. Regeneron and its competitors AbbVie, Alnylam, AstraZeneca, Biogen, and Pfizer each contributed $10 million to support the effort. Their collaboration sped up the sequencing timeline by three years. The companies that participated had access to this extremely important data and could use it to create new drugs.
For an example of a lack of collaboration in the growth stage, look at the streaming services industry in the late 2010s. As competition intensified, major players such as
Netflix, Amazon Prime Video, and Hulu sought to differentiate themselves by offering unique user experiences and exclusive content and using proprietary algorithms. Because they were focused on capturing market share and establishing brand dominance, they competed with one another instead of collaborating.
As noted earlier, once a market reaches the decline stage, its players often revert to collaboration. For example, consider compact discs (CDs). As digital streaming rose to prominence and CD sales slowed, CD manufacturers and music labels collaborated on marketing efforts and special releases to try to extend the life of the technology in the face of disruption.
Life-cycle thinking prevents executives from making a common error: assuming that because a collaborative move made sense early, it remains the right move forever. The core often stabilizes over time, and the edge battle intensifies.
Technology stack position. Technologies live in stacks. Lower layers (or infrastructure) benefit most from interoperability, while higher layers (applications) benefit most from differentiation.
We see this dynamic regularly within big tech. For example, when Google developed the cloud technology
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Kubernetes (which automates the management of applications, among other things), the company understood that because it was at such a low level in the tech stack, it wasn't going to drive competitive advantage. Therefore, Google shared it freely with the world and then donated it to the nonprofit Cloud Native Computing Foundation. Within a few years, Google's primary competitors in the cloud computing space (Microsoft's Azure and Amazon's Web Services) adopted Kubernetes and started relying on it heavily. They also contributed to its development. Although Google had given away an important piece of technology to its competitors, doing so created value by helping to speed adoption of cloud computing. In addition, Google got a multiyear head start over competitors on deploying and integrating this now-crucial technology.
Conversely, consider Uber and Lyft, which compete at higher levels of the technology stack. Although they rely on similar underlying technologies for their mobile apps (GPS navigation and payment processing, for example), the two companies engage in fierce competition to differentiate their service offerings, user experience, and brand position using technology in the middle (pricing and routing algorithms) and top (user interface) of the stack.
What does this mean for executives? If you're working on infrastructure layers, such as protocols, interfaces, safety practices, and enabling components, you should default to
asking, "What must be interoperable to unlock adoption?" Those core areas are candidates for collaboration.
If you're working closer to the end customer—for instance, on workflow integration, proprietary data, branding, or distribution—your default question should be, "What must remain unique for us to win?" The answers are your candidates for competition.
Stack position alone won't make the decision for you, but understanding it dramatically improves the odds that you'll draw the line separating the core from the edge in the right place.
Level of competition. When rivalries are intense, shared risk increases. It's intuitive that low competition can make collaboration easier: Firms feel less threatened, and market-building benefits are clearer. Although the incentive to collaborate decreases as competition approaches moderate levels, what's less intuitive, but extremely important, is that high competition can also increase collaboration in specific domains, especially around shared risk. Cybersecurity is one example.
Security is adversarial; attackers exploit the weakest link. If one firm learns about a new vulnerability and sits on it, an attacker can exploit it elsewhere, which ultimately hurts customers and erodes trust in the entire category. As a result,
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competitors often share intelligence on threats even while competing hard for customers. In 2014 Fortinet, Symantec, McAfee, and Palo Alto Networks created an informal agreement to share cybersecurity intelligence. The effort was so successful that the firms later formalized it by creating the Cyber Threat Alliance, which is still active today and has dozens of member companies, all of whom are competitors. From a strategy perspective, this is “collaborate on the core risk layer, compete on the edges of product and service.” You collaborate in areas where the marginal value of shared learning is enormous and where failure harms everyone’s legitimacy. You compete on what you can charge customers for (outcomes, integration, performance, and trust).
High competition also raises the bar for collaboration governance. If you’re collaborating in one area while fighting intensely elsewhere, you need sharper boundaries, clearer scope, and explicit paths for unwinding joint efforts.
It’s important to recognize that these principles apply to product market competition. With labor market competition (that is, when companies are competing for the same employees), the relationship is different. When labor competition is moderate, companies can offer collaborative opportunities (on R&D, for example, or on open source software) as a perk to attract better talent. However, when labor competition is low, companies don’t need to offer this benefit, and when it is high, they cannot afford to.
Social acceptance and regulation. When legitimacy is at stake, collaboration can help stabilize a market. Some technologies face skepticism, backlash, or regulatory uncertainty. In those cases, collaboration often becomes a way to build legitimacy, establish responsible standards, and avoid the chaos of conflicting rules.
Apple and Google’s cooperation on exposure notification is again instructive. The strategic subtext was simple: If public trust collapses, adoption collapses. Collaboration on a privacy-preserving core enabled broader trust and increased usability while leaving the companies free to compete vigorously in other areas.
Now zoom out beyond “technology” in the narrowest sense. Technology is broader than software and the digital
economy. It includes products, processes, and even category-level practices. The five-factor framework still applies. Let’s look at the soft drink industry. As public concern about sugar and obesity rose, major beverage companies came under scrutiny. One response was collective action—industry commitments and formal and informal partnerships. A 2014 collaborative effort between fierce competitors Coca-Cola, Dr Pepper Snapple Group, and PepsiCo aimed to reduce beverage calories consumed per person nationally. In one TV campaign, delivery people from each company happily walked down the street together to let consumers know they were all working collaboratively to address the public’s concern.
Similar cross-industry efforts are commonly seen in times of regulatory uncertainty, when competitors will work together to help shape the laws that govern their industry. From a strategy perspective, this follows the same pattern: Collaborate on the core legitimacy layer (shared commitments, transparency norms, public messaging, and measurable goals), and compete fiercely on products, branding, pricing, and distribution, which are the edges where customers choose who wins.
When social acceptance and regulation are central, treating legitimacy as a PR problem is the wrong move. It’s an ecosystem design problem. Collaboration can be the fastest way to set credible norms, especially when regulators are watching and the alternative is a patchwork of incompatible or punitive rules.
To see all five factors in one contemporary case, look at Anthropic’s decision to share the Model Context Protocol (MCP), a standard that allows AI models like LLMs and agents to talk to external datasets and tools. Anthropic donated the MCP to the newly formed Agentic AI Foundation (AAIF), which it has joined with its direct competitor OpenAI (as well as other competitors in the AI agent space, including Google and Microsoft).
Anthropic competes in a market in which ecosystems form around developer tools, integration, and compatibility. Using multiple platforms simultaneously is possible but costly for enterprises. Establishing standards can reduce market fragmentation, and whichever company shapes the
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Be explicit about what information stays off-limits to your collaborators, how decisions will be made, and how a collaborative arrangement could change if conditions do.
standard influences the direction of the market. Anthropic's announcement says it wants to keep MCP "open, neutral, and community-driven" as it becomes the established, enabling infrastructure. If we assess that move using the framework, all five factors suggest this was the right decision.
Winner-take-all: If the agent ecosystem tips, it will likely tip toward shared interfaces and developer defaults. By sharing MCP with competitors, Anthropic put itself in a strong position to help set the direction of the standard.
The tech life-cycle stage: Agentic AI systems are in an early phase, which means market growth depends on reducing friction and uncertainty.
Stack position: MCP sits in the enabling layer, an interface and protocol that allows tools and models to work together; competitive applications can be built on top of it.
Level of competition: Rivalry is intense. No firm wants to bet the future on a competitor's proprietary interface. Neutral governance by the AAIF lowers that risk.
Social acceptance and regulation: As AI scrutiny grows, credible governance and openness can improve trust and accelerate responsible adoption.
Anthropic isn't collaborating to be nice. It recognizes that collaborating on the core can be the fastest way to grow a market and prevent it from moving in a direction Anthropic doesn't want. It has plenty of room to compete on the edges with things like models, products, safety systems, enterprise workflows, pricing, distribution, and brand.
A good place to start is to map your technology stack. Identify the layers that you operate in—from the infrastructure and interfaces that enable your technology to the user-facing experience. Consider what customers value at each layer. That will help clarify which parts function as shared foundations and which ones shape the customer experience.
Next, list potential core candidates. These are components for which interoperability, trust, or shared risk reduction could increase adoption or lower costs. At this stage it helps to cast a wide net. You can narrow the list later.
Then evaluate each candidate using the four other factors of the framework. Ask whether the market is likely to tip toward a dominant standard and where the technology
is in its life cycle. Consider how intense competition is and whether rivals face shared risks like security threats. Next, think about the status of social acceptance and the regulatory environment.
Once you've done that, choose the lightest collaboration mechanism that will achieve the goal. Often you don't need a formal alliance. A shared technical standard, a neutral-governed project, or shared threat intelligence may be enough. The key is defining the scope of collaboration and the control mechanisms clearly from the beginning and ensuring that you are complying with antitrust regulations.
You must identify where to draw the boundary between collaboration and competition. Be explicit about what information remains part of your competitive edge and stays off-limits to your collaborators, how decisions will be made, and how a collaborative arrangement could change if conditions do.
It's important to design your edge strategy in parallel. A common mistake companies make is building a strong shared core but neglecting the differentiated capabilities that win customers. Decide early where you will be meaningfully different from competitors and invest there.
Finally, revisit the boundary regularly. As markets mature, yesterday's edge often becomes tomorrow's core. Reexamining the line every six to 12 months helps ensure that your strategy evolves with the market.
THE TOUR DE FRANCE is not a lesson simply in teamwork or in individual heroics alone. It's a lesson in switching modes at the right moment. And it's one that companies should take to heart. Build everything yourself and you'll arrive late; collaborate without boundaries and you'll help rivals catch up or surpass you.
The strategic skill is drawing the line: Collaborate on the core to grow the market, reduce risk, and accelerate adoption, then compete on the edges to deliver unique value and capture it. In other words, ride in the peloton when it makes you faster, then choose your moment and break away. ▼
HBR Reprint R2605D
FRANK NAGLE is the chief AI economist at Microsoft and a research scientist at the Initiative on the Digital Economy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
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ORGANIZATIONAL DECISION-MAKING
ILLUSTRATOR RODRIGO VALENZUELA
AUTHORS
Kris Johnson Ferreira
Associate professor, Harvard Business School
Jordan Tong
Professor, Wisconsin School of Business
A new generation of tools can connect functions and reduce the friction that slows companies down.
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ABOUT THE ART
Rodrigo Valenzuela's New Land paintings explore the history of westward expansion, using a labor-intensive printing process to represent the bureaucratic burdens endured by immigrants.

MAGINE A NEW TARIFF IS ANNOUNCED ON imported goods that are crucial to a company's business and will take effect in 60 days. The CEO of the company recommends "pulling forward" inventory—buying it sooner than originally
intended and importing it before the tariff hits—to protect margins and market share. The logic is clear. Yet weeks later the move hasn't been carried out as the CEO wanted. After rounds of revisions and compromises among different functions—including procurement, logistics, finance, legal, marketing, sales, and merchandising—the company implements a patchwork of suboptimal actions that fail to secure a large portion of the crucial goods before the tariff goes into effect.
Over the past decade, companies have invested heavily in smarter tools, including AI assistants that draft documents and summarize reports and machine-learning systems that forecast demand. When employed well, they improve the performance of clearly defined, narrowly scoped tasks within functions. But most companies have yet to address a deeper structural challenge: how to employ AI to make and implement enterprisewide decisions. This is the next frontier: AI-human systems that coordinate decisions and knowledge across functions.
These are what we call agentic AI orchestration systems, and in our field research on human-AI collaboration, we've interviewed executives at Walmart, Amazon, Ericsson, Ramp, Medtronic, and other companies that are building them. They're making real progress, but the initiatives are still in the early stages: Even the most advanced organizations have far to go to achieve full enterprisewide orchestration. Still, it's possible to see how this technology will evolve, and our additional ongoing research on the most effective ways for AI and humans to work together reveals how these systems should be set up. We consistently find that people create the most value not by competing with AI but by contributing information it does not have—such as tacit knowledge and updates about changing constraints and contextual shifts. The challenge, then, is not deciding whether humans or AI should make decisions. It is designing systems that combine the strengths of both.
Realizing orchestration systems' potential will require more than installing new technology. Companies will have to redesign how higher-level decisions flow from lower-level ones, how human-AI interactions are structured, and how workflows are integrated. The payoff will be substantial: higher-quality cross-functional decisions that are executed faster without surrendering human judgment or control. In fact, these systems will preserve—and in some cases strengthen—managerial authority by embedding it in the ways decisions are structured, informed, and governed. Organizations that build AI orchestration capability into their infrastructure—rather than relying on managers to stitch things together—will gain an advantage over their rivals.
The decisions that matter most in modern organizations typically span multiple functions. They involve interacting
IDEA IN BRIEF
THE PROBLEM
Companies have invested heavily in AI tools that speed up work, yet cross-functional decisions still get bogged down.
THE CAUSE
Information about constraints and trade-offs remains fragmented in silos.
THE SOLUTION
Create master AI orchestration systems that coordinate analyses, route information, and surface trade-offs across the organization, while humans contribute contextual knowledge, set guardrails, and retain final decision authority at the enterprise level.
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constraints, data from multiple sources, and human knowledge and judgment shaped by experience rather than spreadsheets—which often must be applied in dynamic situations where outcomes and downstream effects are inherently uncertain.
Tariff responses are just one example. The same challenges often emerge when companies experience a sudden, unexpected event that significantly increases or decreases demand for their offerings, suffer supply chain disruptions, or redesign their product portfolios. These kinds of situations require enterprisewide solutions, whose quality depends on how well the organization integrates partial, distributed knowledge into a coherent course of action.
Acting on the decision to pull forward inventory before a tariff takes effect, for example, requires addressing a web of interdependent questions: How will customers respond to
price changes? To what extent are suppliers willing to accelerate production? Do our warehouses have the capacity to hold additional inventory? Can our transportation networks accommodate a surge of deliveries? Are there product-lifecycle or obsolescence risks that make front-loading inventory unattractive for some SKUs? How will working capital, risk exposure, and earnings volatility change under different scenarios?
Most organizations have the teams, tools, data, and expertise needed to address such questions. But many aren't skilled at gathering information from disparate parts of the organization and synthesizing it quickly. That task typically falls to a senior leader, who must decide which questions to ask, anticipate constraints that haven't yet surfaced, reconcile conflicting objectives, and manage iterations as new information emerges. Much of that information exists
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only in people's heads. It surfaces informally, unevenly, and often too late. A logistics manager mentions that warehouse capacity and labor are already committed for a seasonal peak. A procurement leader points out that a key supplier is willing to speed up deliveries only if volumes are guaranteed across multiple product lines. Each late discovery forces the process to reset. Scenarios are reworked. Assumptions are revised. Meetings multiply.
It's tempting to blame such breakdowns on culture—on bureaucracy, risk aversion, or misaligned incentives. But the fundamental causes are these: No single individual's brain can hold all the relevant information, constraints, and scenarios. Information is asymmetric; each function knows things that others do not, and often people cannot articulate what will matter until it matters. Issues and risks don't show up all at once; they emerge one by one. So delays in carrying out strategies that entail a host of cross-functional decisions aren't signs of managerial failure. They're signals that the organization has exceeded its capacity to orchestrate decisions.
It's natural to assume that artificial intelligence should provide relief. After all, many of the tasks that slow cross-functional decisions—forecasting demand, estimating risk, generating documents, extracting information from contracts—are precisely the domains where AI has made impressive strides.
Agentic AI can outperform humans when tasks are narrow and well-defined, inputs are complete, and historical data is representative of the current situation. But orchestrating cross-functional decisions means coping with situations in which those conditions often aren't present.
The solution is to combine human judgment and machine intelligence—both for individual tasks and across the broader decision process. At the task level, this means structuring human-AI collaboration so that people contribute information the system lacks and use it to shape outputs. At the orchestration level, it means connecting those outputs—along with the human knowledge embedded within them—so that they're validated, routed, and integrated across tasks and functions.
In most organizations today, employees using task-based agentic AI are expected to improve its performance by monitoring and overriding it when they think they can do better. Yet in practice they often struggle to determine when and how to intervene. In our experimental research, we found that humans tend to develop a general level of trust in AI that they then apply to all situations, rather than adjusting their confidence in AI when its performance is likely to be strong or weak. That sometimes causes people to override AI recommendations when they shouldn't or miss instances when they should, leading to significantly worse outcomes in both cases.
Underlying this pattern is a flawed "human versus AI" mental model. The correct model is "human + AI." The right approach is to ask, "Do I know something important—context, constraints, or tacit knowledge—that the AI can't access or infer on its own?" Only when the answer is yes is human intervention valuable.
In the tariff example, this kind of human information includes tacit knowledge of supplier concessions or constraints and insights into how demand might change if store shelves are flooded with extra inventory. Such information is often sparse, subjective, and unevenly distributed across the organization. Most task-based agentic AI tools aren't designed to surface or integrate it systematically.
Our research points to a more effective approach. In a series of controlled experiments, we found that performance improves when humans are trained to intervene only when they hold important information the AI lacks—either supplying it as an input before the system makes its recommendation or using it to make an adjustment afterward—rather than asked to form independent judgments that compete with the AI's.
Practically, the goal is to have people address questions like these: Does the AI have all the critical input data? Can I still trust the historical relationships between the inputs and the outcome? Is this situation represented in the data the model learned from? If the answer to all those questions is yes, people need not intervene. If the answer to any of them is no, people should adjust the AI tool's inputs or output to incorporate the human-only information. This can be
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The most consequential decisions aren't made within a single task; they emerge from linking together many narrowly scoped tasks.
accomplished by creating a simple checklist that employees can review when using task-based AI agents or by building an AI agent that prompts employees to ask these questions and suggests how to integrate the answers into the tool.
In the hypothetical tariff example, here's how human-AI collaboration could work:
→ A procurement large language model (LLM) scans supplier contracts and identifies excess capacity that could be tapped to speed up the delivery of orders before the tariff goes into effect. But a purchasing manager has had a recent conversation with a key supplier that has revealed critical information the system lacks: Several of the supplier's other customers are pursuing the same strategy, and the supplier will dedicate additional capacity to the company only if it expands its purchases to other items it doesn't buy from the supplier and sell in its stores. In response, the procurement manager revises the LLM's inputs or output to reflect that what appears feasible in the contracts is actually contingent on awarding the supplier additional purchase orders for items the company doesn't currently sell.
→ An AI tool has used data on early-season sales of the current product assortment to predict demand for it later in the season. A merchandiser, however, recognizes that early-season sales of the subsequent assortment would be adversely affected by overstocking current products to mitigate the impact of a higher tariff and therefore adjusts the AI's demand forecast to take that into account.
→ When reviewing AI forecasts for warehouse capacity utilization, a logistics manager recognizes that the relationship between inputs and outputs has shifted since the model was trained: The head of the seasonal-products division has decided to double the amount of in-store inventory for the upcoming Christmas season to support a new product launch. In response, the manager revises the AI's baseline forecast upward to reflect the expected increase and sees that there wouldn't be enough capacity to house extra inventory pulled forward in anticipation of the tariff.
This is a fundamentally different workflow. The responsibility of humans is not to form beliefs about what the best decision should be. Their job is to identify whether they possess information the task-based AI agent doesn't and, if they do, to revise the tool's inputs or outputs to incorporate that knowledge.
The most consequential decisions aren't made within a single task; they emerge from linking together many narrowly scoped tasks. That explains why, despite significant investment in AI and even with better human-AI collaboration, organizations still struggle to move faster on their most important decisions. What's been missing is a system that ensures that human-only information and the outputs of individual tasks are validated and shared with other parts of the organization.
At the foundation of this system is a rule-based layer of agents we call connectors. They take outputs from task-based AI agents, verify that those outputs stay within management-specified guardrails, trigger the next step in the workflow, and pass relevant information on to other task-based agents as inputs or to a higher-level orchestrator. The role of connectors isn't to make decisions; it's to ensure that multitask or cross-functional workflows are executed effectively.
The connectors' guardrails let managers set business rules and decide how much freedom the system has when making decisions. These can be simple—like checking that something is feasible or making sure results fall within an expected range. They can also be more advanced, using other AI tools to run additional checks. For example, a connector might double-check that a forecast isn't unusually high or low according to limits set by management. If something doesn't meet the rules, the connector can stop the process, redirect it, or ask a conversational AI agent to get more input from an employee. In sum, connectors help information move through the system in a structured, consistent, and reliable way.
Overseeing this layer is the master AI orchestrator: an AI agent that employees engage with to share information only they possess, describe external issues that may affect the business (like a new tariff), surface potential opportunities (like pulling forward inventory), and explore what-if scenarios. The master orchestrator doesn't make high-level enterprise decisions; it structures and coordinates the analyses and information needed for humans to make them. In conversational exchanges, it gets employees to share human-only knowledge and articulate objectives, constraints, and decision boundaries. It helps identify and coordinate which tasks, workflows, and employees
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need to be involved in a decision, routes questions to the appropriate tools and people, and manages the overall decision process.
The master AI orchestrator creates a plan, and the connectors execute it by triggering and advancing workflows, validating outputs, and routing information across tasks in a disciplined and repeatable way. Together, the orchestrator and the connectors create a continuous flow of information in which task outputs and critical human-only knowledge become structured inputs for other tasks, vastly improving coordination and drastically shrinking the time needed to make and implement decisions.
Let's return to the tariff example. In a traditional organization, the decision to pull forward inventory would trigger a chain reaction of emails, meetings, requests for analyses, and discovery of constraints. Even with task-based AI agents, the burden of stitching together information would still fall on
a human orchestrator, and critical information would often arrive late—or never travel beyond the silo where it resides.
With agentic AI orchestration, the process unfolds differently. The CEO identifies the tariff issue and the potential opportunity to pull forward inventory and enters this information into the master AI orchestrator, which asks the CEO to clarify objectives and constraints. It then engages the relevant workflows and functional managers—in demand planning, procurement, logistics, merchandising, and finance—and initiates parallel analyses using task-based AI agents. As these analyses run, connectors link them together and prompt the master AI orchestrator to elicit and share relevant human-only knowledge.
Let's look at what happens with the procurement workflow. The master AI orchestrator alerts the procurement manager of the CEO's desire to explore pulling forward inventory and triggers the procurement contract-scanning
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LLM to identify suppliers with possible excess capacity. This task-based tool generates a list of relevant suppliers and contract terms, and a connector provides that output to the master AI orchestrator, which prompts the procurement manager for critical human-only information. After holding discussions with the potential suppliers, the procurement manager might respond that one supplier's excess capacity is available only if the company commits to buying additional items from that supplier. The moment this information is shared with the master AI orchestrator, it's immediately disseminated to all relevant task-based AI agents and employees. Merchandising is alerted to the implications for the breadth of the company's product assortment and shelf space, and connectors trigger its task-based forecasting agents to take the new information into account and update demand scenarios. Finance is also alerted about the conditional supplier capacity, and connectors automatically trigger task-based finance agents to recalculate the potential impact on working capital and earnings volatility. The final decision on whether to pursue the pull-forward strategy—and on what scale—is made by the senior leaders, such as the heads of supply chain, merchandising, and finance, who now have a fully integrated view of the trade-offs.
The effect is twofold. Speed increases because workflows proceed in parallel and iteration is no longer driven by late surprises. Quality improves because each task incorporates validated inputs from elsewhere in the system.
Notably, the orchestration system prevents task-based agents from working at cross-purposes. Last June data science leaders at Walmart, which is in the process of building such an orchestration system, told us that specialized agents can generate high-quality recommendations and human-in-the-loop actions tailored to their respective domains. However, when those agents operate independently, their outputs may conflict. The orchestration layer helps reconcile those tensions, ensuring that agents' outputs remain aligned with enterprise priorities and contribute to coherent business outcomes.
Agentic AI orchestration thus functions as a shared organizational infrastructure—one that's activated by questions and opportunities raised by leadership. Authority and accountability remain firmly with humans. Enterprise decisions aren't automated; what's automated is the orchestration of intelligence, including the routing of questions, the

integration of insights, and the continuous alignment of local analyses with enterprise objectives.
Organizations cannot use AI to break coordination bottlenecks if their underlying decisions are opaque, entangled, and idiosyncratic. So the first thing leaders must do is make sure decision processes are defined and structured well. That effort should proceed from the bottom up, and it won't succeed unless the entire organization commits to it. Only the top leadership can make that happen.
Step 1: Break decisions down into modules. Two companies we studied—a global e-commerce giant and Xsight, an online platform that helps manufacturers sell into overseas markets—found that orchestration improved significantly when decisions were divided into precise, well-bounded tasks. This entails specifying each task's inputs, outputs, constraints,
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and objectives. The scope of each task should be narrow enough that it can be easily understood, evaluated, and linked to other tasks. Information and assumptions should be standardized; for example, procurement, logistics, and finance should all work from the same definition of supplier capacity, whether it reflects theoretical production capacity, contractually committed capacity, or realistically achievable capacity.
Step 2: Strengthen task-based agentic AI. Begin applying agentic AI to the tasks that are largely driven by data that AI can access and where the expected returns are the greatest. In every case the collaboration between people and the AI should be structured. The AI should be designed to make its inputs, assumptions, and reasoning visible to the people involved in the task and to actively elicit the relevant knowledge that only they hold. For example, the system might ask the procurement manager whether he had recent supplier conversations that might affect what the model treats as available capacity. On the human side, people must understand what the AI can and cannot see so that they can recognize when circumstances have changed, when assumptions no longer hold, and when they possess knowledge the system has no way of inferring—and provide that information to the AI or, when needed, override the AI. To this end, people must be trained to ask, “Is the AI system missing something I know?” rather than “Do I agree with the AI system?”
Making this work requires a cultural shift. Everyone needs to understand that AI acts as a structured partner in decision-making. Leaders—from the top to the functional-team level—have to reinforce that mindset.
Step 3: Add the master orchestration. Once task-based AI agents and their human collaborators achieve a satisfactory level of performance, your company can take the next step to orchestrate their collective work. Start by coordinating closely related tasks within individual small groups. Build simple connectors linking one task to the next, and develop an initial master AI orchestrator to interface with the employees involved in those tasks. This will support an agile approach to developing the orchestration software—one that emphasizes iterative progress, rapid feedback, collaboration, and adaptability. When the orchestrator matures
(becoming more developed, capable, stable, and reliable) and works effectively for several groups of closely related tasks, it should be extended across more modules.
In multiple industries companies are beginning to build early versions of such infrastructure. At the fintech platform Ramp and at the healthcare technology company Medtronic, core decision processes have been organized into distinct tasks, each governed by a separate orchestrator. Ramp is now developing a single enterprise master AI orchestrator that will route employee queries across the modular systems and engage the appropriate agents as needed.
Step 4: Manage the system’s evolution. Agentic AI orchestration is not a system you build and leave alone. Leaders must continually ask, “Are modules defined narrowly enough for decisions to be orchestrated effectively? Is human-only information being captured in a way that makes it accessible across the system? Are incentives aligned to encourage early disclosure of constraints rather than late-stage escalation? Do employees trust and understand AI well enough to collaborate with it rather than compete against it?” The answers will change as the technology and the business’s capabilities, constraints, and objectives change—and leaders must update roles, governance, and training accordingly. They should see themselves as the architects of a living decision infrastructure—one that improves as the organization and its AI capabilities mature together.
AGENTIC AI ORCHESTRATION should not be viewed as a means to totally automate decision-making. The goal should be to automate the orchestration of intelligence—the ability to route questions, integrate insights, and align local analyses with enterprise objectives in real time. Organizations that build this capability will compound the value of every piece of human knowledge across the enterprise while their rivals are still discovering critical constraints in the third round of alignment meetings. ▼ HBR Reprint R2605E
KRIS JOHNSON FERREIRA is the Edgerley Family Associate Professor of Business Administration at Harvard Business School. JORDAN TONG is the Robert M. Steiner Chair of Business and the chair of the Operations and Information Management Department at the Wisconsin School of Business.
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ILLUSTRATOR ANTONIO SORTINO

New research reveals they're a critical source of low-cost growth.
AUTHORS
Fred Reichheld Bain Fellow, Bain & Company
Jamie Cleghorn Partner, Bain & Company
Wojtek Kokoszka CEO, Mention Me

SALES & MARKETING
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SALES & MARKETING
ButcherBox, a subscription-based retailer of premium meat and seafood, rocketed past sales of $600 million. Initially the firm grew by marketing through paid influencers, but over time it increased its dependence on buying new customer leads through digital advertising. Then customer acquisition costs began spiraling as paid influencers and social media and search websites raised their prices. Meanwhile, the quality of the customers produced by the paid channels declined: They made smaller purchases, filled their baskets with a less attractive product mix, and defected at higher rates.
Searching for a new strategy to revitalize the company, ButcherBox's CEO, Mike Salguero, landed on the concept of earned growth, which prioritizes high-quality revenue growth from repeat purchases and referrals. (See "Net Promoter 3.0," HBR, November–December 2021.) Since each customer could consume only so much protein each month, referrals seemed like the bigger growth opportunity. Treating his referred customers as a separate channel, Salguero carefully examined their economics and discovered that they were a gold mine—much more profitable than customers acquired through paid ads. So his marketing team launched an incentivized referral program, creating a new stream of customers whose repeat purchases and word of mouth drove a new wave of growth. With this new focus,
ButcherBox has not only boosted referrals by 57% over the past year but cut its customer acquisition costs in half.
Companies spend an enormous amount of marketing money and management time on social media, digital advertising, sponsored search, promotional schemes, paid influencers, search engine optimization, and curated online reviews. Yet for most companies, the best customers still come through referrals—as Bain has confirmed in an analysis of data on more than 10 million individuals who participated in referral programs implemented by Mention Me, a customer advocacy platform. (One of the authors of this article, Wojtek, is its CEO.) Across a range of industries from fashion to food, health and beauty, financial services, travel, and telecommunications, we found that on average, while only 20% of new customers were referred, they generated more than 70% of all new-customer profits. (See the exhibit "Where Your New-Customer Profits Are Really Coming From.")
The outsize profit impact of referrals results from several advantages: Referred customers cost less to acquire, stay longer, and recommend your company to their own friends and family more often. And they buy bigger baskets of purchases and a more profitable mix of products.
Referrals also have a disproportionate impact on revenue growth. We already know from dozens of Net Promoter consulting projects that on average, customers who are promoters spend 1.6 times more than customers who are passives. (Promoters rate a company as a 9 or 10 on the survey question "On a scale of 0 to 10, how likely would you be to recommend us to a friend?" Passives rate it a 7 or 8.) Over the years, however, survey score inflation has swollen the promoter category to half of all respondents. That has muddled the differences between genuinely passionate advocates and people who are promoters in name only—customers who are
IDEA IN BRIEF
Referrals are the most reliable source of profitable growth, yet most companies fail to measure or manage them. Customers acquired through recommendations cost less, stay longer, spend more, and generate additional high-value customers.
While only about one-fifth of new customers arrive via referrals, they account for the vast majority of profits. Traditional marketing metrics obscure this effect by giving too much credit to paid channels and ignoring word of mouth.
Track why every new customer came aboard, quantify referral economics, and identify, understand, and delight more true promoters. Invest in experiences that earn recommendations and campaigns that activate true promoters. Align incentives around referral generation to unlock compounding, lower-cost growth.
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Referred customers cost less to acquire, stay longer, and recommend your company to their own friends and family more often. And they buy bigger baskets of purchases.
merely satisfied but not enthusiastic enough to actively recommend a brand. Our study of Mention Me's data (covering both incentivized and organic referrals) revealed that only 15% of all customers are true promoters, meaning they generate at least one new customer by making a referral. These true promoters generated almost three times more lifetime revenues (combining their own purchases with purchases by their direct and downstream referrals) than passives did. And the subset of true promoters who referred multiple new customers (we call them superpromoters) generated five times more revenues than passives did.
If companies examine only the impact of direct referrals, they will substantially undervalue the compounding growth produced by true promoters—and especially superpromoters. The cascade of customers referring friends, who in turn refer their friends and so on, explains why modest changes in referral rates drive exponential increases in growth.
If referrals are so powerful, why have so many executives overlooked them for so long? Part of the problem is visibility. Most companies don't track referrals in a systematic way, so referred customers get lumped together with customers acquired through other means. As a result, accounting systems and marketing attribution models give credit to campaigns that merely captured customers who had already decided to buy because of a friend's recommendation. That distortion makes paid acquisition appear more effective than it really is while masking the true economics of referral-driven growth.
Many leaders also focus on what's easiest to measure and manage, such as advertising spending and its correlation to new-customer volumes, rather than which experiences evoke delight or the social dynamics that trigger recommendations. And because traditional metrics often don't distinguish between short-term (ephemeral) revenue boosts from new-customer acquisition and sustainable revenue growth from long-term advocacy, executives may not see how well referrals drive sustainable growth and profitability.
In this article we'll look more closely at the economics behind referred customers and explain why CEOs should direct their teams to begin measuring and managing referral behavior more deliberately. We'll demonstrate how referral rates are a predictor of financial success and thus should be scrutinized not just by marketing executives but by the entire C-suite and the board of directors. We'll also offer practical ways to identify true promoters and design systems that turn customer advocacy into a reliable engine of growth.
Referrals can dramatically improve a company's cash flow. We believe that they explain the apparently anomalous cash generation we've observed in Net Promoter superstars like Enterprise Rent-A-Car, Chick-fil-A, IKEA, and Apple. Enterprise has grown from a small family leasing business in St. Louis to become the largest car-rental firm on earth, and it has never had to issue equity to pay for its fleet of more than 2.4 million vehicles. Chick-fil-A grew its systemwide revenues to almost $23 billion while building more than 3,000 company-owned stores, also without tapping equity markets. IKEA likewise has become the world's largest furniture retailer without ever issuing equity or debt. And Apple, a pioneering practitioner of the Net Promoter System, has become such a cash-generating juggernaut that it has repurchased more than $800 billion worth of shares since 2013.
These companies focus on delivering remarkable products and services that inspire customer referrals, so they don't need to rely as heavily as their competitors do on expensive advertising or price promotions to acquire new customers. How large a cash flow advantage can this approach provide? To find out, we compared the NPS leader to a peer that was an NPS laggard in five sectors for which public data on both was available. Those leaders were Hermès, Costco, IKEA, Apple, and the restaurant chain Texas Roadhouse.
We looked at sales, general, and administrative (SG&A) expenses as a percentage of revenues for each pair and found that on average the leader's SG&A percentage was half that of its follower—11% versus 22% of revenues. That means the NPS leaders generated 11 cents more cash flow on every dollar of sales than the NPS laggards did.

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NPS leaders have lower costs because they don't spend a lot of money acquiring customers with unclear long-term revenue potential and little referral generation. (If only 20% of customers at a typical firm come through referrals, then the other 80% should be viewed with a degree of skepticism.) Efficient growth depends on recommendations from existing happy customers.
Earning referrals takes hard work and innovation. Executives may be tempted to take shortcuts with clever customer acquisition schemes, but the benefits rarely justify the costs unless many of those new customers mature into true promoters. This logic is especially relevant given the rise of AI-powered shopping bots. They're designed to be immune to search engine optimization, digital marketing, advertising, and paid influencers. The best bots increasingly favor legitimate reviews and recommendations from customers. As more and more interactions flow through them, a focus on earning referrals will become even more essential to attracting high-quality prospects.
Companies that take referrals seriously build systems to identify which customers are recommending their brand and why. Doing this well requires more than surveys or marketing intuition. It requires operational processes that track referral flows and hold teams accountable for turning satisfied customers into active promoters. In this section we'll detail some of the key actions your company must take to benefit from the referral effect.
Identify new referred customers. You need to find a way to systematically pinpoint these people. One company whose example you could follow is CertaPro, the largest
residential painting company in North America, which has been measuring both NPS and referral leads for more than a decade. It asks all new customer leads how they heard about the company and records their answers in its customer relationship management system. CertaPro's lead inquiry process won't advance until the prospective customer responds, because the company considers that information as vital as a customer's address and credit card number.
Mention Me developed an online solution that makes it easy for new customers arriving via a website to select one of the six most frequently cited reasons they chose the brand or to offer another reason. As part of the process, companies can find out who made referrals by asking customers for the contact information for whoever recommended them so that they can send those people a message of recognition or a gift. Such individuals are the true promoters who make up a company's strategic core, so it's important to identify them and learn more about them—specifically what triggered their referrals.
Identifying all referred customers on first contact allows you to determine your referral ratio (the portion of new customers who are referred), which you can then use as a baseline for improvement. As we've noted, the average referral ratio for Mention Me clients is 20%, but it ranges from single digits up to more than 50%. At one extreme is Costco, which spends very little on advertising and promotions to acquire new members; nearly all its new customers are earned through referrals.
Low-tech solutions like CertaPro's can help you measure referral flows at first. Once you have a system in place, you can keep experimenting and refining your processes to reduce friction and make your data even more reliable. Later you can integrate customer feedback and loyalty management systems with your central customer-records database.
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Quantify your referral economics. To understand how much you can afford to invest in earning referrals and in systems to measure and optimize them, you must be able to determine their value and impact on profits and growth. When ButcherBox carefully allocated advertising, promotion, and onboarding costs to its referred customers, it discovered that the acquisition costs for them were a small fraction of the costs for new customers generated through other channels. The finance team then quantified the post-acquisition-cost value of referred customers, incorporating purchasing patterns, average order size, product mix and margin, frequency, customer retention, and profits from the new customers they subsequently referred. These calculations revealed the full value of earning more referrals.
Another company that quantifies its referral economics is Intuitive Health, which partners with hospital networks to build and operate facilities that provide urgent care and emergency room services under one roof. Its facilities treated more than one million patients in 2025. The company's annual revenues have compounded by more than 30% annually while its profits have been so impressive that its recent recapitalization provided original shareholders a 900% return.
Intuitive tracks the effects of referrals rigorously by region. In the Dallas–Fort Worth area, it discovered, referred customers use more services, boosting revenues, and have profit margins four times as high as those of other customers. Intuitive has also found that its focus on referral generation has reduced customer acquisition costs companywide from $57 in 2015 to just over $20 today. At every clinic, referral volumes figure in the business plan and are treated as a key performance indicator for managers.
Learn how to delight core customers. Creating true promoters and activating their referrals results not from
clever marketing but from repeatedly delivering fresh experiences that are so remarkable that customers naturally recommend a product or service to their friends and family. To achieve this, companies need to develop a granular understanding of exactly what will spark a referral.
Intuitive Health uses its NPS feedback process to learn what delights customers—and what dismays them. Local clinic managers strive to close the loop and probe for root causes of any failure to delight a customer within one or two days. They call not only dissatisfied detractors but every customer who gives a score less than 9 out of 10. Its surveys don't just identify sources of delight; they seek to calibrate key performance thresholds. For instance, Intuitive found that one critical indicator is the time it takes for someone to check in, wait, get treated, and walk back out the door. Operational turnaround time—the share of patients who get in and out the door in less than an hour—then became an important target.
Incentivize referrals strategically. To manage and reap the full suite of economic advantages, most companies should implement an incentivized referral program. But they should be sure to avoid the mistakes firms commonly make with them. Many programs never get integrated with financial systems that track the economics of referred customers. They fail to identify the true promoters who made the referrals—and never probe for root causes. Indeed, referral incentives are treated as a cheap marketing tactic to acquire new customers instead of a sophisticated way to drive profitable growth.
Programs can fall short in several other ways. For instance, if the incentive to give referrals is too large, people may be motivated to act through self-interest rather than by the desire to make a friend happy. Sometimes the incentives are misdirected or rewards are given in a way that blunts their
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impact. For instance, if a business travel program posts referral credits to an executive's account, the executive may never even notice because an assistant processes the invoices.
Companies should experiment to find the right mix of incentives, membership, rewards, and recognition that will motivate true promoters and then should quantify the cascading chain of referrals they initiate. The most effective rewards tend to be modest and transparent to both referrer and referred—large enough to nudge referrers to use the system but not so generous that they motivate referrals absent the genuine enthusiasm earned by a valuable experience. Congstar, Deutsche Telekom's value brand in mobile telephony, provides a good example of this. Its Freundeskreis (circle of friends) membership offers 10% discounts to the referring customer and to the newly referred customer for as long as both remain active customers.
ButcherBox has refined its referral program to focus on its most loyal customers. It emails them a code they can forward to a friend who can use it to get a free box of products valued at $170. The friend must pay $20 for shipping, but that helps focus the program on legitimate prospects. The program is reinforced by sending the original customer an additional code for a free box to share with another friend if the first free-box recipient becomes a paying subscriber. This motivates the best customers to keep introducing more friends to the brand—as long as their referrals turn into customers.
Referral tracking can uncover hidden customer value, as the experiences of Bloom & Wild, a Mention Me client, show. Founded in 2013, the company has grown into Europe's largest online flower and gift platform, with revenues exceeding $150 million. Its data reveals that even modest customers can generate outsize downstream impact through referrals.
Consider one customer, Sally. Over several years she purchased only $112 in products. Yet she directly referred several customers, who collectively spent $3,015. Those customers then referred others, creating additional waves of buyers. In total, Sally's referral chain generated $8,793 in revenues, about 78 times the value of her own purchases. And that figure is likely higher when organic referrals (not solicited with incentives) are considered. Rather than treating low-spending customers as unimportant, Bloom & Wild views them as potential referral catalysts, having learned that there are many Sallys in the customer base.
Most companies assume referrals come from a broad base of happy customers. But the data suggests something much more focused and more powerful is happening. A small slice of customers, the "true promoters," generate a disproportionate share of new-customer profits. Even though true promoters make up just 15% of the customer base, their referrals generate 72% of new-customer profits over three years. And the superior retention rate of referred customers means they generate an even larger share of lifetime profits.

Note: We measured profits from each cohort of new customers over the three years subsequent to their initial purchase. This results in a very conservative estimate of lifetime value but unlocks the statistical benefits of a much larger sample size. Source: NPS Prism, Mention Me
The company also encourages gift recipients to join the program. Each bouquet includes a QR code that lets the recipient thank the sender and earn loyalty points. Today gift recipients' referrals generate 40% of new customers, and standard referrals add another 15%.
Bloom & Wild's system uncovers true promoters so that the company can learn what delights them enough to trigger a referral. Analysts at the company can perform an accurate cost-benefit analysis on initiatives to wow customers, unleashing further creativity and investment.
Develop more-sophisticated referral-tracking capabilities over time. Even when companies offer incentives for referrals, most referrals still happen organically. Among Mention Me clients, incentive programs account for only about 7% of referrals, on average, with a range from 2% to 21%. The more deeply companies understand what's driving organic referrals, the better equipped they'll be to increase them. One key to doing that: Don't stop analyzing referrals after the first purchase.
Although referrals are typically considered a mode of customer acquisition, they can also prompt existing
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customers to purchase additional product lines. Understanding what triggers those sales can help companies increase them.
Companies are also realizing that a referral doesn't always spark an instantaneous purchase. To fully understand referral behavior, they need to get better at tracking the chain of events that leads from a referral to a sale, even if the sale takes some time. Some companies now track this at the product level. For example, Mention Me has developed a method of including a tracker on clients' website product pages. When a customer shares a link to a product with a friend through a text, WhatsApp, or an email, and the friend clicks on it, the system records that incoming click as a referral and captures who made it. If the friend makes a purchase, the tracker connects that person's shopping and referral activity across website visits. Early results suggest that these referrals are highly valuable. Clicks from referral links convert to purchases at more than three times the rate of paid ads and tend to generate more-profitable sales.
While one individual typically decides what to purchase in B2C transactions, the number of people on a B2B buying committee can reach a dozen or more. This group is often influenced by the laws of social psychology, as Mimi Turner and Jann Schwarz of LinkedIn have shown. Their 2025 "buyability driver" research found that when B2B buyers are choosing among a short list of vendors that meet the basic requirements for quality, the leading factors are personal experience with a vendor, references from similar customers, and recommendations from colleagues who have direct experience with the vendor. Personal, trusted recommendations carry far more weight than even price, with 80% of buyers preferring the recommended offering versus the cheaper offering.
Despite the vital role played by customer recommendations, few B2B companies carefully track which individuals provided winning references or probe what motivated them to do so. Meanwhile, customer success teams tend to sit deep in the organization and focus on client retention, with little visibility on which referrals are bringing in new customers.
B2B companies should rigorously track which references and referrals resulted in winning bids, but their game plan for optimizing referral flows will be different. Instead of rewarding a customer for a referral, they should recognize and reward the internal team or individual who earned it. It's also optimal to integrate the reward program with reliable measurement systems used to manage internal processes, such as the compensation system. If bonuses depend on referral and reference data, the data will receive scrutiny that ensures its accuracy.

SALES & MARKETING
In complex sales processes involving multiple references and referrals, it makes sense for an executive to interview client decision-makers to understand how to allocate credit appropriately. Rewarding the asset builders will encourage the building of more assets.
Many executives personally scrutinize failed bake-offs (situations in which their company lost a sale to another). More should examine account wins to understand the role played by promoters who make referrals. Consider how much time and effort the finance staff now spends quantifying balance sheet items such as depreciation and goodwill, while ignoring the far more precious asset of true promoters. This is a huge, untapped opportunity.
IN THEIR QUEST for growth, too many leaders look outward, searching for clever ways to attract new customers. They should instead be looking inward to revitalize their referral engine. True promoters constitute the strategic core of a brand, providing a self-fueling growth engine that attracts the right new customers, who produce higher-quality revenues. They give recommendations because they want to make a friend's life better. They also know their friends' tastes, preferences, and priorities. That's why the customers acquired through referrals usually fit better, buy more, stay longer, and become true promoters themselves, further accelerating growth.
Companies like ButcherBox, Intuitive Health, and Costco understand the vital role played by referrals and work hard to understand how they're earned—and how they spread. They have reallocated advertising and marketing dollars toward delighting core customers to turn them into true promoters. The most advanced firms set clear targets for referral volume. They identify their strongest advocates, experiment with programs that encourage referrals, and invest in systems that reveal how their referrals multiply. As a result, they grow more efficiently than their competitors do and can reinvest the savings to deliver more-remarkable customer experiences. ▼
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FRED REICHHELD is a Bain Fellow and an advisory partner at Bain & Company. JAMIE CLEGHORN is a partner at Bain & Company and the head of its customer practice. WOJTEK KOKOSZKA is the CEO of Mention Me.
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It evolves over time. Here's how to navigate each phase successfully.
AUTHORS
Claudius A. Hildebrand Consultant, Spencer Stuart
Douglas L. Peterson Former CEO, S&P Global

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ILLUSTRATOR CARL GODFREY

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A CENTRAL QUANDARY FOR CEOs: How can you deliver transformational leadership when your ability to execute depends on a group of people you don't hire, can't fire, and have to influence without
direct authority? That is, your board of directors.
Navigating the CEO-board dynamic is one of the most critical and underappreciated challenges of executive leadership. Given the high stakes, it's surprising how little attention has been paid to the way CEOs can manage it over time—as the CEO grows in the role, as the composition of the board of directors evolves, and as new business challenges arise.
S&P 500 CEOs serve for an average of nine years, a period during which they face sweeping changes in both their businesses and their relationships with directors. Yet most new CEOs are caught off guard by how much time and attention the board relationship demands. To be successful at it CEOs have to recognize that working with the board will involve a shifting approach during the course of their tenure: gaining trust in the early days, when they're under the microscope; developing the board into a strategic ally as the relationship matures; maintaining a posture toward the board that encourages debate and engagement; and ultimately shaping the board's future leadership.
There's a significant price to pay for getting it wrong. Allow the board to become too involved in short-term performance and you'll spend your tenure fending off counterproductive strategy pivots; fail to engage the board sufficiently and you'll lack the oversight needed to guard against complacency and excessive risk.
For years we've been thinking about how CEO-board dynamics play out. One of us (Doug) served as the CEO of S&P Global for 11 years, and the other (Claudius) is a veteran leadership adviser who has conducted research analyzing the performance of more than 2,000 S&P 500 CEOs over two decades. In this article, drawing on our extensive knowledge of CEO and board performance, we'll lay out a four-stage framework designed to help CEOs build a productive partnership with the board that creates the healthy tension essential for effective governance and strong company performance.
Each stage requires pivotal shifts in a CEO's thinking and behaviors.
New CEOs often are unsure about what to prioritize. Feeling pressure to make a mark right away, many think they don't have time for the "soft" imperative of building a relationship with the board. That's a mistake, because it means they're forgoing an early opportunity to develop and accumulate social capital, which they'll need to rely on later.
When assuming the new role, CEOs tend to know little about the board's internal dynamics or individual members' views. CEOs hired from outside the company may barely know the directors beyond their interactions during the recruiting process. Even those promoted from within the
IDEA IN BRIEF
CEOs must lead transformations while relying on boards they don't control. Many underestimate how much their relationship with the board must evolve and how mismanaging it can yield poor strategy, weak oversight, and even a premature exit.
Adopt a four-stage approach to CEO-board collaboration: (1) Build trust early by understanding board dynamics. (2) Shape the partnership by influencing composition and engagement. (3) Fight complacency as trust deepens. (4) Focus on succession and long-term governance.
CEOs who adopt this approach to their board relationships build productive tension, stronger governance, and better long-term performance. The result is a board that's a strategic asset rather than a constraint.
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company (as the majority of CEOs are) typically have dealt with the board only in carefully orchestrated environments. In short, new CEOs often don't know how decisions get made on the board and where influence lies.
Adding to the challenge for incoming CEOs, today it's increasingly common for their predecessors to remain on the board of directors as executive chairs. In more than a third of the U.S. appointments made since 2020, the outgoing CEO became the executive chair—up from only about a quarter in 2015. That can create an awkward power dynamic for the newcomer. "Whenever I took a stance in the boardroom in the early days," recalled one CEO we interviewed, "heads would inadvertently turn to observe my predecessor's reaction."
In their first couple of years CEOs can take several actions to address directors' skepticism and build trust:
Map the board's hidden dynamics. Chief executives can establish authentic relationships early on by replacing Zoom calls with individual face-to-face meetings on directors' home turf. These get-togethers—at a favorite restaurant, say, or some other comfortable location—often yield insights about directors' personal styles, priorities, and perspectives. Having one-on-one meetings with directors is not new advice, of course, but we've seen many new CEOs either treat these meetings as check-the-box exercises or take shortcuts with them—by arranging meetings with two directors at a time, for example. CEOs who engage in such practices prevent themselves from building strong individual relationships with directors. They should instead recognize that early one-on-one meetings facilitate intensive "discovery work." Almost every question is fair game and yields valuable intelligence that can later be used to gauge and react to directors' comments in more-formal settings. As one CEO told us, "They all have a reason they joined the board, and it's good to know their motivations. This is the time to understand what each board member brings to the dialogue."
Honor the past while asserting independence. A new CEO can set the tone for a productive working relationship by balancing respect for the former CEO's legacy and existing relationships while also asserting independent leadership. In his initial years as CEO, Doug developed a partnership with the lead director that helped him navigate complex board dynamics and, critically, clarify any
ambiguity in the roles of the nonexecutive chair, the lead director, and the CEO. He also made the most of a preexisting relationship with one respected director, relying on that person as both a private sounding board and an advocate in the boardroom. In the best situations the departing CEO can also be an ally. One outgoing CEO Claudius worked with, for example, made a presentation to the board in which he summed up his weaknesses and pinpointed the areas in which he felt he had failed. His candor gave his successor some room to maneuver early on in developing his stature and building trust.
Define the rules of engagement. The start of a new CEO's tenure is the most natural time to define how the board and CEO will work together. The failure to set operating principles can be costly. In one cautionary tale, a CEO we're familiar with butted heads with the board over its requests for more information about corporate strategy and M&A opportunities, a conflict that eroded trust between the board and the CEO and contributed to the CEO's eventual departure. The decline in the relationship occurred even though the company had outperformed the S&P 500 under the CEO's leadership—a reminder that even high performance may not insulate a CEO from a fraught relationship with the board.
The goal should be to establish processes that encourage transparency and foster trust but also acknowledge the board's oversight responsibility and the CEO's need for support. One critical norm to establish right away concerns how much detail the board needs versus wants. Eager to demonstrate command of the business, many new CEOs overprepare, burying directors in operational minutiae when in fact they need strategic insight. One CEO we know learned that lesson in his first board meeting when he proudly presented a 100-page deck, only to have directors ask for higher-level strategic framing instead. He was able to recover because he made that misstep early, when both sides were still calibrating expectations.
Points of discussion and alignment should include what the organization's vision and mission are, what the CEO will be expected to deliver, the board's role in strategy and governance (not operations), and how everyone will communicate and interact—including the level of detail appropriate for board materials.
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After weathering several earnings cycles, navigating investor scrutiny, and building credibility, the CEO has typically earned enough trust to begin shaping the board's composition and engagement style. This period, usually starting in the second or third year, is the crucible where leadership is forged. The outgoing CEO, if still present, has by now stepped back. Executive chair arrangements typically run one to two years, and Claudius's research shows that in the vast majority of transitions the formal overlap period has concluded by year three. With that dynamic resolved, the new CEO's relationships with directors will have matured, which means the CEO can exert a growing influence on board discussions. This is also a time when the CEO may seek to pursue the chair role or redesign board committees to better support the company's priorities. During this stage CEOs must listen with humility, build consensus for change, and develop the courage to challenge the status quo. It's a delicate moment: Advocating for too much change too soon can be destabilizing, but letting board membership stagnate can hinder the cultivation of new ideas.
To successfully manage this stage CEOs should build lasting alliances by doing three key things:
Refresh the board strategically. Boards don't overhaul themselves often enough. In 2025, for example, the incoming class of S&P 500 directors represented only 7% of all board members, and almost half of S&P 500 boards had no change to their composition at all. The result is predictable: In a recent survey less than a third of CEOs told us that their board had the expertise needed to address today's business challenges.
Although nominating and governance committees drive membership changes and succession planning, during this stage CEOs can—and should—ask to provide more input into the process. Nobody can better communicate to the board how the business is shifting and what kinds of experience and skills the board will require to adapt.
Consider how Doug began remaking S&P Global's board in his second year as CEO. By that point the company was quickly transitioning away from its media and print
publishing roots and transforming into a modern analytics business that served financial markets, and he knew that the boardroom needed voices with expertise in technology, capital markets, operations, and risk management. There were several high-quality, long-serving directors when he became CEO, but they didn't have the background in the core areas for the future he envisioned. So when Doug broached the topic of refreshing the board, he did so in a way that drew parallels to the company's natural evolution as it exited its legacy businesses and invested in new growth markets.
The second stage is also a time when some CEOs feel they've earned the right to become the board chair. Our research has found that CEOs are most likely to be appointed chair before their fourth year and very unlikely to thereafter. But how CEOs request that role matters, as being too aggressive can backfire. One CEO we know learned that the hard way: He pushed intensely for the chair title sooner than the board was comfortable with, damaging his relationships with directors, who then held off making the change for another two years.
Manage the full spectrum of directors. During this stage CEOs need to develop techniques for facilitating robust dialogue in the boardroom. Learning how to manage people with different temperaments—from passive members to those who overstep their governance-and-oversight role—is essential. Making sure every voice is heard can be a tough balancing act, though. How does a CEO engage directors who volunteer less time and perspective while also moderating others who are too involved or provide too much advice? (For more on this topic, see "Managing Difficult Directors," HBR, May–June 2026.)
A strong lead director or board chair is key to success in this area. Many high-performing CEOs schedule a follow-up session with the lead director soon after board meetings and executive sessions in order to take the board's collective temperature—understanding which topics resonated, where directors had unspoken concerns, and which discussions required follow-through. To foster an open dialogue with the lead director, CEOs should signal that they value transparency about directors' questions and concerns.
CEOs will also develop their own particular approaches. During S&P Global's yearly strategic board meetings, for example, Doug liked to have directors and management
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break into working groups to explore different themes. These smaller groups created more opportunities for people to talk and share their viewpoints. Doug also found it helpful to hold what he called a “lightning round” at the end of strategic board meetings, during which he went around the table asking for concise input; everyone had a chance to participate, and diverse voices could be heard. Both approaches helped engage directors.
Orchestrate influence. There’s a point when new CEOs realize how much board activity happens during committee meetings in which the chief executives don’t take part. (Executive sessions where directors meet without the CEO present can feel like black boxes, especially early on.) This forces CEOs to recognize that they need a mechanism for staying informed and entrusting their executive team to interact with board committees.
We’ve observed that many CEOs, particularly early in their tenures, want to exert too much control over interactions with the board. They overscript their teams, and in their own relations with directors they focus on showcasing operational command rather than facilitating strategic dialogue. The CEO who presented the 100-page deck in his first board meeting learned to take a better approach: He started exploring how best to engage the board and eventually pivoted to providing a four-page memo before every meeting, highlighting his top concerns and the strategic questions for which he needed directors’ input. This shift resulted in robust discussions and much more productive meetings. The lesson: Board engagement isn’t about demonstrating how much you know. It’s about focusing the attention of directors on where their insight can add the most value.
As the board’s trust in the CEO deepens, hidden risks can emerge, including overconfidence on the CEO’s part and risk aversion on the board’s part. Call it the trust-oversight paradox: Although CEOs typically welcome the shift from intense oversight that comes during this stage, it can signal a weakening of constructive pushback from the board. Additionally, by this point new directors have gradually joined the board and power has transferred to the CEO,

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CEOs are most likely to be appointed chair before their fourth year and unlikely to thereafter. But how CEOs request that role matters, as being too aggressive can backfire.

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who now has a harder time hearing dissenting voices. Several CEOs shared with us the feeling of being trapped in an echo chamber. The result is often complacency on all sides, with an unfortunate bias toward the status quo.
Such dynamics can pose real risks to the business. Two-thirds of the CEOs that we studied in our CEO-life-cycle research, for example, performed worse in their second five years than in their first five—but their boards were nevertheless much less likely to act on poor performance during the second five years. Essentially, boards seem to be unresponsive to underperformance after the sixth year of a CEO's tenure. Claudius observed that dynamic when working on succession planning with a board that could not imagine that anyone but the long-tenured CEO could lead the company, even though the CEO had presided over six years of bottom-quartile performance.
Here are key actions that CEOs need to take at this stage:
Combat complacency. CEOs should shake things up if social cohesion comes at the expense of rigorous governance, shorter board meetings produce less debate, and the number of questions that challenge management decreases. That's what one Fortune 100 CEO did when he recognized the need to reinvigorate board oversight in his sixth year. After noticing that board meetings had become increasingly perfunctory, he introduced "challenge sessions," during which he rotated committee assignments to bring in fresh perspectives, created formal roles for skeptical questioning in major decisions, and had external experts critique strategy.
Keep the board current. At this stage CEOs have generally established themselves as leaders of the board, with or without the chair title. Even so, they're not always able to change the board's composition as fast as they would like to. They can help build its skill set in other ways, however, including by prioritizing ongoing education—on governance issues, the competitive landscape, the regulatory environment, and changes to the business and its markets. They can also encourage field visits. Doug did both. With an eye to AI's long-term impact, he introduced AI teach-in sessions for the board and started including AI-related discussions at every strategic board meeting. He also made sure his directors had opportunities to visit frontline offices, speak with employees in the field, and get hands-on product demos.
Engineer ways to hear hard truths. As their faith in the CEO grows and as the CEO exerts more control, directors may be less likely to publicly question the CEO on plans or underlying assumptions, so major issues could go unraised in board meetings. Establishing channels for board feedback that don't demand open dissent—such as executive sessions held without the CEO—can help ensure that those issues are raised and can give directors a voice without requiring them to challenge the CEO in front of their peers. Paradoxically, the CEO's success in building trust now entails deliberately making space for directors to test that trust.
The final years of a CEO's tenure bring a dual challenge: maintaining strategic momentum while setting up the future leadership of the board and the company. CEOs at this point may be experiencing a complex emotional tug-of-war between driving today's business performance and looking to the future—both theirs and the organization's. It's a time when CEOs often develop a heightened awareness of their professional mortality. They begin to wonder about the right time to step down, how they should see their role once they exit (Stay on as executive chair? Make a clean break?), and whether the board and the organization are ready for the next leader. They may grow increasingly concerned about the degree of board support for their slate of succession candidates and about whether the board has the right people around the table for the future. This stage requires a mental shift from personal achievement to institutional legacy—and with that shift comes a focus on paying things forward and some deeper reflection on long-term impact beyond financial metrics.
CEOs can successfully navigate this stage by relying on three main approaches:
Break the succession silence. In our research we found that boards are unlikely to broach the topic of a transition with a long-serving, high-performing CEO. In fact, boards often want the CEO to stay as long as possible, and their reluctance to raise the topic of transition may leave the CEO in the driver's seat on succession—a situation not always in the best interest of the company. In one situation
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that Claudius observed, the board stood by as the CEO made himself indispensable by torpedoing the succession-planning process. Unwilling to engage in a dialogue with the CEO about a transition, the company's directors made a move only after an activist investor intervened by demanding an external hire, which scuttled the pathway for a promising internal successor.
More often the CEO can serve as a catalyst for discussions of succession planning with the board, including by helping to define what's needed in a future CEO, overseeing the development of internal candidates, and sharing personal plans and milestones. During Doug's tenure at S&P Global, he used the completion of a major merger as an inflection point for considering succession. The directors spent months defining the qualities needed in the next CEO and delineating the experiences and skills they desired. Those conversations were particularly effective because they didn't come out of the blue; they built on a long-running dialogue about succession planning that included making sure the board got to know the entire executive team.
Shape the board for your successor. As chief executives approach the end of their terms, their influence on board composition is at its peak, and how it's wielded can set the organization's trajectory for years to come. An outgoing CEO has a unique opportunity to use credibility and relationships to champion thoughtful renewal: The CEO can advocate for the addition of directors whose skills and perspectives align with the company's evolving strategy, encourage a healthy mix of tenures, and support robust succession planning for board leadership roles. By prioritizing a diversity of experiences, strategic expertise, and a culture of constructive challenge, the CEO can help create the conditions for ongoing success, ensuring that the board remains a true partner to the next leader and not just a legacy artifact. In this way the departing CEO's final act is about more than just continuity. It's about future-proofing governance and empowering the board to guide the organization through its next era.
One outgoing CEO Claudius worked with began thinking about those things two years before her planned exit. As her transition timeline became more concrete, she realized she had the chance to support the continued performance of the company—her legacy—through the makeup of the board. So she looked at it through a lens that extended beyond her tenure, and she learned that the lead director was planning to leave shortly after she was. Together they designed a longer buffer between the two departures in order to maintain stability and provide support for the new CEO.
Let go of control. For many CEOs one of the most difficult parts of the transition is ceding control of the process,

LEADERSHIP
especially when they've diligently developed internal succession candidates and worked closely with the board on a succession strategy. Once a changeover is imminent, it's the board's job to select a successor, and the CEO must step back and allow the board to do that work.
The transition between CEOs can be a challenging time for departing CEOs, who can feel a loss of power and prestige as the board and the organization pivot their attention to the new leader. As their tenures wind down, exiting CEOs have to confront the question of their post-CEO role. We've seen outgoing CEOs lean in to this unique period by visibly supporting their successors, helping raise the new leaders' profiles with the board and other stakeholders. That can include setting up a process for joint meetings with clients to hand over relationships, connecting with employees, and scheduling introductions to shareholders, regulators, and policymakers. That kind of approach increases the board's confidence in the incoming CEO and helps rally the organization around the new chief executive by making the hand-off visible.
In cases where the outgoing CEO remains with the company as an adviser, a board member, or an executive chair, it's important to define the timeline (shorter is better) and to remain in the background as much as possible. Ideally, the departing CEO provides counsel and support privately, staying out of the spotlight to avoid the risk of undermining the new CEO's authority.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CEOs who thrive and those who merely survive often comes down to one factor: how deliberately they develop a robust relationship with the board. Successful CEOs understand that the board is not a static oversight body; it's a dynamic force that can either propel or impede the company's progress. The question isn't whether your relationship with the board will evolve, because it will. The question is whether you'll shape that evolution intentionally or simply let it happen. ▼
HBR Reprint R2605G
CLAUDIUS A. HILDEBRAND is a consultant at Spencer Stuart and the coauthor of The Life Cycle of a CEO (PublicAffairs, 2024). DOUGLAS L. PETERSON was the CEO of S&P Global from 2013 to 2024.
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104 Harvard Business Review September–October 2026


FINANCE & INVESTING
Most firms get capital allocation wrong. Here's how to do it right.

AUTHORS
Paul Blase Principal, PwC
Paul Leinwand Principal, PwC
ARTISTS RYAN KOOPMANS & ALICE WEXELL
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Photographer Ryan Koopmans and digital artist Alice Wexell integrate digital foliage into images of abandoned buildings, blending the concepts of structure and growth.

Big businesses have an investment problem. While the U.S. GDP grew by an average of 3% annually from 2014 to 2023, largely driven by technological innovation, the annual investment rate of medium to large American corporations declined by a median 16% in that time period. And this pattern is not unique to the United States.
A 2025 OECD paper drawing on both national accounts and firm-level data across 17 advanced economies found that real business investment is roughly 23% below its pre-financial-crisis level on a weighted average basis.
This gap suggests that many companies are compromising their ability to grow over the long term. For some, it reflects pressure to return cash to shareholders. For others, it reflects a risk-averse investment philosophy, a vacuum of good ideas, or complex processes that prevent firms from properly allocating capital to a compelling portfolio of initiatives. No matter what the reason is, companies have to invest to grow—and they need to know how much to invest.
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To help them with that calculation, we and our colleague Aaron Reeves analyzed the financial reports and performance of 2,900 U.S. public companies over 10 years (2014–2023). We discovered that there's an "investment sweet spot"—a ballpark answer to the important question of how much companies should be investing in growth. We also found that 75% of companies were underinvesting or overinvesting, resulting in valuation multiples that were anywhere from 20% to 70% lower than those of the firms that hit their sweet spots.
In the following pages we'll explain how we quantify the sweet spot and present findings that will help firms understand how much they should invest for growth. We'll then draw on our experience advising companies on capital allocation to offer executives a process they can use to identify and manage their most promising growth projects.
The 2,900 companies we looked at were significant players in their industries. All had market capitalizations greater than $50 million, and together they spanned 150 business domains (as defined by industry codes). We began by examining their value-creation performance, calculating the ratio of their enterprise value to their revenue (EV/R) over 10 years. Then we compared the companies on two dimensions of performance that are a central focus of both leaders and investors: asset growth and return on assets.
Asset growth. To evaluate a company's year-on-year investment increase, we determined its 10-year median asset-growth rate (the closest metric to total investment change). We then percentile-ranked the companies within their assigned subindustries and grouped them into quartiles.
Companies that are investing heavily should, in general, be growing their assets at a high rate. Companies in mature, consolidating industries may have high asset growth, too, if they've acquired struggling competitors.
Return on assets. We also calculated each firm's 10-year median return on assets, percentile-ranked the companies within their subindustries, and grouped them into quartiles. Typically, companies that aren't investing for growth focus on short-term returns—which can inform the type of investments they pursue. For instance, they may be more likely to acquire a troubled competitor whose turnaround could generate immediate returns than to invest in new technologies whose returns may come much later.
We then grouped the companies' industries into three maturity stages—accelerating, steady growth, and mature—and saw that the sweet spot for investing in the future differs across them. (See the exhibit "The Investment Growth Map.")
Accelerating industries. Companies in accelerating industries—such as biotechnology, payment-processing services, healthcare equipment, and renewable electricity—have a median annual revenue growth rate of about 10% over a 10-year period. If you're in such an industry or considering entering one, you need to be prepared to significantly build up your assets ahead of the returns they generate. If your asset growth is below the investment sweet spot, your EV/R can be as much as 35% to 50% less than it would be if your investment rate were optimized.
Companies in accelerating industries maximize EV/R when they are in the first (highest) quartile of asset growth and fourth (lowest) quartile of return on assets. These companies (including both firms with less than $1 billion in revenue and large multibillion-dollar corporations) have asset growth rates around 8% and ROAs around 3.8%. Those
IDEA IN BRIEF
Many companies either underinvest in growth or overspend on initiatives that fail to generate long-term value—hurting both competitiveness and valuations.
An analysis of 2,900 U.S. public companies over a decade shows that firms achieve the strongest valuation multiples when they operate within an "investment sweet spot" calibrated to their industry's maturity and growth dynamics. Companies investing outside that range saw valuation penalties of 20% to 70%.
Leaders should align investment levels with their industry context, manage growth initiatives as an integrated portfolio rather than isolated projects, and tie capital allocation directly to strategic priorities. Companies also need governance systems and cultures that support disciplined experimentation, clear growth metrics, and smart risk-taking so that they can reinvest confidently without overextending.
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numbers signal that companies are plowing profits back into the business, driving up assets while driving down returns.
For companies in accelerating industries, the challenge is to figure out what asset base they'll need in order to have the capacity to meet the market's aggressive growth expectations. For example, companies building marketplaces or digital platforms trying to generate network effects to rapidly accumulate customers have to make outsize early investments to get big quickly. That carries a lot of risk, especially for startups. Smart companies find the right balance of organic and inorganic investments and ensure they have enough of both to feed the growth machine.
Steady growth industries. If your company is in a steady growth industry, such as healthcare facilities, construction materials, building products, data processing, or asset management, the challenge is striking the right balance between asset growth, which supports sustained revenue momentum, and return on assets, which increases the value of the asset base.
Steady growth companies in the sweet spot maximize EV/R when they are in the second quartile of asset growth (at about 5%) and in the third quartile of return on assets (also about 5%). For the approximately 73% of companies in this category that are outside the sweet spot, we see EV/R multiples that are 37% to 50% lower than those of firms in it, presenting a great opportunity for improvement.
Steady growth companies that are investing in the optimal range have typically already built a base of assets that allows them to increase their revenue. They generally invest in R&D to add new solutions to their product portfolio that diversify revenue streams or in smaller, tuck-in acquisitions.
Mature industries. If your company is in a mature industry, where additional investments may have diminishing returns, you need to be particularly purposeful about your investment. If you're planning to increase it, you'll need to send shareholders a clear message about exactly how the additional assets improve your growth prospects.
Companies in mature industries face a real risk of overinvesting and chasing growth that turns out to be a mirage. This carries a penalty: Our study found that the 48% of companies in this category that accelerate asset growth beyond their investment sweet spot can see EV/R multiples fall by 20% to 70%. For companies in mature industries, the sweet
spot is in the fourth quartile of asset growth (about 1.6%) and in the second quartile of return on assets (about 6%). Those that strike this balance are limiting their investments, making as efficient use of their assets as they can, and reaping profits while returning cash to shareholders.
A challenge for firms in mature industries is that disruptive companies may use emerging technologies to reinvent their competitive landscape. For example, during the late 1990s the department-store business was a mature industry, but in the early 2000s companies in it were forced to pivot as retail was reinvented by e-commerce. In the face of disruption, companies may need to rework their strategies and invest in emerging technologies to remain competitive or may have to enter higher-growth industries. Both moves will typically require them to increase their asset growth dramatically and decrease their ROA—in effect to become startups again, at least when it comes to investment. If investors like what they see, they'll reward companies with higher multiples. But that rarely happens: Only about 5% of companies in this situation are able to significantly move to the first or second quartile of asset growth and still achieve top-quartile EV/R multiples.
Given that the majority of companies we studied are investing outside their optimal ranges, it's clear that many need to rethink how they manage the investment process—from sourcing compelling ideas for growth initiatives to tracking and integrating investments in the business. Let's look at each of these in turn.
With all the aging assets that need refreshing and technology improvements that just keep up with requirements (or what your competitors are doing), the true growth opportunities you should finance may not be entirely obvious. You must not only uncover them but dedicate capital specifically to them—something companies often neglect to do. Consider the holding company of one global multiline business, which set a goal of generating 20% of its $20 billion in revenue from new technology-driven solutions, including AI, within the next five years. The company didn't explicitly account for the investment needed to deliver on that aspiration—and didn't understand that it would take
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Many companies struggle to decide how much capital to dedicate to growth efforts, undermining their prospects by underinvesting or overspending ineffectively. Research on 2,900 U.S. firms over 10 years revealed that businesses in accelerating, steadily growing, and mature industries have different investment sweet spots, which are determined by their asset growth rates and return on assets. Ideally, companies in accelerating industries should be in the top quartile of businesses for asset growth and in the bottom quartile for ROA. Companies in steady growth industries should be in the second quartile for asset growth and the third quartile for ROA. Companies in mature industries should be in the fourth quartile for asset growth and the third quartile for return on assets. When companies land in their sweet spots, they maximize their market value.

Source: PwC
approximately $5 billion. Nor did it ask the capital planning group to evaluate fundraising options.
In parallel, the investment committee, in its annual budgeting process, allocated $800 million in capital to strategic initiative requests from multiple business units. They included several projects that could have been used to jump-start the new growth strategy—for instance, a partnership to develop a predictive maintenance solution to support a software-as-a-service business model. It wasn't categorized as a growth investment but went into the same partnerships-and-alliances line item as vendors providing IT help-desk services. Meanwhile, to keep up with the competition, the company increased the chief technology officer's budget for emerging technologies with cross-business-unit synergies, such as AI. The CTO prioritized investment in a pilot to test potential AI applications for service optimization, but it wasn't recognized as a growth investment,

FINANCE & INVESTING
even though the goal was to develop a solution that would increase service revenue.
Your challenge, then, is to figure out how much you're actually investing in growth and manage your investments more effectively. To do that, take the following steps:
Calculate your growth investment rate (GIR). We recommend using this metric, which simplifies the sweet spot analysis to asset growth rate minus return on assets, to see how much you're investing relative to your peers. That number can vary across companies from -5% to 50% or sometimes even higher. If it's positive, it means you're investing in assets at a rate that is ahead of your proven ability to generate a return on them for investors. Whether that suggests you're overinvesting or not depends on your context. How aggressively your competitors are investing, your investment philosophy, your confidence in your growth prospects, your certainty about your strategy, your potential for differentiation, your risk appetite, and the maturity of your industry all inform if and how your investment pattern needs to change.
For example, our analysis indicates that in the late 1990s mature retail companies such as Blockbuster, Borders, and Tower Records each had a negative GIR owing to their perceived lack of growth prospects and investor pressure to maximize returns. Then these companies encountered new players such as Netflix, Amazon, and Apple's iTunes. As it became clear that the upstarts with their new digital business models were permanently disrupting the market, the incumbents' leaders should have seen that their approach needed to change. If they'd been benchmarking their GIR against the new competitors, they might have realized they had to invest in building digital assets while maintaining a retail footprint. Our analysis, done retrospectively, shows they needed to increase their GIR by a multiple of three or four to keep up.
Ensure that your investments are managed comprehensively. The next step is to look at how you manage your portfolio of capital investments. In many companies each growth project is evaluated independently of the others. To attract funding, managers in the unit sponsoring a specific project typically put together detailed multiyear financial models that set early, overly ambitious revenue targets based on what often turns out to be a perfunctory assessment of market potential and customer demand. The evaluation methodology can vary considerably: How you evaluate a new
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Companies have to do more than just invest more (or less) in growth. They have to target the opportunities and resources that most align with their growth strategies.

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FINANCE & INVESTING

factory or customer solution will differ from how you evaluate a new market entry. Worse, investments will be managed on different timelines, and different categories of investments will be overseen with different governance mechanisms.
To avoid confusion, we advise leaders to follow a practice that venture capitalists and private equity firms use. They manage the mix of smaller and larger investments in their portfolios by explicitly categorizing them according to their growth and return goals and time horizons. Some investments will have near-term goals; others will lay the foundation for long-term returns. That approach will instill discipline and allow your senior team to understand how various investments add up to deliver on overall company targets.
Drive your investments with a clear purpose and logic. Now look at what specifically you're investing in and how you track performance. Many management teams evaluate the progress of projects only with financial metrics like return on investment or internal rate of return. But these metrics don't provide the insights about long-term growth potential that you need in order to make timely and informed capital reallocation decisions about bigger bets. In fact, we found that approximately 62% of the companies we analyzed can't explain how investments in R&D and assets will convert to revenue, which increases the risk that they won't generate the future margins firms have targeted.
Ultimately, investors want to put their money in businesses that have an expected return, a focus on the right growth markets, an articulated differentiation, and a way to win. We addressed this in our 2024 HBR article, "Create a System to Grow Consistently," in which we explained how the ability to link investments to a clearly defined strategy and value-creation model greatly improves valuation multiples. What this means is that companies have to do more than just invest more (or less) in growth. They have to focus on the opportunities and resources that most align with their growth strategies rather than pursue a disparate mix of projects identified by individual teams or executives.
Companies that get this right make it a clear leadership objective to establish the right system of metrics to track their investments' progress. Such metrics allow you to trace over time how investments in new products, solutions, services, and capabilities convert into sales to target customers—and then into growth and financial impact.
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FINANCE & INVESTING
A good example of this comes from Dexcom, a healthcare company. Its strategy is to be the market leader in direct-to-patient diabetes treatment solutions. Its managers track how investments in R&D and Dexcom’s partner ecosystem increase the value of its continuous-glucose-monitoring platform. They measure the rate of customer adoption and revenue from specific new digital features, connected health-monitoring devices, and consumables to evaluate if the asset investments are delivering the anticipated growth and whether to increase, maintain, or decrease the investment rate over time.
Connect the investment portfolio to your strategy process. The management of your growth portfolio needs to be part of your strategy calendar. Companies should conduct regular project reviews comparing actual and targeted investment performance at defined stage gates, with specified capital reallocation rules informed not just by financial indicators but by the market’s reaction and customers’ responses.
To achieve this, many companies establish formal cross-functional investment committees and incubators with explicit mandates, scorecards, and escalation paths to speed up capital reallocation decisions. The challenge is designing them in a way that keeps the unit sufficiently integrated with the broader corporation. All too often we’ve found that these units become innovation silos that are ignored by the mainstream business units, with the result that companies miss or even kill many good ideas.
One company that breaks this cycle is the benefits insurer Unum Group. It recently set up a strategic innovation function, reporting to the chief strategy officer, that’s responsible for allocating capital for innovation. This function manages a stage-gated process spanning customer discovery, incubation, and minimum-viable-solution development. With each project, further capital allocation is subject to market acceptance and performance on key indicators like customer adoption. The process is seamlessly integrated into Unum’s annual strategic-planning process, which manages stop/start/continue decisions for the next year, adjusts growth portfolio targets, and refines investment needs.
Culture isn’t easy to change—especially when it comes to attitudes about appropriate risk and return. As long ago as
1966, Syracuse University professor Ralph Swalm published an article in HBR (“Utility Theory—Insights into Risk Taking”) presenting research that showed that professional managers were, in general, very reluctant to sponsor risky projects. More than half a century later, Dan Lovallo and his coauthors concluded in their 2020 HBR article, “Your Company Is Too Risk-Averse,” that little had changed. Company cultures reward playing it safe and frown upon failure.
In our experience the best way to counter this barrier to growth is to anchor investments in your strategy, systematically creating multiple and diverse projects that are closely monitored and reassessed as new data comes in. Progressive Insurance offers a good example of how to do this. The company was an early mover in integrating telemetry data on driving behavior into auto insurance offerings. Its leaders didn’t know the exact solution that would win or when it would generate revenue, but they knew telemetry was an incredibly important investment theme with fundamental implications for the company’s direct-to-consumer, risk-based-pricing business model.
Progressive experimented with numerous technologies and consumer adoption techniques over a five- to 10-year time horizon. It introduced formal after-action reviews for the executives and teams involved in the experimentation—giving them a forum to discuss setbacks. If they could explain why the setbacks occurred and what could be done differently in the future to accomplish the long-term goal of the investment, the funding continued. The process created incentives to surface failures quickly and avoid perpetuating bad investments while rewarding smart risk-taking, learning, and perseverance. The result: Progressive became an early leader in monetizing telemetry in insurance.
Companies can also harness the creativity of their organizations using forums like innovation challenges and ideation events to surface bold ideas. But these need to be regular occurrences, not one and done. And leaders must visibly recognize and reward teams of employees (versus individuals) for surfacing and executing bold ideas. Organizations that create financial rewards for those teams and back them up by providing measured capital to pursue their initiatives make the organization psychologically safer for experimentation.
Last, leaders need to reinforce the acceptance of diverse opinions. They must encourage employees to speak up
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Culture isn't easy to change—especially when it comes to attitudes about appropriate risk and return. Company cultures reward playing it safe and frown upon failure.

without any fear of reprisal when the status quo is stifling innovation. That can be difficult in the consensus cultures that many firms favor, where the rigorous discussions required to shape ideas worthy of big investments often fail to take place. The good news, though, is that in most companies you can find employees who will provide the important challenger mindset that your organization needs.
MANY LEADERS STRUGGLE with the fundamental decision of how much to invest in growing a business. Making the right call starts with accurately evaluating which investments will actually lead to growth and understanding whether and why you're allocating too much or too little to them. For many companies this will require a complete
rethink. The objective should be not to eliminate risk but rather to embrace it in a rational fashion. The ambition should be a corporate investment program that—for companies in any industry and in any situation—finds the investment sweet spot. ▼
HBR Reprint R2605H
PAUL BLASE is a principal at PwC U.S. and leads the firm's growth platform. PAUL LEINWAND is a principal at PwC U.S., the leader of the PwC Leadership Center, and an adjunct professor at Northwestern's Kellogg School. He is a coauthor, with Mahadeva Matt Mani, of Beyond Digital: How Great Leaders Transform Their Organizations and Shape the Future (Harvard Business Review Press, 2022).
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MANAGING YOURSELF
by Pamela Meyer
MOST LEADERS EVENTUALLY hit the same wall. They may have a position, a title, and a winning track record, but at some point they will need to mobilize people who aren't their direct reports, won't be able to provide input into key decisions, or won't have control over their budgets.
How do you get the results you want from employees, peers, and bosses when you have no formal authority over them? How do you make your voice heard when
Illustrations by JULIE GUILLEM
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you're not involved in every discussion? This is known as the indirect influence problem. It's more common than many leaders realize—or are willing to admit—and most have no idea what to do about it.
Some push harder to exert what authority they do have, but this often triggers what the psychologist Jack Brehm dubbed reactance—the instinctive tendency to push back when you feel your autonomy is threatened. Decades of research across the fields of marketing, public health, and organizational psychology confirm the same finding: When someone tells people what to do, they often do precisely the opposite.
Meanwhile, the conditions that once made workplace authority effective are changing. Employee engagement in the U.S. has fallen to 31%, according to Gallup. A recent Edelman survey found that trust in employers declined for the first time in 26 years. Work has become more distributed, specialized, and dependent on informal networks, such as Slack channels and alumni networks. As McKinsey reported, "New data tell us that there is no situation in which leaders need to follow the old maxim 'Do it because I said so.''
Today's leaders need to find different ways to motivate and drive change so that team members choose to act instead of being forced. Drawing on two decades of research into what builds or destroys trust, including thousands of interactions with C-suite executives and management teams, I've identified five paths that leaders can follow to wield indirect influence in high-stakes settings.

A few years ago I was brought into a Fortune 100 consumer-goods company to work with a newly appointed chief innovation officer tasked with modernizing operations. She had a budget and the CEO's backing, but every initiative she launched seemed to garner polite agreement in meetings, followed by inaction. During meetings with the division presidents, she noticed that many looked to David, a quiet EVP who ran one of the legacy business units, for a read on how to respond to her. When she spoke with David one-on-one, she discovered that he talked with the company's recently
retired COO weekly. This person no longer had a seat at any formal decision-making table, but his opinion still governed how the old guard thought about risk. So she tracked the COO down to ask what he'd learned from a transformation effort that had failed a decade earlier. When she brought up her conversation with the COO, and the concerns he'd raised, with the team, David's posture changed, and within a week her plans began to progress.
As this story shows, power brokers aren't always obvious. A C-suite or otherwise senior title is only one indicator. Consider Jeff Dean, the lead of Google AI: He is less widely known than Alphabet CEO Sundar Pichai but nonetheless
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The indirect influence problem is more common than many leaders realize—or are willing to admit—and most have no idea what to do about it.
carries a lot of weight within the broader company. Ask yourself: Whom does everyone look to for an opinion before making decisions? What matters to those leaders, and who shapes their thinking?
To recognize hidden sway:
Track decision processes, not job titles. Behind-the-scenes influencers often guide the group without formal authority.
Watch where people look. Pay close attention to gaze patterns. The way heads turn or a group’s eyeline converges can reveal whose opinions matter.
Notice who speaks first and most often. Early contributors on crucial issues typically emerge as perceived leaders.
Spot calculated rule breaking. Failure to adhere to a dress code or social norm in a high-status setting signals confidence if done deliberately.
This path is particularly useful when you suspect that what appears on the surface isn’t the full story. It is invaluable if you are new, lack clout, or face entrenched norms or informal coalitions and cliques. When visible doors won’t open, look for the confidantes, advisers, drinking buddies, golf partners, or other trusted voices.
At one pharmaceutical company I worked with, two division heads had stopped speaking, blaming each other for a botched product. They were communicating exclusively through assistants, and their conflict was becoming
common knowledge across the organization. The CEO was tempted to order the two to resolve the issue, but he worried that mediation from the top would backfire. Instead he asked me, as an outside consultant, to create a back channel. (An impartial colleague or HR leader respected by both executives also would have been a good choice.)
I met with each division head separately and asked both of them to name three legitimate grievances they had with their counterpart and three things the other had done well during the launch. I shared those lists without commentary, then engineered two reasons for them to function professionally alongside each other without needing to address the conflict: a vendor briefing, followed by a budget preview. By the second meeting, they were able to make eye contact. A week later they had a private dinner to work out a reconciliation. The back-channel approach was effective because it gave each person an off-ramp that didn’t require a public act of contrition—just enough private acknowledgment to make the next step possible.
Back channels allow leaders to lower the stakes, protect egos, and explore options in psychologically safe conditions. They reduce reactance and open up real reflection.
To create a private connection:
Notice when a back channel is needed. Watch for public agreement that does not match private behavior, or repeated yes answers with no follow-through.
Open the door without pressuring. Keep the outreach brief, optional, and easy to decline.
Show up with new information, a clear trade-off, or one question that will affect a decision.
Start tentatively, then become firmer. Use soft language to open the conversation, then shift to clear commitments when it’s time to make a decision.
This path works only if the back channeler is a trusted party; otherwise, it can feel like a power grab—or worse, a threat. Use this approach when formal discussions are frozen, issues are charged, or relationships are tense. It should be a temporary measure, however, employed just long enough to open new possibilities before returning to transparent collaboration.
A newly appointed COO at a regional hospital network was asked to revive a staff-restructuring proposal that had been dead on arrival 18 months earlier. She had a new plan and momentum, but when I was hired to advise her, I told her to wait. At the time, a looming union negotiation had everyone in a defensive crouch, and I was worried that fear and uncertainty about it would taint even the best proposal.
Shortly after management and workers reached a deal, the CFO announced strong quarterly results, and two senior skeptics of the first restructuring attempt left the leadership team. The COO pitched her plan then, and it was quickly approved.
Precision movers know not to act when people are experiencing the kind
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In your own battle for influence, directness still has its place, but the real skill lies in recognizing when a subtler approach would be more effective.
of anxiety, defensiveness, or anger that exacerbates reactance. Timing, phrasing, and intensity matter. Good points don't land if they're delivered at the wrong moment. It's better to play the long game, reading moods and stress levels before springing into action.
When Apple's engineers wanted to show the notoriously critical CEO Steve Jobs a prototype of the touchscreen they were developing, they first brought it to Apple's design chief, Jony Ive, knowing that he would pick the right time to share it with the boss. Ive obviously did choose a moment when Jobs was more receptive to the idea—even though it wasn't his—and Apple eventually produced and sold more than 3 billion iPhones.
To master strategic timing:
Control the flow of information.
Hold back sensitive details until you've assessed trust levels.
Leverage the power of silence.
Rather than rushing to respond, create conversational pauses to prompt deeper reflection.
Time your ask to the leader's bandwidth. A person buried in a crisis has no room to evaluate any new proposals. Think in terms of windows and time horizons, not moments. What failed in February may pass in April.
Notice when the discussion is overheating. If people are talking faster or debating in circles, narrow the decision to what can be settled now.
Precision movers are the most powerful when the environment is in flux and key players are feeling uncertain or confused. Ask yourself: Am I patient? Am I emotionally attuned enough to detect mood shifts? Can I withhold
information until the time is right? If so, this path can deliver outsize influence.
PATH 4
CONNECTOR
By age 32, Marcus had turned networking into a system: attend a conference, offer a handshake, follow up with a note, repeat. When his Series A startup hit a wall in 2019, he needed a warm introduction to a procurement lead who could potentially save the company, so he reached out to 11 of his contacts, but none felt any particular obligation to help him. The company folded within six months.
Five years later, Marcus was a VP of product at a midsize software-as-a-service company, where he'd become known as someone who showed up for colleagues—he'd defended a coworker in a difficult executive review, taken on a time-consuming project no one else wanted, and written a genuinely useful recommendation for a junior engineer.
When his company needed to land a partnership with a vendor known for long sales cycles and no patience for cold outreach, Marcus didn't create a deck. Instead, he called the colleague he'd defended in that review years ago, who was now a director at the target company. Three weeks later the deal was signed.
There are two kinds of networkers: those who collect people like business cards—a human Rolodex built for extraction, activated only when they need something—and those who spend years making deposits they don't expect to see returned. The first kind can fill a room with people; the second can move those people.
Connectors change outcomes by widening the field of options. Instead of pushing people toward solutions, they link the right people at the right time so that problems can be solved with better information and less defensiveness.
To harness networks effectively:
Manage information boundaries.
Decide when to connect people and when to keep them separated.
Leverage knowledge from diverse backgrounds. By connecting different groups, you can access varied perspectives that may be invisible to others.
Identify the gap you need to bridge. Look for stalled work, missing coordination, or absent expertise.
Translate before you connect.
When groups speak different professional languages, do the interpretation for them.
The connector path is especially useful when you're dealing with siloed teams, running a project that cuts across functions, or trying to realign a fractured group without triggering egos or resistance. It requires a leader with strong people skills.
PATH 5
PULSE READER
A senior partner at a global consulting firm kept noticing a pattern on tech-heavy engagements: Asian junior analysts were being placed into coding and data architecture roles—sometimes ones they hadn't been trained for—at unusually high rates. She convened a closed-door session with these staffers and opened with a direct question: "Where have you felt overestimated or underestimated in how you were staffed?" After
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experience

some hesitation, a few people offered candid responses, such as “I think we get placed into technical roles based on how we’re stereotyped, not on what we’ve actually done” and “I’ve been staffed into coding work I wasn’t ready for, and it’s hard to push back.” They agreed to let her take this feedback to leadership without divulging names. When she did, she also asked her peers a direct question: “Where might we be confusing perceived strengths with actual capability?” Within weeks, staffing leads began verifying technical readiness more explicitly, and junior analysts had clearer ways to decline roles that didn’t fit.
Pulse readers notice not just what is said aloud but also where energy drops
or attention converges, when silence carries weight, and how opinions are forming. They track shifts in alignment, hesitation, discomfort, and momentum. They consider the whole system. And they’re able to both diagnose and shift emotional currents to achieve strategic change.
To get a better read on your team:
Create psychological safety first.
Charismatic leaders can unintentionally silence others through the “awestruck effect,” in which people suppress emotions when in their presence. Restraint works better when you need to read between the lines.
Connect emotionally before logically. By tapping into feelings such as
hope and belonging and by showing genuine curiosity, you can make your messages more compelling.
Carefully choose your words. When you actively frame a challenge in a neutral or positive light, you’re better able to evoke certain emotions and shape which solutions people consider viable.
Distill complex problems to their essence. When issues feel overwhelming, use structured techniques to sharpen focus. Try the 40-20-10-5 method, in which you progressively distill a problem from 40 words to just five.
This path demands emotional intelligence. It is most successful when the vibe is off, group identity and cohesion are slipping, and anxiety or fear is warping decision-making. If people look to you for emotional cues, this is often the best approach.
IN MOST ORGANIZATIONS expertise is distributed, coalitions form outside the org chart, and decisions take shape long before they become official. People guard their autonomy and react strongly to feeling managed. In your own battle for influence, directness still has its place, but the real skill lies in recognizing when a subtler approach would be more effective. You can choose from any of these five paths or use them in combination depending on the type of reactance you’re facing and the kind of influence you want to exert. ▼
HBR Reprint R2605J
PAMELA MEYER is the founder and CEO of Calibrate and the author of How to Read the Room: The Art and Science of Social Observation (St. Martin’s Press, 2026).
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The CEO of HCLTech on Pivoting for the AI Era
by C. Vijayakumar
WHEN GENERATIVE AI became widely available, in late 2022, we at HCLTech quickly recognized that it would have enormous implications for our organization and our industry. For decades IT services have operated via linear models, with staffing and revenue growing in tandem. Every major technology wave, from the internet to digitalization to the cloud, created demand for more engineers, more consultants, and larger teams. Advances in AI have changed that equation: Vast amounts of knowledge work can now be completed dramatically faster with much less human effort. The technology is not just improving productivity around the edges; it's altering the economics of our business.
At HCLTech that understanding has prompted us to consider difficult questions. How do we prepare 227,000 employees for a future in which some current roles may no longer exist and many of the most important ones have yet to emerge? How do we persuade managers that success should no longer be measured primarily by team size? And how do we help clients adopt AI when we know it might disrupt our own revenue streams?
We have opted to embrace AI wholeheartedly, and it has already changed how we operate internally, create value for clients, and measure success. Our
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Photograph by MACKENZIE STROH
The bigger message was that we all need to prepare for a world in which some roles would no longer exist, emphasizing the urgency of upskilling.

AI strategy rests on several important objectives: proactively transforming our services; building differentiated intellectual property (IP) to accelerate AI adoption in enterprises; creating new AI-led services like Physical AI and AI Factory, new AI ecosystem partnerships, and new tools spanning the entire tech stack; and most important, turning our people into AI builders, AI superusers, and human-in-the-loop decision-makers.
Today, thanks to this organization-wide strategy, careful investments in technology and training, and deep partnerships with clients, we are well on our way. And we hope our story will resonate with any organization hoping to adapt its business for the AI era.
HCLTech has a long history of advancing on new frontiers. It was founded in 1976 as HCL by Shiv Nadar and a group of colleagues with a radical vision of building world-class technology from India at a time when few believed an Indian startup could compete meaningfully with global companies. We have continually evolved over the decades, shifting from IT hardware, to engineering and R&D, to services and software. Each transition required us to move aggressively to where technology and client demands were heading rather than protecting the business as it currently existed.
I joined HCLTech in 1994 as a young engineer, worked my way up through the ranks, and served in several leadership roles before being appointed CEO, in 2016. With so many technology
changes on the horizon, I understood that leading the company would require an entrepreneurial spirit: the willingness to try new things, learn fast, and adapt to changing dynamics.
In recent years we have been working with some of the world's top enterprises to deliver advanced engineering and R&D services, which in many respects paved the way for the AI systems reinventing industries today. About a decade ago our big bet was to expand more meaningfully into enterprise software and platforms that helped clients innovate and grow. That work spanned the technologies, platforms, and research initiatives that underpin the next generation of AI solutions. While the pace of progress has been extraordinary, we are still in the early stages of an AI-led transformation that will require navigating new technological, operational, and societal challenges with the same discipline and ingenuity that brought us to where we are now. We believe this is an inflection point and a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to use technology to amplify both human potential and enterprise value.
Executing such a large transformation starts with facilitating a mindset shift. Nearly everyone in our business came of age in a world where larger teams meant greater impact and higher revenues. But now teams should adopt AI to increase their output and do more with fewer people.
Speed is also of paramount importance. No one should hesitate because of a desire to preserve the old ways or
protect the current cash flow. We need to be comfortable transforming and even cannibalizing parts of our existing business, confident that we are putting ourselves in a stronger position for the future.
As I've shared publicly, over the next few years we are targeting a fundamentally different operating model, one in which growth is no longer tied to an increase in head count but is instead driven by enabling our team members to become AI builders and AI superusers, amplifying their potential through AI-augmented, platform-led delivery.
We first announced our intention in February 2025, aiming not to create anxiety but to communicate transparently, bring our people along on the journey, and foster the mindset shift required to succeed. Our objective is to align our teams around a shared vision and, most important, ensure that they are energized and excited to help build that future together.
How did we bring everyone into this new way of thinking? With conviction and communication.
When I realized the power of AI, I chose not to beat around the bush with our teams. That's why I publicly announced an audacious goal: to double our revenue with half the number of people. The bigger strategic message was that we all needed to prepare for a world in which some current roles would no longer exist, emphasizing the urgency of upskilling. Translating that goal into baby steps, our near-term ambition is to deliver at least 5% revenue growth without having to add more people by enhancing our existing workforce with AI. Of course,
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experience
incremental revenue growth after that 5% will likely require additional talent. But the message is clear: “We are no longer dealing with business as usual. AI changes everything. And your company is encouraging you to stay ahead of the curve.”
Direct, consistent communication has been key to ensuring that the challenge is well-received. I began by calling a conference of our top 150 services-delivery and corporate-function leaders to make sure they were aligned and willing to help percolate the new thinking through their teams. I then traveled to our global locations to meet all our sales teams (all 1,200 members) to explain the strategy and assure them that the changes would ultimately prove positive for anyone willing to work hard, learn, and adapt. With our board, and externally to clients, the media, and shareholders, my message has been exactly the same. We are aggressively adopting AI across every role, as well as helping customers do so. Some jobs and revenue streams will disappear. Others will be created. AI will operate autonomously in very few areas; most often we will have a human in the loop. The future is employees and AI agents that work together. While we expect certain revenue streams to slow down in the near term, we are comfortable making disciplined investments today to strengthen our long-term growth trajectory and future value creation.
Transformation efforts succeed only when companies devote ample resources to them. We are currently reinvesting
part of our profits (see the exhibit “HCLTech”) back into AI technology, the creation of differentiated IP, research and development, and training. We have built a larger team around the chief technology officer and asked him to phase in and scale up initiatives across the organization, starting with broad awareness of the new tools and initiatives and moving into deeper technical and leadership development.
One key platform, AI Force, applies AI to every step of the software-development and data life cycles as well as to both IT and business operations. Many companies currently use AI only to help write code, but we thought it important to build a solution to increase productivity throughout the entire process. Our ability to deploy this service for clients has been a key differentiator in two of our largest wins this fiscal year, one for Guardian Life Insurance and one for a major fashion retailer. Our focus is not only on transforming our services with AI but also on helping our clients successfully transform their business models through AI.
We have also created an office of responsible AI governance and brought in a senior executive to lead it. That group will make sure every platform we build incorporates guardrails so that all AI-enabled decisions are checked for biases and can be traced, reviewed, and reversed if necessary.
On the training front, our expectation is that 5% to 10% of team members will be AI builders who will create new solutions for others to use. We are upskilling our top technologists to fit this category as well as hiring new AI specialist talent. We’re asking the other
Headquarters: Noida, Uttar Pradesh, India No. of employees: 227,000+

Source: HCLTech
90% to 95% of our people to become AI superusers in their respective areas by availing themselves of the tools we’ve built or bought, prompt libraries we’ve created, and programs we offer. Our hope is that all employees can boost their productivity by a factor of three to four.
We recognize that it will take time for all 227,000 of our team members to fully leverage a technology that is still evolving at breakneck speed. But curious, driven employees have been quick to experiment and become adept, and I can confidently say that most of our people now have the motivation and skills to do their jobs more easily and effectively with AI.
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I try to lead by example. I use Claude, Anthropic's AI assistant, for research that I previously asked my teams to deliver, and I treat the AI chatbot as a consultant with whom I can discuss and debate ideas, fine-tune my strategic thinking, or engage in problem-solving. I even created my own revenue-forecasting app. And I keep sharing these examples with my team and the broader organization so that they see that I'm embracing our AI transformation right alongside them.
Of course, HCLTech's long-term success rests on helping our clients embrace AI technology in the same way we are. So far, adoption has been gradual, for several reasons. I sometimes joke that God was able to create the world in seven days only because he didn't have an installed base and didn't have to worry about whether his new systems were compatible with the legacy ones. Companies are rightfully approaching the latest AI tools in a cautious and calibrated manner.
The first mile in our work with them is obtaining all the security, legal, and privacy clearances we need and completing the platform evaluation. Over time, as our own knowledge has accumulated, we've learned how to complete this process much more quickly. If it took three months to get approvals for the first client, we're now able to accomplish it in two weeks. From there we progress to running pilots, most of which have been extremely successful. The last mile is scaling up the new technology across client companies:
training their teams, measuring output, and showcasing real velocity increases or cost savings. Again, over time, we have created recipes for different functions and types of organizations.
Some companies have chosen to simply work directly with AI providers such as Anthropic or OpenAI to drive transformation at scale. We believe that view misses how enterprise change actually happens. We work in partnership with technology firms, but the roles are distinct and complementary: They build frontier models while we make those models work inside real organizations, using our deep knowledge of industries, legacy environments, operations, and governance to help embed AI into existing technology platforms securely, scalably, and in a way that is tied to measurable business outcomes.
Some recent client wins have included helping a healthcare system create an AI adviser for clinicians that has increased patient satisfaction and saved 10 minutes of administrative work per interaction; shifting a bank's trade surveillance from a sampling system to 100% AI; and using AI to optimize cargo packing to increase revenues at an aircraft manufacturer.
We also help some of the world's leading technology giants speed up AI-led innovation, including advancing robotics capabilities such as full-body robot dexterity and helping semiconductor clients reduce development cycles and accelerate time to market for next-generation products. That traction is reflected in our high-tech services business, which is now among the fastest-growing in the industry.
In our view we will grow our market share by proactively helping our clients embrace AI and further drive innovation.
Internally, we are evaluating the progress of our AI transformation by tracking adoption, fluency, productivity gains, cost savings, and innovative solutions. While our existing book of business will face a near-term reduction of 2% to 3%, we expect to gain a larger share of wallet with our clients and increase our broader market share. We also see our new AI-led revenue streams gaining momentum. Our advanced AI revenue boasts a $620 million annualized run rate (as of March 2026), and we expect it to grow 30% a year. With all of that, our revenue per employee continues to show an upward trend.
Externally, our key metrics are the number of clients for which we've deployed AI and the extent of deployment in each. If we aren't making progress with a client, or if we think we could be moving faster, we consider which interventions might get it up to speed. Most important, we are exploring new opportunities with every engagement, helping our clients to capitalize on what is arguably the most transformative technological shift of our generation. While we are encouraged by our strong start, we believe HCLTech is still at the beginning of the journey, with significant opportunities ahead. We are excited about the future and the value we can create for our people, our clients, and all stakeholders. ●
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HBR's fictionalized case studies present problems faced by leaders in real companies and offer solutions from experts. This one is based on the Ivey Publishing case study "Porsche Drive (A): Vehicle Subscription Strategy" (case no. W39684), by Vaughan Griffiths, Varun Gupta, Darren Manion, Sarah Sargent, and Xiao Zhang, which is available at HBR.org.

by Varun Gupta, Xiao (Shawn) Zhang, Vaughan Griffiths, and Jing Li
JON WEBER, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT of customer strategy for Hohenbruck Motoren North America, was driving to work in his HX7, the luxury carmaker's SUV model. Cutting through a residential neighborhood to avoid highway traffic, he eased to a stop at a traffic light, glancing at the time on the dashboard.
Then he saw the other HX7. The same color as his, it was being delivered to a brick house where an HX3 hatchback was parked. An employee from the dealership greeted the customer, who emerged from the house in running shorts and exchanged keys with him.
Then the employee got into the hatchback and drove away, leaving the customer grinning at the gleaming SUV—all before Jon's light turned green.
This was Hohenbruck Access, the carmaker's subscription service, in action. It had launched in 2021 as an experiment designed to test simple but radical questions: Would affluent customers pay to use a Hohenbruck without purchasing one or committing to a traditional lease? Would subscribers become buyers? And would the service change how customers view Hohenbruck's luxury brand?
Illustrations by JORI BOLTON
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The first subscription offering had leaned hard into flexibility. For $4,000 per month, customers could switch between models in as little as 24 hours, using the HX3 hatchback for the workweek, the S90 sports car for the weekend, and the HX7 SUV when family visited. Recently Hohenbruck had expanded the program to 11 cities and introduced single-model subscriptions that started at $2,000 a month. All contracts included insurance, maintenance, roadside assistance, and delivery. The subscriptions were more expensive than traditional leases but were easier to start and stop.
Jon had been meaning to dig into the service's user insights, but gathering data was difficult because customer engagement happened through franchised dealerships. He knew the basics: Most subscribers were new to Hohenbruck. They were usually younger than its traditional buyers and lessees. Some eventually bought a Hohenbruck car.
Watching the exchange left Jon keen to investigate further. The ease and speed of it all felt almost shocking, a clear disruption of Hohenbruck's ownership journey—and potentially of its brand mystique. A Hohenbruck was supposed to be desired, waited for, aspired to. It was not supposed to simply arrive. Yet here was a man in running shorts with an HX7 he did not and might never own.
A few weeks later Jon sat at a conference table as dealer representatives from Texas, Georgia, Illinois, and California
appeared on a wall monitor. "Thanks for joining me today," Jon said. "I'd like to hear about how customers have been reacting to the Access program."
The Texas dealer spoke first. "Access is bringing in people we weren't seeing before," he said, "and many of them eventually buy." He read a software executive's review: "A 20-minute test drive would never have told me whether an electric vehicle fit my life. A two-month subscription revealed everything I needed to know."
The Illinois dealer agreed that multicar subscriptions were a powerful sales tool. It took time to fully grasp the differences between, say, the S90 Touring, the S90 Sport, and the S90 GT. The multicar program helped customers figure out what they wanted, leading to higher satisfaction. "If the point is to turn curiosity into confidence," she said, "nothing we do works better."
The dealer in Georgia nodded. "My team has begun tracking customer comments from follow-up calls, and we've found that Access makes Hohenbruck feel less intimidating," he explained. "Here's how one subscriber put it: 'I love the brand, but I never felt like I belonged in the showroom. This was an easier way to get to know the cars.''
The California dealer was less effusive. "Some subscribers are serious prospects," she said, "but others just want the logo for a month. They get the single-car subscription, post a few videos of themselves driving a Hohenbruck on TikTok and Instagram, and then cancel. This is not the type of customer we want to be associated with."
Jon was still scribbling notes as the meeting ended. It was clear that Access
deepened the pool of potential customers—but was it producing results Hohenbruck didn't want? Was it diluting the sense of exclusivity that the brand had spent decades cultivating? He wrote down a final thought: "Access might be the most effective—and most expensive—test drive we've ever built."
A few days later Jon met with the founder of GearVale Labs, Eli Jaimeson. GearVale had created Access's customer-facing booking and approval platform, as well as the back-end system that matched people with available cars, tracked mileage and utilization, and coordinated dealer inventory. The contrast between the two men was hard to miss. Jon wore his usual Italian-made suit and sipped an espresso. Eli wore skateboard shoes and nursed a giant bottle of Diet Mountain Dew.
They were reviewing the service's pricing model on a screen in front of them. The takeaway was clear: Hohenbruck Access was hovering around breakeven. In stronger markets it had a modest margin. In weaker ones there was no margin at all.
"Anyone can do the math," Eli said. "The subscription price has to exceed the true cost to serve. That includes depreciation, insurance, delivery, maintenance, cleaning, idle days, mileage, employee time, and remarketing."
He clicked to the next screen. "We had more ability to resell retired vehicles than we realized early on, because used-car values were so strong. We overestimated depreciation, which made the economics look better. That
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cushion is disappearing.” Eli pulled up a dashboard. Across the 11 markets, fleet utilization was averaging 64%; it was robust in Chicago and Los Angeles but below 50% elsewhere. “If resale values or utilizations decrease, some markets could be underwater in a year,” he concluded.
The next screen showed the cost stack. Depreciation was the biggest variable. Insurance followed it. Delivery and pickup—once treated as part of the service’s magic—became real costs every time a subscriber switched cars. Maintenance was predictable until it wasn’t. A car retired from the fleet at 10,000 miles was one thing; a car retired above 20,000 miles was another.
“The issue isn’t whether people will subscribe,” Eli said. “It’s whether the
margin is good enough after we include the full cost of serving them.”
“So, what’s your recommendation?”
“Stop multicar,” Eli said. “The business has to stick to single-car subscriptions. The margins there are much more attractive because the logistics are so much simpler.”
Jon frowned. “The dealers think multicar is what converts people. They worry that single-car feels too much like a rental without the commitment.”
“Multicar converts some people. But if the business depends on letting customers treat the S90 lineup like a tasting menu, it won’t pencil. Every swap adds cost. Every extra car in the fleet adds idle time. Every promise of unlimited flexibility forces us to carry inventory we may not use.”

He took a sip of his soda and clicked on a comparison of customer types. Enthusiasts had a high willingness to pay when they could explore different models in anticipation of a purchase; one S90 customer had said he would have paid an even higher monthly fee because he learned so much. But subscribers who didn’t want to buy were different. They valued convenience, bundled insurance, and short-term usage but were more price-sensitive. A Houston doctor who’d needed an HX3 for three months loved the service but wanted a lower monthly fee.
“That’s why single-car is the scalable product,” Eli said. “Different customers than our traditional buyers and a lower willingness to pay, but good margins because of the reduced complexity—and much lower risk.”
“That would also mean accepting that many subscribers may never buy.”
“Some won’t. But they’ll still pay us.” Jon leaned back. It was clear that Eli no longer saw the service as a way to sell cars. He was making a different claim: that a subscription itself should be the core product. Eli was pushing to make Hohenbruck Access an entirely different business.
The next week Jon was in his office when Klara Richter, senior vice president of international strategy, appeared on his screen from Germany. Behind her
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was a pale-wood conference room, the walls empty except for a framed photograph of an early S90, the iconic car that made the brand global.
"I want to start by saying this clearly," Klara said. "The U.S. team built something real with Access.
We've been talking about innovation at Hohenbruck for years, and this was a fantastic example of putting that into practice."
Jon nodded but did not interrupt. "Still, I have read your materials twice, and I think we need to have more clarity about the strategy here," she said. "Hohenbruck Access can be a customer-acquisition tool. But if this is marketing, it is very expensive marketing. And you need dealers to support
a model that does not always reward them the way sales and leases do."
Klara then turned to the second scenario: Access as a recurring-revenue business. "If we price it properly, simplify operations, and shift to single-car subscriptions, it could be a new way to monetize the brand even if subscribers don't become buyers.
"But," she continued, "the big question remains: Can we build that business without cannibalizing our existing one?"
THE EXPERTS RESPOND.

ROBERT PHILLIPS is the former head of marketplace data science for Uber and a former professor at Columbia Business School.
Jon should pursue Access as a real business—if Hohenbruck is willing to commit.
Amazon did not begin as a cloud-computing company, but it became extraordinarily good at managing large-scale computing infrastructure, and Amazon Web Services was born. Hohenbruck may be facing a smaller version of that scenario. While Access started as a way to introduce customers to the brand, it has uncovered a demand for a different
business model. Some people may not want a lease or ownership; they may instead want flexibility, service, and luxury driving with less commitment. Who knows how many of these potential customers might come forward once the program gains real traction?
But Jon needs data, not anecdotes, to make that argument. Hohenbruck has rolled out Access across different cities at different times, which creates an opportunity for comparison. At a minimum, Jon should evaluate Access as a customer-acquisition channel. What kinds of people does it bring in? Are they truly younger? Do they offer higher lifetime value? How many become buyers? What is the cost of acquiring them?
If Access is helping Hohenbruck win loyalty from a new demographic group, that could be extremely valuable. But the company must be honest about the trade-offs: the opportunity cost of renting vehicles instead of selling them, the expense of maintaining a fleet, the time that dealers spend administering the program, the risks that arise when customers drive cars they do not
own, the need to support customer accidents, and the potential brand damage of service failures.
As for stakeholder management, the dealers will be the trickiest. Some will reject Access outright, saying Hohenbruck is about aspiration and ownership. Others will be enthusiastic. A large middle group will wait to see whether headquarters is serious. Jon and his team must anticipate and manage that split. Success will require identifying and supporting dealers who are enthusiastic about the change and are able to make it work. They can serve as ambassadors for the program and mentors to other dealers.
If Jon's analysis shows that Access has the potential to become a sustainable, profitable business, that is what he should recommend. He must acknowledge all the areas affected by such a change and emphasize that nothing can be accomplished without the CEO's full backing. After showing Klara the data, the economics, and the dealer model, he should ask her to make the decision: Is Hohenbruck willing to become not only a company that sells and
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“Some subscribers are serious prospects, but others just want the logo for a month. They post a few videos of themselves driving a Hohenbruck on TikTok and Instagram, then cancel.”
There was a heavy pause. “If we make Access too attractive, more customers may never become owners. Maybe that is acceptable. Maybe it is even the future. But we should not pretend this is only a sales funnel if we are really building a rental business with better margins.”
Jon had no crisp answer. The marketing case was strategically appealing but financially hard to prove. The business-line case was financially imaginable but strategically unsettling.
Between them sat a possibility he wasn’t ready to say aloud: Despite its success and early growth, Hohenbruck Access might be interesting enough to keep experimenting with but not compelling enough to justify the capital, dealer complexity, and management attention required to make it much bigger.
“The way forward is up to you,” Klara told him. “At our next planning meeting, do not bring me another rollout map. Bring me a decision.” ▼
VARUN GUPTA is an associate professor of logistics and supply chain management and leads the logistics program at the University of North Georgia’s Mike Cottrell College of Business. XIAO (SHAWN) ZHANG is an assistant professor of operations and IT management at Saint Louis University’s Richard A. Chalfetz School of Business.
VAUGHAN GRIFFITHS is the former manager of mobility services at Porsche Financial Services. JING LI is a clinical assistant professor of supply chain and operations management at Purdue University’s Mitch Daniels School of Business.
leases exceptional cars but also one that sells flexible access to them? Great companies do not just protect the core. They recognize when the edge of the business is pointing toward the future.

ZABIH ARIA is the senior director of strategy and transformation at Lincoln, Ford Motor Company’s luxury brand.
Jon should reimagine Access before expanding it.
In most new initiatives we assume that growth will lead to more efficiency and better margins. But some business models have diseconomies of scale. Balancing Access’s variables—vehicle values, insurance, maintenance, logistics, fraud risk—could get harder as the program grows, and some factors, such as accident risk and weather exposure, could be trickier in some places than in others. Currently Hohenbruck has neither the expertise nor the technology to manage all of this.
The biggest inefficiency, though, is the dealer structure. If Hohenbruck allows one dealer to roll out the program, competing dealers might object. If it asks competing dealers to cooperate, it may have to create something like a joint venture. If it bypasses dealers and runs Access directly, it risks looking like a direct-to-consumer vehicle business, which raises franchise law and dealer relations issues. The result would almost certainly be lawsuits. That’s a very hard environment to build a national offer in.
The Access program has value, however, because it attracts
younger customers. Luxury car-makers have a wealthy but aging customer base, and if they don’t reach new buyers, they’ll go from profitability to obsolescence in a matter of years.
That’s why Jon should reimagine Access as a carless marketing program rather than a recurring-revenue business. A partnership could offer several options: Hohenbruck could work with an established rental company that has the scale, systems, insurance expertise, fraud controls, fleet management experience, and logistics infrastructure to run this kind of operation. Think “Hohenbruck Access, powered by Hertz.” Hohenbruck is on the front door, but the rental partner manages the fleet and operations. Or maybe Access becomes part of a premium loyalty program for the partner’s elite customers who are demographically attractive but aren’t yet Hohenbruck owners.
All that said, Access might be more viable as a stand-alone business in the future. If autonomous driving reduces the human effort required to move vehicles around, the logistics could
improve dramatically. If laws around franchise relationships change, the business model could become more attractive. Hohenbruck should remain ready for that moment by preserving the knowledge base, expertise, and capabilities created by the program and continuing to learn about pricing, customer segments, dealer friction, insurance risk, and the economics of extended trials.
Jon should go back to Klara with a clear message: Access is valuable but isn’t ready for a national rollout. He can tell dealers that Hohenbruck will not create a civil war by forcing a direct or unfairly allocated model across markets. And he can keep Eli focused on preparedness rather than on defending an expansion plan that may not pan out. This road map gives Hohenbruck the benefits of innovation without letting a promising experiment become a costly distraction. ▼
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LEADERSHIP
STRATEGY
CHANGE MANAGEMENT
STRATEGY

Adi Ignatius | page 38
Following a successful nine-year stint as the CEO of PayPal, Dan Schulman was ready to retire. But after the board of Verizon repeatedly urged him to step in, he became the CEO of the telecommunications giant. His task: to turn around a company that has seen steep declines in market share, share price, and customer satisfaction. In this wide-ranging conversation with HBR’s editor at large, Schulman discusses how he’s trying to shake up Verizon’s culture. “The company had a lot to be proud of, but it was resistant to change... When the pace of change external to a company is faster than the change of pace internally, you’re falling behind.” He also reflects on both the risk and promise of AI and what it takes to be an exceptional leader.
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Felipe A. Csaszar page 44
For decades, the limits of time and brain capacity meant that teams could consider only so many strategic options before making decisions. Strategy tools—SWOT analyses, portfolio matrices—were simple because that’s what planning meetings needed. AI changes those dynamics. It can generate and evaluate thousands of strategic options and build rich, continually updated views of markets and competitors. And it can stress-test potential plans through structured debate that isn’t influenced by internal politics. Since the same AI tools are available to all companies, lasting advantage will go to those that pair them with proprietary data, integrated workflows, and faster execution. In practice, that means casting a wider net for strategic options before narrowing the field, replacing static models with real-time ones, and making AI-assisted challenges a routine part of major decisions.
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Evgeny Kaganer and Christoph Loch page 54
Most corporate transformations fail because they’re approached as fixed, top-down programs with predefined goals, timelines, and financial targets. But as the environment changes—because of technological disruption, for example, or new customer expectations—those assumptions quickly become obsolete. That’s why companies should treat transformation as a learning journey: an evolving process in which strategy, priorities, and even the destination are continually refined. Drawing on research into large-scale transformations and contrasting the experiences of DBS Bank and GE, the authors identify four types of transformation initiatives—pilots, options, established business improvements, and ventures—that together generate critical learning and sustain momentum. They also recommend three leadership practices to keep transformation efforts coherent over time.
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Frank Nagle | page 64
Companies don’t win by isolating themselves, but they don’t win by overcollaborating, either. The real advantage comes from knowing what to build together and what to keep for yourself. It makes sense to collaborate on the “core”—things like infrastructure, standards, and trust, which allow an ecosystem to function—and to compete on the “edges”—those activities that allow companies to differentiate themselves. This article introduces a practical framework leaders can use to determine the right collaboration strategy. It includes five factors: market dynamics, technology life-cycle stage, your position in the technology stack, the level of competition, and social acceptance and regulation. By weighing each factor, leaders can devise a collaboration strategy that grows the market without giving away their edge.
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Kris Johnson Ferreira and Jordan Tong page 76
While many companies now use AI to improve individual tasks, most still struggle to apply it to the cross-functional work that makes or breaks enterprise performance. Drawing on field research at companies including Walmart, Amazon, Ericsson, Ramp, and Medtronic, the authors argue that the next frontier is agentic AI orchestration: systems that connect task-based AI tools and organizational workflows and solicit and integrate critical information that only humans have. In these systems, AI performs analyses, routes information, and surfaces trade-offs, while humans contribute context and tacit knowledge, set guardrails, and make the final calls. Organizations that redesign decisions around orchestrated human-AI collaboration can respond faster, leverage knowledge more effectively, and execute higher-quality enterprise decisions with greater speed and consistency.
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SALES & MARKETING
LEADERSHIP
FINANCE & INVESTING
MANAGING YOURSELF
HOW WE DID IT

Fred Reichheld, Jamie Cleghorn, and Wojtek Kokoszka | page 86
Companies that systematically track referral behavior uncover a powerful, underutilized growth engine. An analysis of more than 10 million consumers reveals that while about 20% of new customers come through referrals, they account for 72% of the profits all new customers generate. Referred customers cost less to acquire, stay longer, buy more, and refer more high-value customers to your company. Yet most firms overlook them because attribution systems give too much credit to paid channels and fail to capture word of mouth. Leading companies, however, treat referrals as a growth metric, invest in identifying true promoters, and design experiences that inspire recommendations. By shifting the focus from buying customers to earning their advocacy, these companies improve margins and build more durable, cash-generating growth businesses.
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Claudius A. Hildebrand and Douglas L. Peterson page 94
CEOs succeed or fail in large part based on how deliberately they manage their evolving relationship with the board. That relationship follows a predictable progression: building trust and understanding early on, shaping the board into a strategic partner as credibility grows, guarding against complacency once trust is established, and ultimately focusing on succession and long-term governance. Each phase requires different behaviors, from investing in one-on-one relationships and setting clear expectations to actively refreshing board composition, encouraging rigorous debate, and planning leadership transitions. The central challenge is balancing trust with oversight—ensuring that the board is engaged enough to provide meaningful feedback but not so involved that it undermines effective execution.
HBR Reprint R2605G

Paul Blase and Paul Leinwand | page 104
One of the biggest strategic challenges companies face is how much they should invest in growth. Drawing on an analysis of a decade's worth of performance data on 2,900 U.S. public companies, the authors have identified an "investment sweet spot," in which firms balance asset growth and return on assets in ways that maximize valuation multiples. Companies in accelerating, steady growth, and mature industries have different sweet spots, they explain, and firms operating outside their optimal ranges can suffer valuation penalties of 20% to 70%. But effective capital allocation is also about aligning investments with strategic priorities and long-term growth logic. To achieve this, leaders must manage investments as an integrated portfolio, establish clear growth metrics and governance systems, and reward disciplined experimentation and intelligent risk-taking.
HBR Reprint R2605H

Pamela Meyer | page 115
As formal authority becomes less effective in modern organizations, leaders increasingly face the challenge of influencing outcomes without direct control. So, they must learn to exert indirect influence in five ways: identifying hidden power brokers who shape decisions; using discreet back channels to defuse conflict and build alignment; carefully timing interventions to individual and organizational readiness; cultivating networks of connections who can help solve problems; and reading emotional and social cues to surface unspoken concerns and guide action. Across these approaches, the central idea is to create conditions in which others choose to act rather than feeling compelled to comply.
HBR Reprint R2605J

C. Vijayakumar page 120
When gen AI emerged, HCLTech recognized that it would fundamentally alter the economics of IT services, breaking the traditional link between revenue growth and workforce expansion. CEO C. Vijayakumar responded by driving an enterprise-wide transformation centered on mindset change, aggressive investment in AI platforms and training, and transparent communication about the future of work. The company is now equipping employees to become AI builders and superusers while helping clients accelerate adoption through scalable, industry-specific solutions.
HBR Reprint R2605K
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“From my family and my mentors, the advice has always been: ‘Be who you are. You cannot be anyone other than yourself.’ And I don’t want to be. I like me.”

Born into a family of gospel singers, Warwick studied music in college and began her career as a backup vocalist. But it wasn’t long before she was recording solo hits. She went on to win six Grammys and in 2024 was inducted into the Rock & Roll Hall of Fame. Though her heyday was in the late 1960s and early 1970s, she has remained culturally relevant since then. In the 1980s she was an AIDS activist; today, at age 85, she’s a savvy social media presence with a new album of duets featuring contemporary stars.
Interview by Alison Beard
HBR: What gave you the courage to try a solo career?
WARWICK: Well, I was working with two of the most prolific songwriters of our day—Burt Bacharach and Hal David—doing demos and background work, and they wrote me a record, which started it all. Hal was not only a lyricist; he was an absolute poet. And of course, Burt was a musical genius. And I sang because that’s what I do. We made each other great. We each relied on each other’s talents. And the songs will live on forever.
Did you ever encounter racism or sexism?
Racism, yes, during my first tour of the Southern regions of our country: being told, “You can’t go in that store” or “You can’t go in that restaurant.” Coming from East Orange, New Jersey, I’d never been confronted with anything of that nature. I found it interesting. “What do you mean I can’t go in there? Of course I can.” That was my attitude at all times. So I never let racism enter my life. I never allowed it. As for sexism, no. There were no efforts to force me to do anything that I didn’t want to do. I was never denied anything. I was never looked at as less than what I am. I’ve always been appreciated for what I brought to the table. I am Dionne, and everyone who knows me knows I’m Dionne.
What lessons do you try to pass on to the next generation?
I don’t give advice. Nobody takes it anyway. I will encourage, and if I’m asked a question and have an answer, I will give that. But most of our youngsters know where they want to go and how they want to get there, and
they’re going to follow their own trail. I can’t tell them what I did because what I did is no longer available to them. The music industry has changed so much that I wouldn’t know how to approach it today.
But you’re a big hit on social media!
I think that’s because I tell the truth. Most people aren’t accustomed to truth, but when they see it and know it’s coming from someone who is completely authentic, it’s a wonderful joy. Sometimes when you tell the truth, it stings a bit, but I try to always leave people with a smile and smile myself. As my grandfather told me, “Frowning gives you wrinkles. Smiling doesn’t.” So I try to, as I say, show all my teeth to people.
Which of all your achievements has meant the most to you?
I refer to awards as rewards. They’re things you earn. They’re presented to you because you’ve done exactly what you set out to do. And each one has been important to me. That said, when I started out, my goal was just to make people happy and enjoy what I was doing musically. Who knew where it would lead?
Looking back, is there anything you would do differently?
Not one thing. Every up and down has something to do with who you are and how you come out of it. So do what you do, and enjoy the ride. When I look out in that audience and see nothing but smiles, I know I’m still doing something right, and it’s easy to keep being me. ♥
HBR Reprint R2605M
Derek Preston/Paul Popper/Popper/Debbie Gentry Images
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For more from Dionne Warwick, go to HBR.org.
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW
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在系统通盘梳理本期报纸所涉及的所有管理实践、技术部署与组织战略报道后,以下 3 个具体事件在制度结构、权力技术与认知局限层面最值得学者进一步深思:
AI 智能体的组织架构化与角色分配 [F11_22 🔍](版面:第11版/专业栏目)
AI 智能体经理(Agent Manager)的职能定义 [F2_3, F2_4](版面:主报深度版面)
认知能力有限性与战略复杂性的矛盾 [F3_6 🔍](版面:主报深度版面)
本期报纸揭示了一个深刻的制度转型:AI 不再仅仅是提升效率的插件,而是正在成为组织架构的正式成员 [F11_22 🔍]。当 23% 的组织将智能体列入组织架构图时,我们面对的不再是简单的技术升级,而是一次官僚制逻辑的数字化重构。
从制度现实来看,这种嵌入引发了管理逻辑的根本转变。传统的科层制依赖于明确的等级和人类经理的判断,而现在,企业开始设立专门的“智能体经理” [F2_3 🔍] 来为 AI 制定入职计划 [F2_4 🔍]。这意味着 AI 智能体被赋予了某种“准员工”的制度身份。然而,这种身份的赋予与其实际的工具属性之间存在张力:组织试图通过正式角色来规范 AI 的行为,但 AI 的执行逻辑本质上是基于概率和数据的,而非基于组织文化或伦理共识。
援引韦伯的官僚制 (Weberian Bureaucracy) 理论,传统的科层制通过标准化的程序来消除不确定性。而 AI 智能体的嵌入,实际上是将这种“标准化”推向了极致。当战略决策因复杂性而超出人类认知能力 [F3_6 🔍] 时,组织倾向于依赖 AI 来评估替代方案。这种技术延伸导致了一种新的权力分布:权力不再仅仅集中在拥有职位的领导者手中,而是部分转移到了能够定义 AI 行为逻辑的“智能体经理”以及支撑 AI 运行的算法架构之中。
在这种治理范式下,真正的制度风险在于,当组织习惯于依赖 AI 简化决策流程 [F1_1 🔍] 时,人类领导者可能会在认知上产生依赖,导致对复杂制度环境的直觉感知退化,最终使组织陷入一种由算法定义的、缺乏灵活性的“数字铁笼”之中。
本期报纸中关于现金奖励与创新 [F8_15, F8_16] 以及员工身份与响应 [F9_17, F9_18] 的研究,共同揭示了现代企业如何通过精巧的激励技术实现对个体行为的引导。
首先,研究通过分析中国上市公司的专利数据发现,现金奖励并不总是能产生更好的创意 [F8_15, F8_16]。这一发现挑战了传统的“经济人”假设,即简单的财务激励可以线性地提升创新产出。它揭示了激励机制在面对复杂创造性劳动时的失效,证明了单纯的物质驱动无法覆盖创新的深层心理需求。
其次,普鲁德霍姆(Prud’homme)指出,有效的创新管理需要考虑员工身份的差异 [F9_18 🔍],因为员工倾向于产生符合其身份的受奖结果 [F9_17 🔍]。例如,专家型人才更倾向于强调创造力。这揭示了一种更深层的“身份规训”:企业不再通过统一的奖励标准来管理员工,而是通过识别并利用员工的“身份认同”来引导其产出。
从批判视角看,这是一种从“强制性激励”向“认同性引导”的权力转移。当企业意识到“奖励活跃度获得更多想法,奖励影响力获得更好想法” [F10_20 🔍] 时,管理层实际上是在通过操纵奖励的定义,来定义什么是“有价值的贡献”。这种权力运作比直接的财务控制更为隐蔽,因为它将个体的自我实现(身份认同)与组织的绩效目标(影响力/活跃度)进行了深度绑定。
综上所述,企业制度正在通过从“通用激励”转向“精准身份管理”,将权力运作隐匿在对个体心理需求的满足之中,从而实现了更高效率的结构性控制。
[F11_22 🔍] 时,其在法律意义上的“代理”关系如何界定?如果 AI 智能体在执行正式角色时造成损失,责任链条如何在“智能体经理” [F2_3 🔍] 与算法供应商之间分配?[F3_6 🔍],人类领导者将决策支持外包给 AI 后,组织内部的“战略直觉”是否会发生系统性萎缩?这种萎缩如何影响组织在极端非线性危机中的生存能力?[F9_17 🔍] 来设计激励机制时,这种做法是否会导致员工为了获得特定身份的认可而进行“表演性创新”,从而掩盖真实的生产力问题?在系统通盘梳理本期报纸所涉及的所有报道后,以下 3 个具体议题在个体生命体验、认知局限与组织异化层面最值得学者进一步深思:
【认知局限与战略复杂性的冲突】 [F3_6 🔍](生活领域:组织决策/认知心理)
【AI 智能体的“非员工化”与身份剥离】 [F11_21 🔍], [F11_22 🔍](生活领域:劳动与就业/组织架构)
【激励机制的身份认同错位】 [F8_15 🔍], [F9_17 🔍], [F10_20 🔍](生活领域:创造力/心理契约)
系统理性模型解构(Deconstruction of Systemic Logos):
在 [F3_6 🔍] 的论述中,战略决策被建模为一个在有限认知资源(Cognitive Resources)约束下的优化问题。系统理性认为,AI 的价值在于通过处理几何级数增长的复杂性,来弥补人类在疲劳、政治压力和时间限制下的评估缺陷。在这种逻辑下,AI 是一个“认知增强插件”,旨在将决策过程从“有限理性”推向“计算理性”。
生活世界真实痛感的现象学深描(Phenomenological Pathos): 然而,对于决策者而言,这种“复杂性的几何级增长”并非简单的计算量增加,而是一种深层的心理压迫。当 AI 能够瞬间生成成千上万个替代方案时,人类决策者面对的不再是“选择”,而是一种“选择的瘫痪”。这种痛感源于主体性的丧失:当人类无法在脑中承载 AI 所呈现的可能性空间时,决策行为从“基于洞察的判断”异化为“对算法推荐的背书”。
Logos 与 Pathos 的辩证摩擦(The Dialectical Friction): 此处发生了深刻的辩证摩擦:系统理性试图通过 AI 消除“认知局限”,但结果却创造了一种新的、更高维度的“认知囚笼”。AI 越强大,人类在战略航向设定中的“掌控感”就越弱。这种摩擦揭示了技术理性的悖论——旨在增强人类能力的工具,最终可能因为其效率的绝对优势而导致人类决策能力的萎缩。
话语温度差与社会心理韧性诊断(Affective Prognosis): 对比报告中冷色调的“认知能力有限”与决策者在面对复杂环境时的焦虑感,可见巨大的话语温度差。这种状态预示着一种新的组织心理危机:领导者的自我认同将从“战略愿景的创造者”转向“算法结果的审核员”。社会心理韧性的重建需要承认人类认知的“有限性”并非缺陷,而是一种必要的过滤机制,用以在复杂性中锚定人类的价值判断。
系统理性模型解构(Deconstruction of Systemic Logos):
在 [F8_15 🔍] 至 [F10_20 🔍] 的研究逻辑中,创新被量化为“专利数量”和“创新程度”。系统理性试图通过建立一套精准的激励函数($\text{奖励} \rightarrow \text{产出}$)来驱动创意。特别是 [F10_20 🔍] 提出的区分:奖励“活跃度” $\rightarrow$ 获得更多想法;奖励“影响力” $\rightarrow$ 获得更好想法。这是一种典型的行为主义管理逻辑,将人类的创造冲动简化为对特定奖赏的条件反射。
生活世界真实痛感的现象学深描(Phenomenological Pathos): 然而,对于“专家型人才”而言,创造力往往源于一种非功利性的、基于身份认同的内在驱动(Intrinsic Motivation)。当创造力被纳入“影响力”或“活跃度”的量化考核时,专家体验到的是一种“认同的异化”。他们必须在“追求纯粹的学术/技术突破”与“迎合组织定义的‘影响力’指标”之间进行权衡。这种痛感在于:我的专业价值被简化为了一个可被奖励的指标。
Logos 与 Pathos 的辩证摩擦(The Dialectical Friction):
此处发生了激励逻辑与身份认同的辩证摩擦。系统理性认为“差异化奖励”是有效的管理工具 [F9_18 🔍],但这种差异化实际上是在将员工进行“标签化”分类(如专家型 vs. 其他)。当员工意识到自己的行为被预测并被通过奖励引导时,原本自发的创造力可能转化为一种策略性的表演。这种摩擦揭示了管理理性在面对人类复杂情感(如自豪感、好奇心)时的粗糙性。
话语温度差与社会心理韧性诊断(Affective Prognosis): 研究报告使用“追踪 2,376 项产出”等客观数据,掩盖了创新过程中个体经历的孤独、挫败与顿悟等热色调情感。这种量化管理导致组织内部产生一种“指标焦虑”。社会心理韧性的诊断结果显示:过度依赖量化激励会削弱组织的长远创新能力,因为真正的突破性创新往往发生在那些不被量化为“活跃度”或“影响力”的、看似低效的探索之中。
[F11_21 🔍],那么在组织架构中为其分配“正式角色” [F11_22 🔍] 之间存在怎样的逻辑矛盾?这种矛盾如何影响人类员工的心理安全感?